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Abstract 
This thesis provides a quantitative investigation into the effect of new social policy 
instruments on income inequality. Income inequality has increased over recent decades 
in the developed world, and existing studies have shown that a high level of income 
inequality is related to many social problems such as low levels of social trust or high 
crime rates. The welfare state, which had played an important role in relieving poverty 
and income inequality, is now under pressure for reformation due to economic and 
sociological changes. 
Many new policy instruments have been introduced in the process of welfare reform, and 
this thesis focuses particularly on private pensions and an active labour market policy. 
Existing studies have examined the distributive outcome of these policy instruments but 
they have shown inconsistent results. In addition, the existing literature suffers from 
limitations, particularly in the failure to consider the interaction between new policy 
instruments and the pre-existing institutional design of the welfare state. The 
contribution of this study is to examine how new policy instruments affect income 
inequality by considering the interaction between new policy instruments and the 
institutional design of the traditional welfare state.  
Data are measured at country-level and consist of nineteen OECD countries between 
1980 and 2010 (for the case of private pension), and twenty-one OECD countries between 
1985 and 2010 (for the case of active labour market policy). The analysis is conducted 
mainly by multi-level analysis. Multi-level analysis can estimate the effect of time-
invariant variables without unrealistic assumptions. The results suggest that an increase 
in private pensions (excluding mandatory private pension) is related to a decrease in 
income inequality among the elderly but that the impact is different according to the 
institutional design of the public pension system. An increase in private pensions is 
related to an increase in income inequality when the public pension has a low level of 
coverage and a high level of earnings-relatedness. In the case of an active labour market 
policy, the results suggest that an increase in spending on active labour market policy is 
related to a decrease in income inequality, but this relation goes in the opposite direction 
when the unemployment benefit is based on a targeted or flat-rate system. This thesis 
suggests that there is no trade-off between new policy instruments and the traditional 
welfare state if the traditional welfare state is well-designed.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction to the thesis: the rationale for the study, 
research questions and methodology 
 
Income inequality has increased over the last few decades, not only in developing 
countries but also in the developed world (OECD 2008; 2013). Income inequality is an 
inevitable consequence of the nature of a free market system which respects individuals’ 
capacities and responsibilities. Many studies, however, have shown that extreme income 
inequality is closely associated with various social problems. Severe income inequality is 
correlated with a reduction in well-being and an increase in the sense of relative 
deprivation for poor people (Alesina et al., 2002; 2004). In addition, the poor are likely to 
suffer from poor health, such as obesity or diabetes, in a more unequal society. Income 
inequality has harmful effects on society as well as on individuals (Wilkinson & Pickett, 
2007). Many studies have shown that the rate of serious crime (murder, rape and similar 
crimes) tends to be higher in an unequal society and the birth rate among teenagers is 
also higher in an unequal society (Hsieh & Pugh 1993; Blau & Blau 1982; Rogers 1979; 
Kaplan et al., 1996; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2007; 2009).  
As a result, a society becomes more unstable if inequality is very high. Income inequality 
is a bad influence on society not only from the perspective of fairness but also from the 
perspective of the economy. Serious income inequality lowers social mobility, which is an 
incentive to work harder, so the dynamic power of the economy is reduced (OECD, 2015). 
The bad influence of income inequality on society results in a reduction in the degree of 
trust in the society, which is considered an important factor in social capital (Putnam, 
1995; 2000; Paskov & Dewilde, 2012; Alesina & Glaeser, 2004). Social capital is useful for 
reducing the transaction cost in society so it stimulates economic development as well. 
Severe income inequality results in less dynamic power and less social capital so it is 
harmful to economic growth. 
Income inequality is the consequence of complicated interactions between a variety of 
economic, political and sociological factors. Previous studies of income inequality have 
focused on economic factors, such as the economic growth rate, GDP per capita or the 
structure of the labour market (Kuznets, 1955). These studies have argued that income 
inequality increases in the early stages of economic development but that it gets better 
when the economic structure matures. On the other hand, some studies have focused on 
political factors affecting income inequality. These studies have insisted that income 
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inequality is generated in a market economy system but that political factors can change 
the control of the market system itself (Hacker & Pierson, 2010; Stiglitz, 2012). 
Democratic institutions, the partisanship of a government or the degree of corruption are 
often referred to as the main reasons for income inequality (Hicks & Misra, 1993; 
Birchfield & Crepez 1998; Kittle & Obinger, 2003; Chong & Gradstein, 2007). 
A welfare state is designed to protect people from risk and help them to maintain a 
decent level of quality of life regardless of individuals’ economic capability. A welfare 
state has various goals but it is closely related to income distribution. As already observed, 
income inequality is likely to be determined by economic and political factors, but the 
welfare state and social policy reshape income distribution so there are limits on the 
restraining factors on income inequality. It is still very important, however, to control the 
increase of income inequality as income inequality is maintained at relatively low levels in 
countries which have a relevant welfare system.  
The foundation of the industrial welfare state system was established and developed 
after the Second World War (Bonoli, 2013; Kersbergen & Vis, 2014). The welfare state in 
developed world was expanded in the 1950s and 1960s when an old age pension system, 
unemployment benefits and a public health system were established. The traditional 
welfare state is still playing an important role but has gone through substantial changes 
over the last few decades (Bonoli & Natali, 2013). Low fertility rates and the increase in 
life expectancy increase public spending on pensions, on care of the elderly and on health 
care. At the same time, changes in the labour market structure have brought about long-
term unemployment due to a lack of appropriate skills and knowledge. These changes 
lead to an increase in social spending which in turn increases the fiscal burden of 
governments 
Under these circumstances, a welfare state attempts to reform an existing welfare system. 
In some cases ‘reform’ is synonymous with ‘cutback’, but reform is also closely related to 
the development of new functions of a welfare state, which include policies designed to 
move unemployed people into employment, facilitating the conciliation of work and 
family life, the privatisation of the pension system and investment in human capital 
(Bonoli, 2013). Some studies have argued that this is a transition from a ‘social welfare 
state’ to a ‘social investment state’ which puts more emphasis on investment and 
education, rather than on protection (Jenson, 2012; Bonoli, 2013). 
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There are many studies which have examined the relationship between the traditional 
welfare state and income inequality. There are, however, few empirical studies which 
have examined the distributive outcome of new policy instruments in a welfare state. 
Some studies have looked at the relationship between an increase in the share of private 
pensions and income inequality; some of them have found that income inequality among 
the elderly increases when the proportion of private pension systems increases (Wells, 
2004; Hughes & Stewart, 2004; Fukawa, 2006). Other studies have found that income 
inequality among the elderly decreases when the proportion of private pensions 
increases (Vliet, 2012). To examine the effect of active labour market policies (ALMPs 
hereafter), most studies have focused on the relationship between income distribution 
and social investment which cover ALMPs and most of them have found a significant 
effect between the two (Vaalavuo, 2013; Card et al., 2010; Cantillon, 2011). Vliet & Wang 
(2015) examined the effect of ALMPs on the poverty rate but they did not find any 
significant relationship between them.  
Previous studies have not explicitly considered the interaction between new policy 
instruments and a pre-existing welfare state institution. New policy instruments do not 
perform in a vacuum as traditional welfare state institutions already exist. Some 
researchers have argued that increases in private pensions are closely related to the 
institutional design of the public pension system. For example, Palme (2006) argued that 
a strong earnings-related pension makes a private pension less attractive so the impact of 
private pensions on income distribution is limited. For ALMPs, some studies have 
suggested that generous unemployment benefits reduce the effect of ALMPs in terms of 
the growth of the employment rate (Carrasco, 1999; Congregado & Millan, 2013). This 
thesis therefore offers an attempt to analyse the relationship between income inequality 
and the reform of the welfare state taking into consideration the interaction between 
new policy instruments and the traditional welfare state.    
To achieve this, a multi-level analysis will be employed. Time-series, cross-sectional data 
is useful in comparative social policy analysis, but there are a number of issues that have 
to be considered. The fixed-effect model and the random-effect model are frequently 
used methods: the fixed-effect model is the most useful because it controls unobserved 
heterogeneity between countries, but it does not test time-invariant variables, such as 
institutions, as it treats these variables as fixed effects. The random-effect model is based 
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on unrealistic assumptions so it is likely to produce spurious results. A multi-level model, 
however, separates the within-country effect from the between-countries effect, so we 
can control unobserved country heterogeneity and estimate the effect of time-invariant 
variables as well. We can see how new policy instruments interact with existing 
institutions through the multi-level model. 
The objective of the thesis 
The objective of this thesis is to offer an empirical analysis of the relationship between 
new policy instruments introduced as a welfare reform programme and changes in 
income inequality. In particular, the focus of this thesis is on the role of private pensions, 
which have increased instead of the public pension system, and the role of ALMPs which 
are considered to be the cornerstone of social investment (Bonoli, 2013) and arguably 
replace the passive labour market programme 
First, this thesis examines the distributive outcome of private pensions and ALMPs as new 
policy instruments of the welfare state. This is about how those new policy instruments 
directly affect income inequality among the elderly population and the working-age 
population respectively. 
Second, this thesis examines how much the effect of new policy instruments on income 
inequality can be changed by the institutional design of the traditional welfare state. As 
stated above, the role of the traditional welfare system is still very important. Previous 
studies have shown that there is a close relationship between private pensions and the 
public pension system, and it is same for the relationship between ALMPs and 
unemployment benefits and other forms of social assistance for the unemployed. In other 
words, the effect of private pensions on income inequality much depends on the 
institutional design of the public pension system. Equally, we can assume that the effect 
of ALMPs also depends on the institutional design of an unemployment benefit system.  
Discussion about the institutional design of the traditional welfare system is related to the 
debate on universalism and targetism (Korpi & Palme, 2003; Van Kersbergen & Vis, 2014). 
There is a long history of debate on the distributive outcome of universalism and 
targetism. An intuitively targeting system looks more useful in terms of reducing poverty 
and inequality but empirical studies have shown that countries based on a universal 
system have lower levels of poverty and income inequality (Korpi & Palme, 2003; Scruggs 
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& Allan, 2006). It is expected that the effect of private pensions or ALMPs on income 
inequality can also be different when they are used in the different context of the public 
welfare system. In this current study, I shall explore what consequences we are likely to 
get when new policy instruments are combined with either a universal-based system or a 
targeting-based system 
The main research questions can be summarized as follows. 
1) Does the institutional design of a welfare state affect income inequality? 
2) What are the effects of new policy instruments, specifically private pensions and 
ALMPs, on the income inequality of the elderly and the working-age populations 
respectively? 
3) To what extent can the effect of new policy instruments be changed by the 
institutional design of traditional welfare programmes? In other words, do pre-existing 
universalist and targeted policy structures make a significant difference to the effect of 
new policy instruments? 
There are some studies which have considered the distributive outcome of private 
pensions and ALMPs, as well as the distributive outcome of the institutional design of the 
welfare state. Thus, research questions (1) and (2) can be regarded as a replication of 
previous research studies. Question (3) is the more innovative part of this thesis, as 
previous studies have not explicitly considered the interaction between the institutional 
design of a welfare programme and new policy instruments.  
The research questions of this thesis are designed to contribute to knowledge on how 
income inequality can be effectively constrained through welfare programmes in a period 
of transformation of the welfare state. A new policy programme can have either a 
negative or a positive effect on income inequality depending on the pre-existing 
traditional welfare system which surrounds them. The main analysis of this thesis deals 
with the effect of private pensions and their interaction with the institutional design of 
the public pension system, and other parts deal with the effect of ALMPs and their 
interaction with the unemployment benefits and minimum income programmes which 
support the unemployed. 
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Research method and design 
Usually comparative research at country level using a quantitative method suffers from 
the small-N problem. The number of countries is limited and countries are not randomly 
selected (Beck & Katz, 1995; 1996). Therefore, time-series cross-sectional (TSCS hereafter) 
data are frequently used to overcome the small-N issue. Repeated observations in each 
country over time can increase the sample size. Even so, there are still some issues to be 
solved, such as auto-correlation or country heterogeneity. Ordinary least square 
regression cannot be used for TSCS data as observations are likely to be correlated with 
each other and the result is likely to be unreliable (Stock & Watson, 2003; Woodridge, 
2015). 
The fixed-effect model is one method that can be used with TSCS data. The advantage of 
the fixed-effect model is that country heterogeneity can be controlled by treating 
country-specific characteristics as fixed effects so that we can see a pure relationship 
between dependent and independent variables stripped of any country-specific effect. In 
this case, however, it is impossible to estimate the effect of time-invariant variables or 
slowly changing variables as the fixed-effect model treats them as fixed effects so they 
are already controlled. In this thesis, I shall seek to estimate the institutional design of a 
welfare programme so it is not possible to use the fixed-effect model. The random-effect 
model can be used as an alternative, although its results can be unreliable because, as 
already stated, the random-effect model is based on unrealistic assumptions (Bartel, 2008; 
Beck, 2001; Wilson & Butler 2007).  
In this thesis, I shall therefore use multi-level modelling as a method of analysis. As 
already explained, multi-level modelling can separate the within-country effect from the 
between-country effect and allow the use of contextual variables which do not change 
over time but are different in different countries. By using this method, it is possible to 
estimate the effect of the institutional design of the traditional welfare programme and 
its interaction with new policy instruments. Some sensitivity tests will also be carried out. 
As noted above, important factors in the institutional design of any welfare programme 
are universalism and targetism, so the classification of institutions is based on 
universalism and targetism.  
This thesis covers nineteen developed countries in the case of private pension and 
twenty-one countries in the case of ALMPs and a time period from the 1980s to 2010. 
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Data are collected from the OECD Social expenditure data base (SOCX) (2015), the OECD 
pension at glance from 2003 to 2013 (2003; 2005; 2007; 2009; 2011; 2013), Scruggs et 
al.’s Comparative welfare entitlements data base (2013), Brady et al.’s Comparative 
welfare state data (2014) and various country-specific sources. 
Structure of thesis 
This thesis is structured in four main parts comprising an introduction, a literature review, 
methodology, and analysis and discussion. It has four literature review chapters, a 
methodology chapter, empirical chapters and a concluding chapter which includes a 
discussion of the findings and the results.  
In Chapter 2, I shall review the relevant literature on how income inequality affects our 
society. The aim of this chapter is to provide a justification for why we need to care about 
income inequality. This chapter begins with an overview of the effect of income inequality. 
I shall show how it affects individual level variables such as the health status of the poor 
and the subjective well-being of individuals, and issues at the societal level, such as crime 
rates, suicide rates and the decrease in social trust.  
In Chapter 3, I shall explore previous studies of the driving factors on the increase in 
income inequality. Conventional analyses of the economic factors affecting income 
inequality will be reviewed and then a discussion of the political factors regarding income 
inequality will follow. In this chapter, I shall establish the foundation for which control 
variables should be selected for this thesis.  
In Chapters 4 and 5, I shall concentrate on the role of the welfare state to constrain 
increases in income inequality. In Chapter 4, I shall primarily focus on a discussion of the 
traditional welfare state, such as how it starts and how it has developed along different 
paths in different countries. I shall also explain the logic for classifying different welfare 
regimes and empirical studies of the distributive outcome of welfare regimes. As noted 
above, the main discussion is based on the difference between universal and targeted 
systems. This chapter also covers issues of how to measure the welfare effort of a 
government. This is the so-called ‘dependent variable issue’ and it provides a discussion 
on what indicators can be selected to reflect welfare effort more thoroughly. In Chapter 5, 
I shall discuss welfare typology. I shall describe how welfare states have taken different 
18 
 
paths in order to shape their own welfare provision and I shall discuss the distributive 
outcomes of different regimes. 
Chapter 6 introduces contextual changes surrounding welfare states and the new 
function of a welfare state. I shall explain the ageing population, the reform of public 
pension programmes and the role of private pension schemes. In addition, I shall explain 
the background to and the aims of ALMPs. I shall then discuss previous empirical research 
studies in order to examine the distributive outcome of private pensions and ALMPs and 
their shortcomings. I shall show that previous studies have not employed inferential 
methods but have just compared figures between countries, and that some studies failed 
to control heterogeneity among countries, which will provide the reason why this should 
be re-examined using a different statistical method. 
Chapters 7, 8, 9, and 10 are the core of this thesis. In Chapter 7, I shall focus on the data, 
the methods and the research framework used throughout the thesis. First, I shall present 
the framework of the analysis, briefly outlining the size of the sample and a list of the 
countries used in this thesis, and I shall describe details of the data, the variables and the 
method for measuring the variables. I shall also discuss the advantages and disadvantages 
of the fixed-effect model and the random-effect model, offering a justification of why 
multi-level modelling is used in this thesis and explaining how multi-level modelling works 
using a TSCS data set. 
As stated above, in Chapters 8 and 9 I shall principally deal with the effect of private 
pensions. In Chapter 8, I shall introduce details of the variables used in the analysis of 
private pensions and provide a detailed explanation of how to classify public pension 
systems. Specific hypotheses will be proposed and descriptive statistics will be given. The 
descriptive statistics will be shown in simple formats, such as tables and graphs. I shall 
also show the result of the fixed-effect model, the random-effect model and the multi-
level model so that we can see the distributive outcome of private pensions and how it 
changes depending on the different public pension systems. Chapter 9 is a 
complementary chapter to Chapter 8.  Because in Chapter 8 I shall not explicitly consider 
a two-tier system of public pension, in Chapter 9 I shall look at the distributive effect of a 
standard pension programme and a minimum (or basic) pension programme and how 
they change when the proportion of private pensions increases.  
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In Chapter 10, I shall deal with the effect of ALMPs. I shall offer a detailed explanation of 
the variables used in the analysis of ALMPs and introduce criteria for how to classify 
unemployment benefits and minimum income programmes. I shall also give descriptive 
statistics first and then show the effect of ALMPs on income inequality, and how it 
changes when it is combined with different unemployment benefit systems and minimum 
income programmes.  
Finally, In Chapter 11, I shall discuss all the findings and propose the conclusion of this 
thesis. I shall review the empirical analysis, discuss the limitations of the thesis in terms of 
theory and methodology, and synthesise all the results from the three empirical chapters. 
I shall explain the policy implications and suggest how we might constrain income 
inequality through new policy instruments, and how we can set the relationship between 
new policy instruments and the traditional welfare state. I shall also identify potential 
directions for further research into income inequality and the role of the welfare state. 
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Chapter 2. Literature review: the effect of income inequality 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
In 1975, Arthur Okun wrote a seminal book entitled Equality and efficiency: the big trade-
off. The core message of this book can be summarized as that inequality is the price which 
the US pays for its economic achievement (Rauch, 2012). To put it another way, it means 
that income inequality is inevitable in the process of establishing a brisk market economy 
system. In another key study, Kuznets (1955) argued that income inequality increases in 
the early stage of economic development, but that eventually it will decrease as an 
economic structure matures (Atkinson, 1997). It has been argued that poverty is a 
particularly critical factor which leads to social dysfunction, so government intervention 
has also focused more on reducing poverty. In contrast, income inequality has been 
considered in the context of a relationship with economic growth, so the harmful impact 
on the individual and on society has been neglected. Titmuss (1965) suggested that 
politicians and the public have a tendency to regard poverty as a problem which should 
be removed but they are reluctant to accept inequality as a problem. As the policy action 
to reduce income inequality needs to be accompanied by redistribution, which means 
taking someone’s profit and giving it to others, it is therefore a very sensitive political 
issue in which no politicians want to seriously engage.  
Another view in the literature has focused on the quality of the data for research on 
income inequality. One of the reasons why income inequality has been neglected is that it 
has been very difficult to carry out research on this topic because of the lack of reliable 
data. The quality of data was very poor in the past so the outcomes from those studies 
were likely to be unreliable. 
Atkinson and Brandolini (2009) pointed out some preconditions for the data sets which 
are required to improve the quality of research: (a) a reference unit should be established 
in order to decide whether to use the individual level or the household level; individual 
level variables should not be applied to household level research; (b) if we use the 
household level, then household income should be adjusted according to the household 
size; (c) when the Gini index is employed, equivalised income should be used; (d) there 
must be consistency in the definition of income and expenditure: regarding the concept 
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of resource utilised, the researcher should stick to one measurement either income or 
expenditure; and (e) tax must also be considered cautiously; the researcher should decide 
whether to use post-tax income or pre-tax income. Pre-tax income is used to analyse 
market income inequality, whereas post-tax income is used to analyse disposable income 
inequality. Researchers must therefore decide which income they are going to use 
according to the objective of the research. However, the quality of data has grown very 
quickly due to developments in statistics and computer science, so now we have a wide 
range of empirical studies on why we need to accept income inequality as a serious 
problem, as well as what factors drive income inequality. 
Many studies have argued that income inequality must have a close association with 
social problems. For example, one of the earliest evidences for the tendency of the 
association between inequality and social problems was Rodgers’s study (1979) which 
examined the relation between life expectancy / infant mortality and income inequality 
across 56 poor and rich countries. The findings suggested that income inequality is 
consistently significant for health status, which means that high income inequality is 
associated with lower life expectancy and higher infant mortality rates. In addition, 
Kaplan et al. (1996) showed that societies with high income inequality are more likely to 
have a low birth rate, high homicide rates and violent crime. They compared fifty US 
states from 1980 to 1990 and estimated the correlation coefficients, and showed that 
income inequality was associated with a large number of health outcomes including 
mortality and death rate. They also showed that economic policy, which increases income 
inequality, has a negative impact on public health.   
Recently, many studies have examined the impact of income inequality on social 
problems. Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) insisted that equality makes a society stronger 
and this triggered a heated controversy. Their study was based on their previous research 
into income inequality and social problems; they reviewed many previous studies across 
the OECD countries and the states in America and argued that income inequality is closely 
related to various social problems such as crime rates and suicide rates, so income 
inequality induces dysfunction in a society. They showed that the correlation between 
income inequality and social problems is significant, so we need to do something to 
relieve the wide gap between the rich and the poor. 
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The objective of this chapter is therefore to review previous studies into the 
disadvantages of income inequality and to organize the empirical findings, and this will 
then provide us with an appropriate rationale for why we need to pay more attention to 
income inequality than before.  
In this chapter, therefore, I shall review previous studies from classic historical works to 
the most recent ones. In the next section, the current trend and situation of income 
inequality will be set out so that we can see that the increase in income inequality is a 
global phenomenon. Then the disadvantages of income inequality will be discussed by 
reviewing previous studies. This section begins with a conventional discussion about the 
relationship between income inequality and economic growth and we can then see how 
the discussion expands to cover the impact of inequality at both the individual level and 
the societal level. The following part therefore is a discussion about the impact of income 
inequality on individual well-being, and then on social dysfunction. In the final section, 
research into income inequality in the context of welfare states will be reviewed.  
2.2. The current situation of income inequality: where we are 
Over the last few centuries, capitalism has been ingrained almost everywhere in the 
world. Muller (2013) summarised the features of capitalism as follows. Capitalism, which 
emphasized private property, stimulated the development of a market mechanism by the 
commodification of goods and services. This commodification forced people to use their 
time more efficiently so that they could use their own specialized skills to produce 
products. This division of labour led to massive production systems which made 
household items very cheap. Under capitalism, humankind experienced unprecedented 
progress not only in the economic aspect but also in the cultural aspect. Muller 
consequently stated, “The history of capitalism is also the history of extension of 
communication, information, and entertainment” (Muller, 2013: 36-37). 
The progress of capitalism, however, brought about inequality. This was inevitable since a 
market system is based on the principle of different rewards for different performance. 
There are diverse kinds of inequality in income, opportunity, between countries, between 
ethnic groups and so on. Other social problems such as social stratification and social 
distance are also related to the issue of inequality. This section shows where we are today 
after experiencing the unprecedented progress of capitalism. 
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2.2.1.  Income inequality in the developed world 
Most of the countries in the developed world have experienced increasing income 
inequality over the last two decades. Published data show that income inequality 
decreased in the 1950s and 1960s, but then began to increase in the mid-1970s and the 
1980s. The labour market changed profoundly because of developments in technology, 
globalisation and regulatory reforms and this affected changes in earnings and income 
(OECD, 2015)  
The disposable income of households has increased by 1.7% per year on average in OECD 
countries over last two decades, but the income of the top 10% of households increased 
faster than those in the bottom 10%, so income inequality is getting bigger. In the 1980s, 
the richest 10% of the population had seven times more income than the poorest 10%, 
and this increased to eight times in the 1990s and to almost ten times (9.6 times) in the 
2000s (OECD, 2015). The Gini coefficient, 1  which is the most frequently used 
measurement of income inequality,  indicates 0 if we have perfect equality and increases 
to 1 as inequality grows: it was 0.29 on average across OECD countries in the mid-1980s 
but increased to 0.32 in 2013 (OECD Income Distribution Database, 2015). 
Although the speed of the increase in income inequality is slightly different in different 
countries (Barro, 2000; Caminada & Goudswaard, 2001), we can nevertheless see that 
income inequality has been increasing on average across the OECD countries for the last 
few decades. Table 2.1 summarizes the changes in the Gini coefficient across OECD 
countries from the mid-1980s to 2012 (2013 for Finland, Hungary, the US and the 
Netherlands). Greece is the only country which showed a decrease in income inequality 
during that period, and the size of the increase was relatively high in Sweden, New 
Zealand and the US. Belgium, the Netherlands and France showed a relatively low 
increase but it nevertheless increased from 0.282 to 0.314 on average. Figure 2.1 then 
shows the trend in income inequality in selected OECD countries and clearly 
demonstrates that income inequality continued to increase in most countries. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Detailed information on the Gini coefficient will be provided in Chapter 7. 
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Table 2-1 Change of Gini coefficient between mid-1980 to most recent year 
 
1985 2012 change 
Denmark 0.221 0.251 0.030 
Czech Republic 0.232 0.251 0.019 
Norway 0.222 0.253 0.031 
Finland 0.209 0.262 0.053 
Sweden 0.198 0.274 0.076 
Hungary 0.273 0.288 0.016 
Germany 0.251 0.291 0.041 
Luxembourg 0.247 0.299 0.052 
Canada 0.293 0.316 0.023 
Australia 0.309 0.324 0.015 
Italy 0.291 0.325 0.034 
New Zealand 0.271 0.333 0.062 
Japan 0.304 0.336 0.032 
United Kingdom 0.309 0.344 0.035 
Israel 0.326 0.377 0.051 
United States 0.340 0.401 0.062 
Mexico 0.452 0.482 0.030 
Belgium 0.257 0.264 0.007 
Netherlands 0.272 0.278 0.006 
France 0.300 0.306 0.006 
Greece 0.352 0.338 -0.014 
Average 0.282 0.314 0.032 
 
<Source: OECD Income Distribution Database (www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-
database.htm)> 
Figure 2-1 Trend of income inequality from selected OECD countries 
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<Source: OECD Income Distribution Database (www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-
database.htm)> 
In particular, income inequality has increased more seriously since the economic crisis in 
2008. The income of the poorest 10% in Spain dropped by 13% per year but only by 1.5% 
for the richest 10% (OECD, 2015). Income at the top level even increased in real terms in 
some countries such as Austria, Denmark, France and the US. Generally speaking, the 
income of the poorest 10% increased less than the income of the top 10% when the 
economy was growing, but the income of the poorest dropped more when the economy 
went into crisis. In other words, the economic crisis hit the lower end of income 
distribution harder. Consequently, we can see that income inequality increased in bad 
economic times as well as in good economic times.  
In brief, most countries experienced market income falls because of the financial crisis, 
and this led to an economic recession in most countries, falling growth rates and 
increasing poverty. This created problems for everyone, but the pain was not evenly 
shared among households. The poor lost more and the rich lost less, and this widened the 
gap between the top 10% and the bottom 10%. 
Investigation of the trend in income inequality across the developed world shows that it 
decreased during the 1960s and 1970s but that it started to increase again in the 1980s 
and was accentuated after the economic crisis in 2008. In other words, we can see the 
increase in income inequality over the last two decades across the world so now we have 
to pay attention to what kinds of problem can possibly be caused by this increase in 
income inequality. In the next section, the negative impact of income inequality on our 
society will be discussed. The discussion can be divided into two parts; in Section 3 I shall 
discuss the conventional debate on the relationship between income inequality and 
economic growth. This relationship has been the main issue for economists for many 
years. In the following section, I shall therefore review theoretical and empirical studies of 
this relationship. They show mixed results, but it seems that recent researches have 
shown that income inequality has a damaging impact on economic growth. In Section 4, I 
shall discuss the relationship between income inequality and various social problems. 
Studies have shown that the increase in income inequality is related to increases in a 
variety of social problems, such as decreasing the subjective well-being of individuals, 
causing bad health status or increasing the crime rate.  
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2.3. A conventional discussion on relation between income inequality and 
economic growth 
As already noted, the relationship between income inequality and economic growth has 
been an important issue for economists. This section begins by considering the traditional 
research of Kuznets (1955) and reviews other studies in order to re-examine his argument. 
According to his argument, an increase in income inequality is inevitable during the 
process of economic growth but many studies have shown that economic growth is not 
necessarily accompanied by an increase in income inequality.  
2.3.1. Discussion on Kuznets’s ‘Inverted-U hypothesis’ 
Since Kuznets proposed the ‘inverted-U hypothesis’ in 1955 (Kuznets, 1955), the relation 
between income inequality and economic growth has been one of the main topics 
considered by social scientists. Kuznets argued that income inequality is determined by 
the level of economic development. Kuznets’s main idea was that income inequality is 
mainly caused by the difference in productivity between agriculture and urban activity. In 
the early stage of a country’s development, there is a huge migration from rural areas to 
urban areas.  Because the productivity of urban economic activities grows faster than that 
of agricultural activities, the income gap between rural and urban areas leads to 
inevitable income inequality. Income inequality is expected to decrease when the income 
per capita reaches a specific level since the process of industrialisation creates the so-
called trickle-down effect, which benefits all people in the economy, and eventually the 
incomes of individuals in rural areas are increased. In brief, income inequality increases in 
the early stage of economic development but is relieved eventually as the economic 
structure matures without any policy effort from the government. From this point of view, 
income inequality is not considered a serious issue because it will be relieved naturally so 
no intervention for redistribution is necessary.  
The inverted-U hypothesis is, however, quite a controversial issue. Some studies have 
provided convincing supportive evidence for it. For example, Adelman and Morris (1973) 
examined the relationship between the income share of the poorest 60% and economic 
development using political and economic data from 74 countries, including both 
developed and developing countries, and showed supporting evidence for Kuznets’s 
hypothesis. There are no long-term data for the developing world, so they compared the 
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average of the key characteristics of countries at different levels of economic 
development. They found that income inequality tended to be low in highly developed 
countries whereas it was relatively high in developing countries. On the other hand, 
however, many studies have disagreed with this hypothesis. Saith (1983) emphasized 
inter-country differences regarding size, historical heritage, and the fact that not every 
country experiences the same process of industrialisation.  
In addition, Atkinson (2009) argued that the early studies of income inequality were 
based on poor data sets because of the lack of statistical technology. In other words, 
there were only sparse available data on income inequality for cross-country analysis until 
1950 when the UN began to establish cross-country data sets on income distribution, and 
other international agencies began to add further statistics in 1970 and 1980 (Atkinson & 
Brandolini, 2009). Atkinson (2009) also pointed out the lack of available data in Kuznets’s 
research. Kuznets’s inverted-U hypothesis was based on only five observations from the 
US and the UK, and two observations from Prussia, Saxony, and from the united Germany 
respectively. Kuznets also recognized the weakness of the available information, 
commenting that his paper was “5 per cent empirical information and 95 percent 
speculation” (1955: 26).   
We can consider two questions regarding Kuznets's hypothesis. The first is whether 
income inequality is inevitable for economic growth, and the second is whether income 
inequality would be relieved without any policy intervention for redistribution. The 
second question is a debate not only on the relationship between economic growth and 
income inequality, but also on the effect of a redistribution policy, and this will be 
discussed further in Chapter 3. In the following section, I shall review studies which have 
examined the relationship between economic growth and income inequality in order to 
check whether an increase in income inequality promotes economic growth or not.  
2.3.2. An assessment of relationship between income inequality and economic 
growth  
Many studies have in fact shown that the relationship between economic growth and 
income inequality works in both directions (Galo & Sagales 2011; OECD 2015). The gap 
between the rich and the poor can act as an incentive for the poor to work harder, study 
harder or take more risks. In this case, inequality can bring economic growth. However, it 
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is the rich who can take greater advantage of economic opportunities when income 
inequality is very high. A rich family is able to educate its children to a higher level than a 
poor family, so children in poor families are unlikely to have access to better 
opportunities. Consequently, economic growth can be slower when income inequality is 
very high, as only a small proportion of people in a society can have opportunities to 
invest in and develop themselves.  
Some researchers have offered theoretical explanations for the positive relationship 
between income inequality and economic growth. Colman (1988) attempted to explain 
why income inequality is not only inevitable but also essential in the early stage of 
economic development. Their argument was based on the assumption that the rich have 
a higher propensity to save their income. This saving is very important for increasing the 
productive capacity which stimulates economic development. In other words, 
accumulation of capital is salient in economic development and the accumulation of 
capital depends on savings, so it is important for the rich, who have a higher propensity to 
save, to have higher incomes. In this sense, income inequality is necessary for 
accelerating economic development (Colman, 1988).  
Other researchers have also argued that income inequality is positively related to 
economic growth. Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), for example, argued that the median 
voter is likely to support a high rate of taxation to fund a public education system, which 
increases human capital and leads to economic growth. Galor and Tsiddon (1997) argued 
that income inequality generates a higher rate of technological progress and growth by 
enhancing high-ability workers to concentrate on technologically advanced sectors. Thus, 
they argued that income inequality and economic growth are positively related.  
There have also been empirical studies which have shown that income inequality is 
positively related to economic growth. Fobes (2000) argued that those studies which 
show a negative relationship between economic growth and income inequality are based 
on the cross-sectional regression model, which is likely to suffer from omitted variable 
bias. Fobes re-examined the relationship between economic growth and income 
inequality using panel data from forty-five countries from 1965 to 1995 and found that 
economic growth was positively related to income inequality. Other studies focusing on 
within-country variations through panel data have shown an insignificant or a positive 
relationship (Li & Zou 1998; Andrew et al., 2011). Galo and Sagales (2011) reviewed 
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various studies on this topic and found that cross-country regressions examining long-
term relationships mostly showed a negative relationship between inequality and 
economic growth, whereas panel data estimates in the short and medium term showed 
mixed evidence. 
Many studies have shown that income inequality might not be positively related to 
economic growth. Leightner (1992) showed that increases in savings do not necessarily 
lead to increased investment by using the cases of Korea and Japan as examples. 
According to his findings, it is not an increase in savings but an increase in consumption 
that causes investment (Leightner, 1992). Dyan and Skinner (2000) showed that the 
propensity to consume gets less at the high end of income distribution by using the data 
from a consumer expenditure survey in the US. Their regression analysis suggested that 
the rich save more than the poor, not only considering current income but also 
considering permanent income (Dyan & Skinner, 2000). These studies showed that more 
equality could be useful for economic development, although this certainly requires more 
research. At least, what they proposed shows that income inequality is not an essential 
element for promoting economic growth (Gallo, 2002).  
Furthermore, some empirical studies have suggested that inequality has a harmful effect 
on economic growth. Deininger and Squire (1997) showed that inequality in initial assets 
(measured by the inequality of land distribution) rather than income is a more serious 
problem for economic development. They proposed a theoretical explanation for this 
empirical finding. They suggested that inequality impedes economic growth in two ways. 
The first way is through the political process. According to their argument, inequality in 
assets has a harmful effect on subsequent economic growth because the poor vote for a 
stronger redistribution policy as income inequality becomes more serious, so a potential 
government which seeks to increase redistribution is likely to take power, and a more 
active redistribution policy can reduce the incentive for more investment. The second 
way is through the financial process. In an unequal society, fewer individuals can access 
the credit market and this leads to lower investment. This lower investment brings about 
a lower stock of human and physical capital and eventually leads to lower growth. When 
income inequality is bigger, the spending power of the poor tends to decrease. However, 
politicians and the public usually do not like to admit this, so they try to compensate by 
allowing the poor greater access to credit, such as an easy home mortgage. As more 
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people get credit, the economy becomes more vulnerable to economic shocks. When a 
financial crisis hits, an economy based on credit is more likely to collapse (Raja, 2010). 
This shows how income inequality can exacerbate a financial crisis.  
Some empirical studies have argued that income inequality could disturb the positive 
impact of economic growth. Gottschalk and Danziger (1985) deconstructed the causes of 
poverty to find the determinants of poverty. They found that both economic growth and 
social transfer are useful for reducing poverty using US household data from 1967 to 1982, 
but they assumed that the variance of income distribution is constant. They found that 
income inequality increased during that period and that this increase was related to an 
increase in poverty of 3.3%. They therefore argued that the anti-poverty effect of 
economic growth is cancelled by inequality. Smolensky et al. (1994) showed that 
economic growth has the effect of reducing poverty, but that inequality, in fact, cancels 
out the effect of economic growth on poverty reduction in the US. They estimated the 
poverty rate from 1963 to 1991 based on the assumption of a constant-variance, log-
normal income distribution and found that the estimation and the actual poverty rate 
were similar until the late 1960s but that the actual poverty rate was higher than the 
estimation during the 1970s and 1980s. They removed the assumption of constant 
variance and found a better fit. This means that economic growth has a trickledown effect 
for reducing the poverty rate, but that an increase in income inequality, in fact, slows 
progress against poverty. Alesina and Perotti (1994), Alesina and Rodrik (1991) and 
Persson and Tabellini (1995) all demonstrated that an increase in income inequality is 
negatively related to economic growth, which implies that income inequality is not 
necessary accompanied by economic growth. 
Recent research of IMF (2014) shows lower net inequality is significantly correlated with 
faster and more durable growth. It shows inequality is negatively related to the growth 
rate of per capita GDP in medium-term and also shows an increase of inequality is 
positively related to the risk that growth spell would end. It means low inequality is 
related to longer duration of economic growth. In other words, high income inequality is 
related to the decrease of economic growth in medium-term and related to less 
sustainable economic growth. In addition, this study also finds no negative effect of 
redistribution policy on economic growth. Another research of IMF (2015) shows an 
increase of income share of top 20% is related to GDP growth declines over the medium 
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term, whereas an increase of income share of bottom 20% is related to higher GDP 
growth. Recent OECD research (2015) employs panel data and finds income inequality is 
negatively related to economic growth.  
In summary, empirical studies have shown mixed results, but an increasing number of 
studies have shown that high income inequality is related to lower economic growth. 
Empirical results show that income inequality is not necessarily essential for economic 
growth, and even high income inequality has a bad impact on economic development. 
Income inequality is sometimes considered as a motivation or an incentive for people to 
work harder which leads to economic development but, as this review has shown, there is 
ample empirical evidence that income inequality can impede economic development 
through the political and financial process. This debate is still continuing, but scholars 
have now begun to realize that income inequality has more diverse aspects and so it 
should be considered in a broader context, not only from the economic aspect but also, 
since the mid-1970s, from the social and individual aspects as well. Inequality study has 
therefore expanded its area to encompass a variety of dimensions and we have found 
that income inequality has a more profound effect on our society than simply economic 
growth. The following section therefore presents a review of the impact of income 
inequality from the individual and societal aspects. 
2.4. The relationship between income inequality and social problems. 
The impact of income inequality is quite diverse. Previous studies have shown that an 
individual’s emotional state, such as level of happiness, satisfaction and well-being, is 
considerable influenced by his/her absolute and relative income levels. In this section, I 
shall review previous studies of how an increase of income inequality is related to an 
increase in social problems. In Sections 2.4.1, 2.4.2 and 2.4.3, I shall focus on how income 
inequality affects an individual’s life, and in Section 2.4.4 I shall consider how income 
inequality affects a whole society. In Section 2.4.5, I shall summarizes the findings and 
discuss the causality between income inequality and social problems.  
2.4.1. Income inequality and subjective well-being level    
The subjective well-being level is considered to be a reliable indicator for measuring an 
individual’s level of well-being (Dolan & White 2007). I shall take an individual’s well-being 
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to evaluate the quality of his/her life rather than a “revealed preference” or “stated 
preference” (Sumner, 1996). Normally, in an empirical study, subjective well-being is 
treated as cardinal or ordinal response data, and there are several factors associated with 
the level of subjective well-being, such as personal, economic, and social factors (Dolan et 
al., 2007). 
In fact, there seems to be a consensus that income does affect the subjective well-being 
level of individuals (Graham, Eggers & Sukhtankar, 2004; Marks & Flemming, 1999). What 
they have suggested is that the well-being level increases as income level increases, but 
that marginal increases tend to diminish well-being. In addition, the impact of income is 
reduced when personal factors are included (Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Frijtres, 2004). Even so, 
it is very interesting that the level of well-being of the individual is also inversely related 
to the income of others (Easterlin, 1995). In other words, an individual’s well-being does 
not increase even though his/her income increases if other people’s income in the same 
social group increases more than their own at the same time. This shows that ‘relative’ 
income is more important than ‘absolute’ income. Studies of Dutch panel data (Van de 
Stadt et al., 1985) and Belgian data (Kapteyn et al., 1978) have shown that satisfaction 
with one’s income is at least partially relative, and the same was found in Germany and in 
the UK (Clark, 2003). The fact that relative income is more important than absolute 
income in determining well-being level means that income inequality has a bad impact on 
an individual’s well-being level since there are more people whose income is less than the 
income of their reference group in an unequal society.  
Few studies have explored the association between income inequality and well-being 
level although there are some studies which have convincingly shown a negative relation 
between income inequality and well-being level. Schwarze and Harpfer (2003)  showed 
that the Gini index had a negative and significant coefficient for subjective well-being 
level in Germany. Alensina et al. (2002, 2004) conducted comparative studies of the 
difference in the impact of income inequality on individuals’ happiness between 
European countries and the US. They found that inequality had a negative impact on 
individual happiness in both Europe and the US but that the impact was stronger in 
European countries. This means that Europe is more averse to income inequality than the 
US, so in Europe the happiness level falls further when income inequality increases. The 
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researchers inferred that the difference between the US and Europe was due to the 
difference in perceived social mobility. 
Social mobility can mitigate the impact of income inequality since an individual can be 
motivated to work harder in order to move up the income ladder when social mobility is 
high. Americans usually believe that they have the opportunity to move up so the current 
income inequality may have little influence on an individual’s ability to move (Alensia et 
al., 2002). That analysis was based on a massive poll in 1998 and confirmed this argument 
since most Americans say that they can endure income inequality as long as the income is 
the result of effort and everyone can achieve it based on merit (Ladd & Bowman, 1998). 
In addition, the interesting thing is that the rich are more affected by income inequality 
than the poor in the US. The happiness of the poor is not actually influenced by income 
inequality but that of the rich is. The most plausible explanation for this is that the rich 
face the possibility that their income level might fall because social mobility is very high in 
the US. People believe that income inequality has a bad impact on the well-being of the 
poor, but the findings of that study showed that the well-being level of the rich can be 
more affected by income inequality than that of the poor. 
In brief, income inequality has a bad effect on individual happiness but this effect can be 
mitigated when social mobility is very high. Moreover, income inequality has a bad impact 
on the rich as well as the poor. This topic definitely requires more study, but the previous 
studies reviewed in this section have shown that income inequality has a bad impact on 
people’s subjective well-being level, although the degree of that impact might be slightly 
different in different regions, income levels and political partisanship.  
2.4.2. Income inequality, solidarity, and social capital  
There have been many studies of the relation between income inequality and social 
cohesion or social trust, and this social cohesion, social trust or social capital is based on 
the individual’s sense of solidarity. Solidarity can be defined as a ‘willingness to contribute 
to the welfare of others’ and it has been discussed for a long time in social theory. 
Durkheim (1893) insisted that solidarity is the one of essential elements for the 
sustainability of a social system, and solidarity is considered to be the foundation which 
binds a society together (Van Oorschot & Komter, 1998). It has been said the social capital 
and social cohesion are very important for the proper function of society. A decline in 
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social capital actually impedes civic engagement which is a useful tool for improving the 
outcome of representative democratic government (Putnam, 1995; 2000). Solidarity is 
therefore important since it provides an emotional foundation for social capital and there 
would be social problems if we have less solidarity (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009).  
It has been reported that social solidarity is also much influenced by income inequality 
within a society (Paskov & Dewilde, 2012). One study has shown that solidarity is 
restrained by the expansion of individualism and a market economy (Alesina & Glaeser, 
2004) since the market economy triggers competition between individuals and people 
have less feeling of solidarity for each other. People are more willing to support other 
people’s welfare when they believe that they are alike and share the same problems 
(Paskov & Dewilde, 2012). We can therefore argue that high income inequality could lead 
to a lack of solidarity since people do not believe that they share the same problems as 
the income gap gets larger, and this lack solidarity might bring about many social 
malfunctions.  
Paskov and Dewilde (2012) examined the relationship between income inequality and 
social solidarity; they divided social solidarity into four categories: solidarity towards the 
community, the elderly, the sick and immigrants. They analysed the association between 
each form of solidarity and income inequality controlling for individual-level characteristic 
variables such as gender, age, marital status, education and income. The results showed 
that people have higher solidarity towards the elderly, the community and the sick but 
lower toward immigrants, and that income inequality has a negative and significant 
impact on all kinds of solidarity. Income level has a positive association with the feeling of 
solidarity, which means that the rich have more sense of solidarity than the poor. 
However, the interaction between income and inequality shows that the rich have a 
greater sense of solidarity, but that the level of solidarity decreases as income inequality 
increases for both the rich and the poor. There is a possibility of reverse causality, which 
means that less solidarity leads to higher income inequality because the lack of solidarity 
makes people dislike a redistribution policy, but Benabou and Tirole (2006) suggested 
that the causality runs in both directions. So it cannot be denied that income inequality 
has a negative effect on individuals’ feeling of solidarity. 
Income inequality hampers the accumulation of social capital not only through lower 
social solidarity but also through the political process. Research has shown that people 
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with low incomes are more likely to be isolated from civic engagement (such as 
participating in elections) because they feel more anxiety about their economic condition 
(Putnam, 2000). As a result, they have no-one to represent them and they are implicitly 
deprived of political power. This phenomenon becomes serious when income inequality 
increases. In addition, social trust becomes weaker as income inequality increases; people 
have less sense of the need to help each other, and this can cause more problems at the 
societal level, as well as the individual level. 
2.4.3. Income inequality, individual’s behaviour regarding marriage and family 
structure 
Previous studies have argued that individuals’ behaviour regarding marriage is affected by 
income inequality. Increases in wage inequality play a significant role in the decline of 
marriage. Gould and Paserman (2003) estimated that 25% of the reduction in marriages 
can be explained by increases in men's wage inequality over the past few decades. This is 
mainly because when income inequality increases, it takes more time for women to find 
financially suitable men, and men at the bottom of the income distribution become less 
attractive as marriage partners. So the financial cost of finding a suitable marriage partner 
increases and both women and men can see less incentive for marrying. In addition, the 
decline in marriage is connected to the increase in single motherhood.  
Because some women regard marriage as a luxury but motherhood as essential (Edin & 
Kefalas, 2005 cited in McLanahan & Perchenski, 2008), an increase in the cost of 
searching for a marriage partner can lead to a greater possibility of them choosing to be a 
mother without marriage. In particular, the expected income of poor women with less 
education is low when income inequality increases, so the opportunity cost of bearing a 
child is lower for them (Gottschalk & Danziger, 2005). This impact can obviously lead to 
single motherhood. It has been widely reported that parents play an important role in the 
nurturing of children, so single motherhood is problematic for children’s development. In 
fact, a large body of research has argued that living without a biological parent, especially 
a father, is related to a negative impact on children’s cognitive and emotional 
development which is essential for them to be able to climb up the income ladder 
(McLanahan & Perchenski, 2008; Esping-Andersen, 2009). These studies have shown that 
children of single mothers are more likely to bear a child at an early age, to have less 
educational attainment and to live in poverty. It is certain that income inequality is a 
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salient factor in determining family structure; at the same time, income inequality is 
inevitably a mechanism for reproducing the inequality in the next generation, which 
mitigates against social mobility.    
2.4.4. The impact of inequality on social and health problems in society 
In the previous section, I reviewed studies of how income inequality affects individuals’ 
emotions and behaviour. The problem is that the harmful impact of income inequality on 
individuals’ emotions and behaviour is turning into the foundation for more serious 
problems in our society. As discussed above, income inequality is negatively associated 
with individuals’ level of happiness, well-being and solidarity, their sense of belonging to 
their community and social trust, so it causes anxiety in individuals regarding their current 
social status and it hampers the functioning of society.  
There are many studies which have shown that crime is higher in a society which is more 
unequal. Hsieh and Pugh (1993) reviewed 34 studies and found higher homicides rate in 
unequal societies. Blau and Blau (1982) suggested that violent crime is more common 
when a community has more heterogeneity as social difference creates social 
disorganization and latent animosities are widened. They used data from metropolitan 
cities in the US and found that income inequality had a positive relation with violent 
crime rates (murder, rape, robbery and assault), whereas the poverty rate was not a 
significant factor in the crime rate. They found, particularly, that income inequality within 
the same ethnic group was not very significant whereas income inequality between 
ethnic groups was quite significant. They therefore argued that income inequality is 
positively related to crime rates and that its impact is clearer when it is combined with 
other factors related to social class, such as ethnic groups. Kaplan et al. (1996) found that 
high income inequality was related to the high dropout rate in the US.  
Wilkinson and Pickett (2007) reviewed a number of studies and found that income 
inequality had a significant positive relation with mental illness, homicide, low level of 
trust, low social capital and even low social mobility in both international comparisons 
and inter-state comparisons in the US. They combined ten social issues (trust, mental 
illness, life expectancy, infant mortality, obesity, education performance, teenage birth, 
homicides, imprisonment and social mobility) into a unified social and health index 
(Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009) and they found a correlation with income inequality: this 
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index was 0.9 in rich countries and 0.6 in the US states. The income level of countries 
measured by GNI per capita did not seem to have any correlation with the index in 
international comparisons and only a weak correlation in US states. 
The impact of income inequality on various social problems also has a bad effect on the 
rich, as well as the poor. Leon et al. (1992) compared infant deaths per 1000 between 
Sweden and the UK and both countries were found to show a decrease in the infant 
death rate in the higher social class as measured by occupation group, but over all levels 
of social class, the infant death rate was higher in the UK. The overall death rate per 1000 
between the UK and Sweden showed the same result (Vagero & Lundberg, 1989). Banks 
et al. (2006) compared the morbidity rate due to various diseases (diabetes, hypertension, 
cancer, lung disease and heart attack) between England and the US, and found that 
except for a few cases the morbidity rate was higher in the less educated group in both 
countries and higher in the US than in England; the US had higher income inequality than 
England. In other words, even the rich and the educated fare worse in an unequal society 
than in an equal society, so we can see that the rich are also affected by the income 
inequality of the community to which they belong. 
These were, however, cross-sectional studies which did not consider the time-variant 
effect, so we also need to look at longitudinal studies because the impact of income 
inequality could be different according to the time span of the research. Time-series 
analysis has shown a mixed effect. Mellor and Milyo (2001) pointed out that there is no 
harmful effect of income inequality on public health over time, and Leigh (2009) argued 
that a cross-sectional study of income inequality and crime rate showed a significant 
association. In contrast, Clarkwest (2008) and Babones (2008) both showed that income 
inequality had a negative association with public health and life expectancy. Table 2.2 
summarises recent studies of the relation between income inequality and social and 
health problems. ‘Positive’ means that income inequality has a positive relationship with 
the dependent variable of the study, ‘negative’ means the opposite. 
Table 2-2 social / health problem and income inequality 
Author (year) Dependent variable Methodology and data Result 
Hsie and Pugh 
 (1993) 
Homicide rate Meta-analysis (34 
studies) 
Positive 
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Blau and Blau 
 (1982) 
Violent crime rate 
(murder, rape, 
robbery, assault) 
Cross-sectional 
regression in 
metropolitan cities in 
the US 
Positive for all 
violent crime rates 
Wilkinson and 
Pickett (2007) 
Social and health 
index 
Comparing the 
correlation coefficients 
of 50 states in the US 
and 21 rich countries 
Correlation 
coefficient was 0.9 in 
rich countries and 
0.6 in US states 
Kaplan et al. 
 (1996) 
Maths and reading 
scores, school 
dropout rate 
Correlation coefficients 
of 50 states in the US 
Positive 
Mellor and Milyo 
 (2001) 
Infant mortality and 
life expectancy 
Time-series regression, 
30 countries for 30 
years and 48 US states 
for 40 years 
Positive, but no 
causal relationship 
Leigh, Jencks and 
Smeeding  (2009) 
Mortality rate, 
violent crime rate, 
social capital and 
trust 
Meta-analysis of 
previous studies 
Positive in cross-
sectional studies but 
absent in time-series 
studies 
Babones (2008) Life expectancy, 
infant mortality 
rates and murder 
rates 
Cross-sectional 
regression using panel 
data from 1970 to 1995 
from 126 countries 
Negative for life 
expectancy, positive 
for infant mortality 
and murder rates 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the effect of income inequality might be exaggerated 
because of individual characteristics since health problems or the crime rate might be due 
to individual characteristics such as family background, education attainment and so on. 
Some researchers used multi-level analysis to separate the impact of individual 
characteristics. Multi-level analysis is useful for dividing variables at a different level when 
micro variables are nested within a macro variable.   
Subramanian and Kawachi (2004) reviewed multi-level analyses of the impact of income 
inequality on health status. They reviewed fifteen studies using data from the US and nine 
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of them showed a negative relationship between income inequality and health outcome, 
ranging over mortality, self-rated health, depression symptoms, hypertension, smoking, 
body mass index and sedentary behaviour, which meant that the impact of inequality on 
health outcome is potentially widespread. They also found that the impact of income 
inequality on health could be reduced when an individual’s characteristic variables such 
as education attainment or income level are controlled for. In particular, controlling for 
education attainment reduces the effect of income inequality whereas sex, age and 
marital status do not make significant differences. Nonetheless, they argued that income 
inequality is still a very important factor in predicting health status. Actually, the size of 
the impact is quite controversial; some studies have claimed that the effect of income 
inequality is significant but that the size is only modest (Lynch et al., 2004; Kondo et al., 
2009). Because there are only a few studies on this topic, it requires more study.   
2.4.5. Summary: is there a causal relation between income inequality and social 
/ health problems? 
In this section, I shall review previous studies on how an increase in income inequality is 
related to an increase in various social problems. As already discussed, many studies have 
shown that an increase in income inequality is related to lower levels of subjective well-
being and lower levels of happiness. In addition, high income inequality is related to 
changes in family formation and attitudes to marriage, which mitigates against social 
mobility. High income inequality is also related to high suicide rates, high crime rates and 
poor health status, particularly among people with relatively low educational attainment.  
What we can see here, however, is only an association so it does not guarantee any 
causality between income inequality and social and health problems. It is very difficult to 
infer causality in the social sciences and it requires very complicated and rigorous 
statistical methods. Even so, we can see the mechanism or theory of how income 
inequality leads to social problems by reviewing previous studies in this area. One 
possible explanation is related to social differentiation. Increases in income inequality 
mean that the gap between levels of social status is getting wider and this leads to status 
anxiety which in turn generates stress in people. This process of social differentiation 
makes a society worse. This can be found in the results of studies which show that an 
association between income inequality and social and health problems gets weaker when 
other social differentiation variables are included. Some sociologists therefore argue that 
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income inequality is just one dimension of social differentiation so the impact of income 
inequality might be exaggerated and other social differentiations such as ethnic group 
might also play an important part in social and health problems (Deaton & Lubotsky, 
2003). However, as we have seen in the work of Blau and Blau (1982), the impact of 
income inequality is still significant even when ethnic group is controlled for. In addition, 
Ram (2005; 2006) found that ethnic grouping cannot fully explain social and health 
problems and showed that income inequality is still very important. In addition, it is 
extremely difficult to measure social differentiation precisely (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009) 
and because income inequality has a harmful impact on individuals’ well-being level and 
sense of solidarity, this leads to a decrease in people’s willingness to cooperate with one 
another (Putnam, 2000). The link between how the impact of inequality on individuals’ 
emotions is connected to social problems seems to show a logical causal relation 
between income inequality and social and health problems. 
Previous studies reviewed in this paper have shown the mechanism by which inequality 
brings about various social problems. Many studies show income inequality has a 
negative effect on society and hardly ever has a positive effect (Rowlingson, 2011). Of 
course, there might be other characteristics such as cultural or individual factors which 
affect social and health problems so certainly more research to test causality using 
statistical methods should be conducted, but the empirical evidence which exists so far 
still shows that causality is likely to exist between income inequality and social and health 
problems.    
2.5. Conclusion: who is affected by income inequality? 
In this chapter, I shall discuss how income inequality has come about in the developed 
world over time and review previous studies of how an increase in income inequality is 
related to an increase in social problems in our society. Income inequality had been 
regarded as an inevitable by-product of economic development, and it had been believed 
to decrease eventually as an economy grows. Furthermore, income inequality was 
sometimes considered as a motivation or an incentive for further economic growth. 
Poverty reduction is therefore frequently referred to as the main cause of social problems, 
so policy action and discussion had been concentrated more on poverty reduction than 
on income inequality. However, income inequality has continued to increase across the 
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world for the last two decades and studies have shown that we need to take it more 
seriously. 
The studies reviewed in this chapter have shown that income inequality is neither 
inevitable nor necessary for economic growth. Some researchers have argued that 
income inequality actually impedes economic growth through the political and financial 
process, and that this reduces the size of any positive impact of economic growth on our 
society.  
Income inequality has a more profound harmful effect on our society. It has a negative 
relationship with individuals’ well-being, happiness and sense of solidarity. Income 
inequality also hampers the accumulation of social trust and the willingness of people to 
cooperate with one another, and also promotes differentiation of social status which 
generates status anxiety. All these negative impacts at the individual level are combined, 
which leads to a decrease in the social capital which is essential for the sustainability of 
our society. As a result, societies which are more unequal tend to do worse than an equal 
society. Empirical studies have shown that social problems such as homicide, teenager 
birth and imprisonment are more likely to occur in an unequal society. Unequal societies 
also tend to have more health problems. For example infant mortality, low life 
expectancy, obesity and mental illness are all more prevalent in an unequal society. 
More research is clearly needed into causality using rigorous statistical methods, but the 
existing studies already provide ample evidence that increasing income inequality makes 
our society more vulnerable and disturbs the proper functioning of the society. Income 
inequality might not be a popular topic for politicians since it is politically a very sensitive 
issue, but previous studies have shown that policy action is required to stop the widening 
income gap between the poor and the rich. We see the negative impact of income 
inequality on our society so now we need to carry out more research into what factors 
are driving income inequality and the effectiveness of policy tools to contain income 
inequality without an economic recession. There have been many studies examining what 
factors drive income inequality. In subsequent chapters, therefore, those studies will be 
reviewed in order to identify ways in which we can stop any further increase in income 
inequality.  
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Chapter 3. Determinants of income inequality:  the conventional 
idea 
3.1. Introduction: Economic and political variables for determining 
income inequality 
In Chapter 2, I reviewed studies of the harmful impact of income inequality on our society. 
We can see abundant evidence which shows how income inequality is related to the 
dysfunction of society, as well as a decrease in the quality of individuals’ lives. The next 
question should therefore be ‘what factors are driving income inequality?’ Since income 
distribution is the result of complicated interactions between diverse factors in a society, 
it is not very surprising that there is no congruence over the main reason behind 
increasing income inequality 
Studies into the determinants of income inequality can be divided into several categories 
according to their main dimension. First, there are many studies of the economic factors 
in income inequality. Most of the early studies focused on the economic dimension, such 
as labour market change due to technical development, the progress of financial 
liberalisation and trade openness. 
Economic factors alone, however, do not fully explain the dynamics of income inequality, 
so researchers of income inequality have gradually enlarged the remit. Political 
institutions, including the social welfare system, are also considered to be important 
factors (Korpi & Palme, 1998) and the policy processes on how organized interests 
intertwine with each other are also an essential factor in analysing income inequality 
(Hacker & Pierson, 2010). Although some degree of income inequality is inevitable in a 
market economy system, political institutions and policy processes are important since 
they can affect the rules which shape the market system.  
It is the so-called “market conditioning policies” (Kelly, 2009) which means that income 
distribution depends not only on economic activities but also on the policy processes 
behind how the government structures the market system. Political factors cover a wide 
range from the type of government and parliamentary system to social welfare 
institutions. A more detailed explanation will be provided later in this chapter. On the 
other hand, there are growing numbers of studies which have argued that sociological 
changes such as an aging population and changes in household structure also play an 
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important role (Esping-Andersen, 2007). In particular, these sociological changes are 
closely related to a welfare institution which is designed on the basis of traditional society 
so the interplay between sociological changes and welfare institutions affects income 
distribution.  
In this chapter, therefore, I shall review the determinants of income inequality in two 
parts. In Section 3.2, I shall discuss the economic factors which are considered to affect 
income inequality. The relationship between income inequality and economic growth has 
already been discussed in Chapter 2. Income inequality affects economic growth but, as 
will be shown, economic growth also affects income inequality. In Section 3.3, I shall focus 
on how political variables affect income inequality. As discussed above, an increasing 
number of studies of income inequality have emphasized the importance of political 
variables to explain increases in income inequality.  
3.2. The determinant of income inequality: economic variables 
Many studies have accounted for income inequality from the economic perspective. 
Kuznets (1955) showed that economic issues are mainly about economic growth, changes 
in the labour market and the development of technology. OECD reports (2011; 2015) 
have also identified those variables as main drivers of income inequality. Technological 
development leads to changes in the labour market which lead in turn to changes in 
income inequality. In addition, an increasing number of studies have suggested that 
globalisation is also significantly related to income inequality. In fact, those variables are 
closely related to one another. In this section, I shall review the economic variables which 
affect income inequality, including a theoretical discussion and empirical results.  
3.2.1. Technology and labour market structure 
Technological developments have contributed to reducing the cost of production through 
improvements in automation and communication. This has opened new opportunities by 
helping many people out of the poverty trap (IMF, 2015). Technological developments are, 
however, also regarded as a main reason for an increase in income inequality, as the 
development of technology increases the demand for capital and for highly-skilled labour 
and this leads to a disproportionate increase in the income of the highly-skilled labour 
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force. In addition, automation eliminates jobs for low-skilled or unskilled workers so they 
face structural unemployment in the long term (Card & Dinardo, 2002; OECD 2011). 
This is also in line with Kuznets's argument since the main force to produce an inverted-U 
curve is the reallocation of the labour force due to the emergence of a new industrial 
sector which is closely related to the development of technology. However, unlike 
Kuznets’s expectation, the income gap between highly-skilled labour and low-skilled 
labour has been widening. As was discussed in Chapter 1, income inequality is increasing 
in developed countries as well as developing countries, and the skills premium which is 
measured by the relative earnings from employment after completing tertiary education 
compared with earnings after completing upper-secondary education shows that it has 
increased most in developed countries between 1997 and 2007 (IMF, 2015). Jaumotte 
(2009) tested the effect of technological development on income inequality using data 
from 51 countries over 23 years and found that technological development was 
significantly related to increases in income inequality.   
Developments in technology also change the labour market structure. As discussed above, 
technological development leads to a disproportionate increase in the demand for highly-
skilled workers and removes low-skilled or unskilled jobs. The OECD (2015: 29) argued 
that these changes lead to more inequality as they create an increase in job polarisation. 
This shows that the proportion of highly-skilled jobs increased from 28% to 38% between 
1995 and 2010, whereas the share of routine-task jobs decreased from 53% to 41% and 
the proportion of low-skilled jobs increased from 18% to 21%. The decline of middle-
skilled jobs and the increase in low-skilled jobs accompanied an increase in non-standard 
work contracts. Non-standard work refers to part-time or temporary workers. According 
to OECD data published in 2013, the proportion of non-standard jobs is more than 40% in 
Australia and Switzerland, and more than half in the Netherlands.  
The increase in non-standard jobs is related to an increase in income inequality as low-
skilled workers are exposed to lower wages and poorer labour condition. The income gap 
between standard workers and non-standard workers is larger at the bottom end of the 
income distribution, and non-standard workers are 20% less likely to receive training than 
standard workers (OECD, 2015). Consequently, non-standard workers, who are mostly 
low-skilled or unskilled workers, not only have less income but also have less opportunity 
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to receive training that could be useful to upgrade their skills and knowledge. In other 
words, low-skilled workers are likely to remain as non-standard workers in the long term.   
Low-skilled workers not only have a lower wage but also a lower level of employment 
protection and this is also related to increasing income inequality. The OECD (2011) 
emphasized that the changes in institutions and regulations in the labour market are 
salient drivers of income inequality. Many OECD countries have implemented regulatory 
reforms which have loosened employment protection and lowered the replacement rate 
of unemployment benefit, which leads to income inequality amongst wage earners. In 
particular, non-standard workers are more vulnerable to those regulatory reforms. In 
addition, the decline in trade union membership could reduce the bargaining power of 
the labour force and lead to an increase in income inequality (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). 
Jaumotte and Osorio-Buitron (2015) found that a decline in unionisation was significantly 
related to an increase in the top-income proportion, and the OECD (2012) showed that a 
high proportion of non-standard workers play an important role in driving income 
inequality.  
In brief, technological development is useful for economic growth because it reduces 
production costs and increases automation. It plays an important role in the decrease of 
poverty. However, it also leads to an increase in the demand for highly-skilled workers 
and eliminates jobs for low-skilled workers. Consequently, the skills premium for highly-
skilled workers is increasing, whereas low-skilled workers have fewer opportunities for 
employment and are likely to be exposed to non-standard contracts, such as part-time or 
temporary work. Labour institutions such as employment protection or trade union 
membership are also changing into something more unfavourable for low-skilled workers. 
All these changes are drivers of an increase in income inequality in the developing world.  
3.2.2. Globalisation  
Since the 1990s, economists have investigated more diverse factors driving income 
inequality. In particular, as globalisation has grown, the factors related to globalization, 
such as trade openness and financial market liberalization, have been examined in many 
studies. Globalisation is expected to contribute to economic growth by stimulating the 
efficient allocation of resources. However, it is also frequently referred to as one of the 
main drivers of increases in income inequality. 
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The concept of globalisation is not easy to define, as it is a mixture of diverse factors. 
Dreher (2006) stated that globalisation consists of three dimensions: economic, political 
and social. He suggested that the impact of globalisation on income inequality must be 
diverse by the dimension of globalisation (Dreher & Gaston, 2008). He stated that 
economic globalisation is related to an increase in income inequality since economic 
globalisation includes trade openness and an increase in the demand for skilled workers, 
so the wage gap can widen between skilled and unskilled workers.  
On the other hand, the impact of political globalisation is not clear since there are two 
competing perspectives. Blank and Freeman (1994) stated that welfare states are faced 
with severe international competition, so they try to reduce welfare benefits in order to 
promote competitiveness in the international market. They argued that excessive social 
protection and assistance has produced rigidity in the labour market and act as a 
disincentive for the unemployed, so governments wanted to reduce welfare benefits 
throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, and the reduction in welfare benefit was related to 
an increase in income inequality. Huber and Stephens (1998), however, stated that 
welfare benefits would increase the protection of unskilled workers from the 
consequences of globalisation as globalisation stimulates competitiveness and brings 
higher rewards for highly-skilled workers. The income gap is widening between high and 
low-skilled workers and the demand for high welfare benefits increases because of the 
widening income gap.  
Dreher (2008) examined the relationship between income inequality and each dimension 
of globalisation using data from 1970 to 2000 and found that overall globalisation 
exacerbates income inequality and that it is significant in OECD countries but still vague in 
non-OECD countries. Thereby, economic globalisation decreases income inequality 
whereas the coefficient of political globalisation is close to zero and neither of them is 
significant in OECD countries. For non-OECD countries, economic globalisation decreases 
income inequality but not significantly, and political globalisation is related to significant 
increases in income inequality. 
Other studies have suggested that the relationship between economic globalisation and 
income inequality can go either way. Economic globalisation is commonly operationalised 
in two ways; trade openness and financial globalisation. Trade openness involves 
removing barriers to international trade so that goods and services can be accessed 
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regardless of borders between countries. Financial globalisation means eliminating the 
barriers that hinder the free movement of capital to promote the efficient allocation of 
resources and international risk sharing.  
Trade openness is also regarded as having mixed results as it increases the skills premium 
on the one hand, but on the other it could also increase real wages by lowering prices 
(Munch & Skaksen 2009). On the contrary, the relationship between financial 
globalisation and income inequality seems to be clearer. The increase in financial 
globalisation leads to a concentration of foreign assets and capital in the highly-skilled 
sector and it increases the demand for highly-skilled workers (IMF, 2015). In addition, 
foreign direct investment could lead to skill-specific technological changes which would 
increase the wages of workers with specific skills (Velde, 2003). 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) demonstrated the effect of financial globalisation on 
income inequality by using data covering a long period, almost an entire century. Their 
findings showed that financial globalisation is more favourable for rich people but that 
trade openness is not. Roine et al. (2009) investigated the determinants of income 
inequality using panel data from sixteen countries over the whole twentieth century. 
Their findings showed that economic growth is pro-rich and that financial development 
increases the income of the rich whereas trade openness is more favourable for poor 
people and decreases the incomes of the rich.  Freeman (2010) also showed that an 
increase in financial flow, particularly foreign direct investment, was significantly related 
to an increase in income inequality in both developed countries and emerging economies. 
An IMF report (2015) found that trade openness is not significantly related to changes in 
income inequality whereas financial openness is.  
In brief, globalisation seems to have a significant relationship with changes in income 
inequality. As globalisation consists of several sub-concepts, its impact on income 
inequality is different according to the dimension of globalisation. Empirical studies have 
shown that trade openness is either not related to income inequality or decreases it, 
whereas financial globalisation is significantly related to increases in income inequality. A 
possible explanation for this is that trade openness can increase real wages by lowering 
prices but that financial globalisation leads to a concentration of capital on specific 
industries which are likely to be highly-skilled, so it is related to an increase in income for 
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workers with specific skills and knowledge. In addition, the free movement of capital is 
likely to maximise profits, so it also leads to inequality in wealth  
3.2.3. Fiscal policy: tax policy and income inequality 
In Chapter 2, two questions were raised regarding Kuznets’s inverted-U hypothesis, the  
second of which was whether income inequality can be gradually relieved without 
government intervention. This question is about the necessity of fiscal policy, including 
redistributive policy. Many studies have discussed the relationship between economic 
growth and fiscal policy but studies discussing fiscal policy and income distribution have 
been relatively scarce until recently (Galo & Sagales, 2009).  
Piketty (2013) argued that income inequality is an inevitable phenomenon as it comes 
from the very nature of capitalism. He insisted that economic profit is distributed to 
capital and to the labour force, and return on capital is higher than the return for the 
labour force, so the income gap between capital owners and wage earners has continued 
to increase throughout the history of capitalism. According to his argument, income 
inequality is the result of the mechanical process of capitalism. This is opposite to 
Kuznets’s theory and income inequality cannot be relieved without government 
intervention if he is right. It is therefore more important to see the relationship between 
redistributive policy and income inequality.  
Fiscal policy usually refers to a policy that deals with government revenue (tax) and 
expenditure. It is a broad concept that covers the tax system, a redistributive system and 
other government expenditure such as public transport, health, education and defence 
(Easterly & Rebelo, 1994), but studies of income inequality have mostly focused on tax 
and social spending (IMF, 2014; Perotti, 1996; Basset, Burkett & Putterman, 1999). Those 
variables are directly related to income inequality but other government expenditure, 
such as on education, also affects income distribution indirectly (Alfonso et al., 2010). 
The effects of social spending are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. In this section, I shall 
consider the big picture on the relationship between income inequality and the tax 
system, and the relationship between income inequality and public expenditure. 
It is believed that any increase in the tax rate means increased tax on the rich which will 
lead to less income inequality. Previous studies, however, have shown that this 
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relationship can be different according to the different kinds of tax. Meltzer (1981) 
showed that income tax is progressive but that payroll tax, social security tax, sales tax, 
VAT and excise tax are regressive, although corporate tax is controversial. Conventionally 
corporate tax is considered as a progressive tax because it is imposed on capitalist 
activities, but the economic effect is different, especially in an open economy, since it is 
easier for capitalists to shift their tax burden onto the working class in an open economy 
by moving their capital to different countries which have a lower corporate tax rate. 
Meltzer’s empirical study supported this argument by showing that the association 
between corporate tax rate and income inequality is weaker in an open economy but that 
an increase in corporate tax is still related to an increase in income inequality in both 
cases. Martinez-Vazquez and Vulovic (2012) carried out extensive research into the mixed 
impact of tax and government expenditure using data from 150 countries over about 
thirty years, and they found that increases in the tax rate (both income tax and corporate 
income tax) were related to a decrease in income inequality but that excise tax was 
related to an increase in income inequality..  
On the other hand, Harberger (1995; 2006) showed that there is no clear association 
between a progressive tax and income inequality. He stressed that income inequality 
measured by the Gini index had decreased from the 1970s to 1980, but began to increase 
again from the middle of the 1980s and then increased rapidly in the 1990s. In contrast, 
the progressivity of income tax has continued to decrease over the last 25 years, so there 
is no clear association between the two factors. Duncan and Peter (2008) showed that 
progressive tax has a positive impact on income distribution, but that inequality 
measured by individual expenditure and not by income did not improve much. Immervoll 
and Richardson (2011) investigated the trends of tax policy and government expenditure 
in OECD countries and found that an increase in tax rate was significant, but that the 
impact was weaker than in a direct benefit system.  
3.2.4. Public expenditure and income inequality 
Regarding the relationship between public expenditure and income inequality, previous 
studies have shown that an increase in public expenditure on the police, fire protection or 
defence is not related to changes in income inequality. Boustan et al. (2010) and Orsberg 
and Smeeding (2004) showed that an increase in public expenditure in the US was not 
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related to changes in income inequality as most of the increase in public expenditure 
occurred in those fields.  
As discussed above, however, some studies have shown that an increase in public 
expenditure on education is related to changes in income inequality. Some scholars have 
argued that education is a good instrument by which to achieve better income 
distribution by stimulating social mobility. This is one reason why the post-war 
governments in most developed countries attempted to expand public education. They 
believed that they could weaken the relationship between parents’ economic capacity 
and their children’s educational achievement by strengthening public education so that 
children can have more opportunities than their parents had.  
Other scholars have argued that we do not have concrete evidence for this. Previous 
studies which have attempted to explain the relationship between education and income 
inequality can be divided into three categories. The first is human resources theory; 
supporters of this view insist that the purpose of education is to improve the capacity of 
the individual so that it can lead to a higher income in the labour market (Schultz, 1963). 
The second category is to analyse the relationship between education and the labour 
market. Supporters of this view insist that the effect of education is closely related to the 
supply and demand of the labour market and to shifts in the industrial structure (Knight & 
Sabot, 1983; Teuling & Rens, 2003; Crenshaw, 1992). The third category focuses on the 
relationship between education and social mobility (Blau & Duncan, 1967; Beller & Hout, 
2006; Sorensen, 2006). Supporters of this view have argued that education affects income 
inequality through inter-generational occupation shift. In other words, education can 
offer opportunities for children from working class families to move up to a higher social 
class. 
Schultz (1963) suggested that education is a good way to lower income inequality, so 
supporting public education is an effective way to achieve better income distribution. He 
regarded education as one way of investing to improve the quality of individuals and that 
the return for education can be measured by income earned by the educated individual. 
Thus, the effect of additional education can be measured by the marginal increase in the 
income of the individual and he found that an increase in years of schooling was 
associated with an increase in the income of individuals, so supporting public education is 
a good instrument for helping the poor out of poverty and ensuring a more equitable 
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income distribution. Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) and Zhang (1996) also argued that 
spending on public education lowers income inequality. Sylwester (2000; 2002), however, 
insisted that supporting public education can promote income inequality only when poor 
families are too poor to send their children to school, so they still cannot benefit from 
public education. On the other hand, Jimenez (1986) and Field (1980) argued that 
increasing spending on public education cannot lower income inequality.  
There have been some studies which have shown more complicated results. Knight and 
Sabot (1983) showed that the impact of education could run in different ways, the 
composition effect and the wage compression effect. The composition effect means that 
expanding education spending results in an increase in income inequality since it 
increases the numbers of the educated who are paid better than the uneducated. The 
wage compression effect means that education spending decreases income inequality 
since more people are educated so the labour supply for the well-paid, highly-skilled jobs 
increases. Therefore, the effect of education on income inequality can be different 
according to the size of each effect in the different conditions which a country has.  
Teulings and Rens (2003) pointed out that the impact of education should be divided into 
long-term and short-term impact. They investigated the relationship between income 
inequality and educational attainment using data from 114 countries for the thirty years 
from 1960 to 1990 and found that the relationship between educational attainment and 
private return was negative in short-term, which means that the private return falls when 
education level increases because of the increase in the supply of high-skilled workers. 
Thus, an increase in educational attainment is likely to compress the income gap between 
the poor and the rich, so income inequality is reduced in the short term. In the long term, 
however, an increase in educational attainment leads to the development of advanced 
technology which brings about an increase in the demand for highly-skilled workers. 
Therefore, an increase in educational attainment is likely to stimulate an increase in 
income inequality in the long term by creating an increased demand for highly-skilled 
workers. 
Crenshaw (1992) showed that the impact of education attainment on income inequality 
depends on the degree of economic development. He examined the impact of education 
and political democratic rights on income inequality using data from 55 countries, 
including both developed and developing countries, from 1965 to 1975, and he found 
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that both the educational enrolment rate and the degree of political democracy actually 
had a curvilinear effect on income inequality. This implies that an increase in educational 
enrolment and the development of political democracy are associated with an increase in 
income inequality until a threshold is reached, and then they are related to abating 
income inequality. The logic which he proposed was that educational expansion is 
focused on business skills and entrepreneurial capacity for a few people in a society at 
first, and that after these entrepreneurs have succeeded in their goal, then the demand 
for the education of workers increases.  
Blau and Duncan (1967) approached this issue from a different perspective. They 
analysed the effects of father’s education level and occupation on children’s education 
level and occupation and found that when the father’s education level is higher, his 
children’s education level is likely to be higher too. In this respect, expanding public 
education can decrease income inequality by improving social mobility in society. 
However, the effect of education is different in different countries. For example, this 
association is weakened in social democratic welfare states (Sorenson, 2006) since the 
government provides children with a more extensive public education so that they can 
benefit from public education regardless of their family background. Beller and Hout 
(2006) examined the relationship between social fluidity and access to education in 
eighteen developed countries and found that the effect of education on social fluidity was 
more sensitive in corporatist and liberal welfare states, which means that expanding 
education is important for promoting the equality of the society in those countries. 
However social democratic and post-socialist welfare states are not very sensitive to the 
effect of education since social fluidity in those countries is not closely related to access 
to education. They explained that equality of opportunity is essential for improving 
inequality; education is just one way to stimulate the equality of opportunity. Since social 
democratic welfare states have various social institutions to improve the equality of 
opportunity (such as a public child-care system), the dependence on education is lower 
than in other welfare states in terms of improving social fluidity. 
Previous studies have shown that an increase in public expenditure on education is 
significantly related to changes in income inequality. Some researchers have argued that 
the relationship between the two is insignificant, but most of the empirical studies have 
shown that there is a significant relationship. Various theoretical discussions have tried to 
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explain this relationship. As reviewed above, some have argued that an increase in public 
education is related to investment in human resources because it helps the poor to get 
out of poverty. Other researchers have argued that public education increases the 
number of well-educated workers who are paid better than less-educated workers, so 
income inequality can increase. Another view is that an increase in public education is 
related to increased opportunities for the poor so it is related to an increase in social 
mobility, which decreases income inequality. Other researchers have argued that the 
impact of public education on income inequality is different according to the different 
institutional designs of a welfare state and to the stage of economic development. There 
have been various theoretical discussions about this, but it seems that increases in 
expenditure on public education are generally related to increases in income inequality. 
In summary, previous studies have shown that both tax policy and government 
expenditure play an important role in determining income inequality but that the 
significance and the size of the effect seem quite different in terms of the sub-
components of each policy area. Increases in income tax and corporate tax seem to be 
associated with a decrease in income inequality, but the significance of corporate tax 
declines as economies transform to an open economy. In the case of government 
expenditure, most studies have shown that it does not have a significant effect on income 
inequality except for social expenditure. The effect of social expenditure will be discussed 
in a later chapter.   
3.3.  Political institution factors 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, income distribution is the consequence of a 
complicated interaction between different actors in a market economy. Income 
distribution is therefore not fully explained by economic factors alone. As discussed in the 
previous section, Piketty (2013) argued that income inequality is due to the very nature of 
capitalism. However, we can see diverse income inequalities in most developed capitalist 
countries (Hopkin & Lynch, 2016). On the other hand, many studies have argued that 
income inequality is the result of political action.  
Hacker and Pierson (2010) showed that the outcome of income distribution is 
considerably affected by the policy process in the US. They showed that income inequality 
in the US is becoming a serious issue, especially when we see the ratio between the top 1% 
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and the rest of society. They insisted that increases in income are getting bigger at the 
higher income level, and that is not fully explained by economic factors such as the labour 
market structure or technological development. Those economic factors partly explain 
income inequality but do not explain the hyper-concentration of income for the top 1%, 
and they emphasized that the government actually has many tools by which to intervene 
in the market and the economy. This leads to the need to review the political factors to 
understand income inequality more accurately. In fact, many studies have examined the 
impact of political factors in income distribution. The type and partisan identity of a 
government are often regarded as determinants of income inequality, and the degree of 
democracy, the level of corruption and the accountability of a government are considered 
salient factors. Hacker and Pierson (2010) suggested that existing political factors are not 
sufficient so we need to extend our concern to the whole policy process. Policy outcome 
is likely to be dominated by well-organized interest, and rich or private companies are 
usually better organized to represent their own interests. Thus, policy outcome is more in 
favour of the rich and of private companies, and this process is a very relevant factor in 
driving income inequality. The details of these political factors are reviewed in the 
following section.    
3.3.1. Political institution, veto points and partisan identity 
One of conventional idea on politics and inequality is the median voter theory which was 
proposed by Meltzer and Richard (1981). They argued that a high level of income 
inequality generates pressure for greater redistribution. They assumed that political 
power is more evenly distributed among voters than economic power so that the majority 
of voters are willing to vote for greater redistribution when income inequality is very high. 
This theory simplifies voters’ behaviour and explains how income inequality is changed by 
political preference. However, this theory focuses on individuals’ behaviour and neglects 
the macro view.  
First, the importance of the partisan ideology of a government and its distributive 
outcome has a long history of debate in the social sciences (Castles, 1982). Bartel (2009) 
argued that the partisan identity of the president has played an important role in income 
inequality in the US through an expanding welfare effort since the Second World War. He 
measured income inequality as an 80:20 ratio, which is the ratio of income at the 
eightieth and twentieth percentiles. What he found was that income inequality becomes 
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more serious when a Republican president takes power, whereas it is abated when a 
Democratic president takes power. Hicks and Misra (1993) and Kittle and Obinger (2003) 
found that social expenditure increases when left-leaning governments take power, so 
income inequality is likely to be reduced when a left-leaning government is in power.   
Other researchers have argued that the effect of partisanship on income inequality is 
limited. Neither Garrett and Mitchell (2001) nor Siegel (2007) found any significant effect 
of the partisanship of the government on welfare effort. Iversen and Cusack (2000) 
examined government ideology and the social transfer programme and found that they 
were statistically insignificant. Those studies did not address the direct effect on income 
inequality, but it can still be inferred that the limited impact on welfare effort or social 
transfer is related to the limited impact on income inequality. Hacker and Pierson (2010) 
also showed that income inequality measured by the ninety-ninth percentile to the 
twentieth percentile has continued to increase regardless of the partisan identity of the 
president in the US.  
Previous studies of the politics of redistribution have neglected the importance of the 
political institution. Schmidt (1996) suggested a reason why the partisanship of a 
government fails to influence welfare policy. He argued that the effect of partisanship is 
limited by the institutional characteristics in which governments operate. In other words, 
if the political institution is based on a consensus-based system or co-governance, then it 
is more difficult to change the current policy because there are more political actors who 
can veto the policy in a consensus-based institution. Consequently, a political institution 
with more separated and independent authority is likely to hinder any kind of change in 
policies, either expanding or retrenchment, in a welfare state. Kühner (2010) also argued 
that the influence of partisan ideology depends on the political institution, and a change 
of ideology is associated with a higher level of policy changes with minimum veto players, 
and it is associated with a lower level of policy change with maximum veto players. Thus, 
either the reduction or the expansion of a welfare effort is considerably affected by a 
political institution, rather than by the partisan ideology of the government. In other 
words, partisan identity cannot play a significant role in income distribution as existing 
political institutions limit its impact.  
Regarding the distributive outcome of a political institution, Birchfield and Crepaz (1998) 
examined the impact of political factors on income inequality using data from eighteen 
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OECD countries. They divided the constitutional system into two categories. One was a 
consensus model which is associated with parliamentarianism, strong bicameralism and 
federalism. The other is the majority model which is associated with presidentialism, 
unicameralism and unitarianism. They tested the hypothesis that the consensus model is 
associated with low-income inequality as a radical change in redistributive policy is more 
difficult under the consensus model. They found that consensus democracy is negatively 
related to the income of the top 20%, and in particular that federalism is significantly 
related to income inequality.  
They also considered the number of veto points in the political system as an independent 
variable; the number of collective veto points is negatively related to income inequality 
whereas competitive veto points are more positively related to income inequality. 
Collective veto points emerge from institutions in which different political actors perform 
in the same institution, and competitive veto points take place when different political 
actors interact through separate institutions with mutual veto powers. The results 
showed that collective veto points are negatively related to income inequality as they 
predicted. They stated that competitive veto points take place when the representatives 
of the institution interact with each other in separate institutions with mutual veto points, 
so it is more difficult to change the status quo. In brief, income inequality is likely to be 
high when power is more concentrated, such as in a presidential system or unicameralism.  
These studies showed that the political dimension, as well as economic factors, has an 
influence on income inequality. The political partisanship of the government also plays an 
important role in shaping income inequality, but recent studies have shown that the 
political institution that governments act within also has a significant impact on income 
inequality. Political institutions matter in income inequality, but the process of how 
institutions are determined is also important in determining income inequality.  
3.3.2. Policy process and income inequality 
Hacker and Pierson (2010) pointed out that the existing economic factors on income 
inequality neglect the role of the government. As reviewed in the previous section, the 
political partisanship of the government has a significant impact on income inequality but 
its impact is limited by the political institution in which the government performs. 
However, the ability of the government is limited by not only official political institutions, 
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but also by the organized interests of various groups in the society. Income inequality will 
increase when the economy grows if the rich and influential groups dominate the policy 
process of government. Benabou (2000) and Stiglitz (2012) showed that redistribution is 
not likely to occur when the rich have more political influence than the poor. 
Hacker and Pierson (2010) also put forward a more detailed explanation for how the rich 
have more power than the poor do in the decision-making process for redistribution. 
They argued that the policy process is the “politics of organized combat” (Hacker & 
Pierson, 2010: 169). Policy change takes place usually when governments want to trigger 
it, but sometimes a government fails to update policy because of organized groups. 
Organized groups can be political actors or business organisations. For instance, the 
financial industry lobbyist wants to defend the hedge fund tax break so the government’s 
attempt to abolish the tax break inevitably fail. 
This failure to change policy occurs because policy decision-makers are more sensitive to 
organized groups than to unorganized voters. In the context of American politics, the 
influence of middle-class organisations declines due to the decline in labour power and 
the increasing importance of money in politics. Consequently, policy changes are in 
favour of the rich and of businesses. Progressivity in the tax system is entirely absent and 
corporate governance allows executives to receive huge amounts of compensation. In 
addition, regulation of the financial market is relieved, which allows financial 
professionals to earn much more than uneducated workers.  
In summary, economic factors seek to explain income inequality through the principle of 
the market system, such as changes in the demand and supply of labour. However, the 
policy process is related to how to control the principle of the market system. The trickle-
down effect of economic growth could be weakened if strong interest groups dominate 
the policy process, as governments are likely to be more sensitive to organized interests.  
Hacker and Pierson (2010) focused on income inequality in the US, whereas Matthijs 
(2016) attempted to explain income inequality in Europe. He argued that income 
inequality in Europe is the result of the institutional structure and has been promoted by 
politics since the late 1990s. The political process in the fiscal policy of Europe is led by an 
independent central bank which has a strong belief in price stability. Discretion on the 
fiscal policy of each member state is seriously limited by the central bank, which is one of 
the main reasons for increases in income inequality. What Matthijs argued was that 
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financial interests and big business lobbies have great power in politics in Brussels, and 
the opinion of a member state is not well reflected in the policy process. The increase in 
income inequality in Europe is the result of this institutional structure.   
3.3.3. Corruption, accountability and income distribution 
Chong and Gradstein (2007) showed that income inequality is closely related to the 
quality of the political institution, especially the rule of law, corruption and democratic 
accountability. They assumed that individual income is the function of the individual 
ability variable and that individuals allocate income between consumption and 
‘unproductive’ investment in rent seeking. This means that an individual’s rent-seeking 
behaviour depends on the quality of the institution, so the inequality is constant and 
determined by individual ability in a good institution when the institution is good, 
whereas income inequality increases over time when the institution is bad. They 
examined the relationship between income inequality and the institution measured by 
the ICRG index (ICRG stands for International Country Risk Guide and it includes 
government stability, corruption, the rule of law, democratic accountability and 
bureaucratic quality) using data from 121 countries from 1960 to 2000. As expected, the 
results showed that the ICRG index was negatively related to income inequality and that 
all the variables were significant. The rule of law has the biggest impact on income 
inequality, followed by corruption and democratic accountability. They found that the 
contribution of the institution to inequality causality was around 33% in total linear 
dependence, and the contribution of the inequality to the institution was about 64%. It 
seems that those two factors reinforce each other and that study showed that strong 
accountability, less corruption and a well-established the rule of law can lead to less 
income inequality.  
 
In fact, this relationship can go either way, as Easterly (2001) and Keefer and Knack (2002) 
argued that high income inequality is related to lower quality in a political institution. 
McFaul’s (2002) description of a Russian case is an example of this. According to his 
findings, a small group of businessman gained access to political power in Russia after 
massive privatisation in the 1990s, and they pursued their own interests, so they had the 
power to hinder institutional development to protect the interests of the smaller 
shareholder. This has also happened in some Latin American countries, where the ruling 
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elites, including large businesses, military personnel and high-ranking civil servants, 
wanted to increase their own interests and strongly damaged the interests of small 
businesses, and this led to an increase in the black market and the informal economy 
(Kaufman, Mastruzzi & Zavaletta, 2003).  
 
In summary, the direction of the causal relationship between income inequality and the 
quality of the institution is not clear, but it looks certain that income inequality is closely 
related to the quality of the institution.  
3.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have reviewed previous studies of the factors which affect income 
inequality. Various studies have explained what factors drive or constrain income 
inequality so in this chapter I divided previous studies into two parts, economic factors 
and political factors. Economic factors affecting income inequality are mainly focused on 
economic growth, globalisation, technological development, changes in labour market 
institutions and tax/public expenditure. Traditionally, it is believed that income inequality 
increases in the early stage of economic development and is relieved in the later stage, 
but empirical studies have shown contradictory results, so further research is required. 
Technological developments lead to a high demand for highly-skilled workers and that 
leads to an increase in the skills premium. At the same time, technological development 
also leads to increased automation, which removes jobs for low-skilled workers. Low-
skilled workers therefore suffer from long-term structural unemployment and they are 
exposed to non-standard contracts which only offer unstable employment. Consequently, 
technological development brings changes in the labour market so the income gap 
between highly-skilled workers and low-skilled workers is likely to increase.  
Globalisation is also regarded as an important factor in income inequality, but the 
direction and size of the effect are still controversial, although it seems that trade 
openness could work to reduce income inequality whereas financial liberalisation has 
been associated with an increase in income inequality in most studies. Increase in tax 
rates and progressivity are significantly related to changes in income inequality. High 
expenditure is not necessarily related to a decrease in income inequality, but previous 
studies have shown that an increase in expenditure on public education is significantly 
related to a decrease in income inequality.  
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Economic factors affecting income inequality are based on the fact that the market 
system inevitably generates income inequality, but some studies have pointed out the 
role of politics in establishing control of the market system. They have insisted that 
income inequality is generated by the market mechanism but that it is politics that make 
the rules for controlling the market system. The political partisanship of the government 
has been regarded as an important factor which affects income inequality, but recent 
studies have argued that the political institutions in which political actors perform are 
more important. Studies of political institutions have shown that the number of veto 
players in the policy process and the type of government play important roles in income 
distribution. Empirical studies have shown that income inequality is likely to be low when 
power is spread across the institutions. In addition, recent studies have shown that the 
policy process on how interests between political organizations are decided and 
coordinated is an important factor in income distribution. In other words, policies are 
decided by the coordination of interests among political organisations, so policies are 
likely to be favourable to those who have strong political and economic power. 
Consequently, policies to support the poor and reduce the income gap are likely to be 
neglected or excluded in the policy process.     
Although income inequality is generated by the market mechanism or by political power, 
a government effort to correct income distribution ex-post should be considered as a 
determinant of income inequality. As discussed in Section 3.2.3, previous studies have 
shown that a redistributive policy is significantly related to changes in income inequality. 
Redistribution is one of the main features of a welfare state, and its path for development 
and institutional design varies between countries. In the next chapter, I shall therefore 
review governments’ efforts to manage social welfare, such as how it started, how it has 
developed and how it affects income distribution.  
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Chapter 4. The welfare institution and income inequality 
 
4.1. Introduction:  the welfare state institution 
The welfare state as an institution is very important factor in determining income 
inequality. Barr (2004: 7) defined the reason for a welfare state as follows: “The welfare 
state exists to enhance the welfare of people who (a) are weak, vulnerable, largely by 
providing social care, (b) are poor, through redistributive income transfer, or (c) are 
neither vulnerable nor poor, by organising cash benefits to provide insurance and 
consumption smoothing, and by providing medical insurance and school education”.  
So one of the main roles of a welfare state is to provide social protection for all who are in 
need of income support from the government. In spite of a common general goal to 
provide social protection to all vulnerable groups, the way to provide social protection 
differs in different countries as the welfare state institution has been shaped and 
developed in the context of the politics and economics of each country. Differences 
between countries in terms of politics and economics in the welfare state are closely 
related to determining the level of welfare effort and the institutional design of a welfare 
state. Levels of income inequality and poverty can be considered as indicators of the 
performance of a welfare state, and it is expected that the performance of welfare states 
will be different according to how the institution is designed and how much effort a 
government puts into maintaining a welfare state (Kersbergen & Vis, 2014).   
Many studies have argued the welfare state has a significant effect on income inequality 
(for example, Kangas & Palme, 2000; Korpi & Palme, 1998). Some studies have examined 
the relationship between the welfare effort and income distribution, and others have 
looked at the relationship between the institutional design of a welfare state and income 
distribution. In this chapter, therefore, a review of previous studies of how the welfare 
state emerged and developed will be presented as well as empirical studies which have 
examined the relationship between a welfare state and income inequality. In addition, 
this chapter also shows how the welfare state has recently been transformed.  
This chapter is structured as follows. The following section discusses why a welfare state 
is required and how it is established. In fact, there are many theories and studies about 
this which have been put forward, but here this topic will be reviewed only briefly 
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because of lack of space. After this, a discussion will be presented about how and why 
welfare states have developed in various ways. This is closely related to the classification 
of the institutional design of the welfare state.  
As already mentioned, although the role of the welfare state to provide protection and 
share social risks is a common factor, the way to achieve it is different in countries for a 
variety of reasons. Each country has a different concept of social rights and duties and 
pursues different values to ensure them, such as freedom, equality or solidarity. These 
differences by countries lead to different welfare state institutions and different 
institutional designs also lead to difference consequences in terms of income inequality. 
This section includes a review of empirical studies of how the institutional design of 
welfare states affects income inequality. The discussion on how to classify the welfare 
state is also related to the level of welfare effort which a government makes, so a 
discussion on how to measure welfare effort follows. This is the so-called ‘dependent 
variable problem’ in comparative welfare state research and it is a very complicated and 
controversial issue how we can measure welfare states’ effort and classify the 
institutional design of a welfare state, so there are various ways to estimate the welfare 
efforts of different countries (Tanzi, 2000; Kühner 2007; 2015). In addition, reliable data 
on this topic have only recently become available. This section reviews the expenditure-
based measurement which is the most frequently used measure and the social 
citizenship-based measurement which reflects qualitative changes in the welfare state. 
Each measurement has its own advantages and disadvantages so this section includes a 
discussion about each measurement and reviews empirical studies of the effect of 
welfare effort on income inequality.   
4.2. How to measure the welfare effort. 
Each country has a different logic and a different background to the development of its 
welfare state, so countries have different levels of commitment to the welfare state. One 
of the main roles of the welfare state is to enhance the welfare of vulnerable groups and 
offer social protection for all, so it can be inferred that high commitment to the welfare 
state is related to lower income inequality. So the amount of resources that a 
government puts into its welfare state is important in terms of income inequality. 
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However, it is difficult and complicated to measure the welfare effort of a government, so 
there is a long-running debate on how to measure the welfare effort. There are two most 
frequently used measurements for assessing a welfare state, although there are various 
other measurements that have been attempted in previous researches. The first is the 
financial approach, such as social expenditure, and that has been used conventionally. 
The second is a social-citizenship based approach such as a de-commodification index or 
generosity score. Each measurement has its own advantages and disadvantages so 
neither of them has sufficient power to end this debate.  
This debate is salient to exploring the drivers of income inequality. As already stated, 
welfare effort is closely related to changes in income inequality so we could have a 
spurious result if we were to select an irrelevant measurement. There is no perfect 
measurement so far, so we need to keep in mind the advantages and limitations of each 
measurement when we interpret the empirical results. In this section, therefore, 
discussions on how they are measured and the advantages and disadvantages of each 
approach will be reviewed. 
4.2.1. Financial approach: based on social expenditure 
4.2.1.1. Aggregated social expenditure  
The most widely used measure is aggregated public social expenditure as a percentage of 
gross domestic product (GDP) (Wilensky, 1975). This shows a country’s effort in the 
reduction of poverty and inequality, but only in financial terms (Castles & Mitchell, 1992). 
Many previous studies used social expenditure as a proxy for welfare effort, especially in 
quantitative comparative research, but this was mainly due to the availability of data 
rather than intrinsic value (Castles, 1989) since aggregate social spending does not show 
the welfare effort very well because it does not reflect the details of the welfare 
institution, such as coverage ratio or replacement rate. However, it had been almost the 
only data set which was available for use in comparative studies (Castles & Mitchell, 
1992), and it is very simple and straightforward, so there are many studies which have 
examined income inequality and public social expenditure.  
The most noticeable advantage of the social expenditure measurement is its availability 
and accessibility. Data on social expenditure are easily accessible in data sets established 
by the OECD or Euro-stat. The availability of data is important, particularly for 
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quantitative research. Advanced and elaborate statistical skills are not possible if there is 
no data that we can use. For this reason, the availability of social expenditure data 
compared with other indicators is quite an important advantage for the researcher.  
However, it is still controversial, as social expenditure reflects only quantity, not quality, 
so it is hard to reflect the changes in the quality of a welfare state. For example, social 
expenditure would increase when there is high unemployment in a time of economic 
crisis, and it would still increase when the benefit level decreases if the number of 
unemployed people increases more. In this case, it is not relevant to say that the welfare 
effort of a government is increasing or that we would have a more generous welfare state 
even though social expenditure is increasing. Social expenditure also does not consider 
the degree of social solidarity or social citizenship, which is a very salient aspect of the 
welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Sometimes the approach based on the 
expenditure even distorts the effort itself and changes in the welfare effort, such as the 
increase in total expenditure under the Thatcher government due to an increase in 
unemployment, rather than an increase in the benefit level of the welfare state (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). 
Scruggs and Allan (2006) showed that welfare states’ efforts or retrenchment measured 
by aggregated social spending do not capture the reality of the situation because 
increasing total spending may coexist with lower individual entitlement. Social 
expenditure also provides little information about the level of social protection for the 
poor at the most risk. Problems of social expenditure can be summarised in three points. 
First, social expenditure does not show the size of the dependent population. If more 
people become unemployed, then total expenditure on unemployment benefit would 
increase even though the level of benefit decreases. Castles (2004) also criticised it 
because it does not consider changes in welfare need. The second problem is 
denominator issues, as social expenditure does not capture the difference in economic 
growth. For example, the ratio of social expenditure to GDP in the UK and Ireland 
increased by 3% a year until 2007, but Ireland’s economic growth had averaged 6.2% 
since 1983 whereas that of the UK averaged 2.7% per year. So considering the economic 
growth rates, welfare retrenchment was more severe in Ireland but it cannot be captured 
if we use social expenditure as a measure of welfare effort (Adema et al., 2011). The third 
problem is taxation. The tax system is used as a transfer mechanism with tax credits being 
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used as an instrument to help poor households or individuals by relieving their tax burden, 
but it is not included in social expenditure. Thus, we can underestimate welfare effort if 
we do not consider changes in the taxation system (Adema et al., 2014).  
In addition, social expenditure data provided by the OECD also has its limitation because 
it does not cover education spending and shows inconsistency in the classification of 
mandatory and voluntary payments (Deken & Kittel 2007; Adema et al., 2014; Kuhner, 
2015).   
Many researchers have proposed other indicators for welfare effort based on social 
expenditure but more elaborate. For instance, Kittel and Obinger (2002) proposed first 
order differences to see changes in welfare effort and Clayton and Pontusson (1998) 
computed standardised social expenditure measurements. Castles (2002; 2004) showed 
disaggregated spending at the branch level. In the following section, those indicators will 
be discussed in turn.  
4.2.1.2. Elaborating social expenditure by disaggregating and standardising 
Castles (2002) attempted to elaborate social welfare spending by using a disaggregated 
expenditure approach. The critiques of this approach usually say that welfare benefit is 
more related to the eligibility criteria for recipients and the generosity with which 
individuals are treated, not to the total amount of money spent, so we cannot compare 
welfare state efforts or see the trajectory of welfare reform if we just focus on aggregate 
social expenditure (Castles, 2008). However, Castles (2002) argued that we can still see 
those things by the expenditure approach if we can disaggregate the social spending into 
several categories. The OECD social expenditure database begins to provide data in more 
detailed categories. When we use aggregate social expenditure, a decrease in one social 
policy area can be compensated by an increase in another area, so we cannot see the 
change in total. However, disaggregated social expenditure helps us overcome this 
problem. The OECD social expenditure database consists of thirteen categories 
representing policy areas (OECD, 2000): 
1. Old age cash benefits 2. Disability cash benefits 3.Occupational injury and disease 
4. Sickness benefits 5. Service for the elderly and disabled 6. Survivors 
       7. Family cash benefit 8.Family service 9. Active labour market programmes 
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10. Unemployment  11. Public expenditure on health  12. Housing 13.Other 
contingencies 
These categories are divided into sub-components of expenditure, so we can find more 
specific information on each account. Since Irish expenditure does not contain the active 
labour market programmes, so Castles (2002) used the other twelve categories to 
determine the shape and direction of the welfare effort of twenty-one OECD countries 
from 1984 to 1997. We can find that some countries which share common historical and 
cultural experiences have the same pattern of social expenditure, so we can see ‘families 
of nations’ grouped into Scandinavian, English-speaking, Continental European and 
Southern European conglomerations (Castles, 2002; 622).  
Castles suggested four categories, age-related expenditure, working-age expenditure, 
health expenditure and other service expenditure, based on data from 23 countries 
(Castles, 2008). He found that some countries had similar spending patterns to those of 
other countries. English-speaking countries showed low spending on age-related 
expenditure and a low level of total expenditure. Scandinavian countries were not big 
spenders on age-related expenditure but they tended to spend more on working-age 
expenditure than the other countries. Continental European countries spent more on 
both age-related expenditure and working-age expenditure. Southern European countries 
had a different pattern from other continental European countries since they spent more 
only on age-related expenditure and they spent less than the average in the other three 
categories. In brief, the point of his argument is that social expenditure can still be a 
useful indicator for finding the characteristics of a welfare state if we use disaggregated 
social expenditure.        
He also examined the relationship between specific expenditure and distributive outcome 
using Pearson’s correlation and found that the correlation was very high between income 
inequality measured by the Gini index and working-age expenditure. Working-age 
expenditure was also highly correlated with the poverty rate because age-related 
expenditure is more associated with horizontal life-cycle distribution and health 
expenditure is not aimed at changing income distribution directly.  
As discussed above, one of the main disadvantages of using the social expenditure 
measurement is that it does not consider the demand side. The amount of social 
expenditure could increase when the number of beneficiaries increases, although the 
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benefit level decreases. Thus, the standardized social expenditure measurement 
considering the demand side of a welfare programme is proposed for this current study. 
As discussed above, social expenditure measurement is likely to neglect socio-economic 
and demographic changes (Clayton & Pontusson 1998) so those commentators argued 
that social expenditure, usually shown as % of GDP, has to be divided by the number of 
beneficiaries, such as the number of unemployed people or the number of people over 65 
years of age. This method is also frequently used as it is simple and easy to compute, 
reflecting at the same time the quality of a welfare programme in terms of benefit level.  
In brief, disaggregated data on social expenditure can be useful for finding how the 
structure of the welfare state institution is changing and developing, and standardised 
expenditure measurement can reflect demographic changes through a relatively simple 
method and data. Although there are many weaknesses in expenditure measurement, it 
is still considered to be the most-used measurement because of its ready availability. In 
addition, as we can see here, there have been many efforts to elaborate expenditure 
measurement for a better estimation. It seems that expenditure-based measurement will 
still be frequently used despite its disadvantages.   
4.2.1.3. Aggregate social expenditure and distributive outcome  
Expenditure measurement is frequently used as an indicator for the welfare effort of 
governments, so there have been many empirical studies which have examined this. The 
relationship between public expenditure in the broader sense and income inequality was 
reviewed in Chapter 3, so the focus of this section is on the relationship between social 
expenditure and income distribution. 
In fact, the empirical studies on the relationship between welfare effort and distributive 
outcome have shown quite diverse results. Wilensky (1975) and Paukert (1973) both 
proposed that expanding a welfare state naturally has an equalising effect on the society, 
which can be summarised as the ‘size hypothesis’ (Palme, 2006: 338), which means that 
income distribution gets more equal as the country raises its welfare effort. In contrast, 
some researchers have argued that increases in the welfare effort are negatively related 
to distributive outcome. Neo-Marxists argue that a welfare state has two contradictory 
mechanisms regarding inequality. They insist that income inequality increases through 
the capital accumulation process but that social transfer programmes can be expanded at 
the same time to justify capital accumulation, so inequality rests on the balance of those 
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two mechanisms and income distribution does not necessarily improve when social 
expenditure increases (O’Connor, 1973). 
Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) compared income distribution by different levels of social 
expenditure in OECD countries. They divided OECD countries into three categories (small, 
medium-sized and large) based on the level of social expenditure between 1960 and 1990 
and compared their income distribution using various indices. This showed that actually 
income distribution was better in small expenditure countries in 1960 since the Gini index 
of those countries was 0.324, whereas that of large expenditure countries was 0.337. 
However, this was reversed in 1990; the Gini of the small expenditure countries was 
0.376 whereas that of the large expenditure countries was 0.321. This shows that 
countries which have higher social expenditure do better than countries which have less 
social expenditure in terms of income inequality. The findings are in line with the size 
hypothesis since they show that higher welfare state spending led to a decrease in 
income inequality. 
Adema and Ladaique (2005) showed a way of elaborating the measure of welfare effort 
by considering the impact of tax and private spending on welfare so that they could 
estimate net spending on social welfare. The government can impose a tax on the social 
benefit (either a direct tax on benefit or an indirect tax on goods and services bought by 
recipients of benefit), or can just provide tax breaks for those receiving cash benefits. 
These different kinds of taxation have different impacts. Direct tax is related to clawing 
back income from the recipients, and indirect tax makes the households with larger 
income-related benefits pay more than those with a lower flat tax rate. They netted out 
all the tax effects to produce net public social expenditure, and then they added private 
expenditure for welfare and reached net social expenditure, which reflects welfare efforts 
better than social expenditure does. In fact, it shows quite different results, for example, 
the US ranked seventeenth in social expenditure in 2001 but went up to sixth in net social 
expenditure, and the ranking of Scandinavian countries tended to go down when 
considering net social expenditure.  
They found that net spending is a better indicator which shows what the government is 
really devoting to social spending. However, Castles and Obinger (2005) showed a 
correlation between expenditure categories and redistribution outcomes among the 
OECD countries and the correlation between social expenditure and the poverty rate was 
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-0.82 whereas the correlation between net social expenditure and the poverty rate was -
0.488. The correlation to the Gini index was also higher in social expenditure than in net 
social expenditure. 
As explained above, social expenditure measurement shows how much a government is 
devoting to social welfare but it does not show the way in which the government spends 
the money or how it delivers a welfare service, which is quite relevant for determining the 
distributional outcome. Kaminada and Goudswaard (2001) argued that the qualitative 
structure of the institution is more important than social expenditure in income 
distribution. They investigated how income inequality can be attributed to changes in 
welfare states by focusing on OECD countries. They considered social security transfer as 
a percentage of GDP and used the gross replacement rates of unemployment benefit to 
measure the changes in welfare states. At first glance, the net social expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP had increased in all countries, and gross replacement rates had 
increased only in the UK and the Netherlands. An OLS regression showed that social 
security transfer was not significant in income inequality, but that gross replacement 
rates were negatively associated with income inequality. The results showed that the Gini 
coefficient decreased by 0.46 when the replacement rate increased by 1%. However, they 
used only regression with a single independent variable so a more elaborate approach is 
required for further study, as they admitted in their study.  
As an example, they selected the case of the Netherlands to show the most detailed 
relationship between a welfare state and income inequality. They used the Theil index to 
measure income inequality. The Theil index has a value of zero in the case of absolute 
equality and a value of log (N) (N is the number of the population in the society) in the 
case of absolute inequality. The advantage of the Theil index is that it can be divided into 
sub-groups because it consists of average inequality within sub-groups plus inequality 
among those sub-groups. Thus, we can decompose the index. The result showed that the 
decrease in the social transfer programme explained the largest part of total inequality, 
about 39%. The next largest was the unequal distribution of primary income, which was 
mainly due to the increase in the labour force participation of women, at about 36%. 
Another factor was the lower progressivity of the tax system, which was about 29%.  
Their findings showed that changes in the welfare state partly explained the current 
situation of the inequality and in particular, the replacement rate is more significant than 
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the total social expenditure. In the case of the Netherlands, the most salient factor in the 
inequality was a decrease in social transfer. Consequently, they argued that we need to 
look into the more detailed design of the institution rather than social expenditure for 
research into income distribution and the welfare state. 
4.2.1.4. Summary 
In conclusion, it is suggested that social expenditure is a useful tool for measuring welfare 
effort since it is easily accessible and available on an annual basis. However, social 
expenditure does not consider the quality of the institution: it shows how much the 
government spends but does not show how the government spends it. Therefore, 
expenditure measurement does not fully reflect all the features of the welfare effort and 
even distorts information on it. Some researchers have therefore attempted to elaborate 
expenditure-based measurement. Disaggregated social expenditure can provide us with 
much more details on changes and the direction of welfare effort, and standardised social 
expenditure measurement reflects socio-economic and demographic changes so it can 
remove distortion of the total expenditure measurement by considering changes in 
welfare needs.  
It seems, then, that expenditure-based measurement has weaknesses but is simple and 
easily accessible for research, and that it is also being elaborated by continuing studies so 
it is still relevant as a measurement of welfare effort. However, it could be dangerous and 
irrelevant if we focus on expenditure alone, although it can be elaborated in various ways. 
The next section will be a review of the social-rights-based approach, as an alternative to 
the expenditure-based approach.       
4.2.2. The social-right-based approach 
As explained in the previous section, expenditure-based measurement has been criticised 
for focusing on how much governments spend but not how they spend it. As mentioned 
above, measurement of welfare effort based on a social-rights-based approach is 
proposed as an alternative. The social-rights-based approach can be useful for measuring 
the quality of a welfare state and it can also help us to identify the structure of a welfare 
state and thus predict how welfare states will change in the future and compare the 
trajectory of the welfare reform of each country. This section therefore presents a review 
of the de-commodification index proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990) and the generosity 
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score which updates and elaborates the de-commodification index proposed by Scruggs 
(2013).   
4.2.2.1. The de-commodification index 
Esping-Andersen (1990) argued that previous methods did not show commitment to 
social citizenship and solidarity, so he proposed a de-commodification index. De-
commodification can be defined as the degree to which an individual can maintain a 
reasonable living standard independent of market participation (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 
37). He calculated a de-commodification index for eighteen developed countries using 
data for 1980. He focused on three programmes, pensions, sickness benefit and 
unemployment benefit. A policy which provides all people with a universal benefit was 
classified as highly de-commodified, whereas a policy which offers benefits based on 
contributions paid or current need was classified as low on the de-commodification index. 
He selected several variables to calculate the de-commodification index for each welfare 
programme. For a pension programme, earnings replacement rate, the number of years 
of contributions to qualify and the proportion of total pension finance paid by individuals 
were considered in the calculation, and for sickness and unemployment the procedure 
was not very different, although there were some exceptions. The proportion of 
individual financing was omitted and waiting days to receive the benefits and weeks of 
benefit duration were included in the calculation of a sickness and unemployment de-
commodification index. In addition, every programme was weighted by take-up rate, 
which means the proportion of people who actually receive the benefit to the total 
number of people eligible for it.  
The results showed that there was a distinction between the groups of countries. In 
general, the de-commodification index was lowest in English-speaking countries. Australia 
and the US scored 13.0 and 13.8 respectively, and the UK scored 23.4, which was 
relatively higher than other English-speaking countries but lower than Continental 
European countries and Scandinavian countries. Continental European countries such as 
Germany, France, and Italy occupied the middle group, ranging from 24.1 to 29.8. In 
addition, Scandinavian countries and some continental countries such as Belgium and the 
Netherlands showed a high level of de-commodification in welfare institutions, ranging 
from 31.1 to 39.1. For the de-commodification index of each programme, the pension 
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benefit was highly de-commodified for most of the countries and unemployment benefit 
had the lowest score across all the groups.   
A de-commodification index shows the extent to which individuals’ lives can be 
independent of the market system, so it shows the quality of the welfare state in terms of 
protecting vulnerable groups in the society. It is very distinct from social expenditure as 
social expenditure only reflects financial terms, concentrating on quantity rather than 
quality. These measurements are often referred as the social-rights-based approach as 
they consider welfare benefit as a right based on citizenship, so they are more 
concentrated about the quality of a welfare state in terms of how much individuals’ lives 
can be protected from social risks.  
However, it is not a perfect measurement of a welfare state. The de-commodification 
index does not cover every aspect of the welfare institution and focuses on particular 
cases, for example, the family policy area such as child benefit not being included in the 
index, so only some aspects of welfare institutions are reflected. It is also said that the de-
commodification proposed by Esping-Andersen focuses on the protective dimension of 
welfare and neglects the productive dimension (Hudson & Kühner, 2010). The 
methodological issue is also addressed (Scruggs & Allan, 2006) since it employs standard 
deviation from the mean for calculation, so countries with slightly below or above one 
standard deviation have a different score.  In spite of its critics, it is still very important for 
reviewing and analysing the de-commodification index as it triggered a massive amount 
of research on welfare institutions. The next index, proposed by Scruggs and Allan (2006), 
was also based on the de-commodification index and elaborated it.   
4.2.2.2. The welfare generosity index 
Scruggs and Allan (2006) emphasized the generosity of entitlement to determine the 
impact of welfare states on income distribution. As discussed in the previous section, 
many criticisms have been raised about expenditure measurement and many of them 
have argued that institutional factors should be taken into greater consideration for 
measuring welfare effort (Scruggs & Allan, 2006; Korpi, 1989; Esping-Andersen, 1990). It is 
therefore necessary to develop welfare measurement to capture the welfare institution 
in a way that reflects the level of welfare commitment in terms of entitlement and social 
right. 
73 
 
Scruggs and Allan also criticized the de-commodification index proposed by Esping-
Andersen although they agreed with the basic idea which he proposed. The de-
commodification index used standard deviation in the calculation, so those countries with 
just above or just below one standard deviation are considered to have very different 
scores even though they do not have much difference in the raw data. To correct this 
anomaly, Scruggs and Allan used a standardized Z-score to calculate a welfare generosity 
score. A Z-score estimates how far an original score lies from the mean in continuous 
scale, so we can avoid the problem of countries with similar scores having a different 
value when they are near the standard deviation and thus establish better accuracy and 
consistency of measurement. 
They therefore proposed a new measurement of welfare effort based on social right. 
They considered unemployment insurance, sickness cash benefits and retirement pension 
as determinants of welfare generosity. In each programme, key characteristic 
components such as replacement rate, qualifying period, waiting days and duration of 
benefit were considered to calculate welfare generosity and were weighted by the 
coverage ratio. For each component, a generosity score was computed by using a Z-score 
calculated as follows. In each component (such as replacement rate or qualifying period), 
the benchmark year mean (they set 1980 as the benchmark year so that they could 
compare it with Esping-Andersen’s de-commodification index which is also based on the 
year 1980) is subtracted and the result is divided by the standard deviation of the 
benchmark year. A Z-score normally has a zero mean and one standard deviation, and 
those scores are confined to a maximum of two in each direction, so its range is from -2 
to 2. To make this score positive, two is added to the Z-score in order to produce the 
generosity score, which ranges from 0 to 4. As a result, we can produce a g-score for each 
specific programme such as unemployment, sickness and pension and produce a general 
g-score by adding those three scores together. They referred to this index as an indicator 
of ‘programme generosity’ (Scruggs & Allan, 2006: 10). 
Scruggs and Allan produced this generosity score using data from 1971 to 2002. Based on 
the change in generosity score from the 1970s to the 2000s, they showed that welfare 
generosity had increased until 1980 and that standard deviation had declined, and that 
welfare generosity turned to decrease since 1980 although most developed countries 
showed a higher level of generosity in 2000 than in 1970, only German and Switzerland 
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showed decreases in welfare generosity (Scruggs & Allan, 2006). Now the most recent 
version of the data contains the generosity scores of developed countries until around 
2011 (Scruggs, 2013).  
Based on the generosity score, Scruggs and Allen (2008) insisted that the conventional 
idea of Esping-Andersen might not be the most appropriate typology, although they 
agreed with the basic idea of Esping-Andersen’s typology. They selected criteria to reflect 
the main characteristic of each regime (conservative, liberal and social democracy) and 
measured the degree of each country in each characteristic. They found that each country 
changed its social welfare institution as time went by, so the welfare regime typology of 
the conventional idea does not fit into the current situation. 
For example, Germany and Italy had a high score in the conservative group in the early 
1980s but only a medium level score in 2002. Canada and Denmark had high scores in two 
dimensions (liberalist and socialist) and four countries (Belgium, Ireland, New Zealand and 
Norway) did not score high in any dimensions. They suggested that there had been some 
movement since the 1980s. In most countries, the individualization of risk and the target 
proportion of the social budget had increased, but at the same time, social programmes 
had a tendency to be more universal and benefits were closer to the flat rate. However, 
Van Kersbergen and Vis (2014) argued that Esping-Andersen’s welfare typology still 
showed distinctive consequences in terms of poverty reduction and income inequality, so 
welfare typology should not be neglected despite all the drawbacks it has, and it still 
seems to need to be updated with recent data.  
Wenzelburger (2013) argued that social-rights-based measures are preferable for a 
comparative analysis of welfare states. However, social-rights-based measures have a 
limitation as shown in the case of the de-commodification index. Generosity score is 
based on the de-commodification index; it therefore has the same problems as the de-
commodification index, such as the exclusion of social programmes that do not replace 
income and the exclusion of long-term care. Consequently, the debate on the 
measurement of welfare effort has not ended yet. 
4.2.2.3. Welfare generosity and its distributive outcome 
Scruggs and Allan (2006) examined the relation between absolute poverty and the 
generosity of welfare states. They found that a reduction in poverty is closely related to 
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welfare generosity. They tested the relationship between absolute poverty and 
programme generosity, adding some control variables such as political partisanship, 
government spending, the level of GDP per capita, growth rate and market poverty 
(Scruggs & Allan, 2008). The results showed that sickness benefit score and pension 
benefit score were negatively related to income inequality and both of them were 
significant. On the other hand, the unemployment benefit score was not significant in 
poverty reduction. When the population was divided into working-age group and elderly 
group, the result was the same but the impact of both programmes (pension and sickness 
benefit) was bigger among the elderly group. As for other variables, the poverty rate 
reduced when market poverty was low with fewer veto points. The impact of the liberal 
regime and the socialist regime was not significant but this was because those regimes’ 
variables were correlated with their generosity score.  
Palme (2006) did not explicitly use generosity score but still employed the replacement 
rate or coverage rate of unemployment benefit, sickness fund and pension programme to 
measure welfare generosity. He found the different impact of each institution on income 
distribution. This showed that more generosity in the pension system was closely 
associated with an increase in poverty level in the working-age population. In contrast, 
more generosity in the sickness fund was related to a lower poverty rate. In addition, 
unemployment benefit generosity was not found to be significant in reducing the poverty 
level.  
These studies have shown that welfare effort measured by generosity score has a 
significant effect on income distribution. As countries put more effort into a welfare state, 
they are likely to have less poverty and less inequality. This result is not much different 
from the results of those studies which employed expenditure-based measurement.  
4.2.2.4. Summary 
In brief, the welfare generosity score proposed by Scruggs and Allan was an elaboration 
of the de-commodification index to measure the welfare effort more rigorously. They 
used Z-scores to calculate the welfare generosity of unemployment benefit, sickness fund 
and pension programme. The welfare generosity index was similar to the de-
commodification index proposed by Esping-Andersen, but it is more consistent and 
accurate, and it covers a longer period. They examined the impact of welfare generosity 
on income distribution and found that the generosity of sickness funds and pension 
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programmes is significantly related to a reduction in the absolute poverty rate in affluent 
countries. They tried to show not only the extent to which income distribution can be 
changed by welfare generosity, but also in what process each welfare institution 
influences income distribution. Thus, they suggested that we need more research on the 
linkage between the political process in determining the welfare institution and its 
distributive outcome. 
Despite the many advantages of the social-rights-based approach, it still has shortcomings. 
It focuses on welfare programmes to replace income, so other programmes such as long-
term care, housing and health-care are excluded. In addition, it does not consider changes 
in welfare needs. The social-rights-based approach is preferable to the expenditure-based 
approach but it does not take an absolute advantageous position over it. Therefore, the 
advantages and disadvantages of each approach have to be kept in mind when they are 
used in empirical studies which look at the relationship between income inequality and 
welfare effort.  
4.3. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a review of the background logic behind how the welfare 
state was founded and has discussed the measurement of governments’ welfare efforts. 
Various factors drive the establishment of a welfare state. Socio-economic development 
such as the development of a market economy leads to an extension of the market 
principal to all social areas, so labour is treated as a commodity and this requires 
government intervention for proper labour legislation. In addition, the prevalence of the 
market system leads to market failure in the social area, so it too requires government 
intervention. On the other hand, the welfare state reflects political struggles between 
different social classes. The social insurance system was introduced to maintain social 
order and maximize the use of the labour of the working class. Difference classes are 
exposed to different kinds of social risk, so the emergence and development of a welfare 
state are driven by political struggles and coalitions to maximize their own interests.   
This chapter also reviewed measurements of welfare effort. It is well known that it is very 
difficult to measure welfare effort properly. There are two main approaches to measuring 
the effectiveness of a welfare state. The first is social expenditure-based measurement 
and the second is the social-rights-based approach. Social expenditure is one of most 
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commonly used measurements since those data are mostly available on an annual basis. 
However, it reflects only financial terms and does not capture the institutional aspect. 
Thus, it does not give us any information about the process by which society shares the 
risk amongst citizens. There have been some attempts to elaborate expenditure-based 
measurement, such as disaggregation and standardising. Expenditure-based 
measurement is still frequently used in empirical research because of its easy accessibility. 
Empirical studies have also shown that an increase in social expenditure has a significant 
effect on income distribution. On the other hand, social-rights-based measurement, such 
as the de-commodification index of Esping-Andersen or the generosity score of Scruggs 
and Allan, is very useful for reflecting the quality of a welfare state and identifying the 
structure of the welfare institution.  However, it requires a great deal of information for 
computation so its accessibility is a bit less than the expenditure-based approach. 
However, due to the development of statistical techniques and data collecting, the 
generosity score has also been frequently used in many empirical studies, although it 
does not cover a social programme that does not relate to income replacement, so some 
important social programmes such as long-term care or education are excluded from the 
generosity score. 
Debate on the measurement of the welfare state is important in this thesis as previous 
studies have shown that income inequality is closely related to the effort of the welfare 
state. Therefore, irrelevant measurement is likely to produce spurious results between 
the two. Each measurement has advantages and disadvantages which have been 
discussed in this chapter, so the debate is still under way. 
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Chapter 5. Welfare state regime: Difference in the institutional 
design of welfare state.  
 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter presented a review of different kinds of measurement of social 
policy development. The expenditure-based approach has been one of most frequently 
used measurements, but it has been criticised because it does not reflect the quality of a 
welfare state. The social-rights-based approach, which was used as an alternative, focuses 
more on the quality of a welfare state and how the government spends the allocated 
expenditure. ’How’ is closely related to the institutional design of a welfare state as an 
institution which is a combination of different welfare programmes, so the institutional 
design of a welfare state reflects process and criteria on how the government spends 
social expenditure.   
The institutional design of a welfare state is different according to the historical and 
political context. Each country has a different social structure, labour market behaviour 
and network between interest groups and these differences influence the trajectories of 
development in the welfare state. This consequently results in the variety of institutional 
designs of a welfare state. Detailed explanations of the process of how the development 
of welfare states takes different paths are beyond the scope of this chapter, so this 
section concentrates on how to classify the institutional designs of welfare states. 
Although each country has its own design of its welfare state, countries which share a 
similar historical and political background are likely to have a similar structure of their 
welfare states. This section presents a review and discussion about how to classify the 
policy structure of a welfare state, as there are several different ways to classify it.  
5.2. Three worlds of welfare state: the welfare regime proposed by 
Esping-Andersen 
5.2.1. Theoretical background to welfare regime 
As discussed in Chapter 4, one of main background logics behind a welfare state is class 
mobilisation theory (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 2006). The development of a welfare 
state is closely related to a power struggle between different social classes about the 
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extension of the scope of social citizenship. Thus the characteristics of a welfare 
institution cannot be understood or measured without a profound understanding of the 
historical process of how to build a welfare state and the political interaction between 
salient actors. 
In fact, some studies have attempted to understand the welfare state as a political power 
struggle between various social groups. T.H. Marshall (1950) insisted that social 
citizenship constitutes the core concept of a welfare state; social citizenship is granted on 
a universal basis rather than on performance. In the period of pre-capitalism, workers’ 
lives were not dependent on the sale of their labour since family, church and the feudal 
system helped them to sustain their quality of life. However, as the market economy 
developed, more workers could sell their labour in the market so their lives became more 
dependent on the market economy, which meant that their lives were more commodified. 
This commodification led to more severe competition between workers and the price of 
labour dropped as the competition became fiercer. Commodification was inevitable for 
the development of capitalism but it was not sustainable (Polanyi, 1944) as it can be 
easily destroyed by illness, accidents or unemployment due to the economic cycle. Thus, 
social citizenship was introduced to protect workers’ lives and to enable them to sustain a 
decent quality of life. As the modern concept of social citizenship was introduced, it was 
accompanied by a de-commodification, which meant that workers’ lives became less 
dependent on the market economy. De-commodification could protect workers who 
provided the labour force from unexpected events, and various types of welfare 
institution were established according to how a society dealt with the de-
commodification. Therefore, the design and effort behind the establishment of a welfare 
institution should be understood as being based on de-commodification, social citizenship 
and historical context.   
5.2.2. How do countries develop welfare state in different ways? 
Countries which share historical and cultural characteristics have developed welfare 
institutions in similar ways. Esping-Andersen considered the struggle between social 
classes and the social stratification system to be the determinants of a welfare regime 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). Continental European countries such as France and Germany 
were based on feudal paternalism and clientelism, so the role of their governments 
emphasized the protection of their people from poverty and maintaining the quality of 
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life. Those countries also had strong and centralized governments so they had sufficient 
bureaucratic power and organization to establish a welfare state. However, the goal of 
social policy in those countries was more concentrated on sustaining social stability and 
order by making people comply with the government’s wishes. They also had a strong 
tradition of emphasizing the role of family and church in taking care of the weak in the 
society. Thus, the difference between social classes was still important, so social 
insurance systems based on occupational group and contribution developed in those 
countries. In pre-capitalist society, occupational groups of artisans and craftsmen which 
had monopolized entry and membership took care of the disabled, widows and orphans 
in their groups. Social insurance based on occupational groups actually maintains the 
difference between different groups, rather than supporting the weaker in the society as 
a whole. 
In contrast, the countries that had liberal governments took a different approach to 
welfare institutions. Their liberalism assumed that the market was emancipatory in 
nature and that each individual could enjoy full employment unless the market was 
interfered with by the government or central power. In addition, liberalism also valued 
individuals’ freedom of choice not being disturbed by the government or other actors. 
Thus, individuals could secure their own welfare if the market worked well, so poverty 
and inequality were not the fault of the market system but the responsibility of 
individuals who neglected to prepare for their own future.  
The welfare states in the liberal world were based on the concept of the residual welfare 
state proposed by Titmuss (1974). That concept meant that a welfare institution was only 
required when the market explicitly failed.  Consequently, those countries preferred 
means-tested assistance rather than a universal approach or social insurance. The 
government was responsible for identifying the individuals or households in need of help 
and for providing appropriate assistance in a way which would not induce them to choose 
welfare instead of work. On the other hand, liberal countries did not object to charity or 
insurance as such. What mattered was that charity or insurance should be free from the 
central authority and based on volunteerism and free contract. Consequently, the private 
insurance market was more preferred and well developed in liberal countries. Anglo-
Saxon countries such as Australia, the US and Canada, and early Scandinavian countries, 
are considered as having a liberalist tradition in designing their welfare institutions. 
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The early Scandinavian countries had similar characteristics to Anglo-Saxon countries but 
had taken a different step in building their social policy institutions. Those countries were 
based on socialism, which strongly objected to the commodification of labour. Those 
countries also had well-organized agricultural communities, so they had a better capacity 
to negotiate with the government. However, they preferred gradual changes rather than 
revolutionary reform so they gradually extended the scope and quality of social rights. 
The labour parties in those countries therefore supported class-exclusive schemes so 
universal coverage was inevitably pursued. At first they avoided social insurance based on 
occupational group and took a universal approach but a modest benefit level, and they 
also introduced private insurance to compensate for the lack of benefit from public 
insurance. Thus, the initial welfare institutions of those countries looked similar to those 
in Anglo-Saxon countries until the 1950s and 1960s. As time went by, their systems 
became more concentrated on strengthening public insurance, not like the Anglo-Saxon 
countries. They extended the scope of absolute need so more people could be covered 
and they upgraded benefits to sustain a decent average living standard. In brief, the base 
of the socialist paradigm in the welfare state was “the emancipation from the market 
dependency” (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 47). 
Consequently, we can find that each country group had a different method and ideology 
to respond to the commodification of labour and the development of capitalism, and they 
established different welfare state institutions. The conservative model, represented by 
Continental European countries, valued the role of family, authority (church) or groups 
which shared the same characteristics for each individual’s market independence in 
maintaining the quality of life, whereas the liberal model emphasized maximizing 
freedom and the responsibility of the individual, so they preferred to minimize the role of 
the government and sought to provide means-tested social assistance rather than a 
universal approach. The socialist model wanted to facilitate the de-proletarianization of 
workers and to extend social rights, so their welfare institutions were more focused on 
extending entitlement and maintaining the quality of life regardless of labour 
participation. We can see that each country had its own way to establish a welfare state 
based on its cultural and political characteristics.        
On the other hand, differences between welfare states can be explained by how strongly 
the middle class cooperated with the working class to support the welfare state (Van 
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Kersenbergen & Vis 2014). If the middle class did not get any benefit from the welfare 
programme, the result was likely to be a liberal regime, whereas it was likely to be a social 
democratic regime when the middle class was entitled to benefits. But then, how is the 
inclusion of the middle class determined?   
Iversen and Soskice (2006) proposed another explanation. They argued that the party 
system plays an important role. After the Second World War, most of the developed 
countries had either a two-party system or a multi-party system. Under a two-party 
system with majoritarianism, the government taxes both the upper and middle classes 
and provides benefits to the poor only when the left party is in power but the 
government will not tax the upper and the middle classes if the right is in power. So under 
the two-party system, the middle class will be either taxed or not, but cannot get benefits 
in either case. Consequently, the middle class is likely to vote for the party of the right 
under the two-party system, so countries with a two-party system tend to have a less 
generous welfare state. In contrast, the middle class has a different choice under the 
multi-party system with proportional representation. The middle class and the party of 
the left can form a coalition and tax the rich only and the middle class has access to 
welfare benefits. Consequently, countries with a multi-party system are likely to have a 
more generous welfare state.  
This explanation proposed by Iversen and Soskice (2006) fits well with the difference 
between a liberal welfare state and the Scandinavian welfare state. However, it has been 
criticised for failing to explain the difference between the Scandinavian welfare state and 
a conservative welfare state, which is generous but differs profoundly from the 
Scandinavian model. Van Kersenbergen and Vis (2014) explained the difference between 
the Scandinavian welfare state and a conservative welfare state by the differences in 
political representation between their welfare states. For Scandinavian countries, there 
were not many conflicts between church and government so churches were not 
threatened by the welfare state which took over the role that the churches used to have. 
Instead, there were conflicts of agrarian and industrial interest, so in the development of 
the welfare state and the importance of a workers-farmers (red-green) coalition was 
emphasized. In contrast, the political space of the agrarian party in Scandinavian 
countries is taken by Christian democratic parties in conservative countries. Parties with 
religious interests played a significant role in the development of welfare states in 
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conservative countries and this is what made the difference between a social democratic 
welfare state and a conservative welfare state.  
The discussion of the three regimes presented by Esping-Andersen is relevant because 
subsequent studies on distinguishing the institutional designs of welfare states were 
mostly based on this typology.  
5.2.3. De-commodification index and welfare typology 
As was shown in the previous section, Esping-Andersen argued that welfare states can be 
divided into three types, liberal, conservative and social democratic. De-commodification 
is one of the main characteristics that affect the institution of the welfare state, so the de-
commodification index which was introduced in Chapter 4 can be an empirical indicator 
to show the difference between regimes.  De-commodification index is frequently used as 
indicator of welfare regime in the empirical studies on distributive outcome of welfare  
A liberal welfare state normally indicates countries with a low de-commodification index, 
which means that the replacement rates of benefit are relatively low, the individual share 
of benefit financing is high and private pensions and private expenditure are prevalent. In 
other words, those countries are more generous in terms of individual freedom and duty, 
rather than government having the responsibility to maintain the individual’s quality of 
life. Australia, the US, the UK, New Zealand, Canada and the Republic of Ireland can be 
included in this model. These so-called Anglo-Saxon countries have a similar institutional 
tradition regarding their welfare states. The second model is the conservative model, 
which occurs in continental European countries such as Italy, France, Germany and 
Switzerland. The conservative model has contributory and earnings-related 
characteristics and a strong legacy of corporatism and Catholic social policy, so the role of 
the government is limited whereas the role of the occupational groups is more 
emphasised in income maintenance benefit.  The third model is found in social 
democratic countries such as the Scandinavian countries, Sweden, Denmark and Norway. 
They have a high de-commodification index so their system has a universal benefit and a 
high degree of equality. Clearly, redistribution is the major goal of policy in the social 
democratic countries (Castles & Mitchell, 1992). In the following section, studies of how a 
different regime makes a difference in performance in terms of income inequality will be 
reviewed. 
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5.2.4. Distributive outcome and welfare regimes 
As mentioned above, the institutional design of a welfare state is expected to make a 
difference in income distribution. Theoretically, the social democratic regime is based on 
the universal system so it provides benefit to all regardless of their income, so it does not 
seem to reduce income inequality. In addition, it is reported that educated people have 
more capacity to take advantage of universal services such as health-care and education. 
It is so-called ‘Matthew effect’ which argues that only the rich can take advantage of a 
universal social programme (Merton, 1968; Rigney, 2010). Moreover, conservative 
regimes mostly have occupational and earnings-related social insurance and these 
systems intentionally reproduce social inequality and status differentials in the welfare 
state. Thus, it seems that social democratic and conservative countries are not effective 
at reducing income inequality.  
In contrast, a targeting system provides benefits exclusively to the poor who are in need 
of it. At first glance, targeting looks efficient because it does not provide benefit to people 
who do not need it. It also looks more effective at reducing income inequality as only the 
poor can have more income from the welfare programme whereas the rich pay tax but do 
not get any benefit. The so-called ‘Robin Hood tax’ which takes money from the rich and 
gives it to poor is one example of the targeting system. In other words, targeting not only 
looks more efficient financially but is also quite useful for reducing income inequality. 
Tullock (1983) argued that targeting is better for the poor as the benefit is concentrated 
on them, whereas the benefit is spread across different income classes under a universal 
system. In addition, Matthew effect mentioned above also provides a rationale for having 
a targeting system. Some studies have argued that the rich can get benefits from 
universal education or child-care as they have access to more information and can get 
more service from them (Cantillon 2010; Vandenbrouke & Vleminckx 2011). 
A simple egalitarian system with a flat-rate benefit for all, which is known as the 
Beveridge system, is often proposed as an alternative to targeting. It is a universal system 
but it is different from the social democratic system, as the benefit is not related to 
previous income. In fact, under the Beveridge system, the poor get relatively more 
benefit than the better off, in spite of flat-rate system. In this sense, the Beveridge system 
can be expected to reduce income inequality as effectively as targeting can because both 
of them offer more benefit to the poor rather than the better off. Under the universal 
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flat-rate system, the absolute amount of benefit is the same for the poor and the rich but 
the relative size of the benefit would be larger for the poor, so the income gap between 
the poor and the better-off can be expected to decrease. Based on this discussion, a 
liberal welfare state should have less income inequality than a social democratic or a 
conservative welfare state. 
However, most empirical studies have shown that social democratic countries have less 
inequality than liberal welfare states. Van Kersbergen and Vis (2014) calculated the mean 
value of the Gini coefficient (which indicates 0 when there is no inequality and 1 when 
there is extreme inequality in a society) of each regime from 1970 to 2000. They found 
that the mean value of the Gini coefficient increased over this period but was still higher 
in the liberal welfare states (0.30 in the 1970s and 0.34 in the mid-2000s) and was lowest 
in the social democratic welfare states (0.22 in the 1970s and 0.25 in the mid-2000s). 
Conservative welfare states were positioned between the other two regimes. Data from 
OECD social expenditure (SOCX) showed the same results, since the Gini coefficient in the 
social democratic welfare states was 0.264 in 2010, 0.337 in the liberal democratic 
welfare states and 0.308 in the conservative welfare states (OECD, 2013). Castles (2008) 
also showed that social democratic countries with a high de-commodification index have 
an equal income distribution with liberal democratic countries. Many studies have shown 
that a welfare regime has a different effect on poverty and inequality, and they seem to 
have reached the same conclusion that a social democratic welfare state has less income 
inequality as well as less poverty than a liberal welfare state (Kenworthy 1999; Korpi & 
Palme 2003; Scruggs & Allan 2006). This is often called the ‘paradox of redistribution’, 
which says that “The more we target benefits at the poor only and the more concerned 
we are with creating equality via equal public transfers to all, the less likely we are to 
reduce poverty and equality” (Korpi & Palme 1999: 681-682). 
On the one hand, this seems to be a quite natural result as countries which have highly 
de-commodified institutions provide protection regardless of the individual’s economic 
performance in the market so people’s lives can be more independent of the market. This 
makes the distributive outcome more equal than in countries with a less de-commodified 
institution. However, an increasing number of previous studies have argued that the 
important thing is whether or not this includes a better welfare benefit. As mentioned 
above, the universal system provides benefit to all regardless of their income and the 
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targeting system provides benefit only to the poor, so the income of the poor can 
increase. However, the targeting system excludes the better-off from welfare benefit so 
they are likely to join private insurance schemes which offer higher benefits. 
Consequently, the income gap between the poor and the better-off increases in a 
targeting system. It is same in the universal flat-rate system as well, since the better-off 
have an incentive to join private insurance schemes. On the other hand, the better-off do 
not have an incentive to join a private insurance scheme under the universal system with 
earnings-related benefits, so the income gap between the poor and the better-off is still 
maintained at a reasonable level, although this system might reproduce the income gap 
in the labour market. Korpi and Palme (1998) argued that the better-off citizens help not 
only themselves but also the low-income group within the encompassing institution.   
The inclusion of the better-off citizens in the welfare state seems to play an important 
role in determining the distributive outcome of the welfare state. The following section 
will therefore offer a discussion of welfare typology and focus primarily on the issues of 
targeting, means-testing and universal eligibility.  
5.3. Five models based on the Targeting and universalism 
Korpi and Palme (1998) wanted to see welfare state institutions from a different 
perspective compared with Esping-Andersen’s de-commodification index. Esping-
Andersen’s model mainly concentrated on the political struggles among states, families, 
and the market in the historical and political context in the determination of welfare 
institutions. Korpi and Palme, however, focused not only on the factors affecting welfare 
institutions but also on the outcome of the welfare states. Institutional structure is 
affected by the conflicts among the interest groups, which then affects the outcome 
(Korpi & Palme, 1998). They therefore focused on two factors which are believed to be 
salient factors in determining the distributive outcome. 
The first factor which they focused on was benefit entitlement and whether it should be 
means-tested or have universal coverage, and the second was benefit level and whether a 
flat rate or earnings-related benefits is more effective. As shown in the previous section, 
some studies have argued that a means-tested system is more efficient at reducing 
poverty and inequality (Tullock, 1983), but most empirical studies have shown opposite 
results. Also, some researchers have argued that a flat-rate benefit is more efficient at 
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reducing poverty and inequality (Castles & Mitchell 1992) but others (such as Palme 1990) 
argued that a universal earnings-related pension system shows better distributive 
outcome in the old-age population than a flat-rate system because an earnings-related 
pension actually crowds out the private pension, and that leads to less inequality.  
Based on those debates, Korpi and Palme (1998) attempted to classify the institutional 
design of welfare state. They did not elaborate the de-commodification index nor 
propose more improved quantitative measurements, but they suggested a different 
welfare state typology combining various levels of benefit entitlement and benefit level. 
They also attempted to examine the effect of the institutional design of a welfare state on 
income distribution.  
5.3.1. Five models based on benefit entitlement and benefit level.  
As a basis of the model, they considered two major social insurance programmes, old-age 
pension and sickness cash programmes, because those two programmes are most 
effective at supporting citizens’ needs, so they are considered a key part of any welfare 
state (Korpi & Palme, 1998). They then focused on three main aspects of each 
programme. The first aspect was the basis of entitlement which indicates whether 
eligibility is based on means-testing, on contributions, on belonging to a specific 
occupational group, or on citizenship. The second aspect was the principle of benefit level, 
whether the benefit level is a means-tested minimum, a flat rate or a different benefit 
related to previous earnings. The third aspect was called “forms for governing a social 
insurance programme” (ibid.: 667), which means that programme governance is based on 
the cooperation between employer and employee. Based on those criteria, they placed 
those countries that had similar welfare systems together into one category based on 
entitlement, benefit level and the type of governance in social insurance.  
Consequently, they established five categories: the targeted model, the voluntary state-
subsidized model, the corporatist model, the basic security model and the encompassing 
model. In brief, the targeted model is a social insurance system based on a means test 
and minimum or smaller benefits focused on the poor. The voluntary state-subsidised 
model uses other voluntary organizations to provide their members with insurance to 
protect them against loss of income. Eligibility is based on membership and voluntary 
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contributions, so it is more important for skilled workers or the middle class, rather than 
the poor. In this model, the flat-rate benefit is more prevalent.  
In the corporatist model, the social insurance system creates socio-political communities. 
The different segments of the labour force form their own groups, and the employees 
and employers have strong co-operation within the groups. Eligibility is based on 
occupational membership and contributions, and the benefit is certainly based on an 
earnings-related system, but the benefit level varies according to the occupational group 
to which the workers belong. It starts with the industrial working class but gradually new 
occupational groups are added. However, the occupational groups are for the 
economically active population, so housewives and outsiders of the labour market are 
excluded from the system. The key difference between the corporatist model and the 
other four models is that the socio-political community is governed by cooperation 
between employer and employee, and the programme is funded by contributions from 
both employees and employers.   
The basic security model, which is closest to the Beveridge model (1942), is based on the 
universality of eligibility, so benefit entitlement is based on citizenship but contributions 
are required. Unlike in the corporatist model, people who contribute to the programme 
belong to the same insurance programme. The benefit level can vary but usually has a 
small variance, so it is more like the flat-rate system. The encompassing model is based 
on a combination of ideas from the Bismarck and Beveridge models. Eligibility is based on 
citizenship and contributions, and the programme provides recipients with basic security 
and earnings-related benefits. This model is likely to crowd out the private insurance 
market and has the potential to cover the whole population. 
5.3.2. Main characteristics of each model 
Social insurance is a risk-pooling system in which members can share risks and resources, 
so the different structures of institutions depend on differences in risk and resources by 
increasing homogeneity in each type. Thus, the welfare institution is related to a coalition 
between poor citizens and better-off citizens, and between the working class and the 
middle class. The corporatist model and the voluntary state-subsidized model both lead 
to strong segmentation of the labour force since they are based on occupational group. 
The occupational or specific industrial group members are likely to share homogeneous 
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risks, contributions and benefits. Thus, the differences between occupational categories 
remain and are institutionalized in those models, so coalition between different classes is 
usually discouraged.  
The targeted model is based on the Robin Hood principle of taking from the rich and 
giving to the poor. Consequently, there would be more tension and conflict between the 
poor who receive the benefits and the middle class who pay for the poor without any 
benefit for themselves. This brings about a negative attitude in the middle class towards 
the welfare institution because the middle class is likely to object to the welfare state 
politically. The basic security model intends to provide a flat-rate benefit based on 
universal citizenship. This means that every citizen who contributes to social insurance 
belongs to the same benefit level. However, the rich are allowed to have private 
insurance as well, so the separation between the middle class and the poor is still 
significant in the basic security model.  
In contrast, the encompassing model includes all citizens and all citizens belong to the 
same programme, which has earnings-related benefits. The encompassing model tends to 
encourage coalition between the working class and the middle class since they are in the 
same programme. In addition, the earnings-related nature of benefits is useful for 
reducing the demand for private insurance since the middle class has no reason to 
abandon public insurance. In the encompassing model, the middle class tries to help the 
poor, as well as themselves (Hirschman 1970, cited in Korpi & Palme 1998) 
5.3.3. Distributive outcome of each model 
Korpi and Palme (1998) examined the poverty rate and inequality index in each group 
using data from eighteen countries in 1985. They found that no country fell into the 
voluntary state-subsidized group. Finland, Norway and Sweden were classified as having 
an encompassing model; France and Germany were included in the corporatist model 
category. Most of the Anglo-Saxon countries (the UK, the US and Canada) and some 
continental European countries (the Netherlands and Switzerland) were included in the 
basic security model. Australia was the only country classified as having a targeted model. 
The results show that income inequality in the working age group (25-59) was high in the 
targeted model countries, and the encompassing model group had the lowest level of 
inequality, followed by the corporatist and basic security models. Countries in the same 
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group had a tendency to have similar values, but there were some differences in the basic 
security model. The Gini index was 0.254 in the Netherlands, which was similar to that in 
the corporatist countries, but in the US it was 0.327, which was the highest level of 
inequality in their sample.  
The poverty rate also showed similar results. The poverty rate was higher in the basic 
security and targeted models but relatively low in the encompassing model, and the 
corporatist model was at medium level. However, like income inequality, the poverty rate 
was quite diverse within the basic security model; the Netherlands was similar to the 
encompassing model countries, but the US had the highest poverty level in its sample.  
Regarding the old-age population (from age 60), we can expect that income inequality is 
lower in the basic security model since the countries in this model have a flat-rate benefit 
whereas the encompassing model and the corporatist model have earning-relatedness in 
their pension systems (Mitchell, Harding & Gruen, 1994), but empirical observation has 
shown different results. Amongst those countries’ 1985 data, income inequality in the 
old-age population was highest in the US, followed by Australia and Canada. The 
countries in the encompassing mode, such as Finland and Sweden, had the lowest level of 
income inequality in the old-age population. In other words, the countries with a flat-rate 
benefit actually had higher levels of income inequality than countries with earnings-
related benefits. The Gini coefficient from OECD data (SOCX) still showed that income 
inequality among the elderly was high in the US, Australia and Canada and low in the 
Scandinavian countries in 2010. According to Korpi and Palme’s (1988) classification, the 
basic security and targeted models have a flat-rate system, so the rich and the middle 
class are likely to have private insurance, and income inequality gets bigger as private 
insurance becomes more prevalent.  
In addition, this shows that the redistribution effect gets higher as the social insurance 
programme is less targeted on the poor. The index of the targeting of transfer income 
which has a negative value when the income transfer is low-income targeting and a 
positive value when the income transfer includes the high earners is positively correlated 
with the size of income redistribution measured by decreases in the Gini coefficient from 
market income to disposable income expressed as a percentage of the Gini coefficient of 
market income. This means that income redistribution is actually relatively small in the 
countries with high levels of targeting such as Australia and Canada. Consequently, 
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studies have shown that countries with universal entitlement and an earnings-related 
benefit system shows better form in income distribution than countries with targeted 
entitlement and a flat-rate benefit system (Korpi & Palme, 1998). This is notable result 
since it is the opposite of many scholars’ expectation, since many scholars have insisted 
that a flat-rate benefit is more useful for reducing inequality (Castles & Mitchell, 1992) 
and a targeted system has more equalizing power than the universal approach (Barry, 
1990; Marshall, 1950).  
However, those studies do not show the rigorous relationship between welfare policy and 
income inequality because they reached their conclusions by simply comparing the 
poverty rates and income inequality across the countries according to the welfare state 
model, and did not consider the impact of other economic or political variables. Even so, 
their findings do shed light on how the welfare institution changes the distributive 
outcome in a very detailed way.  
Subsequently, some studies have examined the impact of welfare institution proposed by 
Korpi and Palme using more rigorous quantitative research methods. Palme conducted 
more developed research in 2006, based on his previous study of 1998 (Palme, 2006). He 
discussed previous studies on the relation between welfare states’ policies, poverty and 
inequality and emphasized that institutional difference between welfare states is very 
important in accounting for the diversity of poverty and inequality which exists across the 
developed countries. However, it is very difficult to make a clear classification in the real 
world since countries adopt mixed welfare states policies. Moreover, one country can fall 
into a different welfare state model according to the different policy areas. We therefore 
need to focus on a specific policy area and its targeted group when we need to know the 
relationship between welfare states’ different regimes and income distribution.  
Palme (2006) took some case studies to prove that the design of welfare state institutions 
matters in income distribution by using pooled time series, cross-sectional regression. 
One of his cases examined the relationship between unemployment insurance and 
poverty among the working aged. Welfare state regimes are divided into three categories 
according to his previous study of 1998; the basic/targeted, state corporatist and 
encompassing models. He established two regression models, the first considered 
structural variables (unemployment rate, the rate of the single earner, female labour 
participation rate) and the welfare regime, and the other considered institutional 
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variables (net replacement rate, coverage rate and maximum duration) and the welfare 
regime. As a result, institutional variables explained a larger part (about 68%) of the 
variation in poverty reduction than structural variables (46%), and the encompassing and 
corporatist models did not show any large difference but the basic/targeted model was 
distinct from the other models. The results showed that the basic/targeted model 
increased the poverty rate by 4.1% more than the encompassing model. In addition, it 
was also shown that retrenchment in the net replacement rate was associated with an 
increase in the poverty rate.   
Another case study was the pension system and poverty among the elderly. The pension 
system was classified into a basic security model and an income security model. The basic 
security model included a citizenship pension (a pension without any needs testing or 
previous income requirement), a minimum pension (basic benefit plus means-tested 
components) and a worker’s minimum pension (requiring completion of a minimum 
number of years of contribution), and the income security model was the worker’s 
pension model which offered benefits to workers on the basis of specific numbers of 
years of contribution and of average earnings.  The results showed that all types of 
pension were related to a decrease in poverty among the elderly, but only the citizenship 
pension and the worker’s minimum pension were significant. This finding indicates that a 
pension based on citizenship is more important in reducing the poverty rate among the 
elderly. It also shows that aggregated pension expenditure is not significant, which 
indicates that the aggregated model does not capture the impact of each component. 
To summarise, then, this current study makes two points. The first is that the institutional 
design of a social protection programme is very important in terms of the distributive 
outcome. The second is that we need to separate the policies according to their main 
objectives because each policy has its own goal and target and each country can fall into a 
different welfare regime according to the specific policy area. 
In brief, the model proposed by Korpi and Palme shows how the mixture in a welfare 
institution affects the distributive outcome. They focused on two factors, benefit 
entitlement and benefit level, and established five models based on the mixture in each 
institution. Although they did not elaborate on quantitative measurements for welfare 
states, they did provide a more sophisticated welfare typology so that we can see the 
difference in distributive outcome in different welfare institutions.  Empirical studies have 
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shown that those mixtures of welfare institution have a significant impact on the 
distributive outcome. Contrary to other scholars’ expectations, the results showed that an 
earnings-related benefit system with universal eligibility is related to a low level of 
income inequality and poverty rate. In fact, this result is in line with the ‘paradox of 
redistribution’ which was described in a previous section.  
5.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a review of previous research studies on the welfare state and 
income distribution. The welfare state is the effort of a government to protect the most 
vulnerable groups in its society. Welfare states all have a similar role but the development 
of a welfare state differs across countries according to their political and social context. 
Thus, the welfare state has different institutional structures. There are various ways to 
identify the institutional design of a welfare state. Esping-Andersen regarded a welfare 
institution as an instrument by which each country responds to the de-commodification 
of labour which arose from the development of capitalism. The de-commodification of 
labour was a universal phenomenon so each country had to establish a different welfare 
institution to deal with it based on its own history of social stratification. Those countries 
which shared a similar history and social structure were likely to have a similar welfare 
system. Consequently, Esping-Andersen suggested three categories of welfare institution, 
social democratic, conservative and liberal democratic welfare states.  
Empirical studies have shown that income inequality and the poverty rate are significantly 
different in different welfare regimes; a social democratic welfare state has a relatively 
low level of poverty and income inequality whereas a liberal democratic welfare state has 
a higher level of poverty and income inequality. It can be inferred that the institutional 
design of a welfare state has a significant effect on income distribution. The point of this 
result is that liberal democratic states, mainly focused on a targeting system, have higher 
income inequality, and this is called the paradox of redistribution. Korpi and Palme 
proposed five categories of welfare institution focusing on the degree of universalism and 
targeting and found that income distribution looks better under a universalist system. 
In brief, this chapter has presented a review of the various institutions of the welfare 
state as determinants of income inequality. Previous studies have shown that the level of 
welfare effort has a significant effect on income inequality and how governments spend is 
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important for income inequality. In other words, not only the quantity of a welfare state 
but also its policy structure are very important in determining income inequality. This 
chapter has concentrated on the conventional discussion of the welfare state. Welfare 
states now face economic and sociological changes so their reformation is an emerging 
issue. Therefore, the following chapter will focus on changes in the environment that a 
welfare state faces, and how it affects the structure of the welfare state and income 
distribution.  
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Chapter 6. Reform of the welfare state and its distributive outcome 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter offered a review of the role of the welfare state as a determinant of 
income distribution. It was shown that the welfare state has a significant effect on 
changes in income inequality. However, the focus of the previous chapter was on the 
conventional welfare state which is established on the basis of the male-breadwinner 
household in an industrial society. Many recent studies have pointed out that welfare 
states have undergone substantial changes since the 1990s (Bonoli, 2013). Sociological 
changes such as an aging population or household formation have put financial pressure 
on the welfare state and produced a new type of vulnerable social group. At the same 
time, the industrial structure is changing rapidly so the type of unemployment is also 
changing. These changes affect income inequality directly and require reform of the 
welfare state.  
Chevan and Stokes (2000) stated that industrial restructuring and population composition 
drive income inequality in the US. Industrial restructuring, so-called “deindustrialization” 
(Bluestone & Harrison, 1982), means the shift of employment from manufacturing to 
services because of technical developments and it had exacerbated income inequality in 
America, as income inequality in the service area is larger than that in the manufacturing 
area. This argument is in line with the argument of Kuznets and other economists who 
insisted that income inequality is mainly driven by changes in the labour market which are 
caused by technological development. The change in population composition also affects 
income inequality: Chevan and Stokes (2000) gave the participation of the female labour 
force, the increase in female-headed families, the proportion of minority groups, 
educational attainment and age as determinants of income inequality.  
The aging population is also reported to bring significant changes to income distribution. 
Previous studies have pointed out that most developed countries experience increases in 
life expectancy combined with a low fertility rate. As the population gets older, economic 
productivity becomes lower and social expenditure regarding old-age care increases 
(OECD, 1996). At the same time, the future generation is expected to take on an 
increased burden to take care of the elderly in the society due to the low fertility rate. In 
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particular, pension costs form a large proportion of social spend and an aging population 
increases pension costs, so the government comes under pressure from a budget deficit.  
The welfare state attempts to introduce new policy instruments to deal with these 
changes, although the functions of the traditional welfare state also remain important. 
For instance, reform of the public pension programme has been attempted across 
developed countries and an active labour market policy is emerging as an alternative to 
the traditional welfare programme. It is difficult to define the trend of these new policy 
instruments, but the policies tend to be more active, productive and preventive. 
Traditional welfare programmes are more focused on a protective system, so this change 
is also expected to affect income distribution.  
Therefore, this chapter will present a review of the sociological and economic challenges 
to the current welfare state and consider how a welfare state deals with those challenges 
with new policy instruments. In particular, the focus of this chapter is on the aging 
population and pension reform, changes in an industrial structure and the introduction of 
an active labour market policy, and these are often regarded as important challenges for 
a welfare state. At the same time, this chapter will also review empirical studies of the 
distributive outcome of new policy instruments and reform programmes.  
6.2. Ageing and income inequality 
6.2.1. Ageing population 
Populations in OECD countries are aging quite quickly because of increases in life 
expectancy and low fertility rates (Esping-Andersen, 2009) in the most developed world, 
but the pace of aging can vary. The size of the increase is quite large in southern 
European countries such as Portugal, Italy and Greece. Nordic countries, except Finland, 
show only modest increases compared with other countries. Life expectancy is increasing 
and fertility rates are still very low in most developed countries, so it has been reported 
that the proportion of the population aged over 60 is expected to reach 32% by 2050, 
from 12% in 1950 and 23% in 2013 (UN World Population Aging, 2013). Most of the 
European countries have been getting older and older during the twentieth century and it 
is expected that more than a quarter of the EU population is going be aged more than 65 
years in around 2040 (Esping-Andersen, 2009). In particular, the proportion of the ultra-
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aged (over 80) doubles every twenty years and is expected to reach around 10% in the 
middle of this century (Esping-Andersen, 2009). 
An aging population affects society in various ways. The aging population is related to the 
decrease in labour supply due to the fall in the proportion of the younger population. 
Changes in labour supply lead to lower economic growth as the relative increase in 
dependent persons is higher than the increase of workers (Prskawetz et al., 2007; Harper, 
2014). The OECD (2012) estimated that the proportion of working-age people in most 
countries is going to decline over the next half century by 9% on average and this will 
have a potentially negative effect on economic growth.  
Aging is also closely related to income distribution and the welfare institution. Most 
people retire at around 60 years old and they depend on a pension during the rest of 
their life, which means they have less income than the economically active group. Thus, 
income inequality between the generations and poverty among the elderly can be a social 
issue. In addition, aging leads to a new type of inequality. Life expectancy is likely to be 
longer for individuals with high education and a professional job, and their average 
income is higher than the average. Thus, individuals with low education and a manual job 
are more likely to fall into the poverty trap after retirement and have relatively short life 
expectancy (Meara, Richards & Cutler, 2008)  
Educational homogamy is something that will increase inequality among the elderly since 
a well-educated couple’s marriage is more stable and their family is likely to have more 
income and less risk of unemployment (Blossfeld &Buchholz, 2009). A less educated 
couple is more unstable, so divorce and lone mothers are more common among less 
educated couples. Consequently, less educated couples are likely to have fewer savings 
and to fall into poverty. As a result, inequality between the rich and the poor increases 
since the rich can enjoy a longer life after retirement with an ample pension and savings, 
whereas the poor suffer from poverty after retirement and die earlier. US studies have 
shown that income among top quintile retirees is higher than the income of bottom 
quintile retirees by eight times (Butrica, Iams & Smith, 2003).  
An increase in the elderly who depend on a pension is inevitably related to an increase in 
welfare expenditure. Thus, countries with a high elderly population are likely to have 
trouble maintaining a decent level in the pension system. The low fertility rate in most 
developed countries means that there are fewer people to work and to finance current 
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government expenditure but more people who need support from the government. 
Consequently, revenue decreases and expense increases, so the government can easily 
get into financial trouble. The government needs to cut the pension benefit but this is not 
easy because the elderly have strong voting power. As the proportion of the elderly 
increases, pension generosity is unlikely to reduce. Politicians, who want to maximize 
their votes, are more sensitive to the requirements of the elderly than to the young 
generation. Thus, politicians try to maintain the generosity of the pension system to get 
votes from the elderly and this leads to cuts in the benefit of other social protection 
systems, such as unemployment insurance or child benefit. Consequently, a generous 
pension system can be related to poverty in the young generation, so it can exacerbate 
inequality between the generations (Scruggs & Allan, 2008). 
In brief, most developed countries are facing an aging population and this is expected to 
have a significant effect on income inequality and government spending. Therefore, 
governments attempt to bring in new policy instruments particularly focused on pension 
reform to deal with an aging population. In the following section, the main characteristics 
of pension reform in developed countries and its distributive outcome are reviewed.  
6.2.2. Aging population and pension reform 
Usually, it is believed that the aging phenomenon has a negative effect on income 
distribution since the elderly are likely to have less income than working-age people are, 
so they are likely to fall into poverty. Thus, we expect income inequality to increase as we 
have more elderly in our society.  
The pension system had been the main pillar of the welfare state as a means for the 
elderly to maintain their purchasing power by income support (Bonoli & Natali, 2012). 
The pension is a not the only social protection system to help the elderly because other 
welfare programmes also affect the income of the elderly. However, although the income 
of the elderly can be influenced by different kinds of welfare policy, a pension is still 
considered the most significant means of income support. Recently, as the proportion of 
elderly has increased, the government needs to spend more on its pension programme 
and has to bear the inevitable fiscal burden caused by the increase in pension 
expenditure. An aging population also implies that there will be more spending on health, 
long-term care and so on.  
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Low fertility rates leads to the reduction of the working-age population which means that 
governments suffer from a lack of funding to support old-age benefits. To overcome this 
financial burden, the government must reform the social protection programme of the 
welfare state. In particular, the reform of pension policy is a major part of the 
transformation of the welfare state as it forms a large part of welfare spending. The 
generous pension systems which have been employed by most developed countries have 
been criticized as they increase the fiscal burden on the government during a period of 
low economic growth. In addition, economic experts insist that current pension systems 
give an incentive to those who want early retirement and makes workers work less, so it 
is argued that current generous pension systems are not sustainable for those economic 
reasons (Marie, 2005). Also, countries are exposed to international competition because 
of globalisation so they try to stay competitive, so pressure on the welfare state is getting 
higher and higher (Ohmae 1994; Reich, 1991). The effect of globalisation is still 
controversial, as was seen in the previous chapter, but it is still argued that economic 
globalisation leads to reform (retrenchment, mostly) of the welfare state.  
However, reform of welfare policy, including the national pension programme, is not easy. 
Tsebelis (2002) stated that reform of the welfare state is difficult since there are many 
veto players in the politics of a welfare state. Pierson (2004) stated that welfare 
programmes are closely related to each other so a change to one part can affect the 
efficiency of the other parts. Thus, welfare institutions tend to have path dependency. In 
particular, the pension system has been considered as one of the most difficult 
institutions to reform. The government has to increase the contribution rate or cut 
benefit to contain pension spending, but both measures can be unpopular with voters 
since it means that the disposable income of both sectors is reduced (Bonoli, 2003). 
Consequently, the reform of a pension programme is likely to face political protest so the 
government is likely to stick to the current institution and avoid radical transformation. 
In addition, a pension programme is a contract between generations (Myles & Pierson, 
2001) so it has inertia inevitably. Consequently, pension policy is the typical case that 
shows path-dependent inertia (Pierson, 2001). Politicians are reluctant to change the 
current system but they cannot neglect demographic and economic pressure any more so 
they have attempted to reform the pension system over the last two or three decades 
and their efforts have often been described as “elephants on the move” (Hinrichs, 2000). 
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Although radical reforms are difficult to achieve, small changes have still been made in 
the form of policy drift, layering and conversion (Hacker, 2004). Policy drift means that 
the effect of a policy is changed without significant changes in policy structure. Under 
policy drift, practical interpretation and implementation of a policy can be changed 
without any formal revision. Conversion is also a kind of policy change without formal 
revision. Conversion occurs when an existing institution has a new direction so the 
institution allows workers to work within the boundary of the institution to pursue 
multiple ends (Thelen, 2004; Beland, 2007). Layering refers to the situation in which new 
policies are added to an existing institution. These three methods show that in reality, 
pension reform is politically difficult.    
Obviously, not every effort to reform the pension system can be interpreted as 
retrenchment of the welfare state. Some countries have reduced pension generosity 
radically whereas the change in other countries is only at a modest level (Bergh & 
Erlingsson, 2009). As already discussed, politics in a pension programme is different from 
other welfare policy areas. Wolf, Wenzelburger and Zohlnhoefer (2013) showed that 
many voters are willing to accept cuts in unemployment benefit but not in pension 
benefit regardless of their political partisanship. They used two international social 
surveys in 1996 and 2006 in eighteen countries and both surveys showed the same result: 
the supporters of the right-wing party were against cuts in pension generosity just like the 
supporters of the left-wing party, so it is not easy to make benefit cuts in a pension 
programme. In addition, empirical studies have shown that the partisanship of the 
government does not play an important role in cuts in pension generosity. On the 
contrary, some have argued that cuts in the benefits of a pension programme are easier 
in the government of left-wing parties. Voters assume that the left are interested in 
expanding or preserving the welfare state, so they believe that benefit cuts are really 
unavoidable in circumstances when a left-wing party attempts to cut the benefit (Ross, 
2000; Green-Pedersen 2001; 2002, Wenzelburger & Zohlhoefer, 2013).  
This case implies, however, that cutting pension benefit is not easy even for left-wing 
parties. In general, previous studies have shown that it is very difficult to cut the 
generosity of a pension programme considering the unique political situation regarding 
pension programmes.  However, changes in the pension system do take place in many 
developed countries. In those cases, what course the government chooses for the 
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transformation of the pension programme is the introduction of a supplementary private 
fund system instead of a public pension (Bonoli & Palier 2007). Transformation from a 
public to a private pension system came in gradually because of the political difficulties 
discussed above. 
The roles of private funds and public pensions are different in different countries; it 
seems that the role of private funds is becoming more important, although the role of a 
private pension and its institutional arrangement depend on the political institution and 
public consensus in each country, so trajectories cannot be identical across the world. 
Continental European countries have introduced new pillars of occupational or personal 
pensions and cut back on public pensions, and Anglo-Saxon countries which already have 
a multi-pillar system focus on setting a regulatory framework for private pensions. Nordic 
countries have a hybrid system, based on a combination of a universal public pension and 
a specific second-tier pension (Ebbinghaus, 2012). 
What we can see is that most countries are still undergoing transformation and this 
transformation includes increasing private funding, a mixed system of private and public, 
and more delayed and insufficient income support for the elderly (Private fund in the 
thesis does not include mandatory private pension. It indicates voluntary private pension 
only). In a broad sense, transformative change is the reduction of the public pension and 
the expansion of private pensions (Ebbinghaus, 2012). Streeck and Thelen (2005) 
explained this gradual change by layering, conversion or displacement. A private pension 
is added as a new layer to a multi-pillar system at first. There is no overall change in the 
public pillar but the main function of the public pillar is converted from status 
maintenance to a basic income function in continental Europe, or the main function of 
the government is converted from the provision of a state pension to control of private 
pensions in Anglo-Saxon countries. Although the details of the process of transformation 
are different, one of main trend is that the way to provide pension is becoming more 
diverse. Public pensions used to be the major source in the past but private pensions are 
taking a significant part in most countries today. Some countries tend to reduce the 
proportion of public money in the pension system so that private pensions provide the 
majority of funding in those countries (Brooks, 2005; Orenstein, 2008). Based on this 
trend, public pensions are likely to be replaced by private funding, personal savings and 
collective agreements between employees and employers. Second, the goal of public 
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policy for the elderly is changing. The previous pension system was blamed for 
stimulating early retirement because of the generous pension benefits with a relatively 
short qualifying period, so reforms of the pension system have pursued delaying 
retirement and promoting the continued employment of the elderly (Jespen et al., 2002; 
Ebbinghaus, 2006). These changes help a government to maintain a sustainable pension 
system and overcome the fiscal deficit by increasing income tax revenue and reducing the 
period of pension payment.  
These changes are accompanied by an increase in investment in lifelong education for the 
elderly.  An active labour policy is a very relevant tool in the transformation of the welfare 
state in this regard. An active labour policy provides those who are in unemployment with 
education and training programmes which will improve their employability. This is one-
step further than just offering income protection for unemployment, so we can help the 
elderly to get back to work through education and training. Details of active labour 
market policy are discussed in a separate section. It is essential for the elderly, as it is 
necessary to improve the skills and knowledge of the elderly so that they can remain in 
the labour market longer than previous generations. In brief, the goal of public policy for 
the elderly is to support them to stay in the labour market longer, not just provide them 
with income support.  
6.2.3. Pension reform and its distributive outcome 
There have been many studies of pension reform in the modern welfare state in terms of 
its drivers, politics and institutional trajectories, but not many of them have considered 
the distributive outcome of transformation (Bonoli & Natali 2012). This is very salient 
aspect of transformation as one of main functions of a welfare state is to redistribute 
income and contain the poverty level. As has been shown in the discussion above, 
privatisation and financialization of pension system is likely to lead to insecurity for the 
elderly. An increase in voluntary private pensions inevitably strengthens the link between 
current income and pension income so a withdrawal of public pensions and the extension 
of private incomes is likely to increase the risk of poverty and income inequality not only 
among the elderly, but also among the entire society. In particular, after the economic 
crisis hit European countries in 2008 and 2009, it was reported that the income insecurity 
of pensioners was higher in those countries which had a more privatised and financialized 
pension system.  
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In other words, pensioners are likely to be exposed to risk from outside if the country 
they live in has a more privatised system and an open economy system. Zaidi (2010) 
projected benefit ratios over the period 2007-2060 based on the current trends in benefit 
cuts. The benefit ratio is calculated from the value of average public pension relative to 
average wage. If the benefit ratio is high, it means that the value of the average pension is 
close to the average wage. His projection showed that the benefit ratio will decrease in 
22 European countries out of 27, and it is particularly serious for Sweden, France and 
Austria. The decline in the benefit ratio of those countries will be more than 20%, so the 
increase in mandatory private funding cannot offset the cut in the generosity of the public 
pension. Consequently, future retirees in those countries will have a higher risk of being 
poorer than the current generation.  
There have been several studies of the distributive outcome of increases in private 
pensions. Caminada and Goudswaard (2005; 2010) found that a public social security 
system generally has a larger distributive effect than a private social security system, so it 
can be inferred that an increase in private pensions has a negative effect on income 
inequality and the poverty rate. Studies based on cross-sectional data have shown that 
income inequality among the elderly increases as the proportion of private pensions 
increases (Wells, 2004; Fukawa, 2006). Hughes and Steward (2004) argued that an 
increase in the proportion of private pensions is associated with an increase in the 
poverty level among the elderly. It is fair to say that the level of private pensions depends 
on income level during the working life (Vliet et al., 2012), so it can be inferred that high 
incomes are likely to have a higher proportion of private pensions as supplementary and 
this will lead to higher income inequality.  
On the other hand, there have been studies which have argued that an increase in private 
pensions does not have any significant effect on income inequality among the elderly. 
Vliet et al. (2012) criticized previous studies for using either only cross-sectional data or 
descriptive analysis for one or two countries, so they did not capture the dynamic parts of 
pension reform and failed to generate a universal conclusion. They therefore used time-
series data from fifteen EU countries over twelve years and found that income inequality 
among the elderly in fact decreased as the proportion of private pensions increased. They 
argued that the absolute increase in private pension benefit is smaller for low incomes 
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but the relative size of benefit could be larger for low incomes than for higher incomes, 
but there was no concrete evidence for this. 
6.3. Changes in labour market structure and active labour market policy.  
6.3.1. The origin of active social policy and ALMPs 
The unemployment protection system in most developed countries is based on the 
heritage of the industrial era (Alber, 1981). The main characteristics of the industrial era 
were long and stable employment based on a manufacturing economy. However, the 
importance and proportion of manufacturing began to decrease from the mid-1960s. 
Benefits provided by the government at that time were focused on financial support 
which replaced workers’ salaries during their unemployment. Unemployment benefit was 
expected to play the role of an automatic stabilizer during temporary downturns. 
Unemployment was considered temporary due to periodical economy recessions, so the 
main role of unemployment benefit was to help the unemployed to maintain their quality 
of life during unemployment and they were expected to get a job when the economic 
downturn ended. During the industrial era, unemployment benefit consisted of two 
systems. The first was unemployment insurance based on contributions from workers and 
the second was to support workers at the lower level or atypical workers who were 
unlikely to have a regular type of unemployment insurance. Unlike the pension system, 
the variation in unemployment benefit systems in different countries was less diverse 
than other social protection systems as there was no universal system and benefit was 
either based on contributions or was means-tested, although there were some variations 
in financing and governance (Clasen & Clegg, 2011). Previous studies have nevertheless 
shown some extent of difference between different welfare regimes. A universal system 
was prevalent in most social democratic countries, whereas social insurance was the key 
component in conservative countries. A means-test system was a common feature of 
liberal countries, but they also had other types of social assistance (Bambra & Eikemo, 
2008).  
Even so, changes were noticed in economic trends which affected labour market policy 
and many studies have pointed out that fundamental changes in the welfare state took 
place between the late 1990s and the early 2000s (Bonoli, 2013). Industrial employment 
began to decrease quite quickly and the employment service area started to surge; the 
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female labour market participation rate began to increase so the importance of the male-
breadwinner model began to decline. In addition, service-based economies are likely to 
have lower increases in productivity so flexibility was more important than stability for 
efficient production. In addition, service-based economies require highly skilled workers 
so an increase in service-based economies leads to an increase in the for demand for 
highly skilled workers rather than for low-skilled workers. Now the demand for low-skilled 
workers is shrinking even in a time of economic boom.  
In this regard, unemployment is not frictional or temporary any longer as unemployment 
is not a periodical but a structural problem. The unemployed are therefore unlikely to find 
new jobs if they do not have relevant skills and knowledge, and the risk of unemployment 
is higher for those who do not have advanced levels of skill or knowledge. These changes 
in society and in the industrial structure brought about changes in labour market 
institutions, such as increasing short part-time contracts or time-limited contracts (Bonoli 
& Natali 2012). Under conventional unemployment protection, the unemployed find 
themselves under-protected and unemployment protection provides just temporary 
assistance but cannot remove the fundamental cause of unemployment. Governments 
also have faced an economic crisis and an age of austerity after a golden age of welfare 
state expansion, so it is necessary for them to find new strategies for the welfare state 
(Bonoli & Natali 2012; Bonoli 2013). 
The increase in female labour market participation has led to a shift in welfare states 
which are based on the male-breadwinner model. Domestic work that used to be 
performed within the household, such as child-care, has to be externalized, so the 
demand for policy instruments to reconcile work and family life increases. In addition, 
changes in family structure and behaviour have caused an increase in single parenthood 
which has raised salient issues for the welfare state, such as income support and child-
care, and work for a single-parent family is likely to be exposed to the risk of getting into 
poverty and the traditional welfare state is unlikely to cover single parenthood. Along 
with long-term unemployment due to economic structure, these changes are termed the 
‘new social risk’ (Bonoli, 2013) and new social policy instruments are required to deal 
with these issues.   
Consequently, welfare states attempt to find more active policy instruments to deal with 
this situation. Active social policies are needed to prevent people from falling into 
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circumstances which require protection from the government and it is necessary to 
encourage the unemployed and the retired to re-enter the labour market by updating 
their skills and knowledge. In Sweden, for instance, the government increased 
employment in the public or para-public sector rather than just providing the 
unemployed with benefit. This was a kind of active social policy as it provides 
opportunities to acquire work experience. Now most welfare states have introduced a 
social policy set which intervenes more actively in the life of the unemployed, such as job 
training, job-searching consulting and so on. The government not only improves the 
quality of life of the unemployed, but also promotes national competitiveness by 
promoting labour market participation and investment in human capital (Bonoli, 2013). 
Consequently, an active social policy indicates a series of policies to help people back into 
the labour market by the removal of obstacles to labour market participation and 
prioritizing investment in human capital.  
ALMPs are considered to be one of most salient components in an active social policy. 
Bonoli (2013) argued that ALMPs are the cornerstone of an active social policy. ALMPs are 
sets of policies to remove obstacles to entering the labour market (Bonoli 2011), and they 
have multiple goals. There are some issues about how to define and measure ALMPs 
practically, and this is discussed in the data and variables section. ALMPs became an 
important policy tool in many OECD countries from the mid-1990s but the origin of the 
ALMP can be traced back to the 1950s.  
Most experts agree that the Rehn-Meider model in Sweden was the starting point for 
ALMPs (Bonoli 2011). From 1951, Sweden introduced an egalitarian wage policy which 
meant identical wage increases across the whole of industry. Industries with low 
productivity were pushed out of market as they could not bear the wage increase. The 
redundant workers were unemployed so the government needed to retrain them and to 
supply a new labour force to the flourishing industries.  At that time, the use of ALMPs in 
Sweden was a way of responding to the shortage in the labour force so the government 
provided finance for an extensive vocational training programme (Swenson, 2002).  
The trajectories of ALMPs from the 1950s are quite diverse in different periods as well as 
in different countries. In the 1950s and 1960s, most developed countries were 
undergoing a rapid expansion of their economies so the main objective of ALMPs was to 
retrain and upskill the labour force. They could then provide industries with workers who 
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had adequate skills and knowledge. At that time, unemployment benefit was still core for 
the social protection of the unemployed, and it was not quite related to ALMPs. In the 
1970s, most countries went through a recession due to economic crises such as the oil 
crisis. Many workers lost their jobs and governments provided alternative jobs for them. 
Governments needed to create direct demand in the labour market as demand in private 
industries shrank.  So ALMPs in the 1970s were focused on the government’s need to 
produce more jobs in the public or para-public sector. After this period, ALMPs began to 
be integrated into unemployment policy as well. Finally, from the mid-1990s, an 
activation paradigm emerged in labour market policy. ALMPs in this period put emphasis 
on employment assistance and the reinforcement of work incentives. Also, integration 
between ALMPs and the unemployment benefit system was getting stronger. The main 
trend has been summarized here although the time span of each country could be 
different. Some countries such as Sweden and Germany began to set out ALMPs earlier 
and the other countries such as Denmark and the UK developed ALMPs to a significant 
extent a bit later. 
In the meanwhile, the notion of flexicurity became very popular in labour market policy at 
the international level. Flexicurity is the combination of a relatively liberal labour market 
with a generous welfare state. It was based on the Danish approach to the labour market  
which used flexible employment contracts, a high replacement rate of unemployment 
benefit and a developed ALMP system. The unemployed could easily enter into or exit 
from the labour market due to low job protection but generous unemployment benefit 
compensated for the financial difficulties of unemployment. ALMPs also helped the 
unemployed to move back into the labour market. The EU included its vision of flexicurity 
in many policy fields including ALMPs (EU, 2007).  
6.3.2. Various types of ALMPs 
ALMPs cover a diverse range of policies so it is very difficult to define them clearly. This 
study will therefore attempt to identify the different types of ALMP that are implemented 
across countries in order to determine what areas ALMPs cover. The dimensions of 
ALMPs which governments put emphasis on differed slightly between countries. At one 
extreme, ALMPs were more concentrated on vocational training, removing the obstacles 
to employment and facilitating re-entry to the labour market. Sweden is a typical country 
of this type. At the other extreme, ALMPs are combined with stronger work incentives, 
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time limits on recipiency and benefit reduction. Mostly English-speaking countries fall in 
this category (King 1995; Peck 2001).  
There have been various attempts to distinguish between these two types of ALMP. 
Barbier (2004) distinguished between liberal activation and universal activation. Liberal 
activation refers to a system which concentrates on work incentives and benefit 
conditionality, whereas universal activation refers to a system which concentrates on 
human capital investment, such as job training and education. Most English-speaking 
countries fall into liberal activation and Nordic countries into universal activation. Also, 
continental European countries can be different from Nordic or English-speaking 
countries so they can be categorized into a third type.  
Clegg (2005, cited in Bonoli, 2012) also attempted to distinguish different types. 
According to his classification, there are two types of ALMP: circulation and integration. 
Circulation is intended to improve the opportunities for the unemployed to contact 
potential employers, whereas integration provide the unemployed with jobs directly, 
such as subsidized jobs or sheltered employment. It is clear that this dichotomy is an 
oversimplification of real-world policies, but it can be a good starting point for classifying 
the type of ALMP.  
Morel et al. (2012) identified a difference between Nordic countries and English-speaking 
countries. Nordic countries have a combined system between active policy and 
conventional social protection policy whereas English-speaking countries replace social 
protection with active policy. Continental European countries are mostly regarded as 
remaining as conventional social protection welfare states, although they attempt to 
introduce some of the active policy. In this regard, Morel’s analysis is in line with the 
classification of Barbier (2004).  
Kersbergen and Hemerijck (2012) also classified active welfare states into three types. 
The Nordic welfare states offer a wide range of social services and generous income 
guarantees, and their ALMP is aimed at maximising the employment rate for both men 
and women. In contrast, liberal welfare states offer means-tested benefits while 
increasing ALMP. Continental welfare states, which were based on protection for the 
male-breadwinner model, are targeting outsiders in the labour market, such as the young, 
female and low-skilled workers.   
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Table 6-1 Type of ALMPs 
Barbier (2004) 
Liberal activation Work incentive, benefit conditionality 
Universal activation Human capital investment, education 
Clegg (2005) 
Circulation 
Opportunity for the unemployed to contact 
employers 
E.g) placement service 
Integration 
Directly providing jobs to the unemployed.  
e.g subsidized jobs, sheltered employment 
Kersbergen & 
Hemerijck 
(2011) 
Nordic welfare state 
Increase in human investment with generous 
income support 
Liberal welfare state 
Increase in job training and job searching with 
means-tested benefit 
Continental welfare 
state 
Focus on outsiders in the labour markets with 
male-breadwinner model  
6.3.3. Social investment and ALMPs 
Another notion which indicates the recent transformation of the welfare state is ‘social 
investment’. Social investment had emerged after the era of neo-liberalism in the 1980s, 
moving away from the conventional welfare state (Jenson 2012). In the 2000 Lisbon 
agenda, it was emphasized that social protection systems have to be modernized to 
strengthen their function to contribute to competitiveness, employment and growth 
(Cantillion, 2011). The aim of this is better social inclusion through higher labour-market 
participation.  
Bonoli and Natali (2012) identified three main blocks of social investment. The first is 
constant learning. The social investment perspective emphasises constant learning to 
update the skills and knowledge of workers as well as childhood education. A knowledge-
based economy brings about rapid changes in the labour market so governments have to 
provide constant learning to help workers to have adequate skills and knowledge. 
Childhood education, job training and supporting job seeking all reflect this dimension. 
The second dimension is an orientation to the future. Investment is closely linked to the 
return in the future. Spending occurs in the present but investment generates dividends 
in the future. This dimension contributes to shifting the notion of the welfare state from 
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passive expenditure to preventive investment. In this regard, childhood education and 
child poverty are considered more important than tertiary education and adult poverty, 
as they are very salient to determining the future well-being of today’s children, and that 
can be regarded as a return on investment. The third dimension is the link between 
individual and collective well-being.  
The social investment perspective claims that investment in individuals leads to common 
prosperity in the future for all. The policy instrument for education or job training is 
expected to contribute to breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty and reducing 
unemployment. The changes caused by the policy are related to lower crime rates and a 
more stable society, so society and community can get benefit from social policies in the 
end. Those sets of policies are desirable from an economic perspective and not only from 
the social justice perspective.  Empirically, measurement of social investment normally 
includes expenditure on parental leave, elderly care, child-care and education, as well as 
ALMPs (Vliet & Wang, 2015). 
In brief, a social investment state considers social policy not as a cost, but as an 
investment in human capital. Social protection is not just designed to help people at risk 
but also to prepare them to have a more stable job. In this regard, social policies are 
essential to economic development and employment growth. On the one hand, social 
investment rests on investment in human resources, such as childhood education, life-
long training and so on. On the other hand, social investment is the best use of human 
resources, such as supporting women’s and lone parents’ employment (reconciliation 
policy, child-care, parental leave and so on). Social investment seems to be in line with 
active social policy in that both of them emphasise the more active role of the 
government and ex-ante prevention rather than ex-post protection. However, still, there 
is a difference between active social policy and social investment.  Social investment is 
focused on human capital and the notion of equality of opportunity but little attention is 
paid to work incentive. On the other hand, active social policy is more concentrated on 
direct linkage to helping people to enter the labour market by the removal of all obstacles 
to labour market participation, so the work incentive is a very important component in 
active social policy (Bonoli, 2013). In brief, social investment and active social policy cover 
slightly different areas although there are some areas where they overlap. ALMPs are 
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considered as important components for both social investment and active social policy 
(Bonoli, 2012)  
6.3.4. The distributive outcome of ALMPs and social investment 
Now, we can ask a question about how ALMPs affect income distribution. Do ALMPs play 
a positive role in supporting the poor? Does a different type of ALMP have a different 
effect on income distribution?  Do ALMPs decrease income inequality or not? As shown 
above, there have not been many studies of the distributive outcome of ALMPs. Some 
studies have examined the distributive outcome of social investment but not ALMPs.  
Vaalavuo (2013) examined the distributive outcome of social investment but excluded 
ALMPs because ALMPs are the part of social investment but their proportion is only 
marginal so they are not included in social investment. On the other hand, there are some 
studies which have examined the effect of ALMPs on employment. Card et al. (2015) 
reviewed more than 200 econometric evaluations of ALMPs from around the world and 
found that the effect of ALMPs is close to zero in the short term but becomes a positive 
effect after two or three years. The effect becomes larger for females and the long-term 
unemployed. They showed that ALMPs are mostly effective at increasing the 
opportunities for employment in the long term and are more significant for female 
workers and for the unemployed in the long term. In addition, the effect becomes more 
significant during an economic recession. It seems that most studies agree that ALMPs are 
a useful policy instrument to promote employment.  
Based on those studies, ALMPs are intuitively expected to decrease income inequality. If 
ALMPs help the unemployed to find a job and reduce the time they are dependent on 
unemployment benefit, the unemployed are likely to have more income, as normally 
their income in new jobs is higher the unemployment benefit. In particular, the objective 
of ALMPs is to upskill the labour force so that low-skilled workers who do not have a high 
income can enter into the well-paid high-skilled job market if they can successfully finish a 
re-training programme.  Thus, ALMPs can be a useful instrument to push up the income 
of the poor so that income inequality can be reduced.  
On the other hand, however, income inequality can increase or remain at the same level 
if the quality of jobs that the unemployed get after re-training is not decent. ALMPs 
includes direct job provision to the unemployed particularly in the public sector but the 
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important part is to provide a training programme. It helps the unemployed to get 
adequate skills and knowledge but it is not easy to find a decent job when the economy is 
in recession.  Morel et al. (2012) pointed out that focusing on activation often disregards 
the quality of work. Sometimes workers fail to get out of poverty even when they find a 
job, as the jobs they find do not provide them with a sufficient wage to get out of poverty.  
In addition, usually, ALMPs are more concerned about the ‘future’ of the unemployed, 
rather than ‘present’, so the poor today are likely to be left aside (Morel et al. 2012). As 
shown above, Nordic countries have a kind of dual system which has ALMPs on one side 
and a conventional social protection system on the other, but English-speaking countries 
are likely to replace a conventional social protection system with ALMPs. As shown above, 
ALMPs neglect the quality of a job, so when the unemployed cannot get a job or fail to 
get a well-paid job, their income can plummet because their unemployment benefit is 
also reduced. In this case, income inequality could be worsened even though the 
government is spending more money on ALMPs.  
However, there have not been many studies of the distributive outcome of ALMPs, but 
there are nevertheless some empirical studies which have examined the effect of social 
investment on income distribution, and which help us to infer the distributive outcome of 
ALMPs indirectly. Vliet and Wang (2015) evaluated the effect of social investment, 
including ALMPs, by using data from fifteen developed countries over ten years. They 
showed that social investment including ALMPs or primary/secondary education had a 
significant positive effect on improving the employment rate but did not show any 
significant effect on poverty reduction. They pointed out that social investment can help 
people to enter the labour market but does not really guarantee a decent job. More 
people get into the labour market and get a chance to work, but in fact, those jobs do not 
pay them well so it does not show a significant effect on poverty reduction.  
However, although these studies have indirectly examined the distributive effect of 
ALMPs, it is still not quite clear. Previous studies have argued that the insignificant effect 
of social investment on income distribution is mostly due to nature of service policy, such 
as child-care service or primary education. Esping-Andersen, for example, pointed out 
that service policy is less distributive than direct cash transfer (Esping-Andersen & Myles 
2009). Cantillon (2011) also offered a reason why social investment does not have a 
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significant effect on income distribution. She pointed out that employment growth occurs 
only in employment-rich households rather than in employment-poor households.  
She analysed data from EU-SILC and showed that the number of people of working age in 
jobless households decreased from 13% in 2005 to 12% in 2008, and the number of 
people of working age in job-rich households increased from 44% in 2004 to 48% in 2008. 
Namely, a household in which one or two members are already in work can get more 
benefit than a household in which no-one is in work. She argued that this is mainly due to 
the ambivalence of social investment. Social investment aims at moving people into work 
so it normally starts by making work attractive. This strategy inevitably benefits those 
already in work. Family-work balance policies such as parental leave and child-care 
services are an example of this.  
She argued that the statistics show households at new risk, such as a lone mother or a 
low-educated household, are less likely to use those policies. In this case, the poor 
household is likely to get less benefit from a set of policies which make work attractive. 
Consequently, only middle or high-income groups can get a benefit from those policies 
and this makes income distribution worse. This is in line with the so-called ‘Matthew 
effect’ which means that the middle class is likely to be the main beneficiaries of welfare 
policy.  
Vandenbroucke and Vlemincks (2011) called this a ‘resources competition explanation’ of 
upward pressure on poverty. Social service is less distributive than cash transfer as we 
can see in the case of child-care service, and poverty remains high as more resources are 
concentrated on social service than on cash transfer. Ghysels and Van Lancker (2011) also 
showed that Matthew effects are found in child policy as high-income couples or highly 
educated couples can get more benefit from child-care service. These studies argued that 
service policy is the main reason for the insignificant effect of social investment.  In 
addition, there are some studies which have argued that the effect of primary education 
on income distribution cannot be measured in the short-term as it takes much time to see 
how well primary education affects the income of students when they grow up.  
In brief, most of the studies of the distributive outcome of social investment found no 
significant effect, which is possibly due to the nature of service policy or education policy. 
It can therefore be inferred that this result cannot necessarily indicate that ALMPs do not 
have a significant effect on income distribution.  
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Consequently, the distributive outcome of ALMPs remains largely unanswered. A few 
studies based on specific country contexts have suggest that a clear relation is not 
observed, but it is hard to generalize. Studies which have examined the distributive 
outcome of social investment have shown that social investment policy does not have a 
positive effect on the poverty rate or on income inequality. However, the main cause for 
this is that service policy is less distributive than cash-transfer and this is focused on child-
care service or work-life balance policies, which are included in social investment but not 
in ALMPs. Therefore, they cannot offer evidence which proves the distributive outcome 
of ALMPs and it is necessary to examine the distributive outcome of ALMPs, rather than 
broader concepts such as active social policy or social investment.  
6.4. Conclusion    
This chapter has reviewed the challenges that the welfare state is confronting, policy 
instruments to deal with these challenges and their distributive outcome. Developed 
countries are confronted with an aging population and most countries have attempted to 
reform the public pension system and introduce private pensions. The introduction of 
private pensions is expected to have a negative effect on income inequality as it is likely 
to increase inequality between the better-off and the poor. However, previous empirical 
studies have shown inconsistent results on the effect of private pensions. It should be 
noted that the effect of an increase in private pensions has to be considered in the 
context of the institutional design of the public pension system as they are very closely 
associated with each other.  
In the meantime, the welfare state is also emphasizing an active and preventive role for 
welfare programmes, rather than continuing with passive income protection. Thus active 
labour market policy is considered as an important policy instrument to deal with long-
term unemployment due to changes in the industrial structure. The main goal of an active 
labour market policy is to provide education, job training and other programmes to 
improve the capacity of the unemployed and increase their opportunity to re-enter the 
labour market. Some empirical studies have shown that an active labour market policy is 
useful for increasing the employment rate, but its effect on income distribution is not 
clear. In fact, there have not been many empirical studies which have examined the 
distributive outcome of an active labour market policy. In addition, the distributive 
outcome of an active labour market policy is also expected to be closely related to the 
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unemployment benefit and other social protection programmes to support unemployed 
individuals.      
In brief, the welfare state attempts to introduce new policy instruments but their 
distributive outcome is still largely unanswered. Of course, it is true that we need much 
data to examine the distributive outcome of new policy instruments and some argue that 
there is still not sufficient data available (issues of data quality on ALMPs will be discussed 
in Chapter 10). For these reasons, it is understandable that there are not many empirical 
studies of this issue. However, as has been demonstrated in this chapter, a welfare 
programme is quite an important determinant of income inequality and it is also a useful 
instrument for suppressing the increase in income inequality. Thus, this thesis has tried to 
examine the distributive outcome of new policy instruments using panel data which 
contains the most recent information. In particular, this thesis concentrates on the 
interplay between new policy instruments and traditional protective welfare programmes. 
Details about the framework and the methodology of analysis are explained in the 
following chapter.  
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Chapter 7. Framework of analysis and methodology 
7.1. Introduction 
Previous chapters have shown that income inequality is a very important factor which 
affects various social problems so it is essential to minimise income inequality to stabilise 
a society. Therefore, the question is how to reduce income inequality and establish the 
relevant institution. To find an answer to this question, first, this thesis reviews important 
factors in determining income inequality from previous studies. As shown in the previous 
chapter, there are various factors which affect income inequality. Conventional 
discussions of income inequality focus on the economic and political aspects. The 
development of technology, which increases the demand for a high-skilled labour force, 
brings about an imbalance in the labour market, and is often referred to as an economic 
factor. In the meantime, political factors are also considered as determinants in income 
inequality as discussed in chapter 3.  
In addition, the various types of welfare institution also play an important role in shaping 
income distribution. Unlike economic or political factors, welfare programmes affect 
income inequality ex-post, after it is determined through the market and political system. 
The institutional design of a welfare state has been developed in various ways because of 
differences in political and economic conditions and previous studies have shown the 
differences in welfare institutions and how welfare effort can make a significant 
difference to income inequality.   
However, welfare institution, which is designed to tackle down income inequality, had 
been established based on working-age male breadwinner model (Korpi, 2000). Thus, we 
need to ask to what extent the current welfare institution matters in containing income 
inequality caused by current demographic changes. As shown in the literature review, 
change of demographic changes such as ageing population is often referred to bring 
about significant changes in income distribution and welfare state itself. In the meantime, 
a rapid development the technology and industry changes labour market structure, so 
new type of unemployment is emerging. Welfare state introduces new policy instruments 
to deal with these changes.  
However, the distributive outcomes of these new policy instruments (or welfare reform) 
have not been well explored. In particular, there have not been many empirical studies 
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using large panel data. This thesis will therefore attempt to analyse the effect of new 
policy instruments on income inequality. This chapter describes details of the 
methodology and the research framework and is structured as described below.  
The framework of the analysis is introduced first. This thesis will attempt to analyse the 
distributive outcome of new policy instruments but previous studies have shown that 
new policy instruments are deeply related to a traditional welfare programme. Therefore, 
this section explains the relationship between a new welfare programme and the 
traditional welfare programme and how they are connected to each other in this thesis. 
Then, the research methodology is explained. This study employed multi-level modelling 
as an alternative to the fixed-effect and random-effect models which are frequently used 
for panel data. The reason why this method fits into the framework of this study is also 
explained.  Details of variables and the methods to measure them are explained in the 
main analysis chapter, as they are slightly different in their focus. This current chapter 
only explains the big picture and the contours of variables and measurements. At the end 
of this chapter, the general hypotheses to be examined are proposed, but again, more 
details of them are explained in the analysis chapters. 
7.2. Framework of analysis 
As stated above, this study focuses on changes in the welfare state and its distributive 
outcome. ‘Change’ of the welfare state in this study can refer to the introduction of new 
policy instruments or the reform of current welfare policy. As reviewed in the previous 
chapter, there has been much discussion of this change, but this thesis concentrates on 
the effect of private pensions and an active labour market policy. The previous chapter 
showed that an aging population and changes in economic structure and the labour 
market can be significant challenges to the welfare state. The introduction of private 
pensions and active labour market policies are introduced to deal with these challenges. 
Therefore, this study will examine the distributive outcome of the increase in private 
pensions and an active labour market policy considering other economic and political 
variables. 
However, many previous studies have shown that the effect of new policy instruments 
has to be considered in the context of the traditional welfare programme. The effect of 
private pensions is closely related to the institutional design of public pensions, and the 
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effect of ALMPs is also related to unemployment benefit and other forms of social 
assistance for unemployed individuals. The following section reviews the relationship 
between new policy instruments and traditional welfare policy.  
7.2.1. Effect of private pension and institutional design of public pension system 
A pension programme for the old-aged population has two distinct goals: income security 
and basic security (Palme, 1990; 2006). Income security is that the pension programme 
replaces the income earned during earlier working life and basic security is that the 
pension programme provides a minimum income standard at floor level. Pension 
programmes attempt to achieve both goals, but the relative emphasis is different 
according to the institutional design. It can be inferred that the distributive outcome of a 
pension programme will be different according to the institutional arrangement. 
Some empirical studies have examined the relationship between a pension programme 
and income distribution to the old-aged. Kohl (1990) argued that higher basic security 
entitlements are related to lower poverty rates among the elderly. Palme (2006) showed 
that a high replacement rate of a pension programme is related to less inequality among 
the elderly. He argued that the impact of a pension programme is different according to 
the type of pension, and the result shows that a generous pension programme reflecting 
basic security is related to a decrease in income inequality among the elderly, whereas a 
generous pension programme reflecting income security is not significantly related to 
changes in income inequality.   
Scruggs (2006) did not specify pension generosity, but he showed that a generous welfare 
state which has a generous pension programme is related to less poverty and inequality. 
Lefèbvre (2007) argued that the distributive effect of a pension programme is different 
according to the design of the pension system, but that, generally, a generous pension 
system is related to a decrease in the poverty rate and income inequality among 
European countries.  
Regarding the distributive effect of private pensions, the distributive outcome of an 
increase in private pensions shows inconsistent results, as shown in the previous chapter: 
some studies have shown that income inequality decreases as private pensions increase. 
What we need to note here is, however, that the effect of private pensions is related to 
the institutional design of public pensions (Palme, 2006). The institutional design of the 
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public pension affects income distribution among the elderly, so it is expected to 
influence the effect of private pensions as well. In fact, there has been a long debate on 
how the institutional design of a pension scheme affects income distribution. The mains 
topics discussed are eligibility (universal or targeted) and benefit level (flat rate or 
earnings-related). In fact, this debate is largely related to the paradox of redistribution 
discussed in the previous chapter.  
Le Grand (1989) argued that universal eligibility can bring about a waste of resources in 
poverty reduction and even intensify income inequality as the rich can get the universal 
benefit as well as the income from their own savings and assets. In contrast, Fritzell (1991) 
and Mitchel (1991) argued that a universal welfare system seems to be a better way to 
obtain greater equality.  However, it seems that most studies have agreed that universal 
eligibility has better income distribution than a targeted system (Korpi & Palme 1998), 
although there is still some controversy about it. Regarding earning-relatedness, Mitchel, 
Harding and Gruen (1994) argued that a strong earnings-related pension is likely to 
aggravate income inequality as income inequality among the working-age population is 
reflected in old age under an earnings-related pension system. Castles and Mitchell (1992) 
also argued that universalism can bring greater equality but that strong earnings-
relatedness worsens income inequality more than a flat rate benefit system. However, 
Korpi and Palme (1998) found that an unequal pension system is related to equal income 
distribution. In other words, countries with an earnings-related system in which pension 
benefit is dependent on previous income are likely to have more equal income 
distribution than countries with a flat-rate system. Palme (2006) argued that an unequal 
pension system with earnings-related benefits makes a private pension less attractive 
since the recipient can get sufficient benefit from the public pension. In contrast, an equal 
pension system with a flat rate is likely to have a low benefit level so the rich have more 
incentive to have a private pension whereas the poor cannot afford to have a private 
pension so income inequality is likely to worsen. In brief, previous studies have shown 
that both eligibility and earnings-relatedness are important factors affecting income 
distribution and it is the same with moderating the effect of a private pension as well. 
However, earnings-relatedness seems to be more controversial than eligibility.   
Previous empirical studies of the distributive outcome of private pensions have either 
focused on a few countries only or have used cross-sectional data. Vliet et al. (2012) used 
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time-series cross-sectional data but they did not consider the institutional design of the 
public pension. It is therefore necessary to examine income distribution and current 
pension reform focusing on private pensions and considering the institutional design of 
public pensions. It is expected that the effect of private pensions will depend on the 
design of the public pension programme.  
7.2.2. Active labour market policy and unemployment benefit 
There have been many studies of the distributive effect of conventional unemployment 
benefit. Those studies have shown that the institutional design of unemployment benefit 
has a significant effect on income distribution. Palme (2006) showed that a high 
replacement rate and a longer duration have a significant effect on reducing the poverty 
rate, and Korpi and Palme (1998) showed that countries with a universal benefit system 
are likely to have a lower poverty rate and income inequality. At the same time, active 
social policies have a close relationship with conventional protective social policies as 
they have emerged as a policy instrument to deal with new social risks due to changes in 
the economic and social environment, which had not been a salient issue under the 
traditional welfare state (Bonoli, 2013). Thus, active social policies have been developed 
within the context of the traditional welfare state institution so its distributive effect is 
also influenced by the existing welfare institution. In this regard, it is fair to say that the 
effect of ALMPs on income distribution is influenced by unemployment benefit as well.  
Not many studies have looked into the relationship between ALMPs and the traditional 
welfare institution. Cantillon (2011) argued that the generosity of conventional passive 
income protection has decreased whilst spending on active social policy has increased. 
OECD data show that the average net replacement rate for the long-term unemployed as 
well as for individuals at the initial stage of unemployment had decreased between 2001 
and 2008. Nelson (2007) also showed that social assistance has tended to decrease over 
the last two decades. Many studies have shown that the unemployment benefit is 
reduced through making benefits more selective and conditional, or reducing duration 
and generosity (Caminada et al. 2008; Van Vliet 2010; Kühner 2015).  
Vandenbroucke and Vlemincks (2011) called this a re-commodification explanation. 
Bonoli (2009) argued that one extreme of ALMPs is the protection of employment and 
that the other extreme is re-commodification, such as retrenchment of unemployment 
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benefit. Vandenbroucke and Vlemincks (2011) argued that it is hard to deny that ALMPs 
partially contribute to the re-commodification and retrenchment of the traditional 
welfare state, although some countries have cut benefits without increasing ALMP. The 
budgetary resources of governments are scarce and limited so focusing on ALMPs tends 
to decrease unemployment benefit. Studies have pointed out that an increase in ALMPs is 
connected to the retrenchment and re-commodification of the traditional unemployment 
benefit and this brings a disappointing consequence in poverty trends.  
In contrast, Kersbergen and Hemerijck (2011) argued that the current trend of poverty 
and income inequality is not very related to the emergence of ALMPs. They insisted that 
increase in income inequality is not related to changes in welfare state. They pointed out 
that income distribution is more affected by economic and labour market factors than by 
the welfare state. Income inequality had decreased during the first decade after the 
Second World War and this was not because of the welfare state, but because growing 
productivity in low-skilled workers was faster than in high-skilled workers so incomes at 
the lower end increased faster than at the high end. In this regard, the main drivers for 
rising income inequality are globalisation and technology-driven economic growth which 
increases the demand for high-skilled workers, rather than welfare reform. In addition, 
some studies have argued that decreases in expenditure on the traditional welfare state 
have taken place only in a limited number of countries, and the quality of the 
conventional welfare system has not changed much (Vliet & Wang, 2015). The main point 
of those studies is that ALMPs are not closely related to the decrease of the traditional 
welfare state or the trend of income distribution.  
What we want to focus on here is the effect of the quality of unemployment benefit and 
its interplay with ALMPs on income inequality. Generous unemployment benefit helps the 
unemployed to maintain their quality of life and consumption level by offering income 
protection. Thus, it helps the unemployed to avoid getting into poverty and works as a 
stabiliser on the business cycle. In addition, unemployment benefit can assist job 
searching so the unemployed have more time to look for a more relevant job for them 
without concern for their livelihood. Thus, generous unemployment benefits make a 
contribution to better job matching and that leads to lower unemployment, poverty 
reduction among the unemployed and smoothing the individual’s consumption during 
unemployment (Cullen & Gruber, 1996; Gabe & Whittaker, 2012). 
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On the other hand, a number of empirical studies have suggested that generous 
unemployment benefit induces longer unemployment duration and that sanctions or 
strict eligibility for unemployment benefit have a significant effect on reducing 
unemployment duration and the exit rate from welfare to work. Empirical studies have 
shown that sanctions increased the number of months in employment by 0.6-0.8 months 
in Germany and increased the exit rate by 100% in the Netherlands (Hofmann, 2008; Van 
den Berg et al., 2004). Job-searching is necessary during benefits and also shows a 
significant effect on reducing unemployment duration (Johnson & Klepinger, 1994). 
Scarpetta (1996) examined the relationship between unemployment benefit and 
employment rate using data from OECD countries from 1983 to 1993 and found that a 
generous unemployment rate, such as a high replacement rate and long duration, has a 
negative effect on employment rate; in other words, this study shows generous benefit is 
related to longer unemployment. In addition, he found that high generosity of 
unemployment benefit also deteriorates the capacity of the labour market to adjust itself 
to social/economic changes. Carrasco (1999) and more recently Roman, Congregado and 
Millan (2013) have also shown that a high replacement rate in unemployment benefit is 
significantly related to a longer period of unemployment.  
In addition, unemployment benefit raises the reservation wage, which is the level of wage 
that an unemployed person is willing to accept in work, so the unemployed reduce the 
effort necessary for job searching and their willingness to accept job offers because of the 
generous unemployment benefit. In this regard, a generous unemployment benefit 
causes the unemployed to stay in unemployment and leads to a negative impact on 
income distribution. Based on the findings of the studies discussed above, it can be 
inferred that a generous unemployment benefit could have a damaging effect on income 
distribution by causing the unemployed to stay in unemployment for longer. In addition, a 
generous benefit can also reduce the effect of ALMPs by removing the incentive for the 
unemployed to get a job. In other words, a generous unemployment benefit could reduce 
income inequality or the poverty level by itself, but it also reduces the effect of ALMPs on 
the employment rate and possibly income distribution as well.  
However, the notion of flexicurity provides a different logic for the relationship between 
ALMPs and traditional unemployment benefit. The case of Denmark, which succeeded in 
reducing its unemployment rate dramatically, shows that ALMPs combined with a 
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generous unemployment benefit can be useful for reducing the unemployment rate. This 
may be special case, but it could be inferred that an increase in ALMPs combined with 
generous unemployment benefit could have a positive impact on income distribution.  
Most previous empirical studies have simply compared data on poverty rates and 
expenditure on ALMPs (Kersbergen & Hemerijck ,2011; Cantillion, 2011; Morel et al. 
2012). It is true that the poverty trend is increasing and that expenditure on ALMPs is 
increasing, but this cannot be evidence that there is a significant relation between the 
two.  A more rigorous quantitative method with a large data set is required. In addition, 
previous studies have mostly focused on specific components of unemployment benefit, 
such as replacement rate or duration. However, each of these is part of the institution of 
unemployment benefit so it becomes important to see how they are combined as a 
whole institution. In addition, as discussed in the first section of this chapter, there is 
another programme called MIP which can affect income distribution among the working-
age population along with unemployment benefit. MIP acts as the last safety net for the 
unemployed so it has to be considered together with unemployment benefit.  
7.2.3. Framework, sample and size of analysis 
This study assumes that the institution moderates the effect of policy. Therefore, the 
effect of private pensions or ALMPs is in fact different by institution from public pensions 
or unemployment benefit. Of course, other variables in economics and politics are still 
considered very important. Therefore, the framework of analysis can be shown as below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increase of private pension 
Increase of ALMPs 
Income inequality 
Design of public pension system 
Design of Unemployment benefit  
and other social assistance 
Figure 7-1 Framework of analysis Figure 7-1 Framework of an lysis 
Figure 7-1 Framework of analysis 
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One of the most important things in this analysis is to clarify which institutional dimension 
is important in moderating the distributive effect of private pensions or ALMPs. It is 
possible to classify a public pension system or unemployment benefit after identifying 
which dimensions matter. Discussion of this is based on the classification between 
universalism and targeting, but it is a more complicated issue so details of the 
classification are discussed in the analysis chapters and are only briefly explained in this 
chapter.  
Regarding the public pension system, the most frequently used factors in terms of 
association with a private pension are earnings-relatedness and eligibility (Korpi & Palme 
1998; Palme 2006). They argued that the effect of a private pension is insignificant under 
high earnings-relatedness and eligibility, as people do not have the incentive to join a 
private pension scheme. So the institutional design of public pensions is classified based 
on the level of earnings-relatedness and eligibility.   
Unemployment benefit is a bit more complicated. Unemployment benefit is designed to 
support the unemployed, but they are also supported by various types of social assistance, 
so the two supports should be considered together. There have not been many studies 
which have looked for what factors in unemployment benefit affect the role of ALMPs, so 
this current study assumes that earnings-relatedness and eligibility of unemployment 
have an association with the effect of ALMPs on income distribution, just like a pension 
programme. Along with the design of unemployment benefit, the characteristics of other 
social assistance programmes for the unemployed are also considered when classifying 
the types of a support programme for the unemployed.  
This thesis includes 21 OECD countries, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. However, the actual number of countries was slightly different according 
to the main topic of analysis, as there are some differences in the numbers of countries 
from which data are available. These countries were selected as they have similarities in 
their levels of economic development and political systems based on democracy. Most 
previous studies of the welfare state and income distribution have also been based on 
these countries (Korpi & Palme 1998; Palme 2006; Allan & Scruggs 2001; 2006; Kenworthy 
2006). Some East European countries also have available data, but those countries have 
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some degree of difference in economic development compared with the countries in the 
sample. In particular, most East European countries are transition countries, so there are 
still substantive differences in their political systems. Thus, it is better that East European 
countries be dealt with in a different context from the countries in the sample. Asian 
countries, such as Japan and South Korea, are also excluded as these countries have a 
different path in the development of their welfare states and political systems.  
This research covers 31 years (1980 to 2011) in private pensions and 26 years (1985 to 
2011) in ALMPs. Data could have stretched back to the 1960s, but there is a great deal of 
missing information in data from the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, there were many 
economic and political changes during that period so we would have too many variables 
to control if data from the 1960s and 1970s are included.  The welfare state is regarded as 
having entered a period of permanent austerity from the 1980s so the 1980s can be 
regarded as a critical point in terms of welfare transformation (Pierson, 2001; 
Wenzelburger, 2013). Regarding ALMPs, the time span is reduced to about twenty-six 
years from 1985 to 2010 as data on ALMPs are rarely available before 1985. The 
frequency of inclusion in the analysis is a bit different by topic, so the details are 
explained in each chapter.  
7.3. Methodology: how to use time-series data in the analysis of 
institution 
7.3.1. Fixed effect and random effect model 
One of the most frequently used methods for comparing welfare states is time-series 
cross-sectional (TSCS) analysis. Cross-sectional analysis using country-level data often 
suffers from the small-N problem since the number of countries is likely to be limited. 
Time-series data solves this issue by using multiple data for each country over time so we 
can have more samples to examine.   
The classic ‘small N’ problem was regarded as an important issue in using regression 
analysis in a country-level comparative study. Since the number of countries included in 
the model is limited, regression analysis using the country-level variable inevitably suffers 
from the small N problem. TSCS solves this problem by using observations measured 
repeatedly over time. If there are twenty countries that we can use for five years, then we 
have a hundred (20x5) observations that can be put into the model. In addition, TSCS is 
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useful since it captures both country-specific effects and time effects at the same time. 
Other advantages of TSCS have been discussed widely in previous studies (Beck & Katz, 
1996; Kittel and Winner, 2002) so they do not have to be recapped in this section. 
Obviously, TSCS is a very useful method for comparative political economy research but it 
still has some issues to overcome.  
In order to get robust estimations from the regression, Xi and Yi have to be independently 
distributed (Stock & Watson, 2012; Woodridge, 2002). However, previous studies have 
shown that data for comparing welfare states are not likely to satisfy those conditions 
(Beck & Katz 1995; Wilson & Butler 2007; Plümper, Troeger & Manow 2005). The most 
important issues are unit heterogeneity and non-stationarity (Kühner, 2007; Podesta 
2006). Cautious model specification would be one remedy to deal with these issues. In 
stochastic analysis, stationarity is assumed that the mean and variance do not change 
over time. However, TSCS data in welfare state are unlikely to meet this assumption. For 
instance, policy-makers typically begin with the last period’s budget and tend to make 
incremental changes when they make a budget for new period (Podesta, 2006). In this 
sense, data on budget cannot be stationary. However, the stationarity is usually assumed 
in the comparative welfare state research unless observations have dramatic change, 
otherwise it is almost impossible to use TSCS data in the comparative welfare state 
research (Podesta, 2006) 
Unit heterogeneity is closely related to auto-correlation and omitted variable bias. 
However, TSCS uses observations measured repeatedly for each country so observations 
for the same country over time are likely to be highly correlated to each other. Those 
observations measured repeatedly for one country tend to be correlated to each other 
since each country has some country-specific characteristics which are difficult to 
measure. Therefore, the regression model without country-specific characteristics is likely 
to suffer from omitted variable bias. Simple Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression which 
assumes no serial correlation and no country heterogeneity is likely to fail to produce 
robust estimations.  
The fixed-effect model is frequently suggested to control country heterogeneity (Beck & 
Katz, 1995; Podesta, 2006). The fixed-effect model treats country-specific characteristics 
as fixed effects. The fixed effects can be both country-specific variations and time-specific 
variations. In other words, the fixed-effect model can capture both variables that do not 
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change over time (but remain the same for each country) and do not change across 
countries (but remain the same for specific years) by including a dummy variable for 
countries or years (Stock & Watson, 2003). 
In other words, all higher-level (country-level in this case) variances are controlled and 
what remains is the within-country effect (Allison, 2009). The fixed-effect model is 
considered a good instrument for controlling unobserved national characteristics, so it 
helps us to see the pure effect of independent variables stripped of those fixed effects.  A 
simple method for using the fixed-effect model is to include a dummy variable for each 
country.  
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = ∑ 𝛽0𝑗𝐷𝑗
𝑗
𝑗=1
+ 𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗 
Where Dj indicates the dummy variable for each country and xij is the independent 
variable. Uj and eij are variances in country level and occasion level respectively. However, 
dummy variables for each country account for all variances at the country level, so Uj=0 in 
the fixed-effect model. 𝛽1 is the size of effect of variable Xij  on Y in the given country. The 
fixed-effect model does not suffer from heterogeneity bias since country-level variance is 
controlled by the dummy variables (Bell & Jones, 2015).  
However, the fixed-effect model does has a limitation. Since the objective of the fixed-
effect model is to control the country-specific variables, it is not possible to estimate 
time-invariant variables because they are already treated as fixed effects (Bartel, 2008), 
so those variables are automatically dropped. In other words, fixed effects absorb all of 
the variations between countries so the effect of an independent variable is solely a 
within-country effect.  The effect of X on Y is shown in only a given country in the fixed-
effect model so it is impossible to test not only a between-country hypothesis but also 
slow-changing variables in the fixed-effect model (Beck, 2001; Bell & Jones, 2015). Fixed-
effect models lose a lot of information such as a political institution or other time-
invariant variables regarding the welfare state. For instance, the institutional design of a 
pension system or unemployment benefit cannot be tested in the fixed-effect model as 
these variables either remain the same over time or change very slowly.  
On the other hand, the random-effect model treats Uj as a random variable so it considers 
the between-entity effect as well as the within-entity effect. In other words, estimations 
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from the random-effect model are a mixture of within-entity effect and between-entity 
effect. In addition, the random-effect model is based on the GLS (Generalised Least 
Square) model, so it can control autocorrelation (Reed & Ye, 2009). 
The random-effect model is preferable in that it has greater flexibility and generalizability, 
and especially its ability to test variables measured only at country level (Bell & Jones, 
2015). The major advantage of using the random-effect model is that it is possible to 
include a time-invariant country-level variable in the model so the effect of the between-
countries hypothesis can be tested (Bartel, 2008). However, the random-effect model is 
not frequently used in economics and political science. The major weakness of the 
random-effect model is its unrealistic assumption that unobserved heterogeneity is 
uncorrelated with independent variables.  
The random-effect model is used to divide unexplained residuals into two categories: 
higher-level residuals between higher-level entities (countries) and lower-level residuals 
within these entities.  Higher-level residuals (Ui) and lower-level residuals (eij) are 
separated from each other and each of them has a normal distribution. According to the 
basic assumption of regression analysis, the independent variable (Xij) should not be 
systemically related to residual (Ui , eij). It can be expressed as E(Ui | Xij , Zj )=E(eij | Xij , 
Zj )=0 and it is same with Cov (Ui, Xij)=0. This means that the independent variable is not 
related to country-level variance. However, this is a very unrealistic assumption since 
independent variables are very likely to be associated with country-specific characteristics 
in most cases, so such endogeneity is the main reason that the random-effect model is 
less likely to be used than the fixed-effect model (Bartel, 2008; Beck, 2001; Wilson & 
Butler, 2007).  
7.3.2. An alternative way: the basic logic of multilevel modelling 
To overcome the disadvantages of the fixed-effect and random-effect models, this 
present study employed multi-level modelling. Before going into the details of how to 
apply multi-level modelling for TSCS data, it is necessary first to explain the basic logic of 
multi-level modelling. In fact, multi-level modelling is particular type of random effect 
model so basic principal is same (Bell & Jones, 2015) 
Multi-level modelling has been developed mainly in education and psychology studies, 
and it is still expanding its territory so it has a very broad application. Multi-level 
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modelling is designed to test variables at different levels, for instance, individual 
characteristics and country-specific characteristics. The conventional idea of OLS does not 
distinguish between these two, but multi-level modelling can separate the group level 
effect from the individual level (Hox, 2010). In other words, multi-level modelling can be 
used when a lower-level entity (such as an individual) is nested within a higher-level 
entity (such as a country).  
There are two basic models in multi-level modelling, the random intercept model and the 
random coefficient model. There are more applications but they are mostly derived from 
these two models. Let us suppose that i indicates individual (or household) and j indicates 
the group to which individuals belong, and that we have one dependent variable (Y) and 
one independent variable (X). First, the value of Y is the outcome of interest and Y 
consists of two parts. 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
In this equation, 𝛽0𝑗 is the mean of group j and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is individual variance that has 0 mean 
and 𝜎2 standard deviation. Namely, Y consists of group means and individual variance. 
However, group mean 𝛽0𝑗 consists of two parts as well when each group has a different 
value. This is shown as 
𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛿0𝑗  
In this equation, 𝛾00 indicates the grand mean, in other words the mean of whole sample, 
and 𝛿0𝑗 indicates a group variation that has 0 mean and 𝜏00 standard deviation. This helps 
us to see the different impact of individual level and group level. We can put those 
equations into one mixed model. 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛿0𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
Generally, 𝛾00 refers to a fixed effect, 𝛿0𝑗 and  𝜀𝑖𝑗 refers to a random effect. On the other 
hand, 𝛿0𝑗 is a level-2 variance and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is a level-1 variance. This is called the random 
effects ANOVA model (or empty model, since it does not use any explanatory variable) 
and it is usually used as a preliminary test to check whether multi-level analysis is 
required or not. In other words, this model shows whether each group has unique 
characteristics which require us to consider them separately by showing that an individual 
value can be clustered around the group mean. Since the intercept of this model (𝛽0𝑗) 
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consists of two parts, a fixed part and a random part, it has different intercepts for each 
group. Some groups have a high intercept and others may have a low intercept if each 
group has unique characteristics. In addition, we also find what the main source of 
variance is by computing intra-class correlation. The standard deviation of individual level 
variance is 𝜎2, and that of group level variance is 𝜏00, so intra-class correlation can be 
computed as below 
𝜌 =
𝜏00
𝜎2 + 𝜏00
 
The value of 𝜌 shows the extent to which the variance can be explained by group level 
difference. For example, if we say 𝜌=0.11, it means that 11% of the variance is due to the 
difference between level-2 units.  
Then let us suppose we have one explanatory variable at level 1 (X) and one at level 2 (Z). 
First, we can plug a level-1 explanatory variable (X) into this equation as shown below. 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
where 𝛽1𝑗 is the coefficient of X so it shows the relation between X and Y. Actually, at this 
point, we need to decide which model is going to be used, the random intercept model or 
the random coefficient model. If we allow a random effect only in the intercept part and 
assume the relation between X and Y is the same across the group, then it is the random 
intercept model.  
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛿0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
In this model, 𝛽1 shows the average relationship between X and Y and it is the same 
across the groups. Although this coefficient is the same across the groups, it is still more 
rigorous than single-level analysis since this model includes the group effect. However, if 
there is no reason to believe that the relation between X and Y is the same across the 
groups, then we can allow the coefficient 𝛽1 to vary across the groups. This is the random 
coefficient model. 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛿0𝑗 + (𝛾10 + 𝛿1𝑗)𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
The logic is exactly same when the group level variable (Z) is put into the model.  
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = γ00 + γ01Zj + δ0j + (γ10 + δ1j)𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
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𝑌𝑖𝑗 = (γ00 + γ10𝑋𝑖𝑗 + γ01Zj) + (δ0j + δ1j𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗) 
In this model, (γ00 + γ10𝑋𝑖𝑗 + γ01Zj) is the fixed part and (δ0j + δ1j𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗) is the 
random part. The level-2 variable has a fixed part only but the level-1 variable has both a 
random part and a fixed part, so it shows us the different value for each group. What we 
can check is the grand mean of coefficient of X and its range according to the group 
characteristic. The value of Z is also more precise than in conventional regression, since it 
shows us the consequence when the individual level variables are controlled. In addition, 
it does not give us R square to check the fitness of the model. Instead, it shows deviance 
and that the fitness is high when the value of deviance is low. This is the basic structure 
and logic of the random coefficient model which is one of the most popular models for 
multi-level analysis. 
The point of multi-level modelling is that dependent variables are affected by lower-level 
characteristics (such as the individual) and by higher-level characteristics (such as the 
country level) as well, and higher-level characteristics are different by group but the same 
within a group. In this study, TSCS data is treated as multi-level data so observation of a 
country at each year consists of a first-level variable, and country-specific characteristics 
consist of the second--level variable. Observations over years are nested within each 
country as country-specific characteristics are different by country but the same within 
each country.  
7.3.3. Within-between country model: application of multilevel modelling 
Bell and Jones (2015) argued that the weakness of the random-effect model could be 
overcome by careful model specification. It is therefore necessary to consider the 
substantive source of this endogeneity. In fact, the effect of Xij consists of two parts; one 
reflects the difference between higher-level entities and the other reflects the difference 
between occasions, within higher-level entities. The coefficient from the random-effect 
model assumes that within- and between-country effects are equal and this can cause the 
so-called ‘cluster confounding‘ problem, as well as endogeneity.  In TSCS data, a change in 
X might have no effect on Y in one country, but it might be the opposite in another 
country, so it is necessary to separate the within-country effect from the between-
country effect, otherwise we would have one coefficient representing an average of 
within- and between-country effects. This can be problematic when the within-country 
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and the between-country effects have very different directions. Cluster confounding 
refers to a situation when we fail to measure the precise estimation when the within-
cluster (country in this case) effect goes in a different direction from the between-cluster 
effect, so the random effect model fails to give a precise estimation.  
The main solution for endogeneity and cluster confounding is to separate the within-
country effect and the between-country effect.  Mundlak (1978) suggested including an 
additional term for the mean value of each time-varying variable to account for the 
between-country effect.  The country-level mean value for time-varying variables is 
treated as a country-level variable. It can be simply expressed as  
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2?̅?𝑗 + (𝑢𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗) (1) 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑗  indicates time-varying variables and ?̅?𝑗  indicates the mean value of 𝑥𝑖  of 
country j. 𝛽1 represents the within-country effect because the between-countries effect 
of 𝑥𝑖  is controlled by ?̅?𝑗.  𝛽2 represents the difference between the within and between 
effects. This can be changed into a more straightforward formulation by using the 
difference between ?̅?𝑗 and 𝑥𝑖𝑗  : 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑥𝑖𝑗 − ?̅?𝑗) + 𝛽2?̅?𝑗 + (𝑢𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗) (2) 
In this equation, 𝛽1 represents the within-country effect and 𝛽2 represents the between-
country effect so interpretation of the coefficient is more straightforward (Snijders & 
Bosker, 2012). In addition,  𝑥𝑖𝑗  and ?̅?𝑗  are correlated in equation (1), but this correlation is 
lost in equation (2) by group mean centring 𝑥𝑖𝑗 so more precise estimation is possible 
(Raudenbush, 1989). 
This model is an application of multi-level modelling as (𝑥𝑖𝑗 − ?̅?𝑗) represents the lower-
level variable and ?̅?𝑗 represents the higher-level variable as it remains the same within 
country but is different by countries. This model is the random intercept model, as it does 
not allow 𝛽2 to vary by country.  
There are several advantages in using this model. Unlike the fixed-effect model, the 
between-countries hypothesis can be tested using a time-invariant variable (such as the 
institutional design of public pension or unemployment benefit). As discussed above, the 
fixed-effect model treats variation between countries as a fixed effect so they can be 
controlled but not estimated. However, this model allows estimating the coefficient of 
133 
 
country-specific time-invariant variables by simply adding a country-level time-invariant 
variable. A second advantage is that, by separating the within-country effect from the 
between-countries effect, cluster confounding can be avoided and the assumption that 
higher-level residuals are uncorrelated with independent variables (Cov (Ui, Xij)=0) is not 
required any more since the group mean centred variables have a mean of 0 for each 
country (Bell & Jones, 2015). Consequently, the value of  𝛽1 in equation (2) is identical 
with the coefficient from the fixed effect model (Mudlak, 1978) so we can get a precise 
estimate without sacrificing time-invariant variables through careful model specification. 
In addition, it is also possible to allow coefficients to vary for each country if the extended 
model (the random coefficient model) is used. 
In fact, the number of countries could be an issue when multi-level analysis is applied to 
panel data. A sufficient number of higher-level entities (countries, in this case) is 
necessary to avoid spurious result. Multi-level modelling separates the within-country 
effect from the between-countries effect but the between-countries effect comes from 
regression based on country level. Thus, if we have twenty countries in the sample, then 
this means that the result is computed using only twenty observations.  
There seem to be no rules of thumb but it is said that around 50 groups are necessary to 
get a robust result from the random coefficient model, and the random intercept model 
produces robust results with fewer samples than the random coefficient model (Hox, 
2005). Some have argued that it is large enough if we have 30 samples (Kreft & De Leeuw, 
1998). This current study has the same problem since the number of countries is around 
twenty. 
However, Bryan and Jenkins (2013) ran a simulation analysis using data from five 
countries to 100 countries (they assumed that each country had a sufficient number of 
individuals) and estimated the relative parameter bias and standard error bias of country-
level variables to find the relevant number of countries for multi-level modelling. They 
found that an estimation of parameter and standard error for an individual level variable 
is unbiased regardless of the number of countries in the random intercept model, and 
that the relative bias in the standard error of country-level variables was less than 2% 
when the number of countries exceeded fifteen, so it was negligible. In addition, the 
relative bias of parameter estimation is almost the same if the number of countries 
exceeds twenty. For the random coefficient model, they found that the relative bias was 
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less than 2% when the number of countries exceeded ten, and that the country level 
variance was underestimated but was less than 2% if the number exceeds 25.   
The robustness of the modelling is sensitive to the number of independent variables. In 
this thesis, using the random intercept model makes it possible to estimate unbiased 
coefficients and standard errors since we have twenty countries in the sample. In addition, 
we could control more independent variables if we had more countries in the sample, but 
we can put only a limited number of regressors into the model in this research.  
One thing that has to be considered is that the data set for this thesis is unbalanced data 
with missing values. A few influential units can often drive the result of regression with 
unbalanced data. Therefore, this thesis also employs Jackknife analysis to check any bias 
in the estimation. In Jackknife analysis, coefficients are estimated from the whole sample 
and each element is dropped from the sample in turn and coefficients are estimated from 
this smaller sample. Jackknife analysis is useful for obtaining unbiased predictions. The 
results of the Jackknife analysis are provided in the Appendix.    
Consequently, this study attempted to employ various models from the fixed-effect 
model to the random-intercept model to see how the coefficient and significance of each 
variable changed according to the model specification. Time-varying variables were 
tested first in the fixed-effect model and the random-effect model, then the random 
intercept model with time-invariant contextual variables was used. Cross-level interaction 
variables were also employed to find how much the effect of private pensions and ALMPs 
differed according to the institutional design of the welfare system surrounding them.  
7.3.4. Limitations of methodology 
In spite of the many advantages of multi-level modelling, this study still has several 
limitations. This section discusses the limitations in both the methodology and the data. 
In fact, these two issues are closely related to each other. 
The most salient limitation was from data availability. This study used time-series data 
based on about twenty countries over thirty years. This should produce about 600 
observations but there were many missing values and that produced a very unbalanced 
data set. Of course, it is almost impossible to obtain perfectly balanced data for 
comparative social policy research at the country level, but seriously unbalanced data can 
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still produce some bias in estimation. Luckily, the multi-level analysis employed here was 
not affected by unbalanced data, and the Jackknife analysis still shows the relevance of 
the analysis.  
However, it is still problematic, as we cannot use methods which consider the time-lag 
effect. It takes time to observe the effect of private pensions or particularly ALMPs on 
income distribution, so regression analysis which considers time lag could produce an 
interesting result.  
There are several techniques for this, such as lagged independent variables (for example, 
if the dependent variable is measured at the time point T, the independent variables 
measured at T-1 are put into the model) and the first-difference model. However, these 
models cannot be used when there are many missing values as more observations will be 
lost. In this case, only a small number of observations remain when the first-difference 
model or lagged independent variables are employed, so the result is likely to be 
unreliable. In fact, this issue is one limitation of the methodology used in this study. It 
might take time to observe the policy outcomes of new policy instruments but the multi-
level model cannot take account of the time effect. Therefore, the results might be 
different when time lag is considered, but that was not possible in this study. 
In addition, it has to be noted that new policy instruments are measured as a percentage 
of GDP, which can be quite controversial. As explained in Chapter 4, there is a debate on 
how to measure the welfare effort of a country. Spending is one of most frequently used 
indicators, but it is necessary to keep in mind that spending reflects the size and quantity 
of welfare effort but not the quality. Spending on ALMPs does not include the spending in 
the local government and private sectors, although their role in delivering ALMPs is on 
the increase. As discussed above, this study employed the proportion of the elderly 
population and the unemployment rate to reflect the demand side of the welfare 
programme. As discussed in Chapter 4, this is a standardising index so we can control 
functional changes in expenditure level.  
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7.4. Research design for the thesis 
7.4.1. The basic structure of the research: dependent and independent variable, 
and data set 
As mentioned above, the aim of this research is to examine the effect of new policy 
instruments on income inequality, so conceptually dependent variables should be a proxy 
for income inequality and the independent variables should be economic and political 
factors, as well as an indicator of new policy instruments. In addition, the typology of the 
public pension system and unemployment benefit are also included as independent 
variables. Section 7.4.1.1 discusses the dependent variables of the model. There are 
various measurements of income inequality, and this section introduces the frequently 
used inequality measurement techniques and reviews the advantages and disadvantages 
of each of them. Section 7.4.1.2 introduces the bigger picture of the independent 
variables. 
7.4.1.1. Dependent variable: How to measure income inequality? 
There are many ways to measure income inequality or welfare effort so it is very 
important to select a relevant proxy for those variables. First, the dependent variable as a 
proxy of income inequality has to be determined.  It is not simple task to measure income 
inequality properly and there is no such thing as a perfect measure. 
Fields and Fei (1978) identified four conditions that are important for measuring 
inequality well. A brief description of these four conditions follows. 
(a) Symmetry: This means that an inequality indicator must not be related to changes in 
the order of an individual’s income. For instance, if the household incomes of A, B, C and 
D are £100, £80, £60 and £40 respectively, then income inequality should be same when 
the incomes of A, B, C and D are changed to £80, £100, £60 and £40. In other words, 
income inequality remains equal when the incomes of households A and B are switched.  
(b) Population independence: Inequality measurement should not be affected by 
population size. In the example above, income inequality should remain the same when 
the number of households is doubled. So, if households E, F, G and H, which have incomes 
of £100, £80, £60 and £40 respectively, are added to households A, B, C and D, income 
inequality should be the same.  
137 
 
(c) Scale independence: If one income distribution is derived from another by 
multiplication of the constant, then the inequality between the two distributions should 
be the same. If we double the first distribution, then we can get another income 
distribution of households A to D with incomes of £200, £160, £120 and £80, respectively. 
In this case, the inequality index of the first income distribution should be equal to the 
inequality index of the second income distribution, which had doubled from the first 
distribution.  
(d) The Pigou-Dalton Transfer principle: Income inequality measurement has to decrease 
if income is transferred from the rich to the poor, even when their rank order in the 
income distribution does not change.  
Once the measurement of income inequality is determined, then there are several 
conditions that have to be decided, such as a unit of income (household or individual) or 
tax (pre-tax or post-tax). Details have  already been discussed in Chapter 2.  
There are several indices which are needed for these four conditions. One of the most 
frequently used is the Gini coefficient index (Atkinson & Brandolini, 2006; Milanovic, 
2000). The Gini coefficient is derived from the Lorenz curve. The Lorenz curve shows a 
graphical representation of the relationship between the cumulative share of total 
income and the cumulative percentage of income receiving units (Blackwood & Lynch, 
1994; Deininger & Squire 1996; Heshmati, 2004). In a Lorenz curve, the 45-degree line 
dividing the angle generated by the horizontal and vertical axes is the reference line. If 
income distribution is perfectly equal, then the Lorenz curve is identical with the 
reference line. On the other hand, if the income distribution is becoming unequal, the 
Lorenz curve moves away from the reference line.  
Based on the Lorenz curve and the reference line, the Gini coefficient can be calculated as 
(Blackwood & Lynch, 1994). 
𝐺 =
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐿𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑧 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑠
  
Therefore, the Gini coefficient has a value between 0 and 1, with 0 as perfect equality and 
1 as perfect inequality. The Gini coefficient meets the four conditions described above 
and it provides general information about the income inequality of a country and makes it 
relatively easy to compare countries (Heshmati 2004; Deininger & Squire 1996). In 
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addition, data availability is also very good since international organisations such as the 
World Bank, IMF or OECD provide good data on the Gini coefficient.  
However, there are some disadvantages of the Gini coefficient. It does not provide 
detailed information about the poor people who suffer most from income inequality. The 
Gini coefficient fails to provide details about how income distribution changes when the 
index goes up or down (Deininger & Squire, 1996). For example, redistribution from the 
top to the middle is not distinguished from redistribution from the middle to the bottom. 
In fact, this is a common problem with aggregated measurements (Atkinson, 1970). 
Graham (2002) also argued that the Gini coefficient does not capture what happens over 
time and within a particular society’s income distribution. Two societies that have same 
Gini coefficient could be very different in mobility or opportunities for individuals.  
The Theil index is another popular measurement of income inequality. When everyone in 
a society has same income, the Theil index is 0, which is perfect equality. If income 
distribution within the society is extremely unequal, then the Theil index is log N (N=the 
number of the population). The advantage of the Theil index is that it can be easily 
decomposed into sub-groups. Thus the Theil index shows the general situation of one 
country and it provides the proportion attributable to between sub-groups. The Theil 
index has the same problems as the Gini coefficient as it is also an aggregated index. In 
addition, the Theil index requires a great deal of information for computation, so data 
availability is relatively lower than for the Gini coefficient.  
As an alternative to the Gini coefficient, the income share of a specific income bracket 
(usually the top 10/20% or the bottom 10/20%) is frequently adopted as a measurement 
of income inequality. The income share of the top 10% divided by the income share of 
bottom 10% is also used as a measurement to overcome the shortcomings of the Gini 
coefficient. In other studies, the ratio of income share between the top 20% and 80% or 
the top 10% and 90% has also been widely used (Caminada & Goudswaard, 2001; Roine & 
Vlachos, 2009; Muller, 1985). Income share or income ratio shows how income 
distribution is changed in a specific income class.  
However, Jenkins (1991) argued that any measures based on just one of two cut-off 
points in income distribution, such as the income share of a specific income group (5% or 
10%) or income ratio, are likely to produce irrelevant results as it is completely insensitive 
to income transfer over large sections of the distribution. A £10 transfer from someone 
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with £10,000 would be different from a £10 transfer from someone with £100, but those 
measures do not reflect this difference. In addition, those measures are useful when 
researchers are interested in changes in the income of a specific class, but generally, they 
do not reflect the situation of a society as a whole. The following table summarises the 
types of inequality measure used in frequently cited studies. 
Table 7-1 Measures of income inequality 
Measurement Studies 
Gini coefficient Rudra (2004), Paskov & Dewilde (2012), Korpi & Palme (1998), 
Atkinson & Brandolini (2006), Scully (2003), Milanovic (2000), Forbes 
(2000), Deininger & Squire (1996), Benedict (2011), Crenshaw 
(1992), Alfonso & Schuknecht (2008), Jaumotte, Lall & Papageorgiou 
(2009) 
Income share of 
middle 20% 
Persson & Tabellini (1994), Alesina, Rodrik & Paukert (1973), Weede 
(1997) 
Income share of 
top  20% (or 10%) 
Muller (1985; 1988), Birchfield & Crepaz (1998), Weede (1980), 
Roine, Vlachos & Waldenstrom (2009) 
Income share of 
bottom 20% 
Weede (1980), Deininger & Squire (1996), Milanovic (1996), Fiszbein 
& Psacharopoulos (1995) 
Income share of 
bottom 10%  
Roine & Vlachos & Waldenstrom (2009) 
P90/10 ( or 80/20) 
ratio 
Caminada & Goudswaard (2001), Alvarez (2001), Ronie, Vlachos & 
Waldenstrom (2009) 
Household income Haughton & Nguyen (2010), Zhong (2011) 
* Household income is used as a dependent variable to examine the 
income gap between specific groups or socio-economic classes (for 
example, inequality between genders or regions) 
 
As shown in the table, the Gini coefficient is the most popular measurement of income 
inequality in many studies. However, many studies have used more than one 
measurement to produce more robust estimations since each measurement used in the 
previous studies has its own advantages. Many researchers have employed the Gini 
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coefficient as a base and the income share of a specific income class as a supplementary 
measurement (Deininger & Squire, 1996). 
This current study employed the Gini coefficient as a proxy for income inequality due to 
its high accessibility. In fact, it is not easy to find other data going back to the 1980s and 
there are many missing values, so it is not relevant for quantitative research. In addition, 
as discussed above, income share measurement does not reflect the general situation of 
a society so the Gini coefficient is more relevant for looking at the income inequality of a 
whole society. For the analysis of private pensions, the Gini coefficient among the elderly 
population over 65 years old was employed and the Gini coefficient among the working-
age population was employed for the analysis of ALMPs.  There are also many missing 
values in the Gini coefficient among the elderly, but the number of missing values is less 
than in other data sets.  
7.4.1.2. Description on Independent variables 
The main independent variables in this study are private pensions and ALMPs. This study 
used spending on private pensions and spending on ALMPs as a measurement for the two 
variables. As shown in the previous chapter, there are advantages and disadvantages in 
expenditure measurement. It can measure the size of these policy instruments but it does 
not reflect how they are spent. However, spending is the most frequently used 
measurement for these two variables, and practically it looks very difficult to find 
alternative variables at present. Discussion of relevant measurements for private pension 
systems or ALMPs is definitely necessary and it is in line with measurement issue 
discussed in chapter 4. Expenditure-based measurement has some disadvantages, such as 
not reflecting the qualitative dimension or the demand side. One alternative is to use a 
standardising expenditure measurement as shown in Chapter 4, so for this study, the 
proportion of the population over 65 years old and the unemployment rate were used as 
independent variables. We can control the effect of functional changes in expenditure 
level by including those variables.  
The welfare effort of other areas should also be included in the analysis as control 
variables. Not only ALMPs or private pensions, but also the general level of welfare effort 
affects income inequality. In this case, there is an issue over which one is better as a 
measurement of a welfare state, expenditure or generosity score. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the measurement of welfare effort has to reflect qualitative 
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characteristics and changes in the welfare institution so it has to show the extent to 
which the welfare institution helps the poor cope with their situation (Scrugg & Allan, 
2006; Cox, 2001). In addition, the measurement needs to be easily accessible on an 
annual basis (Castles, 2006).  
Consequently, every model in this thesis was tested twice. The first test was the welfare 
generosity index introduced in the previous chapter. The generosity index indicates the 
extent to which existing welfare programmes are generous to the poor and reflects the 
extents to which the government provides the poor with generous protection. The 
welfare generosity index explained in the previous chapter reflects qualitative changes 
since it considers changes in the conditions for entitlement. Second, expenditure-based 
measurement was also used. The most distinctive advantage of expenditure-based 
measurement is its accessibility on an annual basis. In addition, many studies have used 
expenditure-based measurement so it is easy to compare results.  
There are economic and political factors that affect income inequality, so they should be 
included in the analysis. Detailed lists of variables are different depending on the topic, so 
they are explained in each analysis chapter. Generally, GDP and degree of globalisation 
are included as economic variables. One thing that has to be mentioned is this study do 
not include variables on political institution. This study is based on data 20 countries over 
thirty years, but there are many missing values so we have only the limited number of 
observations. Therefore, the number of independent variable has to be limited otherwise 
it could reduce robustness of the analysis. In addition, data for political institution, such 
as veto points or corruption has limited availability. Therefore, this study does not include 
variables on political institution.  
For this analysis, data were collected from various sources. Data on social expenditure, 
private pensions and ALMPs were taken from OECD data sets. The Gini coefficient among 
the elderly and working-age populations were also taken from OECD data sets. Economic 
variables such as GDP per capita or the globalisation index were also taken from the OECD, 
and the generosity scores of the welfare state came from Scruggs’s (2013) data set. Other 
data were drawn from comparative welfare state data sets made by Brady, Huber and 
Stephens (2014). Detailed descriptions of the variables are explained in each analysis 
chapter.  
7.4.2. Hypotheses of analysis. 
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This chapter is intended to show only the ‘big picture’ of the thesis, so this section briefly 
introduces the basic hypotheses which will be explained, tested and discussed in much 
more detail within their respective analysis chapters. This thesis focuses on how much 
difference is made by the institutional design of public welfare systems in the effect of 
new policy instruments on income inequality. Hypotheses A refers to the effect of private 
pensions and the institutional design of a public pension system, and hypotheses B are 
about the effect of ALMPs. 
Hypothesis A 
An increase in private pension has significant effect on income inequality.  
Hypothesis A-1 
An increase in private pension does not have a significant effect in countries with a 
generous public pension system. 
Hypothesis A-2 
An increase in private pension has a significant positive effect on income inequality in 
countries with a less generous public pension system. 
Hypothesis B 
An increase in ALMPs has a significant negative effect on income inequality. 
Hypothesis B-1 
An increase in ALMPs has a stronger negative effect on income inequality when 
unemployment benefit and the minimum income programme are less generous. 
Hypothesis B-2 
An increase in private pension has a weaker negative effect when unemployment 
benefits and the minimum income programme are more generous. 
In fact, the effect of ALMPs and private pensions is an explorable hypothesis as previous 
empirical studies have shown that the effect of these policies is not very clear. This study 
tentatively assumes hypotheses A and B. The subordinate hypotheses are based on 
studies which have examined the relationship between new policy instruments and public 
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welfare systems. As shown in the previous section, individuals do not have an incentive to 
join a private pension scheme when the public pension provides sufficient benefit, so 
hypotheses A-1 and A-2 are based on this. Regarding unemployment benefit, individuals 
can remain longer in unemployment when the unemployment benefit and minimum 
income programme are generous, and they do not have an incentive to join any active 
labour market programmes. Hypotheses B-1 and B-2 are derived from this. The detailed 
hypotheses from hypothesis A will be explored in Chapters 8 and 9, and those from 
hypothesis B will be explored in Chapter 10.  
The meaning of ‘generous’ benefit is still very vague; it will be specified in the analysis 
chapter when the institutional design of the public welfare system is classified. The 
‘generosity’ of a welfare system in this thesis is much related to the discussion of the 
universal and targeting systems in Chapter 4. In this thesis, ‘more generous system’ 
means that the welfare system contains characteristics of a universal system, and ‘less 
generous system’ indicates that the welfare system is more close to a targeting system.    
7.5. Conclusion 
The reduction in income inequality and poverty is one of the main objectives of social 
policy. In order to reduce income inequality and have a better shape of income 
distribution in the era of transformation of the welfare state, it is necessary to determine 
how new policy instruments affect income inequality. An aging population and the fiscal 
burden on governments led to the reform of the public pension programme and an 
increase in private pensions, and the transition from the protective welfare state to the 
productive welfare state is closely related to the emergence of ALMPs. However, the 
effect of these new policy instruments is determined in the interplay with the traditional 
public welfare system. 
Therefore, this thesis attempts to examine the distributive outcome of new policy 
instruments in the context of the institutional design of the traditional welfare state and 
this chapter has offered a big picture of the research design and methodology used. TSCS 
data is frequently used in comparative welfare state research and it overcomes the ‘small 
N issue’ which is often mentioned as a problem in TSCS data at country level. However, it 
also has some problems, such as auto-correlation and omitted variable bias. The fixed-
effect model is useful as it can control unobservable heterogeneity between countries, 
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but it can also lose a lot of information as it treats time-invariant variables as fixed effects, 
so we cannot test it. The institutional design of a welfare programme is time-invariant or 
changes very slowly over time, so it cannot be estimated by the fixed-effect model. The 
random-effect model can be an alternative to the fixed-effect model but its estimation 
can be spurious as it is based on unrealistic assumptions. 
Therefore, this thesis employed multi-level modelling which can separate the within-
country effect and the between-countries effect. It is possible to estimate the effect of 
the time-invariant institution, as well as private pensions and ALMPs using this model, 
controlling other country-specific characteristics. The Gini coefficients among the elderly 
and working-age populations are used as dependent variables, and spending on private 
pensions and ALMPs is employed as a main independent variable. Other variables that 
can affect income inequality, such as welfare effort, economic and political variables, are 
also included as control variables. The institutional design of public pension and 
unemployment benefit/minimum income programmes is specified in more detail in the 
following chapter.  
Chapters 8 and 9 deal with the effect of private pensions on income distribution. Chapter 
8 shows more detailed research questions, hypotheses and classifications of the public 
pension system. This will show how to classify public pension systems based on eligibility 
and earning-relatedness which are known to be important factors which affect private 
pensions. More detailed introductions to variables and descriptive statistics are also 
shown. Chapter 8 mainly focuses on how an increase in private pensions is related to 
changes in income distribution and how this relation can be changed by the institutional 
design of public pensions. Chapter 9 is a supplementary analysis to Chapter 8. It covers 
the distributive outcome of first-tier pensions and second-tier pensions, and how they 
interact with private pensions. Chapter 10 deals with the distributive outcome of ALMPs. 
The classification of unemployment benefit and minimum income programmes is 
explained in Chapter 10, and descriptive statistics and the result of the analysis are 
presented.  
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Chapter 8. Distributive outcome of private pension part 1 
8.1. Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, income inequality is the consequence of 
complicated interactions between various factors in society, not only economic factors 
and political issues, but also demographic changes and welfare reform are considered as 
two of the main factors in changes in income distribution.  In particular, an aging 
population and changes in family formation are regarded as important factors and are 
closely related to the reform of the welfare state. The reform of the welfare state is 
needed to build a more efficient and sustainable welfare system under the fiscal burdens 
that governments face, so new policy instruments are needed for reform. Therefore, the 
empirical analysis in this thesis explores the relationship between new policy instruments 
and income inequality focusing on the interaction between new policy instruments and 
the existing traditional welfare state. First, this chapter concentrates on private pensions 
and income inequality. As was shown in the previous chapter, the modern welfare state is 
under fiscal pressure caused by an aging population and increases in pension expenditure, 
so many policy reforms are attempted in the pension programme as well as the labour 
market policy to cope with an aging population.   
As was shown in Chapter 6, one of main new policy instruments is the introduction of 
private pensions so this chapter looks at how pension reform is related to income 
inequality controlling other main factors, such as economic development, globalisation 
and political characteristics. The goal of this chapter is first to look at the empirical 
relationship between private pensions and income inequality. Second, as stated in 
Chapter 7, the relationship is expected to be affected by the institutional design of a 
public pension programme, so this chapter will looks at how the relationship differs 
according to the institutional design of the public pension system. The institutional design 
of pension systems is classified based on the debate between a universal system and a 
targeted system, but criteria that are more detailed are applied to classification.  
This chapter is structured as follows. It discusses how to classify welfare institution in this 
chapter is structured as follows. It discusses how to classify welfare institutions in the 
public pension system first. This starts with a discussion of the existing classifications and 
what criteria they are based on.  As shown in Chapter 6, previous studies have shown that 
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earnings-relatedness and eligibility are important for the relationship between private 
pension and public pension systems. In addition, eligibility is closely related to the debate 
between the universal system and the targeted system. Therefore, this chapter proposes 
a classification based on earnings-relatedness and eligibility. Specific research questions 
and hypotheses are also proposed. 
The following section introduces the dependent and independent variables. A brief 
description has already been given in Chapter 7 so further details of the list are given in 
this section. Descriptive statistics of the main variables follow. The trends of the main 
variables over time are shown first, and a simple analysis of variance (ANOVA) is carried 
out to see whether or not there is a significant difference in income inequality between 
types of pension institution. The results of the empirical analysis are presented after the 
descriptive statistics.  
8.2. Research questions, design, and hypotheses 
This section discusses how to classify the institutional design of public pension systems. It 
reviews Beveridge-type and Bismarck-type systems and then looks at the classification 
proposed by Korpi and Palme (1998; 2006). Their classification is based on earnings-
relatedness and eligibility so it covers salient factors in the relationship between private 
and public pensions, as well as discussions of the universal and targeted systems. This 
section proposes a new classification based on Korpi and Palme’s classification but using 
some empirical data on earnings-relatedness and coverage rate. Specific hypotheses 
based on the theoretical discussion of the relationship between public and private 
pensions are then presented.  
8.2.1. Institutional design of public pension: The Bismarck model vs The 
Beveridge model  
The primary purpose of this thesis is to look at the distributive outcome of new policy 
instruments, which in this chapter is a private pension scheme, and to see how the 
distributive outcome can differ according to the institutional design of the public pension 
programme. The important question is therefore how to measure and classify the 
institutional design of public pension systems. As explained in Chapter 7, the main 
components considered are the earnings-relatedness of a pension and its eligibility 
criteria (Korpi & Palme 1998; Palme 2006). The conventional idea of classification by type 
147 
 
of public pension is the Bismarck-style and the Beveridge-style (Disney 2004; OECD 2007). 
The Bismarck-style is pension system which provides earnings replacement so there is a 
strong link between earnings during working age and pension income. Thus, the 
Bismarck-style system is based on social insurance and has earnings-related benefits. 
Entitlement is generally based on contribution record. Most continental European 
countries, such as Germany and France, have a Bismarck-style pension system. In contrast, 
the Beveridge-style system is more concentrated on basic security, rather than earnings 
replacement, so a flat-rate benefit unrelated to contributions is provided. Eligibility is 
mostly based on residence and in some case on need (Bonoli 1997; Queisser et al., 2007).  
However, the details are slightly different in different countries; the Netherlands and New 
Zealand have income-tested and flat-rate benefits systems whereas Canada and Ireland 
have a combination of the flat-rate and earnings-related benefit systems (Disney 2004). 
The Beveridge-style system can be found in Anglo-Saxon countries and some continental 
European countries such as the Netherlands and Switzerland. It is said that Beveridge 
regimes are typically accompanied by a private pension scheme as they mainly provide a 
flat-rate benefit so the rich have an incentive to buy a private pension to maintain their 
previous income level. Thus, the coverage rate of private pensions in a Beveridge regime 
is likely to be high, so it can be inferred that private pensions have a more significant 
negative effect on income distribution in Beveridge-regime countries. This is in line with 
Palme’s argument (2006) as discussed in Chapter 7. The argument is that a private 
pension has a significantly negative effect on income distribution in countries with more 
‘equal’ structure, but the Bismarck regime is a more ‘unequal’ structure than Beveridge’s 
as it has stronger earnings-relatedness so the effect of private pensions is likely to be 
insignificant in Bismarck-style systems.   
Table 8-1 Beveridge regime & Bismarck Regime (Disney, 2004) 
 
Countries 
Pension Scheme type Benefit level (%) 
(replacement rate 
standard pension) 
1st tier 2nd tier 
Beveridge  
Regime 
Australia 
Canada 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
New 
Zealand 
Switzerland 
 
Targeted 
Targeted/Basic 
Targeted/Basic 
Basic 
Basic 
 
Basic 
Targeted/Minimum 
 
Private DC 
Public DB 
Private DC 
- 
Private DB 
 
- 
Public DB/Private 
DB 
46.9 
69.9 
62.84 
57.93 
60.29 
 
59.77 
56.74 
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UK 
US 
Targeted/Minimum/Basic 
- 
Public DB 
Public DB 
55.96 
76.66 
Average value of benefit level 60.77 
Bismarck 
Regime 
Austria 
Belgium 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Italy 
Luxemburg 
Norway 
 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
- 
Targeted/Minimum 
Minimum 
Minimum 
Targeted 
Minimum 
Targeted 
Targeted/Basic/Minimum 
Minimum 
 
Minimum 
Minimum 
Minimum 
Public DB 
Public DB 
Public DB 
Public DB+Points 
Points 
Public DB 
Public NDC 
Public DB 
Public 
NDC/Private DC 
Public DB 
Public DB 
Public 
NDC/Private DC 
65.23 
65.72 
75.51 
64.32 
57.70 
- 
79.03 
- 
63.7 
 
66.20 
98.09 
90.02 
 
Average value of benefit level 72.55 
<Sources: Disney’s classification (2004), replacement rates are taken from Comparative 
welfare entitlement data set (Scrugg, 2013) 
Specification of the pension scheme follows the OECD pension-at-a-glance (2013). As 
shown in Chapter 7, the public pension system has a basic security dimension and income 
security dimension so usually, the public pension system consists of a two-tier system. 
The first tier usually reflects redistributive components (basic security) to ensure that 
pensioners can achieve a minimum standard of living (Queisser et al., 2007) and it is not 
related to previous income level, whereas the second tier programme focuses on the 
savings or insurance aspects of the public pension (income security) as it is the earnings-
related part. What we can find here is that Beveridge-regime countries are likely to have 
targeted or basic pensions as the first tier programme whereas most Bismarck-regime 
countries have a minimum pension.  
‘Basic pension’ refers to a flat-rate benefit or benefit depending on years of work, not 
past earnings (OECD, 2013). ‘Minimum pension’ in this table is slightly different as 
governments offer benefit to individuals who have lower pension income than the 
minimum standard set by the government. It looks similar to means-testing but is 
different as it is not affected by other income, such as savings (OECD, 2013). Thus, 
minimum pension is in the middle between basic pension and targeted pension. For the 
second tier programme, some Beveridge-regime countries have a private pension scheme 
only, whereas all of the Bismarck-regimes countries are based on a public pension system, 
although some of them have a mixture of private and public schemes. Regarding benefit 
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level, the table shows the replacement rate of a standard pension, which is based on 
contributions and is earnings-related. Although most Beveridge-regime countries (New 
Zealand and Ireland do not have an earnings-related pension system as they have basic 
pension system only) have an earnings-related element in the pension scheme, their 
benefit level, which is 60.77% on average, is relatively low compared with Bismarck-
regime countries which show 72.55% (Greece and Luxemburg do not have data in 
Scruggs’s data set). Based on previous studies of the effect of private pensions and the 
institutional design of public pensions, the following hypotheses can be proposed. All the 
hypotheses in this chapter have been developed from hypothesis A in Chapter 7.  
Hypothesis 1: An increase in private pensions is related to an increase in income 
inequality under the control of other independent variables. 
Hypothesis 1-1: An increase in private pensions is not significantly related to an increase 
in income inequality in Bismarck-regime countries. 
Hypothesis 1-2: An increase in private pensions is related to an increase in income 
inequality in Beveridge-regime countries.   
Hypotheses 1-1 and 1-2 are very straightforward. In previous studies, it has been argued 
that a private pension does not play a significant role in the pension programme in 
countries with strong earnings-relatedness based on contribution, whereas the opposite 
is expected in countries with a universal flat-rate benefit. In fact, this has been frequently 
discussed in previous studies which have shown that a generous public pension crowds 
out private pensions (Künemund & Rein 1999; De Deken, 2013). It can therefore be 
inferred that a private pension is unlikely to affect income distribution in a Bismarck 
regime which has an earnings-related benefit, and that a Beveridge regime is likely to 
have contrary consequences, as the Beveridge regime is concentrated on the universal 
flat-rate and its earnings-relatedness is relatively weaker than in the Bismarck regime. 
Thus a private pension is more attractive for the rich in Beveridge-regime countries, so 
income inequality can get worse when the rich are likely to join private pension 
programmes.  
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8.2.2 Institutional design: earning-relatedness and coverage 
Apart from the classification on the lines of Bismarck-Beveridge regimes, this study 
attempts to propose a different classification based on empirical data on earnings-
relatedness and eligibility. As shown in previous section, the pension program can be 
divided into Bismarck and Beveridge model. However there are difference between 
Continental European countries and Scandinavian countries although they are included as 
Bismarck model (Korpi & Palme, 1998). Therefore, they proposed the classification based 
on earning-relatedness and eligibility, and elaborated and empirically tested in 
subsequent studies (Palme, 2006). They argued that there are two main issues on the 
best policy design to reduce poverty and inequality (Korpi & Palme 1998). One is whether 
the social policy should be universal or targeted, and the second is whether it should be 
related to previous earnings or should be equal for all. In fact, this issue has been 
repeated in previous studies as the debate on the ‘paradox of redistribution’. As reviewed 
in Chapter 6, the core question on this is whether the middle class should be included in 
the welfare programme. They therefore proposed an institutional design for a welfare 
state based on these two questions.  
This section attempts to employ the basic idea of this model and re-classify it based on 
empirical data. First, the degree of earnings-relatedness is computed. In this study, the 
degree of earning-relatedness is measured by the net replacement rate by earning level. 
The replacement rate for a high income is normally lower than for a low income and the 
gap in the replacement rate between the rich and the poor tends to be bigger when 
earnings-relatedness is weak. For instance, New Zealand has only a flat-rate basic pension 
system and the replacement rate for the poor is around 81.7% but for rich it is 23.9% 
(OECD, 2013). Table 8-2 shows the net replacement rates for people at different earnings 
levels: half, average and double average earnings.  
Table 8-2 Replacement rate by earning level in 2013 
 0.5 1 2 
Gap between high and low 
income 
Australia 100.5 67.7 55.6 44.9 
Austria 91.2 89.9 64.5 26.7 
Belgium 80.7 63.9 35.4 45.3 
Canada 90.7 64.4 32.0 58.7 
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Denmark 117.5 82.4 60.5 57 
Finland 71.3 62.4 62.2 9.1 
France 71.3 62.4 63.2 8.1 
Germany 57.8 55.2 42.6 15.2 
Greece 92.5 79.6 61.2 31.3 
Ireland 75.5 52.2 28.2 47.3 
Italy 83.9 82.0 82.6 1.3 
Luxemburg 87.1 70.5 63.6 23.5 
Netherlands 104.8 103.8 94.9 9.9 
New Zealand 81.7 57.7 23.9 57.8 
Norway 91.1 63.8 42.5 48.6 
Portugal 77.7 65.6 69.6 8.1 
Spain 79.5 79.8 63.9 15.6 
Sweden 68.8 55.3 79.1 -10.3 
Switzerland 78.4 77.8 37.3 41.1 
United Kingdom 67.2 48 23.9 43.3 
United State 58.7 49.9 37.1 21.6 
Average 82.3 68.3 53.51  
<Sources: OECD pension at glance, 2013> 
The data shown in Table 8-2 are from the year 2013, but the degree of earnings-
relatedness cannot be judged by only one-year data so it is necessary to see a trend of 
earnings-relatedness in public pensions. This study used data from the ‘OECD pension-at-
a-glance’ from 2005 to 2013. The trend is summarized in the following table. 
Table 8-3 Trend of earning-relatedness 
 
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 Average 
Denmark 60.1 60.5 59.3 58.6 57 59.1 
Canada 58.8 58.4 58.2 57.6 58.7 58.34 
New 
Zealand 
55.1 58.2 56.5 56.4 57.8 56.8 
United 
Kingdom 
48.6 42.1 41 43.6 43.3 43.72 
Ireland 41.1 42.3 44 39.6 47.3 42.86 
Australia 40.5 42.7 43.4 40.5 44.9 42.4 
Belgium 42.1 36.6 37.5 40.4 45.3 40.38 
Switzerland 30 39.9 35.4 43.1 41.1 37.9 
Norway 35.4 22 23.9 38.8 48.6 33.74 
Austria 11.9 25.3 25.7 27.6 26.7 23.44 
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United 
State 
22.4 24.2 24.6 23.5 21.6 23.26 
France 28.9 23 18.7 20.4 8.1 19.82 
Luxemburg 20.8 16.6 15.3 14.1 23.5 18.06 
Greece 0 6.6 9.4 9.4 31.3 11.34 
Spain 5.3 9.6 9.9 12.1 15.6 10.5 
Portugal 29.6 7.9 0.6 2.8 8.1 9.8 
Finland 12.4 5.9 8.7 6.9 9.1 8.6 
Germany -5.3 1.1 14.8 12.2 15.2 7.6 
Netherlands -1.3 2.2 9.5 10.9 9.9 6.24 
Italy 0.2 0.8 -3.9 1.5 1.3 -0.02 
Sweden 15.9 7.5 -6.6 -11.3 -10.3 -0.96 
<Source: OECE pension at glance 2005-2013> 
Table 8-3 shows the trend of the gap in replacement rate between the rich and the poor. 
Earnings-relatedness gets weaker as the gap increases. As shown in the table, the 
distinction between strong earnings-relatedness and weak earnings-relatedness is 
relatively clear as most of the countries can be seen to have been stable over this period 
except for a few cases. The average value of the gap in total is 26.33. Most countries have 
stayed either below or above this average value. There are some exceptions, for example, 
Sweden shows a steep line of decrease but this does not matter in practical terms as 
Sweden shows a consistently low level of the gap (strong earnings-relatedness). For 
Sweden, the gap has had a negative value since 2009 which means that the replacement 
rate for the rich is higher than the replacement rate for the poor.  
In fact, the countries that are more problematic are Norway and Greece. For Norway, the 
gap was higher than 30 in 2005 but it went down below 30 in 2007 and 2009, and then 
went up again. Although there are some fluctuations, the average value of the gap in 
Norway is above 26.33 and is on the increase, so Norway is considered as a weak 
earnings-relatedness country in this study. In contrast, Greece had strong earnings-
relatedness until 2011 but then had weak earnings-relatedness in 2013. In the context of 
this study, Greece was considered to be a country with weak earnings-relatedness based 
on the most recent data, but in fact, all the results still remain the same when Greece is 
considered as a strong earnings-relatedness country. Table 8-4 shows a list of the 
countries in each category.  
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Table 8-4 Classification based on earning-relatedness 
Strong earning relatedness Weak earning relatedness 
Austria(M) ,Finland(M), France(M), 
Germany(M), Italy(M), Luxemburg(M), 
Netherlands(V),  Portugal(M) , Spain(M), 
Sweden (M), USA(V) 
Australia (v), Belgium(M), Canada (V) 
Denmark(V), Greece(M), Ireland(V), New 
Zealand(V), Norway (M), Switzerland (V), UK(V) 
*M: Bismarck Regime, V: Beveridge regime 
As expected, most of the Bismarck-regime countries have strong earnings-relatedness 
and the Beveridge-regime countries have weak earnings-relatedness. There are some 
exceptions: the Netherlands and the US are classified as Beveridge regimes but their 
earnings- relatedness is relatively strong. The case of the Netherlands could be plausible 
as the Netherlands can be classified as a Bismarck regime by some researchers. The US is 
a bit different; its earnings-relatedness is slightly stronger than the average but its benefit 
level is low compared with other countries. Denmark is the opposite case as the gap is 
relatively large but the benefit level is relatively high in all earnings levels. The case of 
Greece is similar; its benefit level is relatively higher than other countries with weak 
earnings-relatedness but the gap between high and low incomes (31.3) is slightly higher 
than the average (28.77). This calculation and classification are based on the data from 
the OECD in 2013. However, the degree of earnings-relatedness does not frequently 
change so this classification is still valid. 
Countries with low earnings-relatedness pension systems are likely to have high coverage 
rates as most of them are based on the universal basic security system. In contrast, the 
coverage rate in the countries with strong earning-relatedness pensions is more varied. 
Korpi and Palme (1998) showed the difference in eligibility across countries that had 
strong earnings-relatedness. They showed that continental European countries are based 
on an occupational pension system and that Nordic countries have universal eligibility 
with strong earnings-relatedness. As shown above, universalism is considered to be a 
significant factor affecting income distribution so this current study calculated the 
average coverage rate of each country for thirty years using the coverage rate data 
proposed by Scruggs (2013). As shown above, the public pension system has a two-tier 
system so the coverage of each tier of the programme might be different. However, this 
thesis approaches this in a broader sense so eligibility is based on how many people in the 
society are covered by the public pension.  The coverage rate shown in Scruggs’s data is 
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computed as the number of benefits paid to the population above retirement age. 
Therefore, this thesis selected coverage rate as an indicator for eligibility for a public 
pension.  
Regarding eligibility, this study uses the mean value of the coverage rate of public pension 
system. All data are taken from Comparative welfare entitlement dataset by Scruggs 
(2013).  
Table 8-5 Coverage rate from 1980-2010 
 
 <Sources: Comparative welfare state entitlement, http://cwed2.org/) 
As we can see in the table, Austria, Australia, Portugal and Spain have distinctively lower 
level of coverage rate but the other countries generally have the high level of coverage 
rate. Among strong earning-relatedness countries, Germany and USA have relatively 
lower level of coverage rate compared to Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and France. 
Among weak earning-related countries, most of countries have relative high level of 
coverage except Australia.   
Countries with strong earnings-relatedness are divided into ‘low coverage’ and ‘high 
coverage’ based on the average value across the countries. Countries with weak earning-
related, they are treated as one group although Australia have lower level of coverage 
rate. Australia is the only one country that have weak earning-relatedness and low 
coverage rate. However, it is usually classified as same group with other Anglo-Saxon 
country coverage rate country coverage rate 
Netherlands 1.031667 
New 
Zealand 
0.9625 
Sweden 1.025217 Ireland 0.9612903 
United 
Kingdom 
1.016207 Germany 0.96 
Norway 1.014063 USA 0.9433333 
Finland 1.006667 Belgium 0.9295833 
Switzerland 1 Austria 0.8569565 
France 1 Australia 0.7185807 
Denmark 0.996 Portugal 0.68 
Canada 0.9877419 Spain 0.61 
Italia 0.97625 Greece N/A 
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countries (Esping-Andersen 1990; Antonius & John, 2002), so this study put Australia into 
the same group with other Anglo-Saxon countries. 
It needs more cautious to deal with Luxemburg and Greece as they do not have available 
data. Luxemburg is often classified as same group with Germany or Austria (Antonius & 
John, 2002), so it is included in low coverage group. As shown in above, weak earning-
related group is treated as one group although there are some variability in coverage rate. 
However it is still valid as they are generally high level of coverage rate. As a consequence, 
the countries in each group are summarized the following table. As discussed above, the 
core characteristics of public pension system in terms of income distribution is earning-
relatedness and coverage rate. Thus, this study employs two dimensions only to classify 
the institutional design of public pension. Other characteristics such as qualifying period, 
thus, are not reflected in this study. 
Table 8-6 classification based on earning-relatedness and coverage 
 Weak earning-relatedness 
Strong earning-relatedness 
Low coverage High Coverage 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Greece, Ireland, 
New Zealand, Norway, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom 
Portugal, Spain, USA, Austria, 
Germany, Luxemburg 
Finland, France, Sweden, 
Netherlands 
 
According to previous studies, strong earnings-relatedness based on universal coverage 
makes a private pension less attractive so private pensions do not have a significant effect 
on income inequality. In contrast, a weak earnings-relatedness pension system 
encourages the rich to join private pension schemes so income inequality is expected to 
increase as private pension spending increases. This is a bit complicated to predict in the 
case of strong earnings-relatedness but a low coverage rate, but it is nevertheless 
expected that a private pension does not have a significant effect if earnings-relatedness 
is a more important aspect in income distribution. However, if a public pension system 
has strong earnings-relatedness but is accessible only to a limited group of people and the 
excluded class is likely to be poor, then only those in the rich class can access a private 
pension on the top of the public pension and in this case an increase in private pensions is 
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related to an increase in income inequality.  In brief, this study proposes the following 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2 
An increase in private pensions has significant effect on an increase in income 
inequality in countries with a weak earnings-relatedness pension scheme. 
Hypothesis 3 
An increase in private pensions does not have significant effect on changes in income 
inequality in countries with strong earnings-relatedness and a high coverage rate. 
Hypothesis 4 
An increase of private pensions does not have significant effect on the increase of 
income inequality with strong earnings-relatedness but a low coverage rate if the 
strong earning-relatedness is more decisive than universal coverage in the low level of 
income inequality.  
Most of the developed countries are finding that they have an aging population. However, 
the welfare effort of the welfare state including a pension system is declining due to fiscal 
deficits and low economic growth. The direction of current reform in pension systems is 
to adopt a public-private mixed programme, decrease the importance of the public 
pension and delay the retirement of workers. These changes could help governments to 
budget more sustainably, but we need to consider their distributive consequences. 
Previous studies have shown that the changes from public pension to private pension in 
the developed world are causing the elderly to have less benefit and to be more exposed 
to economic shock from outside the country as private pension companies can invest in 
other countries in order to gain a better return, so their profits can be affected by global 
shocks such as financial crises. Pensioners’ benefits from private pensions can be affected 
when private pension companies are affected by global shock (Bonoli & Natali, 2012). 
Therefore, it is expected that there will be more poverty and inequality in our society as 
the proportion of private pensions increases. This is why we need to examine the 
relationship between pension reform and its distributive outcome. The next section offers 
detailed information on the variables, data and methodologies for the model required to 
test the hypotheses proposed above.  
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8.3. Data, Variable and Methodology 
As shown in Chapter 7, this thesis focuses on how an increase in private pensions is 
related to changes in income inequality in the context of the existing pension programme. 
Therefore, the dependent variable is income inequality and main independent variables 
are private pensions, the index of welfare effort and an aging population. However, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, many drivers affect income inequality. The main 
drivers are divided into three categories, political, economic and welfare institution 
variables. The welfare institution can be measured by welfare effort as the main 
independent variable, and economic variables and political variables are included as 
control variables. A detailed explanation follows. 
8.3.1. Independent variables and controlled variables 
8.3.1.1. Main independent variables 
A main independent variable can be categorized into two parts. The first is to indicate the 
reform of the pension programme, and the other is to measure welfare effort, particularly 
on the pension programme.  As shown above, the main strategy of pension reform is to 
postpone the retirement age and increase the mixed private-public system. In the first 
category, the labour participation rate of the elderly (over 65 years) and the relative size 
of voluntary private pension expenditure are included as variables. Both were obtained 
from OECD social expenditure data sets and the relative size of voluntary pension 
expenditure was computed by private pension expenditure as a percentage of public (and 
mandatory private) pension expenditure. Both forms of data cover around thirty years 
from 1980 to 2011.   
The other category is welfare effort focusing on the pension programme. The method for 
measuring the welfare effort was discussed in the previous chapter. To summarize, the 
most frequently used measurement is social expenditure (Castles, 1999; 2004; 2008) 
since availability and accessibility are relatively better than other indices and are very 
straightforward to understand. However, social expenditure reflects financial terms only 
so it is criticized for neglecting qualitative changes in welfare effort. It does not tell us 
how money is spent and does not consider changes on the demand side. In addition, 
studies of changes in the welfare state using expenditure measurement have shown 
inconsistent findings (Wenzelburger, 2013; Kühner 2007; 2015).  
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Thanks to improvements in statistical methods and information processing techniques, 
welfare generosity which is now measured based on social rights is broadly available and 
it enables us to see qualitative changes in the welfare state over time and space as well 
(Scruggs & Allan, 2004; 2006). Although the data for social rights-based measurement are 
not easy to obtain and to update, it is getting better and better as time goes by. The 
detailed method for calculating welfare generosity has already been explained in the 
previous chapter so it does not have to be recapped in this section. 
Another issue for measuring welfare effort is to select either summary measures or 
specific measures for each welfare programme.  As mentioned above, not only pension 
programmes but also health-care or long-term care expenditure is expected to play an 
important role in income distribution. Some previous studies have focused on 
measurement of a specific programme when they examine the relationship between 
income distribution and welfare effort (Palme 2006). It has also been argued that we 
need to be more programme-specific when evaluating welfare effort since disaggregated 
data is better for capturing changes in the welfare policy of countries as the diversity of 
welfare policy is getting wider (Kühner 2007). In addition, the politics and changes in 
pension programmes are different in different welfare areas so a pension programme 
might have a different direction from unemployment benefit or sick pay and summary 
measurements are unlikely to capture the difference.  
Therefore, this study employs a general welfare generosity score as a measurement of 
welfare effort. The generosity score can be divided into two parts, pension generosity 
score and the generosity score of other programmes. In addition, it is important to 
capture data from as many countries as possible. As discussed in Chapter 7, multi-level 
analysis requires many samples at the country level. Generosity scores are available for 
nineteen countries whereas social expenditure is available for only eighteen countries. 
Thus, we can capture more countries when we use a generosity score. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the pension generosity index proposed by Scruggs (2013) 
consists of three factors; the replacement rate (RR) of the minimum pension, the RR of 
the standard pension and the coverage rate of the public pension. The welfare generosity 
score is used to test hypotheses 1 to 5. However, as discussed in Chapter 5, welfare 
generosity is not a perfect index so all the models in this chapter were re-tested using 
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expenditure-based measurement as well. The results are available in the appendix A.3 
and A.4.  
Institutional variables which reflect time-invariant, country-specific characteristics are 
included as well. In this study, ‘context variable’ refers to the institution of the country in 
which the welfare effort is embedded, so it affects every variable within one country. 
Those context variables are similar to country dummy variables to absorb country-specific 
effects which are unobservable. However, context variables in this study are for reflecting 
the institutional design of the public pension programme and they can be captured, 
whereas country dummy variables are only for being controlled to strip off the effect of 
the unobservable variables. This study has two context variables. As stated above, the 
Bismarck and Beveridge regimes are used first. Then a classification based on the degree 
of earnings-relatedness is applied. As shown above, there are some countries that are not 
very clear. Thus the classification shown in the previous section is applied first and then 
some changes are applied.  
8.3.1.2. Control variables 
Regarding control variables, important variables which affect income inequality are 
divided into political, economic and social variables. So this study also selects variables 
based on previous studies. First, an aging population should be considered as a social 
variable because social expenditure can be driven by an aging population without 
qualitative changes. This study uses the proportion of the population over 65 years old as 
a measurement for an aging population. The data were obtained from OECD demographic 
statistics. At the same time, including the proportion of the population over 65 is 
important as it controls the demand side of the welfare state. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
expenditure measurement carries several problems and one way to overcome its 
disadvantages is to standardise the expenditure measurement that reflects the demand 
side of social expenditure. This study employs spending on private pensions as a measure 
so we can control the effect of functional changes in expenditure by including this 
variable.   
GDP per capita and the openness of the capital market are considered to represent the 
economic dimension. Economic variables have been regarded as the most salient factor in 
income distribution and the level of economic development is an important factor in 
income inequality. In fact, some studies have used economic growth rate as an economic 
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variable but Kuznets (1955) insisted that it is not the relationship between economic 
growth and income inequality but the level of economic development and income 
inequality that is relevant. The basic structure of his argument was that income inequality 
increases in the early stage of economic development and is reduced as the economic 
system and the labour market become mature. Thus the level of economic development 
is well reflected in GDP per capita, rather than in the economic growth rate. We can see 
from the data that the economic growth rate is relatively low in high-income countries 
and higher in middle-income or low-income countries. That is why this study used GDP 
per capita rather than the economic growth rate as a variable.  
Another index for the economic aspect is the openness of the capital market. As shown in 
the previous chapter, globalisation is regarded as an important factor in income 
inequality as well as in welfare reform.  Trade openness is commonly used as an indicator 
to measure the degree of globalisation (Dreher, 2008; Jesper & Roine, 2009) but the 
openness of the financial market is used in this current study. This is because financial 
openness is likely to be more directly associated with pensioners’ income as the 
privatisation and financialization of the pension system become more intensified. This 
study employed the financial openness index (KAOPEN) established by Chinn and Hiro 
(2008). This index contains four main indicators of financial openness: the presence of 
multiple exchanges rates, restrictions on current account transactions, restrictions on 
capital account transactions and the requirement for the surrender of export proceeds. 
This index measures the intensity of capital controls, and a higher value indicates a high 
level of financial openness. 
8.3.1.3. Dependent variable 
Regarding the dependent variable, the Gini index was used as a measurement for income 
inequality.  There are many measurements for income inequality and each one has its 
own advantages and disadvantages as explained in the previous chapter. The Gini 
coefficient is quite straightforward to understand and can be easily obtained so it is 
considered as a dependent variable in the analysis offered later. For this study, Gini 
coefficients were taken from OECD data sets of income distribution. The Gini index for the 
old-age population is employed as a dependent variable so we can find the more specific 
effect of an independent variable focusing on the old-age population.  
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Apart from the Gini coefficient, all the other data were taken from the Comparative 
welfare state data set, 2014 established by David Brady, Evelyne Huber and John D. 
Stephens. They assembled this data set using original data mainly from OECD and ILO 
data, and it contains data on income distribution, social expenditure, general economic 
data (from OECD), welfare generosity (from Scruggs and Allan), political institution and 
demographical changes of 22 countries, roughly from 1960 to 2011. This study used data 
from nineteen countries (leaving out Japan, Luxembourg and New Zealand) for the thirty 
years from 1980 to 2010. The welfare institution in Japan has developed in a different 
political and economic context from western countries, so it is not relevant to put all of 
them together. Welfare generosity scores for Luxembourg and data on private pensions 
for New Zealand do not exist, so these two countries were excluded from the analysis 
carried out in this chapter.  
There are many missing values before 1980, so this study focuses on data from 1980. In 
addition, the crisis of welfare states became obvious from the 1980s and it is regarded 
that welfare states entered into times of permanent austerity from the 1980s onwards 
(Wenzelburger, 2013). However, there are still missing values particularly in Gini 
coefficients and this can be problematic as a missing value in Gini coefficients can lead to 
having to delete whole cases. There are various techniques for filling the missing values 
using existing data, but this study just focused on the original data sets. Values produced 
by those techniques are hypothetical and could distort the results. The numbers of 
inclusion for each country are shown in Table 8-7. This was expected to show the 
relationship between income inequality and pension reform in the era of transformation 
in the welfare state. All the variables in this study were summarized in Table 8-6.  
Table 8-7 shows a number of inclusions for each country. From that table, we can see that 
this data set is seriously unbalanced, which is likely to generate bias: the result could be 
distorted by countries with large numbers of inclusions. That is one reason why multi-
level modelling is used for analysis as it is not affected by the number of observations in 
each group, so unbalanced data do not make a difference in multi-level modelling. As 
stated in the methodology chapter, this study employed Jackknife analysis to check 
whether the result can be changed by one group (country, in this research), but Jackknife 
analysis shows that it does not make any difference.  The results of the Jackknife analysis 
are available in the appendix A-5 and A-6 
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Table 8-7 List of variables 
 Dimension Variable Sources 
Dependent 
variable 
 
 Gini Coefficient for Old age 
population 
OECD (1980 to 2011) 
Independent 
variable 
(time-
variant) 
Pension 
reform 
Labour market participation rate of 
the elderly 
OECD (1980 to 2011) 
Relative size of private pension 
expenditure 
OECD (1980 to 2011) 
Missing: New Zealand 
Sociological 
changes 
The share of elderly (over 65 years) 
among population 
CWS (1980 to 2011) 
Economic 
Real GDP per capita OECD (1980 to 2011) 
Openness of capital market CWS(1980 to 2011) 
Welfare 
effort 
Welfare generosity 
(unemployment benefit, pension, 
sick pay) 
Scruggs & Allan (1980 to 
2011) 
Missing: Luxemburg 
Welfare generosity (pension) 
Scruggs & Allan (1980 to 
2011) 
Missing: Luxemburg 
RR of Standard pension 
RR of minimum pension 
Coverage rate of public pension 
Scruggs & Allan (1980 to 
2011) 
Missing: Luxemburg 
Size of welfare state 
(Social expenditure – old age 
expenditure) 
OECD (1980 to 2011) 
Time-
invariant 
country-
specific 
variable 
Institutional 
design of 
public 
pension 
Bismarck regime and Beveridge 
regime 
 
Strong earning-relatedness and 
weak earning-relatedness 
 
 
Table 8-8 List of countries and number of inclusion 
Country Frequency of 
inclusion 
Country Frequency of 
inclusion 
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Australia 5 Italy 7 
Austria 7 Netherlands 8 
Belgium 7 Norway 6 
Canada 31 Portugal 7 
Denmark 10 Spain 8 
Finland 18 Sweden 8 
France 6 Switzerland 1 
Germany 8 UK 15 
Greece 9 USA 8 
Ireland 7   
 
8.4. Descriptive statistics 
This section presents the basic statistics of the main variables and shows the trend of 
each variable. It reviews how income inequality among the old-age population, spending 
on private pensions and the proportion of the old-age population change over time. In 
addition, it shows how the generosity of the traditional welfare state changes over time. 
This section provides the correlation coefficients of the independent variables and an 
analysis of variance which shows whether a significant difference in income inequality 
exists between different institutional designs of public pension systems. 
8.4.1. Descriptive statistics of welfare state 
Before going on to the main analysis, it is necessary first to review the current situation of 
the welfare state. As shown above, an aging population is becoming a serious issue in 
most of the developed world and the main strategies of modern welfare states for coping 
with an aging population can be summarised in two points. The first is to rearrange the 
institutional design of the pension programme from a public-centred system to a mixed 
public-private system and this change is also related to limiting the role of the public 
pension system. The second is to increase the labour market participation rate of the 
elderly by either delaying the retirement age or prolonging labour market participation 
after the legal retirement age. Now we can check the actual trend of an aging population, 
changes in the generosity of pension system and the labour market participation rate of 
the elderly from the data set.  
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First, Figure 8-1 presents the development of the Gini coefficient among the elderly. As 
stated in the previous section, there are many missing values here. For example, there are 
only two cases for Switzerland and countries such as Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Belgium 
have data for only about the ten most recent years. The Gini coefficient shows that 
income inequality among the elderly looks stable over this period, except for some 
countries. Australia and Sweden show a consistent increase in income inequality, and the 
US and Germany also increased but at a modest rate. In contrast, income inequality 
among the elderly plummeted in Greece and the Netherlands.  However, it seems that 
most countries remained at a similar level.  For example, income inequality increased in 
Sweden but still maintains a low level compared with other countries; Portugal showed a 
decrease in income inequality in the last ten years but its level is still very high.  
The overall trend shows that income inequality had decreased between 1980 and 2011 
but the detailed trend is a bit different. It decreased until 2000 and then it began to 
increase after the early 2000s. Chapter 2 showed the trend in the income inequality of 
the whole population in OECD countries, and showed that income inequality decreased 
until the middle of the 1980s but it turned into an increase from then on. The overall 
trend is not much different from the trend that was shown in Chapter 2.  
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Figure 8-1 Trend of income inequality among elderly 
 
<Sources: OECD income distribution data set> 
Figure 8-2 shows the proportion of the population over 65 years old. There is a small 
difference between the countries. It looks steeper in Italy, Finland and Greece and not 
very steep in the US, the UK, and Norway. Nevertheless, it is clear that developed 
countries are facing a serious aging population issue. 
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Figure 8-2 Trend of old age population 
 
<Sources: Comparative Welfare State data set: 
http://www.lisdatacenter.org/resources/other-databases/> 
Figure 8-3 Generosity of public pension 
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<Sources: Comparative Welfare Entitlement data set: http://cwed2.org/> 
Figure 8-3 shows the trend of pension generosity for twenty countries. The average 
generosity score of public pensions was 10.9 in 1980 and 12.37 in 2010 so it has, in fact, 
increased slightly during the last three decades. However, the trend is different in 
different countries. The US and the UK remained stable at the low level whereas Denmark, 
Norway and the Netherlands remained stable at a high level. Spain and Belgium showed a 
slow increase but Sweden showed a very steep decrease. From a time perspective, the 
mean values of the pension generosity scores increased from 1980 to 1990, and then 
began to decrease and fell rapidly from the middle of 1990 to early 2000. There was an 
economic recession from the late 1970s to the early 1980s so it has been argued that the 
age of austerity began in the early 1980s (Pierson 2001; Allan & Scruggs 2004). However, 
it turned into an increase from the middle of 2000. In brief, pension generosity seems to 
be very stable in most countries but has decreased radically in Sweden. So we cannot say 
that the generosity of pension programmes has retrenched in the modern welfare state. 
In addition, it is not clear that an increase in a mixed public-private funding system leads 
to a decrease in the quality of the public pension programme.  
Figure 8-4 Labour participation rate of elderly 
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<Sources: Comparative welfare state data set: 
http://www.lisdatacenter.org/resources/other-databases/> 
Figure 8-4 shows that the labour market participation rate of the elderly over the last 
three decades consistently decreased until 2000 but turned into an increase from 2000 
and kept increasing until recently. Most of the countries showed a similar pattern but 
Greece and Ireland showed a consistent decrease whereas New Zealand and Norway 
both showed quite fast increases since around 2000. On average, the labour market 
participation rate of the elderly was around 10% in 1980, fell below 6% around the end of 
1990s but went up to about 9% in 2010.  
Now we turn to the size of private pension spending compared with a public pension. As 
mentioned above, one of the main trends in pension reform is introducing a mixed 
funded system. Figure 8-5 presents the development of relative sizes of private pension 
spending. Although the size of public pensions remains at a similar level, the relative size 
of private pension spending has increased, as shown in the graph. 
Figure 8-5 Share of private pension 
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<Sources: Comparative welfare state data set: 
http://www.lisdatacenter.org/resources/other-databases/> 
Some countries, such as Finland and France, did not show any significant changes in the 
size of private pension spending, but Canada, Denmark and the US showed quite a steep 
trend line which means that the size of private pension spending had increased 
consistently. Belgium, Sweden and the UK also increased but the changes were relatively 
small. On average, some countries remained the same and some countries increased, but 
few countries showed a decrease in the relative size of private pension spending. It seems 
that the proportion of private pension spending is on the increase in general.  
Table 8-9 presents a summary of income distribution, the size of private pension, and the 
degree of earnings-relatedness and coverage rate according to different types of public 
pension institution.  
Table 8-9 Summary by type of public pension 
Type of public 
pension 
institution 
Income inequality 
(Gini Coefficient) 
Size of private 
pension 
Earning-
relatedness 
Coverage rate 
Working 
age 
Old age    
Weak earning-
related 
0.293 0.269 0.308  0.953 
Strong earing-
related / high 
coverage 
0.253 0.242 0.196  1.01 
Strong earning-
related / low 
coverage  
0.308 0.299 0.130  0.785 
As expected, income inequality is lower in the strong earnings-related/high coverage 
group than in the other two groups. It is the same for working age as well as old age. The 
size of private pension is highest in the weak earnings-related group. This is not surprising 
as most of the countries in the weak earnings-related group had a Beveridge regime with 
the intention of providing a safety net for the poor only, whereas the middle class is 
explicitly expected to use various forms of private pension (Korpi & Palme 1998). 
Regarding coverage rate, it is highest in the strong earnings-related/high coverage group 
and lowest in the low coverage group. The weak earnings-related group shows a 
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relatively high coverage rate as expected. The descriptive statistics show that the strong 
earnings-related/high coverage group has better income distribution with a low level of 
private pensions. However, it is a bit different for the other two groups. The weak 
earnings-related group has the highest level of private pension as we expected, but, in 
fact, income inequality is higher for the low coverage group, although the proportion of 
private pensions in that group is the lowest among the three groups. This table sheds light 
on the idea that the size of private pension might not be directly related to an increase in 
income inequality.  
Table 8-10 ANOVA inequality and institutional design 
 
Number of Observation= 221 R-Squared=.2175 
Root MSE=. 03907 Adj R-Square=.2103 
Source  Partial Sum of square F Prob>F 
Institutional 
design 
 .092539683  30.30 0.0000(***) 
Residual  .332923734    
Total  .425463417    
Table 8-10 shows that there is the difference in income inequality among different 
institutional designs of public pension system, which shows that income inequality is 
higher in the strong earning-relatedness/low coverage group and relatively lower in the 
strong earning-relatedness/high coverage group . The results of the ANOVA shown in 
Table 8-10 show whether this difference is statistically significant. It shows that the F-
value is 30.30 and the P-value is zero, which indicates that this difference is statistically 
significant. In other words, the results of the ANOVA imply that income inequality is 
significantly different according to the institutional design of the public pension system. A 
few more ANOVA tests were carried out the P-value was lower than .01 in all cases. That 
means that the difference between income inequality among the old-age population and 
in spending on private pensions is significantly different according to the type of the 
public pension system.  
Table 8-11 Correlates of independent factors 
 
Share of old age 
population 
Labour market 
participation rate of 
elderly 
Share of 
private 
pension 
Welfare 
generosity 
Real GDP 
per 
capita 
Capital 
openness 
Share of old 1.000      
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age 
population 
Labour 
market 
participation 
rate of 
elderly 
-.1517*** 1.000     
Share of 
private 
pension 
-.3750*** .1413*** 1.000    
Welfare 
generosity 
.5304*** -.1280*** -.4839*** 1.000   
Real GDP 
per capita 
.1737*** -.0754* .1685*** .1151*** 1.000  
Capital 
openness 
.2663*** -.1983*** .2823*** .0236 .6325*** 1.000 
Multi-collinearity between the independent variables may cause an unstable regression 
coefficient. Table 8-11 shows the correlations between the independent variables. There 
are some variables that reach in excess of .50 which indicates that there is some degree 
of multi-collinearity in this model.  The focus of this analysis is the structure of public 
pension systems and spending on private pensions and Table 8-10 shows that spending 
on a private pension does not highly correlate with other variables. This thesis accepts 
some degree of multi-collinearity between controlled variables, particularly correlation 
between the openness of the capital market and the real GDP per capita. However, this 
variable is excluded in sensitivity tests to keep the bias caused by multi-collinearity to a 
minimum. The results are available in Appendix A.1 and A.2. 
In brief, we can observe an aging population in most of the countries and the fact that 
more elderly people now stay in the labour market after retirement age. In addition, the 
findings show that the generosity of public pension programmes decreased much during 
the 1990s but increased in the 2000s, so we cannot see a clear retrenchment of public 
pension programmes. However, it is clear that the relative size of the private pension 
system is increasing across the developed world, although this increase has not led to a 
reduction in the quality of public pension programmes so far. This section also shows that 
significant differences exist according to the institutional design of a public pension 
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system. The proportion of private pensions is highest in weak earning-related group but 
income inequality is highest in strong earning-relatedness/low coverage group.   
Based on the descriptive information obtained, the next section will examine the 
relationship between income inequality and private pensions in the context of the 
institutional design of a public pension system.  
8.5. Income inequality and the effect of private pension 
This section presents the result of the main analysis on the relation between private 
pensions and income inequality. As stated in Chapter 1, the primary purpose of this thesis 
is first to look at the empirical relationship between private pensions and income 
inequality, and second to look at the effect of the institutional design of a public pension 
system and then finally to look to how the interaction between the two affects income 
inequality. To find the answers, this section presents the effect of private pensions first, 
and then gives the regressions with the institutional design of a public pension and with 
interaction.  
8.5.1. Effect of private pension: without context variables 
This empirical section employs the following process. First, the fixed-effect model 
controlling the between-countries effect is examined. This model is expected to find the 
within-country effect of the independent variables which removes between-countries 
variance. Then, the results of the random-effect model which assumes that the country 
level variance is uncorrelated with the independent variables are compared with the 
results of the fixed-effect model. Finally, the results of the multi-level analysis are shown 
to see the within-country effect and the between-country effects. The results from each 
model are shown in Table 8-12. The reported models used generosity score as a variable 
for welfare effort, as we can capture more observation when the generosity index is 
employed. These models were tested with expenditure-based measurement again and 
the results are given in the appendix. They do not show any significant differences.  
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Table 8-12 Regression without context variable 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 
Fixed effect 
model 
Random effect 
model 
Within-
country
2
 effect 
Between country 
effect 
Share of elderly 
population over 65 
years old 
-.146806 
(-.68) 
-.048039 
(-.43) 
-.1600643 
(-1.27) 
.6664898 
(-1.38) 
Labour Market 
participation rate of 
elderly 
.0029096 
(1.93*) 
.0027736 
(3.49***) 
.0029254 
(3.38***) 
.0037229 
(2.93***) 
Real GDP per capita 1.57e-07 
(.34) 
1.03e-07 
(.30) 
9.75e-08 
(.29) 
-2.27e-06 
(-1.37) 
Openness of Capital 
Market 
-.0092373 
(-1.24) 
-.0081605 
(-2.50**) 
-.0085493 
(-2.69***) 
.0175321 
(1.05) 
Relative size private 
pension 
-.0308068 
(-2.25**) 
-.0397283 
(-3.97***) 
-.0273172 
(-2.31**) 
-.1185763 
(-3.13***) 
Pension generosity -.0093742 
(-2.90***) 
-.0075629 
(-4.81***) 
-.0091885 
(-5.21***) 
-.0014981 
(-.38) 
Other generosity -.0060574 
(-2.90**) 
-.0061431 
(-7.31***) 
-.0058462 
(-5.27***) 
-.0064928 
(-5.04***) 
Constant .5380347 
(7.57***) 
.513131 
(18.68***) 
.567539 
(6.93***) 
Observations 175 175 175 
Clusters 19 19 19 
R square 
Within= .5107 
Between=.4617 
Overall= .4409 
Within= .5036 
Between=.5320 
Overall= .5086 
Log likelihood= 492.78781 
As shown in Table 8-12, the results of the fixed-effect and the random-effect models are 
similar but still there is a difference in the size of the coefficient, which means that the 
assumption of the random-effect model (Cov(U_i, Xi)=0) is not met in this case. Thus, the 
estimation of fixed effect is more precise than that of random effect, although the 
significance and direction of the coefficient remain almost the same. The coefficients of 
fixed effect solely reflect the within-country effect. This shows that the elderly labour 
market participation rate is positively related with income inequality, which means that 
income inequality in the society increases as more elderly people stay in the labour 
market. Regarding the effect of welfare effort, the direction of the effect is the same as 
expected. Both social expenditure and welfare generosity have a negative coefficient 
which means that income inequality decreases when welfare effort increases. The 
                                                          
2  Normally within-country effect in this model should have same coefficient with fixed effect model but fixed effect model is 
estimated by GLM (Generalized Linear model) and within-between effect model is estimated by MLE (Maximum likelihood estimation) 
so they are slightly different. When within-between model is estimated by GLM, coefficients are identical to fixed effect model.  
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increase in private pensions, which is what we are interested in, has a negative effect on 
income inequality. As the proportion of private pensions increases, income inequality 
decreases. Considering previous studies which have argued that the redistribution effect 
of private pensions is less than that of public pensions, this result is unexpected. However, 
this result is in line with those of some of the previous empirical studies which have 
argued that income inequality gets better as the proportion of private pensions increases 
(Vliet et al., 2012).  
As explained above, the fixed-effect model can show a more precise coefficient than the 
random-effect model because of the unrealistic assumption of the random-effect model. 
A multi-level model was used to separate the within-country effect and the between-
countries effect.  ‘Country’ means that specific values are included to explain the 
between-country effect, and each variable is replaced with distance from the mean value 
of each variable. The result remained almost the same. The relative size of private 
pension spending was still negatively related to income inequality. As the size of private 
pension spending increases, income distribution becomes more equal. The multi-level 
model shows that the effect of the relative size of private pensions has a negative effect 
on income inequality whereas the elderly labour participation rate has a positive effect on 
income inequality. Their effects are significant both in within-country and between 
countries terms. This means that the effects of those variables are significant in a given 
country, and the countries with high levels of private pension have less inequality than 
countries with low levels of private pension, whereas countries with a higher elderly 
labour market participate rate have higher inequality than countries with a lower level of 
elderly labour market participation rate.  
Consequently, it can be argued that an increase in private pensions has a positive effect 
on income distribution among the elderly and the elderly labour market participation rate 
has a negative effect on income distribution both within the country and between 
countries, so the distributive outcome of pension reform is still not clear. Regarding the 
welfare effort variables, welfare generosity was significant both between countries and 
within-country. A high level of welfare effort decreases income inequality in a given 
country, and a country with a high level of welfare effort also has a significantly lower 
level of income inequality.   
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Models 1 and 2 do not consider the context variable, which is the institutional design of 
public pension in this case.  As explained above, it is expected that the effect of private 
pensions can be different according to the institutional design of the public pension 
system, so models 1 and 2 do not fully capture the effect of private pensions on income 
distribution. Figures 8-6 and 8-7 show why we need to consider institutional context 
variables to see the precise effect of private pension. 
Figure 8-6 Scatter plot and fitted line 
 
In this scatterplot, the X axis represents the proportion of private pension spending, 
shown as the difference from the mean value of each country, and the Y axis represents 
the Gini coefficient among the elderly. As explained above, difference from the mean 
value is used to estimate the within-country effect.  The scatterplot and the fitted line 
show that there is a negative effect between the two variables, so income inequality 
decreases when the proportion of private pension spending increases in a given country. 
It can be inferred that an increase in private pensions is related to a decrease in income 
inequality in general. In fact, this result is in line with those of several previous studies 
which have argued that there is a negative relationship between income inequality and 
an increase in private pensions.  However, this general effect is the average value of the 
coefficient of each country so it does not provide detailed information on how the 
relation is changed in each country.  
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Figure 8-7 shows fitted lines according to the institutional design of a public pension 
system and shows that the relationship between income inequality and private pensions 
has an opposite direction for some institutions.  
Figure 8-7 Fitted line by institution 
 
We can see that the slope of private pensions is quite different according to the 
institutional design of the public pension system. Generally, it looks to have negative 
effect on the Gini coefficient as shown in Figure 8-6, but in fact, the effect of private 
pensions is diverse. The relationship looks negative in Weak earning-related group and 
Strong earning-relatedness/high coverage group but opposite in Strong earning-
relatedness/low coverage group. This is an unbalanced panel so the length of the line is 
different according to the institution. This graph, of course, does not show that this 
relationship is statistically significant, but certainly, it can be a motivation for further 
research to explore the different effects of private pensions according to the institutional 
design of the public pension system.  This figure shows why we need to consider the 
institutional design of public pensions as those differences between countries could be 
due to the difference in public pension institution and its interplay with private pensions. 
These context variables on the institutional design of the public pension cannot be tested 
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in the fixed-effect model as it treats context variables as a fixed effect. The following 
section shows the results of the random-effect and multi-level models (the random 
coefficient model) using context variables and interaction variables.  
8.5.2. The effect of private pensions in the context of the institutional design of 
the public pension 
Now we can check how the effect of private pensions varies according to the institutional 
design of the public pension system. As stated in the previous chapter, the first 
institutional designs employed are the Bismarck and Beveridge models. The Bismarck 
model is generally based on an earnings-related occupational pension system whereas 
the Beveridge model is based on a flat-rate and universal coverage pension system. We 
expect that an increase in private pensions will not have a significant effect on changes in 
income inequality in the Bismarck model and that an increase in private pensions will be 
related to an increase in income inequality in the Beveridge model.  Table 8-13 presents 
the result of the analysis. In this table, the Beveridge model is used as a reference group 
Table 8-13 Context variable: Bismarck VS Beveridge 
Variable 
Model 3 Model 4 
Random effect model 
Within- 
effect 
Between 
effect 
Within- 
effect 
Between 
effect 
Share of 
elderly 
population 
over 65 years 
old 
-.1251201 
(-1.06) 
-.1240443 
(-1.04) 
-.160062 
(-1.27) 
-.6663382 
(-1.26) 
-.1675118 
(-1.31) 
-.658309 
(-1.25) 
Labour 
Market 
participation 
rate of elderly 
.0028515 
(3.59***) 
.0029022 
(3.56***) 
.0029254 
(3.37***) 
.0037229 
(2.93***) 
.0028916 
(3.31***) 
.003761 
(2.95***) 
Real GDP per 
capita 
1.39e-07 
(.41) 
1.37e-07 
(.40) 
9.75e-08 
(.29) 
-2.27e-06 
(-1.35) 
9.65e-08 
(.28) 
-.2.29e-06 
(-1.36) 
Openness of 
Capital 
Market 
-.0081581 
(-2.52**) 
-.0081643 
(-2.52**) 
-.0085492 
(-2.69***) 
.0175317 
(1.05) 
-.0086288 
(-2.71***) 
.017375 
(1.04) 
Relative size 
private 
pension 
-.0335407 
(-3.21***) 
-.0330202 
(-3.15***) 
-.0273175 
(-2.31**) 
-.1185931 
(-2.67***) 
-.0269819 
(-2.27**) 
-.1189054 
(-2.68***) 
Pension 
generosity 
-.0081358 
(-5.12***) 
-.0085086 
(-4.79***) 
-.0091885 
(-5.20***) 
-.0014973 
(-.37) 
-.0088758 
(-4.49***) 
-.0015577 
(-.38) 
Other 
generosity 
-.0062177 
(-7.36***) 
-.0061739 
(-7.12***) 
-.0058462 
(-5.26***) 
-.0064929 
(-5.03***) 
-.0057803 
(-5.13***) 
-.0065268 
(-5.06***) 
Bismarck .0278655 .0308773 -.0000172 -.0004071 
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model (1.84*) (1.77*) (-.00) (-.02) 
Private 
pension 
*Bismarck 
 
-.0335558 
(-.35) 
 
.0436643 
(.35) 
Constant .5098544 
(18.89***) 
.5109507 
(18.66***) 
.6089598 
(7.72***) 
.5685089 
(6.85***) 
Observations 175 175 175 175 
Clusters 19 19 19 19 
R square 
Within= .5037 
Between=.572 
Overall=.5616 
Within= .504 
Between=.57 
Overall=. 56 
Log likelihood=492.79 Log likelihood=492.85 
 
As explained above, one advantage of the random-effect model is that it can include 
context variables that do not change over time in the model but it could produce a 
spurious result due to the unrealistic assumption. In contrast, the within-between effect 
model can capture the advantages of both the fixed-effect model and the random-effect 
model so we can test time-invariant variables without the assumption of the random-
effect model.  
As the Beveridge model is used as a reference group, the coefficient of private pensions 
indicates the effect of private pensions in the Beveridge model. The coefficient shows 
that an increase in private pensions is related to a decrease in income inequality among 
the elderly. An increase in private pension is expected to be associated with an increase in 
income inequality, as we expect that the rich can get benefit from a private pension on 
the top of a public pension in the Beveridge system. However, income inequality 
decreases as the proportion of private pensions increases in Beveridge-system countries.  
The core of the argument on the different effects of private pensions is the earnings-
relatedness of the public pension. The private pension is expected to have an insignificant 
effect in the Bismarck system because it has earnings-relatedness so the rich have no 
incentive to join a private pension scheme, and it is the opposite in the Beveridge model 
because it has a flat-rate universal system so the rich have a strong incentive to join a 
private pension scheme. However, this result implies there can be a more important 
factor than earnings-relatedness in income inequality so it leads us to the next analysis, 
which employs a classification which is more specific. 
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Table 8-14 Regression with context variable 
Variable 
Model 5 Model 6 
Random effect model 
Within- 
effect 
Between 
effect 
Within- 
effect 
Between 
effect 
Share of 
elderly 
population 
over 65 years 
old 
-.0974944 
(-.86) 
-.0400519 
(-.34) 
-.1554209 
(-1.23) 
-.9556664 
(-1.99**) 
-.1084769 
(-.87) 
-1.016012 
(-2.11**) 
Labour Market 
participation 
rate of elderly 
.002768 
(3.45***) 
.0023498 
(2.84***) 
.0026554 
(3.10***) 
.0036381 
(2.86***) 
.002212 
(2.55**) 
.0032905 
(2.61***) 
Real GDP per 
capita 
1.75e-07 
(.51) 
1.15e-07 
(.33) 
1.33e-07 
(.39) 
-2.13e-06 
(-1.31) 
5.49e-08 
(.16) 
-2.22e-06 
(-1.36) 
Openness of 
Capital Market 
-.0086134 
(-2.67***) 
-.00882 
(-2.75***) 
.0091503 
(-2.88***) 
.0106632 
(.55) 
-.0093045 
(-2.99***) 
.0082479 
(.42) 
Relative size 
private pension 
-.0364459 
(-3.62***) 
.0219977 
(.77) 
-.0276365 
(-2.34**) 
-.0873463 
(-2.03**) 
.0514865 
(1.60*) 
-.081998 
(-1.90*) 
pension 
generosity 
-.0080339 
(-5.08***) 
-.0080513 
(-5.08***) 
-.0093938 
(-5.33***) 
.0014011 
(.33) 
-.0094776 
(-5.39***) 
.0013623 
(.32) 
Other 
generosity 
-.0058912 
(-6.66***) 
-.0059427 
(-6.71***) 
-.0058936 
(-5.32***) 
-.0046706 
(-3.07***) 
-.0062478 
(-5.59***) 
-.0042987 
(-2.81***) 
Weak earning-
related  
-.0318121 
(-1.94*) 
-.020627 
(-1.22) 
-.0240257 
(-1.39) 
-.0250193 
(-1.45) 
Strong/High 
coverage  
-.0158947 
(-.79) 
-.0046179 
(-.22) 
-.0372331 
(-1.84*) 
-.0384762 
(-1.90*) 
Private 
pension * 
Weak earning-
related 
 
-.0642223 
(-2.13**) 
 
-.0842883 
(-2.58**) 
Private 
pension 
*Strong/high 
coverage 
 
-.0741316 
(-1.84*) 
 
-.1102557 
(-2.50**) 
Constant  
.52767585 
(17.82***) 
.558959 
(7.38***) 
.56292484 
(7.50***) 
Observations 175 175 175 175 
Clusters 19 19 19 19 
R square 
Within= .5018 
Between=.6332 
Overall=.6117 
Within= .5291 
Between=.6154 
Overall=.5896 
Log likelihood 
=494.4537 
Log likelihood 
= 498.387 
 
In this model, countries are divided into three categories based on coverage rate and 
earnings-relatedness. The random-effect and multi-level models employing a regime 
dummy and cross-level interaction variables are shown in the table. The significance and 
direction of the other variables’ coefficients in both models are not much different from 
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each other. Both models contain some interesting results. First, there is a significant 
difference in inequality between different institutional designs in public pensions. The 
descriptive statistics show the difference in income inequality, and these results show 
that income inequality is significantly lower in strong earning-relatedness/high coverage 
group compared with weak earning-relatedness group and strong earning-
relatedness/low coverage group. They show that there is no significant difference 
between weak earning-relatedness group and strong earning-relatedness/low coverage 
group.  The effect of private pensions is also different from what we expected. Without 
cross-level interaction variables, it shows that an increase in private pensions is still 
related to a decrease in income inequality. However, the effect is different according to 
groups when cross-level interaction variables are included.  
This shows that an increase in private pensions is related to an increase in income 
inequality in the high earnings-related/low coverage group and a decrease in income 
inequality in the other groups. In fact, this effect is at the critical point (the Z-statistic is 
1.60, which made the P-value 0.10) but the P-value is lower than 10% if the generosity 
score is replaced with social expenditure, or if the generosity score is employed without 
separation into pension generosity and other generosity scores. Based on the previous 
discussion, this study assumes that the effect of private pensions is significantly related to 
an increase in income inequality in the low earnings-related group. However, income 
inequality is reduced as the proportion of private pensions increases in this group. We 
would expect that a private pension in this group increases income inequality as the rich 
have an incentive to have a private pension and the poor are likely to be excluded from 
the benefit of a private pension. However, the results show the opposite. Income 
inequality in this group significantly decreases as the proportion of private pensions 
increases. For the strong earnings-related/high coverage group, it is expected that a 
private pension does not have a significant effect as the private pension is not attractive 
in this group. But the results show that income inequality is reduced as well and the size 
of the coefficient is larger than in the weak earnings-relatedness group.  
Korpi and Palme (1998) argued that strong earnings-relatedness is likely to make private 
pensions less attractive for the rich so we expect that private pensions would not have a 
significant effect under a strong earnings-related pension system. However, the findings 
of this study show that private pensions could have a significant and negative effect on 
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income distribution even when public pensions have a strong earnings-related system but 
the coverage rate is relatively low.   
This is an unexpected result so several sensitivity tests were used to check it. As discussed 
in the previous section, all the models were re-tested with an expenditure-based 
measurement instead of welfare generosity. Also, the correlation table shows that the 
openness of the capital market is relatively highly correlated with GDP per capita, so all 
the models were re-tested without the openness of the capital market variable. Finally, 
this is an unbalanced result so the results could be skewed by one extreme case, so 
jackknife analysis was done as well. There were small differences in the size of the 
coefficient, but the direction and significance of the coefficient remained the same. In 
fact, an increase in private pension in strong earning-relatedness/low coverage group was 
significantly related to an increase in income inequality at the 10% level in all sensitivity 
tests.  All the results of the sensitivity tests are available in the Appendix A.1 and A.2.  
The result is clearer if we look at the conditional plot. The conditional plot presents the 
marginal effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable. In this case, it 
shows how much the Gini index is changed when the proportion of private pensions 
increases by one unit of measure. It shows that the marginal effect of private pensions is 
to decrease income inequality in both the weak earnings-related group and the strong 
earnings-relatedness/high coverage group and that the slopes are almost similar to each 
other. In contrast, the slope of the strong earnings-relatedness/low coverage group 
shows an increase in income inequality as the proportion of private pensions increases.   
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Figure 8-8 Conditional effects plot, outcome: income inequality among elderly 1980-
2010 
 
Another issue regarding this model is that the openness of the capital market has a 
significant effect on the decrease of income inequality among the elderly. Although the 
between-countries effect is not significant, it is significant that income inequality among 
the elderly decreases as the openness of the capital market increases in any given country. 
This is also an unexpected result since it has been reported that the openness of the 
capital market makes a pension system more vulnerable to risks from economic 
fluctuation, although this topic is quite controversial. 
The results of this analysis can be summarized as follows.  This model shows that an 
increase in private pension spending decreases income inequality in general. But the 
effect of private pensions is different depending on the interplay between private 
pensions and the institutional design of the public pension system. Based on theoretical 
discussions in studies, this study predicts that private pensions will increase income 
inequality in the weak earnings-related group but not in the other groups. However, in 
fact, income inequality is reduced as private pensions increase in weak earning-related 
group and strong earning-related/high coverage group. 
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8.6. Discussion: Private pensions and institutional design of public 
pensions 
Previous studied have pointed out that earnings-relatedness and universal coverage are 
salient factors affecting the distributional outcome of the public pension system (Palme, 
2006; Kangas & Palme, 1993; Korpi & Palme, 1998). As mentioned above, many scholars 
now agree that universal coverage brings better income distribution than a targeted 
system but earnings-relatedness is still controversial. On the one hand, strong earnings-
relatedness brings about more income inequality among the elderly as their income 
history in working age is reflected in old age under a strong earnings-related system. This 
means that inequality among the working-age population is maintained when they get 
old. On the other hand, it is argued that the rich will want to buy private pensions if 
earnings-relatedness is weak, so the income gap between the rich and the poor is 
widened as the poor cannot afford a private pension. This argument assumes that private 
pensions have a less redistributive effect than public pensions. However, the findings of 
this study show that income inequality does decrease when private pensions increase in 
the Beveridge model. This shows the possibility that there might be a more important 
factor than earnings-relatedness. So this study applied a classification based on earnings-
relatedness and coverage rate at the same time. In this classification, countries with weak 
earnings-relatedness are likely to have a high coverage rate whereas the coverage rate is 
quite varied in countries with strong earnings-relatedness. 
As shown in the previous section, the results show that income inequality is reduced as 
the proportion of private pensions increases in both the weak earnings-related group and 
the strong earnings-related/high coverage group. The result is the opposite in the strong 
earnings-related/low coverage group. In this group, income inequality increases as the 
proportion of private pensions increases,3 which means that the rich can get benefit from 
both the strong earnings-related public pension and a private pension. On the other hand, 
the poor are unlikely to get any benefit even from the public pension. In fact, some 
countries in this group, such as Spain and the US, show strong earnings-relatedness and a 
high level of benefit in second-tier pension programmes but a very low level of benefit in 
the first-tier pension programmes. What we have found here is that income inequality is 
                                                          
3
 However, it should be kept in mind that this effect is at the critical point. As mentioned earlier, this effect becomes 
clearly significant when the generosity score is replaced with social expenditure. In addition, this effect is still significant 
when the generosity score is employed if it is not divided into pension generosity and other generosity score.  
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reduced as private pensions increase in countries with a high coverage rate regardless of 
the degree of earnings-relatedness. Thus, the results of this study seem to support the 
notion that strong earnings-relatedness does not reduce income inequality among the 
elderly, as private pensions are not less redistributive as much as we had expected. 
The argument that strong earnings-relatedness brings positive income distribution 
assumes that expansion of private pensions has a bad impact on income distribution. 
However, the findings show that an expansion of private pensions is not always 
associated with an increase in income inequality. The institutional design of the public 
pension system matters, and expanding the coverage of the public pension seems to be 
more salient than earnings-relatedness.  
As shown in Table 8-4, most of the countries that have strong earnings-relatedness are 
based on the Bismarck model. Among those countries, countries in strong earning-
relatedness/high coverage group mostly have strong earnings-relatedness, a high 
replacement rate and minimum pensions in the first-tier programme, whereas countries 
in strong earning-relatedness/low coverage group have targeted programmes (Germany, 
Luxembourg) or a minimum pension in the first-tier programme but a very low 
replacement rate (Portugal, Spain) or do not have a proper first-tier programme (Austria, 
US). Consequently, countries in strong earning-relatedness/low coverage group have 
relatively low coverage rates compared with countries in strong earning-relatedness/high 
coverage group. The Netherlands is an exceptional case as it has a targeted first-tier 
pension programme. However, the replacement rate of the first-tier programme is very 
high compared with other countries. This will be discussed in the next chapter.    
Thus, these findings also support the argument that universal coverage is more effective 
in reducing income inequality than targeting or occupational coverage. In addition, these 
results show that private pensions can play a positive role in income distribution if they 
are combined with a high coverage rate of the public pension. In this case, private and 
public pensions can be complementary. This does not argue that strong earnings-
relatedness is related to an increase in income inequality, as it does not directly consider 
the relationship between earnings-relatedness and income inequality, but the role of 
earnings-relatedness in the context of an increase in private pensions. It shows that 
strong earnings-relatedness can restrain increases in private pensions, but it does not 
necessarily bring a decrease in income inequality.  
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In brief, the paradox that a more unequal and earnings-related public pension has more 
equal income distribution has been proposed in previous studies but this current study 
shows slightly different results. In a broad sense, expansion of private pensions is not 
necessarily associated with an increase in income inequality. The results show the 
opposite in fact. The effect of an increase in the private pension system depends on the 
interaction between private pension and public pension, and strong earnings-relatedness 
does not bring about better income distribution whereas widening coverage looks to be 
more important for bringing better income inequality. In other words, these results still 
imply that a universal system may bring about a reduction in income inequality compared 
with a targeted system. In this sense, these results can be viewed as supporting the 
paradox of redistribution, which argues that a universal system is preferable to a targeted 
system in the reduction of poverty and inequality.  
In fact, the core discussion on the paradox of redistribution is whether it includes the 
middle class or not. In a targeted system, the middle class is excluded from the public 
welfare system so they have an incentive to seek private insurance, which increases the 
income gap between the poor and the middle class. In this case, it looks more important 
to support the poor through the public pension system.  It can be inferred that income 
inequality increases when private pensions increase in strong earning-relatedness/low 
coverage group because the income gap gets larger if the public pension covers only a 
limited proportion of the population, so the poor are likely to be excluded from the public 
pension system. In this case, income inequality can still increase if the middle and rich 
classes join a private pension scheme, although the proportion of private pensions is still 
very low. In other words, both strong earning-relatedness/high coverage group and 
strong earning-relatedness/low coverage group have an unequal pension structure as 
they both have strong earnings-relatedness so the rich and the middle class do not have 
an incentive to join a private pension scheme. That is why the proportion of private 
pensions is still low in both types. However, in strong earning-relatedness/low coverage 
group the poor are likely to be excluded from the public pension so income inequality 
gets bigger just by a small increase in private pensions. For weak earning-relatedness 
group, it can be inferred that income inequality does not get worse although the rich and 
the middle class are likely to buy private pensions as the poor are still covered by the 
public pension.  
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This is just an inference from what has been found from this analysis. There is one more 
thing that should be considered. As shown above, most of the developed countries have a 
two-tier pension system. The results raise a question about the role and effect of a first-
tier pension programme.  As mentioned above, a second-tier programme normally 
reflects the income security dimension so it is contribution-based and more selective, 
whereas the first-tier programme reflects the redistributive dimension. The difference in 
coverage matters in income inequality as shown above, and it shows that the important 
thing is whether the poor can be covered by a pension system or not. The poor are 
unlikely to have private pensions so the income gap would increase if the quality of the 
public pension is low. In this regard, it is expected that the benefit level of each tier 
programme might have different effects on income inequality, especially when they are 
combined with a private pension. Strengthening the first-tier pension programme can be 
a good strategy for achieving better income distribution under an increase in private 
pensions. Therefore, the next chapter will explore the distributive effect of first- and 
second-tier pension programmes considering an increase in private pensions, as a 
supplementary analysis to this chapter. 
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Chapter 9. How private pension is related to income inequality part 
2 
9.1. Introduction 
Chapter 8 explored the relationship between private pensions and income inequality. The 
results showed that income inequality increases when the proportion of private pensions 
increases if the public pension system has low coverage and high earnings-relatedness. It 
can be inferred that to cover a large population it is essential to relieve income inequality 
so that what matters is whether the poor are covered or not by the public pension 
programme. It could be argued that covering a large population is essential for relieving 
income inequality when private pensions increase. This means that it is more important 
to secure a high coverage rate of the public pension system than to establish a strong 
earnings-related pension programme under fiscal pressure if we want to relieve income 
inequality among the elderly.  
As shown in the previous section, the public pension institution consists of a two-tier 
system in most developed countries, which was not considered in the classification in the 
previous chapter. Palme (2006) argued that the goal of a pension programme can be 
divided into two dimensions, basic security and income security. Basic security aims to 
provide a minimum level of income to maintain an adequate standard of living, and 
income security is aimed at providing the proper level of income replacement considering 
income level during the working life. Usually, it is believed that a first-tier pension reflects 
the basic security dimension and the second-tier pension reflects income security. 
Considering this, it is plausible that the pension income of the poor is more closely related 
to the first-tier pension programme as the second tier pension is inevitably more selective. 
Thus, the distributive outcome of a pension programme is likely to be different according 
to the arrangement of the programme.  Some countries maintain a generous level of 
benefit in the first tier whereas others have generous benefit in the second-tier 
programme and this is expected to make a difference in income distribution.  
This chapter provides a supplementary analysis to Chapter 8. This chapter looks at the 
distributive effect of each tier of a pension programme and its interaction with private 
pensions. If the distributive effect of a first-tier pension is larger than that of the second-
tier pension, this can support the results discussed in the previous chapter that a high 
188 
 
coverage rate is important for relieving income inequality when the proportion of private 
pensions increases.  The following section first proposes hypotheses to be tested in this 
section and their rationale, and then gives descriptive statistics. The result of the analysis 
is shown and discussed. The discussion is followed by a summary of the results and a 
discussion of the policy implications. A conclusion then wraps up the discussion on the 
distributive outcome of pension reform in the modern welfare state.   
9.2. Hypotheses for analysis 
As mentioned above, the aim of a pension programme is to secure the income level of the 
previous working life on the one hand and to help the elderly to maintain a standard of 
quality of life on the other. The former is reflected in first-tier pensions and the latter in 
second-tier pensions. As the main goal of the first-tier programme is redistribution, a 
generous benefit level of a first-tier pension programme seems to lead to better income 
distribution. Some previous studies have shown that higher basic security entitlement 
tends to decrease the poverty level among the elderly (Kohl, 1993; Palme, 2006). 
Regarding the second-tier programme, a high benefit level can bring about two results in 
terms of income distribution: a high benefit level secures a high income in old age so it 
can be more effective in decreasing poverty among the elderly, but it can also bring about 
an increase in income inequality as the income gap between the rich and the poor can 
still remain even among the elderly. In brief, we can draw several facts from previous 
studies. First, an increase in benefit level in the first-tier programme is associated with a 
decrease in income inequality among the elderly. Second, an increase in benefit level of 
the earnings-related pension is associated with a decrease in the poverty level but an 
increase in inequality among the elderly.  
However, the effect of benefit level on income distribution needs to be understood and 
analysed in the interplay with private pensions. Chapter 8 showed that an increase in 
private pensions is associated with a decrease in income inequality when it is combined 
with high coverage. Considering this result, it can be assumed that a high level of benefit 
in the basic/minimum pension is related to a decrease in income inequality and this 
relation can be stronger when it is combined with an increase in private pensions. The 
earnings-related pension is a more complicated case. Chapter 8 showed that strong 
earnings-relatedness is not necessarily related to a decrease in inequality, although it 
could be effective in containing the expansion of private pensions. The proportion of 
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private pensions is also considered to have a close relationship with the benefit level of 
earnings-related pensions. Therefore, the proportion of private pensions is expected to 
be low at the high benefit level, and to be high at the low benefit level, but the effect of a 
high benefit level considering private pensions is unclear, as the previous chapter showed 
that an increase in private pensions is not necessarily associated with an increase in 
income inequality. 
Some previous studies have shown that a higher degree of income security in earnings-
related pensions tends to decrease income inequality among the elderly. Jäntti, Kangas 
and Ritakallio (1996) investigated the development of pension systems and their impact 
on income distribution among the elderly in Finland and found that a shift from a 
‘marginal’ to an ‘institutional’ model of welfare state brings better well-being and income 
distribution among the elderly. The marginal (or residual) model is a state without basic 
security and income-related benefit and only with a targeted, means-tested benefit. The 
institutional model refers to a state with both income security and a basic security system.  
They argued that the Finnish pension system changed from a marginal model to an 
institutional model and income inequality and poverty were reduced. Through the 
transformation, coverage rate, as well as benefit level, had increased very much. It is very 
true that income distribution got better after the transformation, but it is still not clear 
whether this was due to the higher benefit level or the higher coverage rate.  
As discussed in Chapter 7, several studies have tested the relationship between pension 
programme and income distribution and have shown that generally an increase in the 
generosity of a pension programme is related to lower poverty or inequality, but the 
effect of a pension programme can be different according to institutional arrangement. 
Most of those studies agreed that an increase in generosity in a first-tier pension 
programme is more significant for reducing poverty and income inequality. In sum, 
considering that the previous results showed that a generous pension is related to better 
income distribution, it can still be hypothesized that a high benefit level in an earnings-
related pension is also related to a decrease in income inequality among the elderly. 
Regarding the interplay between an earnings-related pension and a private pension, it 
can be hypothesized that a high benefit level of an earnings-related pension limits the 
effect of private pensions.  Consequently, the following hypotheses can be proposed.  
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Hypothesis 1: An increase in benefit level in the first tier is related to a decrease in 
income inequality under the control of the other independent variables. 
Hypothesis 1-1: The effect of benefit level in the first tier can be strengthened by the 
interplay with private pensions. 
Hypothesis 2: An increase in benefit level in the second tier is related to a decrease in 
income inequality under the control of the other independent variables. 
Hypothesis 2-1: The effect of benefit level in the second tier can limit the effect of 
private pensions. 
Namely, this research assumes that increase of benefit level is related to the decrease of 
income inequality at both tiers, but this relationship is more significant or larger in the 
first-tier program, rather than second tier pension. 
To test hypotheses 1 and 2, the replacement rate is separated from the welfare 
generosity score. The benefit level can be measured in various ways but mostly it is 
measured by replacement rate, so this study also employed replacement rate as a 
measurement of each tier pension system.   
A first-tier pension programme is normally either a minimum pension programme or a 
basic pension as shown in Chapter 8. The concepts of minimum pension and basic 
pension are slightly different. However, this study employed the replacement rate of the 
minimum pension proposed by Scruggs (2013) as a measure of benefit level of a first-tier 
programme. A minimum pension in Scruggs’ data is defined as a pension programme 
“that is payable to someone above the standard retirement age” (Scruggs & Allan, 
2006:58), usually based on a means-test in part or whole and an non-contributory system. 
Therefore, the concept of ‘minimum pension’ in Scruggs’s data includes both basic 
pension and minimum pension in the OECD category. So this study employed 
replacement of minimum pension as a measurement of the benefit level of a first-tier 
programme.  
Regarding the second-tier programme, the replacement rate of a ‘standard pension’ in 
Scruggs’s data was employed. In his data, a standard pension was defined as a public 
pension system based on previous contributions and earnings-related pension, so it looks 
fine to employ this as a measurement of the benefit level of the second-tier programme. 
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Interactive variables between minimum pension replacement rate (MPR) and private 
pension, and between standard pension replacement rate (SPR) and private pension are 
included to test hypotheses 1 and 2. In this model, the welfare generosity score without a 
pension programme is considered as an independent variable to control the size of the 
welfare state.  
9.3. Descriptive statistics 
This section presents descriptive statistics about the main factors in this analysis. Figures 
9-1 and 9-2 show the development of the MPR and that of the SPR. 
The pension generosity score shows that there was no rapid reduction in generosity score 
in general. However, the direction of change is quite diverse according to country. In 
general, MPR showed a slight increase between 1980 and 2011 but each country showed 
a different trajectory. Portugal seems to be an outlier but MPR still increased without 
Portugal being included. Except for Portugal and Spain, most countries showed quite a 
stable trend. MPR consistently decreased in Sweden, Finland and Greece but increased in 
Norway, Ireland and Austria. Presumably, this difference can make a difference in income 
distribution as well. Regarding SPR, it looks less stable than MPR but the trend was also 
different according to country. In general, SPR slightly increased from 1980 to 2011. It 
decreased in Sweden and Germany and slightly increased in Norway and Finland. 
Consequently, the combination of MPR and SPR is different according to country. For 
instance, both MPR and SPR decreased over this period in Sweden even though the 
average benefit level is still considered relatively high compared with other countries. On 
the other hand, MPR decreased and SPR increased in Finland and both increased in 
Norway. In brief, both MPR and SPR slightly increased between 1980 and 2011, and the 
size of the increase was a bit higher in SPR than MPR. However, the actual trend is diverse 
and this diversity is expected to affect income inequality if the distributive effect of MPR 
and SPR is different. 
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Figure 9-1 Trend of first-tier pension program 
 
<Sources: Comparative welfare entitlement data set: http://cwed2.org/> 
Figure 9-2 Trend of second-tier pension program 
 
<Source: Comparative welfare entitlement data set: http://cwed2.org/> 
193 
 
Table 9-1 summarizes the average value of SPR and MPR for each country for the three 
decades from 1980 to 2010. Generally speaking, SPR was likely to be higher than MPR in 
most countries. One exception is France, which had a higher replacement rate in 
minimum pension than in standard pension. Scandinavian countries tended to have high 
replacement rates in both pension programmes, whereas Anglo-American countries 
tended to have low replacement rates in both, and continental countries showed a 
medium level of benefit. Spain and Portugal are unique cases as they had generous 
benefit in standard pensions but the minimum pension was very low. Spain is the most 
diverse as it had the highest replacement rate in standard pension (98%) and the lowest 
replacement rate in minimum pension (19.2%). Among the continental countries, 
Germany had a relatively low level of replacement rate in the minimum pension 
programme. However, this was the average value of each pension programme, so it is 
necessary to see how these changed over time.  
Table 9-1 Mean value of replacement rate 
Country Replacement rate of standard pension Replacement rate of minimum pension 
Australia 0.469 0.465 
Austria 0.652 0.513 
Belgium 0.657 0.394 
Canada 0.699 0.578 
Denmark 0.628 .586 
Finland 0.755 .529 
France 0.643 0.670 
Germany 0.577 0.258 
Greece - .411 
Ireland 0.579 0.460 
Italy 0.790 0.511 
Netherlands 0.6029 0.6029 
New Zealand 0.597 0.596 
Norway 0.637 0.6255 
Portugal 0.662 0.348 
Spain 0.980 0.192 
Sweden 0.900 0.616 
Switzerland 0.567 0.445 
UK 0.559 0.405 
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USA 0.766 0.466 
Average 0.6695 0.4835 
<Sources: Comparative welfare entitlement data set: http://cwed2.org/> 
Correlations between the Gini coefficient, the proportion of private pensions, SPR and 
MPR are summarized in Table 9-2. We can see immediately that MPR has a significant 
negative relationship with Gini coefficient, but that SPR does not have a significant 
relationship with Gini coefficient among the elderly. In other words, MPR has a negative 
relationship with inequality and SPR does not have a significant relationship with 
inequality. The interesting thing is that MPR has a positive relation with private pensions, 
which means that private pensions increase when MPR increases. On the other hand, SPR 
has a negative relation with private pensions. This implies that an increase in benefit level 
in second-tier programmes is negatively associated with the size of private pensions. This 
is in line with the argument that a generous benefit in public pension makes private 
pensions less attractive so the demand for private pensions decreases. A negative 
correlation between MPR and private pensions is not straightforward to interpret, but it 
would be plausible if the government attempts to increase MPR when it expands the 
private pension market to prevent an increase in income inequality.  This is a just 
correlation between two variables without considering the effect of other variables but it 
shows an interesting idea and gives us some hint of the main analysis.  
Table 9-2 Correlation coefficient income inequality, Private pension, MPR and SPR 
 Gini among elderly 
Share of private 
pension 
MPR SPR 
Gini among elderly 1.000    
Share of private 
pension 
.0483 
(.4974) 
1.000   
MPR 
-.2810*** 
(0.00) 
.1616*** 
(.0002) 
1.000  
SPR 
-.0970 
(.1762) 
-.2043*** 
(0.000) 
-.0541 
(-.1953) 
1.000 
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9.4. The effect of private pensions and the benefit level of the public 
pension 
9.4.1. The effect of private pensions and benefit level 
This section will test hypotheses 1 and 2, which are related to the relationship between 
private pensions and the benefit level of a public pension system measured as 
replacement rate.  As shown in the previous chapter, it was expected that the effect of 
the benefit level of a public pension system can be different in the two tiers. The models 
in this section employ the same control variable as the previous models but there are 
some changes. The welfare generosity variable is now divided into three parts. As stated 
above, this section tests the relationship between the benefit level of a pension and 
income distribution among the elderly, so pension generosity should be separated from 
other welfare generosity scores. The welfare generosity score without a pension  
programme is included as a control variable since another welfare programme can still 
affect income distribution. The fixed-effect, random-effect and multi-level models were 
employed for the analysis. Tables 9-3 to 9-5 show the results of the analysis without the 
interaction variable first. 
Table 9-3 The effect of replacement rate: fixed effect 
Variable 
Model 1: Fixed effect model 
1st tier program 
only 
2nd tier program 
only 
Both program 
together 
Share of elderly population over 
65 years old 
-.1425636 
(-.62) 
-.0146827 
(-.08) 
.0053808 
(-.04) 
Labour Market participation 
rate of elderly 
.0023746 
(1.52) 
.0030454 
(1.88*) 
.0028651 
(1.90*) 
Real GDP per capita -8.30e-08 
(-.20) 
-1.58e-07 
(-.29) 
-3.07e-07 
(-.74) 
Openness of Capital Market .0008954 
(.12) 
.001584 
(.21) 
.0060224 
(1.15) 
Relative size private pension -.0327773 
(-2.60**) 
-.0180202 
(-1.20) 
-.0205449 
(-1.64) 
Size of welfare state -.0067447 
(-3.34***) 
-.0045837 
(-2.44**) 
-.0038914 
(-2.50**) 
Benefit level (1
st
 tier program) -.0582613 
(-1.71) 
 
-.0458409 
(-2.01*) 
Benefit level (2
nd
 tier program)  
-.1122176 
(-2.88***) 
-.0840391 
(-2.43**) 
Constant .4520026 
(6.59***) 
.4281416 
(7.40***) 
.4133292 
(10.27***) 
Observations 171 166 165 
Clusters 19 18 18 
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Table 9-4 The effect of replacement rate: random effect 
Variable 
Model 2: Random effect model 
1st tier program only 
2nd tier program 
only 
Both program 
together 
Share of elderly population 
over 65 years old 
-.1053169 
(-.96) 
.0459908 
(.42) 
.0137935 
(.14) 
Labour Market participation 
rate of elderly 
.002697 
(3.47***) 
.0029088 
(3.81***) 
.0028158 
(3.90***) 
Real GDP per capita -1.08e-07 
(-.31) 
-1.71e-07 
(-.52) 
-3.11e-07 
(-.99) 
Openness of Capital Market .0018809 
(.50) 
.00212 
(.61) 
.0060293 
(1.73*) 
Relative size private pension -.0362893 
(-3.70***) 
-.0271342 
(-2.70***) 
-.0263141 
(-2.78***) 
Size of welfare state -.0061016 
(-7.50***) 
-.0052716 
(-6.11***) 
-.00466 
(-5.62***) 
Benefit level (1
st
 tier program) -.061542 
(-4.16***) 
 
-.0493454 
(-3.54***) 
Benefit level (2
nd
 tier program)  
-.0943052 
(-4.66***) 
-.0702323 
(-3.54***) 
Constant .4417249 
(17.44***) 
.4312659 
(16.04***) 
.4280755 
(16.69***) 
Observations 171 166 165 
Clusters 19 18 18 
Table 9-5 The effect of replacement effect: multilevel model 
 
Model 3: within-between country model 
1st tier programme only 2nd  tier programme only 
Both programme 
together 
Within Between Within Between Within Between 
Share of elderly 
population over 65 
years old 
-.1090998 
(-.85) 
-.601224 
(-1.58) 
.0032199 
(.03) 
-.3964568 
(-.93) 
-.0023235 
(-.02) 
-.3608126 
(-.92) 
Labour Market 
participation rate 
of elderly 
.0029958 
(3.67***) 
-.002738 
(2.19**) 
.0032934 
(4.08***) 
.0035806 
(2.98***) 
.0029471 
(3.84***) 
.0039374 
(3.54***) 
Real GDP per 
capita 
-2.38e-07 
(-.69) 
-1.67e-07 
(-.11) 
-2.45e-07 
(-.76) 
-1.50e-06 
(-1.04) 
-4.61e-07 
(-1.49) 
9.78e-08 
(.07) 
Openness of 
Capital Market 
.0025174 
(.68) 
.0110301 
(.75) 
.0026965 
(.79) 
.0247909 
(1.63) 
.0073144 
(2.14**) 
-.0106998 
(.71) 
Relative size 
private pension 
-.0320323 
(-2.72***) 
-.084189 
(-2.48**) 
-.015704 
(-1.35) 
-.1044192 
(-3.12***) 
-.0149875 
(-1.38) 
-.0763286 
(-2.36**) 
Size of welfare 
state 
-.006623 
(-6.21***) 
-.005763 
(-5.01***) 
-.004189 
(-3.74***) 
-.0067268 
(-5.44***) 
-.0036094 
(-3.45***) 
-.0062435 
(-5.08) 
Benefit level (1
st
 
tier program) 
-.0539115 
(-3.53***) 
-.11140 
(-2. 52**) 
  
-.043732 
(-3.04***) 
-.1006499 
(-2.18**) 
Benefit level (2
nd
 
tier program)   
-.116839 
(-3.12***) 
-.0369639 
(-.79) 
-.0882222 
(-4.07***) 
-.0442356 
(-1.02) 
Constant . 
(8.02***) 
.4950639 
(6.93***) 
.5030352 
(7.63***) 
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Observations 171 166 165 
Clusters 19 18 18 
 
There are some differences between the fixed-effect model and the random-effect model. 
As expected, the benefit level of the first-tier programme has a significant effect on 
income inequality except in Model 1. The benefit level of the second-tier programme 
shows quite a significant effect on income inequality. In addition, the effect of private 
pensions becomes insignificant when the benefit level of the second-tier programme is 
put into the model. It can be argued that this is in line with the argument that a generous 
public pension programme can make private pensions less attractive so the effect 
becomes insignificant. When the benefit levels of both programmes are considered, both 
are significant and private pensions are insignificant. In addition, the size of the 
coefficient is higher for the second-tier programme than for the first-tier programme, 
which implies that an increase in benefit level in the second-tier programme has a bigger 
effect on reducing inequality. In other words, an increase in the benefit level in the 
second-tier programme can be a better strategy for tackling inequality among the elderly, 
rather than in the first-tier programme. However, the random-effect model shows 
something different. It shows that the benefit level of the first-tier programme has a 
significant effect on the decrease in income inequality as well, and private pensions still 
have a significant effect on the decrease of income inequality when the benefit level of 
the second-tier programme is considered. But this model also shows that an increase in 
benefit level at the second tier has a bigger effect on income inequality than in the 
benefit level at the first-tier programme, although an increase in benefit level at the first-
tier programme also has a significant effect on income inequality.  
As stated in the methodology chapter, the fixed-effect model is likely to produce more 
rigorous results than the random-effect because of the unrealistic assumptions of the 
random-effect model. There is no time-invariant variable in this model but the benefit 
level of the first-tier programme is quite stable in most countries and the benefit level of 
the second-tier programme is also stable for some countries. As explained in the 
methodology chapter, the multi-level model is also useful when the variable is sluggish 
because it does not change rapidly over time. So Model 3 shows the results of the multi-
level analysis. There are several things to be noted in this model. Unlike the fixed-effect 
model, it shows that an increase in benefit level at the first-tier programme also has a 
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significant effect on decreasing income inequality. This is significant for both within-
country and between-countries. An increase in benefit level at the second tier is 
significant within-country, but it is not significant in-between countries. In other words, 
we can see that income inequality decreases as the benefit level of the second-tier 
programme increases in one country, but at the same time we can see countries with a 
higher level of benefit level do not have lower levels of income inequality.  On the other 
hand, private pensions have the opposite effect. Namely, an increase in private pensions 
in a given country does not have a significant effect on income inequality but countries 
with high levels of private pension are likely to have lower levels of income inequality. 
This result is the same when the benefit level of both programmes is considered. Only the 
benefit level of the first-tier programme has a significant effect in a given country as well 
as between countries. However, it should be kept in mind that we need to concentrate 
more on the within-country effect as the between-countries effect is likely to suffer from 
omitted variables bias (Shalev, 2008). This model still shows that an increase in 
replacement rate at both tiers is significantly related to a decrease in income inequality, 
and an increase in replacement rate for the second-level programme has a larger effect 
on a decrease in income inequality. A 1% increase in MPR is related to a decreasing in the 
Gini coefficient of 0.044 whereas a 1% increase in SPR is related to decreasing the Gini 
coefficient by 0.088. 
These results show that the effect of private pensions can be different in the context of a 
given country. In addition, an increase in the benefit level of the second-tier programme 
can be a good strategy but it does not consider the interaction effect between private 
pensions and the benefit level of the public pension system. Now we can see the results 
of the analysis considering the interplay between private pension and benefit level. 
9.4.2. The effect of private pensions and benefit level considering the 
interaction effect 
Table 9-6 presents the results of considering the interaction between the benefit level of 
the public pension and private pensions.  Model 4 shows the results of the fixed- and 
random-effect models and Model 5 shows the result of the multi-level model.  
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Table 9-6 The effect of replacement rate: interaction with private pension 
Variable 
Model 4 Model 5 
Fixed effect 
model 
Random effect 
model 
Within-country 
effect 
Between country 
effect 
Share of elderly 
population over 65 
years old 
.0206634 
(.19) 
.0169276 
(.17) 
.1308225 
(1.17) 
-.4038968 
(-1.01) 
Labour Market 
participation rate of 
elderly 
.0017428 
(1.57) 
.0019342 
(2.66***) 
.0028891 
(3.87***) 
-.0016561 
(1.41) 
Real GDP per capita 9.34e-08 
(.23) 
3.29e-08 
(.11) 
-2.63e-07 
(-.89) 
2.07e-07 
(.14) 
Openness of Capital 
Market 
.0039769 
(.81) 
.0044729 
(1.34) 
.0059564 
(1.84*) 
.100115 
(.65) 
Relative size private 
pension 
.0642694 
(1.04) 
.0528113 
(1.06) 
-.0303807 
(-2.75***) 
-.080389 
(-2.44**) 
Size of Welfare state -.0043325 
(-3.61***) 
-.0046876 
(-5.69***) 
-.004437 
(-4.28***) 
-.0057716 
(-4.74***) 
Benefit level (1
st
 tier 
program) 
-.0279597 
(-2.37**) 
-.0287302 
(-2.08**) 
-.0510962 
(-3.44***) 
-.1033959 
(-2.19**) 
Benefit level (2
nd
 tier 
program) 
-.0584852 
(-1.80*) 
-.0570655 
(-2.19**) 
-.0577427 
(-2.67***) 
-.0397565 
(-.90) 
Private pension* 1
st
 
tier program 
-.280731 
(-5.22**) 
-.2774798 
(-4.59***) 
-.8758806 
(-2.40**) 
Private pension * 2
nd
 
tier program  
.0719153 
(.76) 
.0835464 
(1.23) 
1.06844 
(4.22***) 
Constant .3966313 
(9.06***) 
.4098032 
(13.59***) 
.5156772 
(7.67***) 
Observations 165 165 165 
Clusters 18 18 18 
The core variables which we are interested in show similar results across the models. 
Both the fixed-effect model and the random-effect model show that the interaction 
between SPR and private pension does not have a significant effect on income inequality. 
In other words, an increase in benefit level at the second-tier programme has the effect 
of decreasing income inequality, but an increase in private pensions does not have a 
significant effect on moderating the effect of the pension benefit. In addition, both 
models show that private pension does not have a significant effect on income inequality. 
However, an increase in MPR is significantly related to a decrease in income inequality, 
and the size of effect is larger when it is combined with private pensions. Namely, the 
effect of MPR on reducing income inequality is larger when private pensions increase. 
This means that an increase in benefit level at the first-tier programme can be a relevant 
policy measurement to tackle an increase in income inequality under the condition that 
private pension prevails.  
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The multi-level model shows a slightly different result. The effect of the benefit level at 
the first-tier programme is the same but an increase in private pensions has a significant 
effect in decreasing income inequality. More importantly, the interplay between the 
variables shows an interesting result. It is the same in that an increase in benefit level at 
the first-tier programme has a significant effect on decreasing income inequality and its 
effect is magnified when it is combined with the expansion of private pensions. However, 
an increase in benefit level at the second-tier programme, which decreases income 
inequality in a given country, is associated with an increase in income inequality when 
private pensions are expanded. In other words, an increase in benefit level at the second-
tier programme is normally associated with a decrease in income inequality, but it 
increases income inequality when it is combined with private pension. This implies that an 
increase in benefit level at the second-tier programme is not a relevant strategy when 
private pensions are expanded. As stated in the previous section, this study tried different 
models such as the two-way fixed-effect model and Jackknife analysis, but the results 
remained the same Results are available in Appendix B.1 and B.2.  
In brief, these results show that an increase in benefit level at the first-tier programme 
generally has a significant effect on decreasing income inequality among the elderly, and 
its effect gets stronger when the proportion of private pensions expands. This study  
proposed several hypotheses based on previous studies before the main analysis was 
presented. The results of the analysis are in line with the expectations proposed. An 
increase in benefit level at the first-tier programme decreases income inequality among 
the elderly, and this effect is magnified when private pensions expand. On the other hand, 
an increase in benefit level at the second-tier programme also has an effect of decreasing 
income inequality, but its effect is restricted when private pensions expand. In fact, the 
effect of an increase in SPR could be cancelled out when the proportion of private 
pensions increases.    
The other variables show almost the same direction and significance as the models in the 
previous chapter. The elderly labour market participation rate is significantly related to an 
increase in income inequality, and the size of the welfare state decreases income 
inequality. The openness of the capital market has a significant effect on increasing 
income inequality within a country, but the between-countries effect is not significant. 
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GDP per capita also shows no significant relationship with income inequality among the 
elderly.  
9.5. Discussion 
Many studies have argued that a generous benefit level of the public pension decreases 
income inequality and limits the expansion of private pensions in general. However, the 
structure of the benefit level in the public pension is not simple so it requires a more 
rigorous approach. Generally, the benefit of a public pension consists of a two-tier system 
which reflects different dimensions.  
This study assumes that each level has a different effect on income distribution and that 
the interplay with private pensions is also different. Considering the nature of each 
programme, the first-tier programme is expected to have a more salient effect on income 
inequality, as the first-tier programme reflects the redistributive dimension whereas the 
second-tier programme reflects the income security dimension. Previous models have 
shown that an increase in private pensions is related to a decrease in income inequality 
when it is combined with a high coverage rate. Based on this finding, it is expected that 
an increase in benefit level at the first-tier programme is associated with a decrease in 
income inequality and that its effect gets stronger when it is combined with an expansion 
of the private pension. The results from Models 1 to 5 support this assumption.  
This shows that an increase in benefit level at the first-tier programme has a significant 
effect on decreasing income inequality alone, and that its effect is magnified when the 
interaction between private pensions and benefit level is considered. The poor, who are 
unlikely to have a proper employment history or sufficient income and so are likely to be 
excluded from the second-tier pension programme, can still approach the first-tier 
programme. This means that an increase in private pensions does not cause many 
problems for income distribution as long as the poor are protected by a generous first-tier 
programme. On the other hand, an increase in benefit level at the second tier is related to 
a decrease in income inequality alone, but it increases income inequality when private 
pensions increase. The second tier reflects the employment history of individuals so it is 
normally less redistributive than a first-tier programme. Thus, a high benefit level at the 
second tier means that the rich are likely to have more income from their pension than 
the poor, as income level during working life is to be maintained even after retirement. 
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The expansion of private pensions under this circumstance leads to benefit for the rich, so 
income inequality increases as a result if the poor are not sufficiently supported by the 
public pension system.  
Considering the fiscal burden on the government because of an aging population, it looks 
reasonable to reduce the benefit level and expand private pensions, but the reduction in 
benefit level should be specified.  
Chapter 8 showed that securing a high coverage rate is important for relieving income 
inequality so it is important for the poor to be covered by the public pension system 
when the proportion of private pensions increases. This current chapter shows that an 
increase in benefit level at the first tier has a better effect on reducing income inequality 
than an increase in the benefit level of a second-tier programme, particularly when the 
proportion of private pensions increases.  
A concrete policy guide cannot be proposed from a single empirical research study but 
this study does provide some broad policy implications. A reduction in benefit level at the 
second tier combined with expanding private pensions would be fine in terms of income 
distribution but a reduction in benefit level at the first tier could bring about a harmful 
effect on income distribution. As shown in the descriptive statistics, the detailed 
trajectory and combination of the two-tier system differs from country to country. 
According to the results of this study, the best combination to achieve reform policy is to 
expand private pensions, reduce the benefit level of the second-tier programme and 
provide a generous first-tier pension system with universal coverage.  
9.6. Conclusion 
The starting point of this study was how the welfare state copes with an aging population 
in the era of transformation and this research has attempted to examine the relationship 
between current pension reforms and the distributive outcome. We assume that new 
policy instruments are closely related to the existing welfare state, so this thesis 
particularly focuses on the interaction between private pensions and the institutional 
design of the public pension system.  
The results of this study show that delaying retirement has a negative effect on income 
inequality, and although the effect of private pensions is complicated to interpret, it 
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shows that the effect of private pensions is determined by the relationship with the 
public pension system. An increase in private pensions is related to a decrease in income 
inequality among the elderly in general, but its effect differs according to the institutional 
design of the public pension system. It is related to an increase in income inequality in 
countries with strong earnings-relatedness and a low coverage rate system, and to a 
decrease in income inequality in the other two groups. These results show that an 
expansion of private pensions is not necessarily related to an increase in income 
inequality. In addition, they support the argument that universal coverage is more salient 
for achieving better income distribution than earnings-relatedness. This implies that it is 
important for the poor to be covered by the public pension system. The analysis in this 
chapter also shows that the distributive effect of a generous first-tier programme is larger 
than that of a second-tier programme when the proportion of private pensions increases.  
This study raises some important policy implications. An increase in private pensions does 
not bring an increase in income inequality if the public pension has a relevant institutional 
design to moderate the effect of private pensions. Strong earnings-relatedness can be 
effective for restraining an increase in private pensions, but restraining private pensions is 
not necessarily related to restraining income inequality. On the other hand, income 
inequality decreased when private pensions increased in countries with a high coverage 
rate. It can be inferred that securing a high coverage rate is more important than strong 
earnings-relatedness in terms of better income distribution. It is therefore important to 
secure wide coverage of the public pension if the government wants to introduce or 
expand the private pension market. 
In this regard, it is expected that the benefit level of the public pension at the first tier 
matters in income distribution. An increase in benefit level at the second tier, as well as 
the first tier, is related to a decrease in income inequality but this relationship is slightly 
different when the interaction between the benefit level of the public pension and the 
proportion of private pensions is considered. The size of the effect is larger for the first-
tier programme when the proportion of private pensions increases, but the effect on the 
second-tier programme is canceled out.  
The most important thing that determines the effect of private pensions seems to be 
whether the poor can be covered by the public pension or not. Universal coverage and a 
generous benefit level at the first tier are related to the protection of the poor. The 
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reason why various studies have argued that private pensions have a negative effect on 
income distribution is based on the idea that only the rich can get additional benefit from 
a private pension on the top of public pension and the poor cannot afford a private 
pension. However, what the findings of this study suggest is that this additional benefit 
for the rich is not related to an increase in income inequality if a sufficient level of public 
pension is provided to the poor. 
The findings also raise a fundamental question on the role of private pensions on income 
distribution as private pensions have mostly been considered to have a negative effect on 
income distribution. However, the findings suggest that private pensions do not have a 
negative effect on income distribution. On the other hand, a private pension could have a 
positive effect if a relevant public pension system is established. Thus, the introduction of 
a private pension system should be dealt with very carefully and should be accompanied 
by reform of other components in the public pension system. 
Additionally, the findings propose an answer to the question of which institution is most 
relevant for better income distribution. There has been a long debate on the distributive 
outcome of universalism versus targeting and earning-relatedness versus a flat rate. 
Certainly, the findings of this study provide some clues only and not a clear answer to 
those questions as this study has only considered the role of the institutional design of a 
public pension system in the context of expanding private pensions. Regarding the 
universalism versus targeting argument, the findings are more supportive of universalism 
as they showed better income distribution in countries with a wider coverage rate of the 
public pension system. It is not clear on the issue of earnings-relatedness versus flat rate. 
Strong earnings-relatedness did not show a significant effect on decreasing income 
inequality and the result was inconsistent when it was combined with an increase in 
private pensions. In other words, strong earnings-relatedness did not have a significant 
effect on decreasing income inequality by itself and did not show a significant effect on 
moderating the effect of private pensions. However, the findings showed no evidence 
that a flat rate is more efficient at reducing income inequality.  
The expansion of private pensions is a prevalent phenomenon across the developed 
world as countries face an increase in the financial burden on government due to low 
fertility rates and aging populations. The results of this study suggest that the role of the 
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public pension is still very salient to minimizing the negative effect and maximizing the 
positive effect of private pensions in terms of income distribution. 
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Chapter 10. How are ALMPs related to income inequality? 
10.1. Introduction 
Previous chapters have examined the relationship between pension reform and income 
inequality, focusing on the effect of private pensions and their interplay with the 
institutional design of the public pension. It has been shown how an increase in private 
pensions affects income inequality among the elderly. However, the previous chapters 
have dealt only with income inequality among the elderly, so it is still necessary to 
examine the effect of welfare reform on income distribution among the working-age 
group to see the whole picture of how welfare reform affects income inequality in 
general. Therefore, this chapter explores the relationship between welfare reform and 
income inequality among the working-age group. As explained in the literature review, 
new risks related to labour market changes are emerging, such as globalisation and 
increased flexibility in the labour market. These changes affect the risk of unemployment 
for unskilled workers particularly, so this leads to changes in the social protection that the 
government provides for the unemployed.  
The way welfare states respond to the new risks is more focused on the prevention of 
unemployment by increasing the capacity of workers to adapt to the changes (Jenson & 
Saint-Martin, 2003). Welfare states provide not only financial support to the unemployed 
but also have more active policies to increase their skill, knowledge and capacity in order 
to help them to stay in work and reduce the time spent on searching for new jobs. These 
active social policies to deal with new risks in the labour market are called Active Labour 
Market Policies (ALMPs). ALMPs help the unemployed to increase their chances of finding 
new jobs and help the government to reduce its financial burden by reducing the time 
spent on job searching as government spending on unemployment benefit can be 
reduced as well.  
As explained in the literature review, ALMPs are considered to be the cornerstone of 
active social policy and this transition from redistributive social policies to active social 
policies is expected to bring better social inclusion and better income inequality. 
Vanhoudt (1997) argued that the development of technology leads to economic growth 
but it is likely to be related to an increase in income inequality. He argued that low-skilled 
workers tend to be replaced by advanced technology and only the rich can get any 
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benefit from technological developments as they can reduce the cost of the labour force 
so income inequality would increase. However, ALMPs can cancel the effect of technology 
on income inequality because they provide an opportunity for low-skilled workers to 
upgrade their skills and knowledge since without this opportunity they are likely face 
unemployment due to advancing technology. Vaalavuo (2013) argued that social 
investment including ALMPs is related to the distribution of opportunity rather than of 
income, so it would be less distributive than the traditional welfare state. However, she 
argued that it still has an impact on income inequality as it may serve some income 
classes more than others.     
However, as discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, some researchers have argued that active 
social policies are partially responsible for the current failure to achieve poverty reduction 
(Cantillon 2011; Vandenbrouke & Vlemincks 2011). In fact, empirical studies of the 
redistributive effect of ALMPs are limited. Most of the studies have focused on one or 
two countries so it is difficult to see the general effect of active social policies on income 
distribution. Vanhoudt (1997) examined the effect of ALMPs on income inequality using 
data from eleven developed countries but did not find a significant relationship between 
ALMPs and income inequality. Vliet and Wang (2015) showed that social investment did 
not have a significant relationship with poverty reduction in fifteen European countries. 
As shown in the case of public pensions, new policy instruments do not exert their 
influence on distributive outcomes alone but are closely related to the already existing 
traditional welfare state institution. It is therefore very important to consider the effect of 
unemployment benefit on income distribution and its interplay with ALMPs as well before 
looking into the distributive effect of ALMPs, as explained in Chapter 7. 
Some studies have argued that a generous unemployment benefit is associated with a 
decrease in poverty (Palme 2006; Scruggs 2006). Those studies emphasised the 
institutional design of unemployment benefit, such as how replacement rate, duration 
and targeting/universalism affect income distribution. However, it is more complicated 
when the interaction between unemployment benefit and ALMPs are focused on. Many 
studies have argued that a generous unemployment benefit contributes to raising the 
equilibrium of the unemployment rate and deteriorates the speed of the labour market’s 
ability to adjust to economic shock (Carrasco, 1999; Calmfors & Skedinger, 1995; 
Scarpetta, 1996). Hofmann (2008) and Van den Berg et al. (2004) showed that the 
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imposition of sanctions on unemployment benefit has a significant effect on reducing the 
duration of unemployment.  
In other words, previous studies have shown that a generous unemployment benefit is 
useful for reducing poverty but at the same time, it has an arguably significant effect on 
keeping the unemployed in unemployment for longer. Røed and Westlie (2012) insisted 
that a generous replacement rate of unemployment benefit is related to the moral hazard 
problem, which means that the unemployed do not do their best to find a job because of 
a generous unemployment benefit. Considering that ALMPs are intended to return the 
unemployed to the labour market, those studies have suggested that a generous 
unemployment benefit is likely to have a bad effect on the employment rate, unlike 
ALMPs. However, as was shown in Chapter 7, the notion of flexicurity and the case of 
Denmark show that a generous unemployment benefit combined with ALMPs can lead to 
better results in increasing employment and this can be related to lower poverty and 
lower income inequality. It can therefore be inferred that the effect of ALMPs can be 
different according to the institutional design of unemployment benefits.  
Along with unemployment benefit, this current study also considers minimum income 
programmes (MIPs, hereafter) as a traditional social policy to affect income distribution 
among the working-age population. The goal of MIPs is to provide comprehensive 
protection as a last safety net for when social benefits are exhausted or they do not 
provide a sufficient social minimum. As MIPs are the last safety net for the unemployed, 
so it can be inferred that they affect income inequality as well. In addition, the form of 
MIP varies from country to country so the effect of MIPs on income distribution also can 
be different according to the policy structure of the MIP. Thus, this current study will 
attempt to classify the institutional design of unemployment benefit in conjunction with 
MIPs in order to find out how different policy structures of unemployment benefit and 
MIPs can affect the impact of ALMPs on income inequality.   
So this chapter will examine the effect of ALMPs and their interaction with traditional 
passive social policy on income inequality among the working-age by using time-series 
data from around twenty developed countries. This chapter is structured as follows. 
Section 10.2 focuses on the classification of the institutional design of unemployment 
benefit. In particular, a classification based on universalism/targeting is proposed and 
hypotheses to be tested are put forward. Section 10.3 explains what variables were used 
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and how they can be defined. Section 10.4 presents descriptive statistics and the results 
of main analysis and Section 10.5 contains a discussion and conclusion.  
10.2. Classifying the policy structure of unemployment benefit 
There are various components which have to be considered for the classification of policy 
structure but it is not easy to consider them all at the same time. Things to be considered 
include deciding how much unemployment benefit is generous as a replacement rate, 
qualifying period, duration and eligibility. It is also necessary to consider how an MIP is 
structured and the relation between the MIP and unemployment benefit. As stated above, 
the policy structure of an MIP varies from country to country so it is quite complicated to 
classify unemployment benefit and MIP at the same time. In addition, there have not 
been many studies which have clearly shown which parts or components in 
unemployment benefit or MIPs are related to effect of ALMPs, so this thesis employed 
criteria that are frequently used as measurements of the generosity of unemployment 
benefit (Scruggs, 2013). 
This study considers unemployment benefit first, and then considers the features of MIPs. 
The classification starts with the question of whether there is an earnings-related 
unemployment benefit or not. Questions should reflect the conceptual dimension that we 
want to capture. Based on the discussion of universalism versus means-testing, earnings-
related unemployment benefit, flat rate or means-tested should be the first question to 
be asked. The second and third questions are also frequently used to measure the 
generosity of unemployment benefit: they are the qualifying period and the duration of 
unemployment benefit. Generally, a short qualifying period and a long duration are 
considered as generous unemployment benefits. These three questions are the criteria 
for classifying unemployment benefit.  
Regarding the main features of MIPs, the critical dimensions in MIPs need more 
explanation. As stated in the introduction to this chapter, MIPs are quite diverse between 
countries and there are also various components used to construct MIPs, so it is not easy 
to decide what components are important for determining the institutional 
characteristics of MIPs.  
Some previous studies have attempted to classify the structure of MIPs. Various 
dimensions have been considered as salient for capturing the characteristics of MIPs. 
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Lødemel and Schulte (1992) used whether or not social work/treatment measures are 
attached to the receipt of assistance and the degree of programme centralisation as 
salient dimensions that need to be considered. Gough et al. (1997) elaborated this and 
proposed extent, structure and generosity as the main dimensions. Extent is measured as 
expenditure on social assistance and the number of beneficiaries, and generosity is 
measured as benefit level and replacement rate. The structure is a bit more complicated; 
it reflects the main structure of programmes such as centralisation versus local variation, 
right to benefit versus discretion and individual versus family obligation. Gough et al. 
(1997) proposed eight regimes based on these criteria. Hölsch and Kraus (2004; 2006) 
also attempted to identify regimes across different countries and used expenditure, 
generosity, the degree of targeting and duration.  
This thesis attempts to classify the institutional design of MIPs based on some of the 
criteria used in previous studies. The first question is the existence of MIPs at the national 
level. If a country has MIPs at the national level, then the subsequent questions are 
whether they are supplementary to unemployment benefit and whether they require any 
conditions, such as job search or vocational training. The first question is related to the 
structure of MIPs in terms of whether or not a centralized programme exists, which has 
been frequently used as the main dimension in previous studies. The second question is 
to find the relationship between MIP and unemployment benefit.  Bahle, Hubl and Pfeifer 
(2011) argued that an MIP is likely to be residual and supplementary when there is 
sufficient income support from a generous social insurance system.  
The third question is the relationship between MIPs and ALMPs. In general, the second 
and third questions are related to the scope and extent of MIPs. Those dimensions are 
expected to act as moderators for the effect of ALMPs and unemployment benefit on 
income distribution. MIPs are likely to be more inclusive if they do not have any 
conditions attached or if the unemployment benefit is less generous. The selected criteria 
for this new classification are summarized in Table 10-1. 
Table 10-1 Items in unemployment benefit and MIPs 
Unemployment benefit MIPs 
1) Main unemployment benefit is earning-
related? 
1) MIPs exist at the national level? 
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2) Qualifying period of unemployment 
benefit 
2) Are MIPs supplementary to 
unemployment benefit? 
3) Duration of unemployment benefit 3) MIPs require job search or vocational 
training? 
This study employed data on the policy structure of unemployment benefit and MIPs 
from MISSOC 1996 to 2010 for European countries and from social security policies 
throughout the world for non-European countries. Except for questions 2 and 3 in 
unemployment benefit, others questions required a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. 
Questions 2 and 3 are measured as the number of weeks. Data on qualifying period and 
duration came from the Comparative Welfare Entitlement Dataset compiled by Scrugg et 
al. (2013). One of the primary goals of this current study is to examine empirically the 
effect of universalism and means-testing. Therefore, the most critical question is question 
1 in both unemployment benefit and MIPs.  
Based on the six questions, five model types are proposed.  
Type 1 is called Basic Security-Targeted model. Countries in this type do not have an 
earnings-related unemployment benefit. Australia and New Zealand have means-tested 
benefit systems and the UK and Ireland have flat-rate unemployment benefits.   
Type 2 is called Citizenship model. Countries in this type have earnings-related 
unemployment benefit with a relatively short qualifying period and a long duration. 
Countries in this type also have a supplementary MIP that is designed to top-up payment 
as unemployment benefit. Scandinavian countries except for Denmark fall into this type, 
and Switzerland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands are also included in this type.  
Type 3 is called the Hybrid model. It contains earnings-related unemployment benefit 
with a relatively short qualifying period and MIPs that are not supplementary. Countries 
in this type normally have conditions suitable for an MIP, such as the obligation to 
exhaust maintenance claims or other benefits prior to receiving social assistance. 
However, countries in this type have diversity in the duration of unemployment benefit. 
Denmark, Portugal and Spain have much longer durations than Canada.  
Type 4 is labelled Residual model.  Countries in this type have earnings-related 
unemployment benefit with a long qualifying period and a short duration. Their MIP is not 
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supplementary so it acts as a last safety net when other benefits are exhausted. France, 
Germany and Austria fall into this type.  
Type 5 is Local MIP. It comprises countries which did not have unemployment benefit or 
national MIPs prior to 2010. There are three countries in this type, and each of them has a 
different kind of support system. Italy has a social allowance which is available only to 
recipients older than 65 who have no other income, and it also has some income support 
at local government level. Greece has had a social solidarity allowance since 2009. It was 
introduced in response to the 2008 financial crisis and supports families with very low 
income and other vulnerable social groups. The United States has a supplementary 
security income which is means-tested assistance at federal level.  
Table 10-2 Structure feature of unemployment benefit and minimum income 
programme 
Model Countries Key structure 
Basic Security-
targeted 
Australia 
New Zealand, 
The United 
Kingdom, 
Ireland 
1) Absence of earning-related unemployment 
benefit 
2) Either means-tested or flat rate benefit exists 
Citizenship Finland, 
Sweden, 
Norway, 
Luxemburg, 
Switzerland, 
Netherlands 
1) Earing-related benefit with short qualifying 
period and long duration 
2) Supplementary MIP on the top of 
unemployment benefit 
Hybrids Denmark, 
Portugal, 
Spain 
Canada 
1) Earning-related benefit with short qualifying 
period 
2) MIP that are not supplementary 
3) Duration is various 
Residual  Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Austria 
1) Earning-related benefit with long qualifying 
period and short duration 
2) MIP that are not supplementary 
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Local MIP United States 
Greece 
Italy 
1) No unemployment benefit or MIP at the 
national level. 
As stated above, ALMPs improve the employment rate by providing various services to 
help the unemployed re-enter the labour market, but their effect can become weak when 
the unemployment benefit is very generous. In this regard, the effect of ALMPs on 
income distribution, whether it is positive or negative, can be weak in countries with 
more generous unemployment benefit and can be more significant in countries with less 
generous unemployment benefit. Of the five models, it seems that the Basic Security -
Targeted model and the Local MIP model are less favourable for the unemployed, and 
that the Citizenship model is more favourable for the unemployed. The most distinctive 
difference of Basic security-Targeted model from the other models is that they have no 
earnings-related unemployment benefit. Citizenship model and Residual model are 
similar as both have an earnings-related unemployment benefit although the details are a 
bit different. The difference between Citizenship model and Residual model is the nature 
of the MIP, which is supplementary in Citizenship model and not in Residual model.  
Countries in Hybrid model do not fall into a clear ideal type so they are called Hybrids.  
This study assumes that the institutional design of unemployment benefit and MIP affects 
income distribution. As shown above, a generous system is expected to have a lower level 
of income inequality. Thus, Citizenship model is expected to have the lowest level of 
income inequality and Residual model is also expected to have a lower level of income 
inequality. In contrast, Basic security-targeted model and Local MIP model are expected 
to have higher levels of income inequality compared with the other models.  
Regarding the interaction between ALMPs and the institutional design of unemployment 
benefit and MIPs, previous studies of the distributive outcome of ALMPs have not 
provided a clear answer. Therefore, this thesis is an exploratory analysis of this 
relationship. This thesis assumes that an increase in ALMPs is associated with a decrease 
in income inequality by helping the unemployed to get jobs and income. This study will 
propose preliminary hypotheses and will attempt to determine the distributive effect of 
ALMPs.   
The previous chapter showed a clear interactive effect in the case of pensions so it is 
worth exploring whether a similar interaction exists in the relationship between 
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unemployment benefit and ALMP. This study therefore proposes the hypothesis that the 
effect of ALMPs can be different according to the institutional design of unemployment 
benefit and its combination with an MIP. The effect of ALMPs is stronger in the Local MIP 
model and the Basic security-Targeted model as these models are relatively less generous 
in general than the other models, and it is weaker in Citizenship model as this type is 
relatively more generous than the other models. In other words, if ALMPs are associated 
with a decrease in income inequality, then the size of the reduction in income inequality 
is larger in Basic security-Targeted or Local MIP and it is at a modest level in the other 
models.  
There are two points that we need to focus on. The first is the difference between Local 
MIP model and the other models. As shown in Table 10-2, the three countries in Type 5 
do not have unemployment benefit or MIPs at the national level whereas the other 
models have a protection system at the national level despite all the differences in their 
programme structures. It is expected that the existence of a national level protection 
programme makes a difference in the effect of ALMPs on income inequality. The second 
point is the difference between Basic security-Targeted model and Citizenship, Residual, 
and Hybrid. The distinctive difference is that countries in Basic security-Targeted model 
have a means-tested or flat-rate unemployment benefit whereas countries in Citizenship, 
Residual, and Hybrid model have an earnings-related unemployment benefit. As shown in 
the literature review, there is a debate on the advantages and disadvantages of the 
means-tested benefit system. Many studies have shown the limitations of the means-
tested system and this current study is expected to show how a means-tested system 
interacts with ALMPs so that the income distribution changes.   
Consequently, the hypotheses proposed in this study are as follows. 
1) The institutional design of unemployment benefit and MIP has a significant effect on 
income distribution under the control of the other independent variables. 
     1-1) Basic security-Targeted model and Local MIP model have higher levels of income 
inequality 
     1-2) Citizenship model and Residual model have a lower levels of income inequality.  
2) An increase in ALMPs is related to a decrease in income inequality in general under 
the control of the other independent variables. 
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     2-1) The distributive effect of ALMPs is stronger in Basic security-Targeted model and 
Local MIP model. 
    2-2) The distributive effect of ALMPs is weaker in Citizenship model.  
Details of the research model, variables, measurement techniques and data are described 
in the following section.  
10.3. Model, variables, and data  
The aim of this chapter is to examine the effect of active social policy on income 
inequality using data from the OECD social expenditure and income distribution database. 
The dependent variable in this analysis is income inequality measured by Gini coefficient. 
Unlike the analysis discussed in the previous chapter, this chapter uses the Gini 
coefficient among the working-age population (20-54 years old) as ALMPs are expected to 
affect income distribution mainly among this population. The main independent variable 
is government spending on ALMPs. ALMP data from the OECD covers various sectors such 
as employment services and administration, training, job rotation and job-sharing, 
employment incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, and direct job 
creation. Government spending is shown as percentage of GDP. At the same time, 
traditional social expenditure is also included as a main independent variable. Data on 
social expenditure include various kinds of expenditure on social protection, such as 
pensions and sick pay. Thus, social expenditure is divided into two: spending on 
unemployment benefit and other social expenditure. Spending on unemployment benefit 
is expected to have a more direct effect on income distribution among the working-age 
population than other social expenditure. Generosity score is used in case of pension but 
this chapter employs expenditure as a measure because social expenditure captures more 
countries in the case of ALMPs. Although this chapter is based on expenditure 
measurement, sensitivity tests will be carried out on generosity scores.  
As discussed in the literature review, a measurement based on expenditure has an 
obvious weakness in that it reflects only the financial aspects of social policy so the 
qualitative aspect and institutional characteristics cannot be reflected. Different types of 
active social policy can fall into same category and expenditure cannot reflect ‘the effort’ 
of the welfare state in some cases. For example, the UK shows a consistently low level of 
spending on ALMP but this does not include generalized wage subsidies in the form of tax 
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credits (Berry, 2014; Clasen, Clegg & Goerne, 2016). Apart from the weakness of 
expenditure measurement, OECD data sets of ALMP and social investment have further 
weaknesses which should be considered. First, OECD data for ALMPs cover only 
expenditure by central government but ALMPs are being decentralized in many 
developed countries (Clasen, Clegg & Goerne, 2016). For example, expenditure on 
employability provision in Scotland was financed by the Scottish government and the 
European social fund (around £70million) in 2012 but UK ALMP data in OECD and Eurostat 
does not include Scottish sub-national provision (Goerne & Clegg, 2013). Not only local 
government but also the private sector plays in important role in delivering ALMP. Many 
developed countries attempt to contract out of delivery of ALMPs to private providers 
and then control the efficiency and effectiveness (Sol & Westerveld, 2005). Sometimes, 
governments make ‘black box’ contracts which provide no prescription, policy instruction 
and grants discretion to a private provider. The UK work programme is an example of a 
black box contract (Finn, 2012). With the growth of local government and private 
providers of ALMPs, the OECD data set cannot precisely reflect the size and effort of the 
government and this can lead to distorted results in an analysis of its distributive effect.  
However, internationally comparable data sets to reflect the quality of active social policy 
for the long term are not available. This study therefore used expenditure data despite 
acknowledging the weakness of expenditure based measurement, as OECD data are 
nevertheless the most reliable and comparable data set for the long term at the moment. 
It should therefore be kept in mind that the results of this study will not be decisive 
because of the OECD data issues explained above.  
It is also very important to select control variables. As shown in the previous chapter, 
income inequality is the consequence of the complicated interplay between various 
economic and social factors. In particular, as Kersbergen and Hemerijck (2012) argued, 
the characteristics of the labour market are very salient. Many previous studies have 
shown which variables should be considered in research into income distribution. As 
explained in the previous chapter, GDP per capita should be included as a control variable. 
Variables related to globalisation, such as proportion of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) or 
the openness of the capital market should also be included, but variables were not 
included in this study as they have shown a consistently insignificant effect on income 
inequality. The unemployment rate is also considered to be an important factor (Vliet & 
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Wang 2015). As discussed in Chapter 4, including the unemployment rate is done to 
control the demand side of unemployment benefit and ALMPs.  
The age composition of the population is also reported to play a salient role in income 
distribution so the percentage of the population over 65 and the percentage of the 
population under 15 are also included. In addition, variables to account for labour market 
institution should be considered. This study used a variable measuring union density. 
Previous studies have shown inconsistent results of the effect of union density on income 
distribution. On the one hand, strong union density leads to high wages and less wage 
dispersion so it decreases income inequality. On the other hand, however, strong union 
density increases the difference between insider and outsider. This means that 
employees with permanent contracts enjoy protection and wage growth from strong 
union density, but entry to the labour market is more difficult for employees with 
temporary contracts or the unemployed. Union density data is also taken from the OECD 
data set. Table 10-3 shows a summary of the variables and how to measure them. The 
data used in this study covered the period from 1985 to 2011, as data for ALMPs are not 
available before that.  
Table 10-3 List of Variables and sources 
 Dimension Variable Sources 
Dependent 
variable 
 
Gini Coefficient for working age 
population 
OECD (1985 to 2011) 
Independent 
variable 
 
Active social 
policy 
Expenditure ALMPs OECD (1985 to 2011) 
Conventional 
social policy 
Old social expenditure OECD (1985 to 2011) 
Expenditure on unemployment 
benefit 
OECD (1985 to 2011 
Welfare generosity 
Scrugg & Allan (1985 to 
2011) 
Missing: Luxemburg 
Generosity of unemployment 
benefit 
Scrugg & Allan (1985 to 
2011) 
Missing: Luxemburg 
Economic Real GDP per capita OECD (1985 to 2011) 
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Foreign direct investment CWS(1985 to 2011) 
Unemployment rate OECD (1985 to 2011) 
Age 
composition 
Share of working age population 
(15-64) 
OECD (1985 to 2011) 
Labour 
market 
institution 
Union density OECD (1985 to 2011) 
Table 10-4 Number of inclusion by country 
Country Frequency of 
inclusion 
Country Frequency of 
inclusion 
Australia 9 Netherlands 13 
Austria 9 New Zealand 7 
Belgium 12 Norway 5 
Canada 26 Portugal 6 
Denmark 21 Spain 10 
Finland 24 Sweden 9 
France 16 Switzerland 4 
Germany 22 UK 13 
Greece 3 USA 26 
Ireland 12 Luxemburg 11 
Italy 3   
 
Table 10-4 shows the number of inclusions in the analysis. Compared with the data 
analysed in Chapter 8, we can see an increase in the number of countries and the number 
of observations. New Zealand and Luxembourg were excluded from the analysis of 
private pensions but they included are in this analysis. Although the number of 
observations also increased, we still can see an imbalance among countries. As discussed 
in Chapter 8, this is one reason to employ multi-level analysis. The fixed-effect model and 
the random-effect model can be biased by an unbalanced data set, but multi-level 
analysis is not much affected. However, a Jackknife analysis was still carried out to check 
for any bias and the results are available in the Appendix C.2. 
The methodology has already been fully explained in Chapter 6 so it does not have to be 
repeated here. This chapter also shows the result of the fixed-effect model, the random-
effect model and the multi-level model.  
219 
 
10.4. Descriptive statistics 
This section presents descriptive statistics of the main variables. Section 10.4.1 shows 
how the variables are changed over time. In particular, this section focuses on how 
spending on ALMPs and unemployment benefit has changed. Section 10.4.2 presents the 
mean value of each variable and compares the difference between institutional designs. 
The results of ANOVAs and t-tests are shown to check the significance of any difference. 
10.4.1. Trend of key variables 
Figure 10-1 shows the development of ALMPs, social investment expenditure, and 
conventional social expenditure. On average, government spending on ALMPs was 0.645% 
in 1985 and slightly increased to 0.796% in 2011, although some countries had decreased 
spending on ALMPs. English-speaking countries, such as New Zealand, the UK and the US 
showed decreases during this period and stayed at the low level of spending compared 
with other countries. Nordic countries showed relatively high volatility but generally 
spent more on ALMPs than other countries.  Graph 4 shows the change in income 
inequality during this period. There are some differences by countries but it can be seen 
that income inequality among the working-age population generally increased. The Gini 
coefficient across countries was 0.275 in 1985 but increased to 0.306 in 2011. 
Scandinavian countries showed consistent increases but the level was still very low 
whereas English-speaking countries stayed at a high level of income inequality. 
Continental European countries maintained a medium level but Greece showed quite a 
high level of income inequality. 
Figure 10-2 shows the trend of expenditure on unemployed benefit. There are variations 
between countries but the general trend can be seen to decrease slightly during this 
period. On average, spending on unemployment benefit took 1.56% in 1985 but 
decreased to 1.42%. Most of the Nordic countries showed the same trend on both ALMP 
and unemployment benefit, but Denmark showed a clear decrease in unemployment 
expenditure and an increase in ALMP. Netherlands is interesting as ALMP slightly 
decreased as did expenditure on unemployment. It should be noted that total social 
expenditure had increased during this period (20.24% in 1985 and 25.8% in 2009). In 
other words, other expenditure except unemployment spending increased in general. 
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However, unemployment rates also increased during this period in most countries, so we 
can argue that unemployment benefit actually decreased during this period.   
The generosity scores of the unemployment rate show different results. As explained in 
the literature review, generosity score includes the replacement rate, duration and 
coverage of unemployment benefit. It is expected that the generosity of unemployment 
benefit will decrease as the proportion of ALMPs increases, but as Figure 10-3 shows, 
most countries showed quite a stable trend in this period. Sweden, Denmark, Canada and 
Germany showed a clear decrease in generosity whereas southern European countries 
such as Spain, Greece and Italy showed an increase in generosity score. In fact, southern 
European countries had relatively low levels of generosity so their levels were not very 
high despite increasing for a decade. Average value across countries increased slightly 
between 1985 and 2009. Standard deviation between countries reduced from 2.84 to 
2.37 so the difference between countries was reduced. However, it should be kept in 
mind that the detailed trend was different by countries.  
It should be noted that generosity of unemployment benefit did not necessarily decrease 
even though ALMPs had decreased. For example, Ireland showed a decrease in 
expenditure but generosity was slightly increased, and it was the same for Italy. It is true 
that expenditure on ALMPs increased but the quality of unemployment benefit was not 
degraded much, contrary to the findings of some previous studies. Regarding the 
dependent variable, Figure 10-4 shows that it increased from 0.275 to 0.306 between 
1985 and 2011, so we can see that income inequality increased during this period. 
Regarding social investment, it is not easy to see a trend in how it developed as there are 
many missing values. Nevertheless, it showed 4.87% on average in 1997 but increased to 
5.69% in 2009, so we can see that social investment increased between those years, but 
we need more data on this. Table 10-5 summarizes the changes in each value between 
1985 and 2009.  
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Figure 10-1 Trend of ALMPs 
 
<Sources: OECD social expenditure : http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/> 
Figure 10-2 Trend of spending of unemployment benefit 
 
<Sources: OECD social expenditure : http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/> 
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Figure 10-3 Generosity of unemployment benefit 
 
<Sources: Comparative welfare entitlement data set: http://cwed2.org/> 
Figure 10-4 Trend of Gini coefficient among working age population 
<Sources: Comparative welfare entitlement data set: http://cwed2.org/> 
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 Table 10-5 Descriptive statistics of main variables 
10.4.2. Difference between the institutional designs of unemployment benefit 
and MIPs 
Table 10-6 shows the value of each variable by institutional design of unemployment 
benefit. As expected, The Citizenship model had lower income inequality and also spent 
more on ALMPs. This model shows the lowest income inequality and the highest level of 
welfare effort. The Basic Security-Targeted model and the Local MIP model showed 
relatively high income inequality and low welfare effort. In particular, the Local MIP 
model showed the highest level of income inequality and the lowest level of social 
expenditure, as well as generosity score. The Local MIP model shows less than half of 
spending on ALMPs and UI of the Basic Security-Targeted model. Table 10-6 shows that 
the Residual model, which has a high level of spending on ALMPs, had a low level of 
income inequality. However, this does not mean that spending on ALMPs leads to low 
income inequality as this model shows a generally high level of welfare effort.  
ANOVA tests were carried out to check whether the difference between institutions was 
statistically significant and they showed that all these differences are statistically 
significant as the p-value was lower than 0.01 in all cases. We can see that there is a 
substantial difference between the key variables according to the institutional setting of 
unemployment benefit and MIPs. These results are available in the Appendix C.3.  
 
Average 
value in 
1985 
Average 
value in 
2009 (or 
2011) 
Difference between 
1985 and 2009 (2011) 
Active labour market policy 0.65% 0.80% (2011) +0.15 
Expenditure on unemployment benefit 1.56% 1.419% -0.141 
Other social expenditure (without ALMP 
and unemployment benefit) 
17.9% 23.71% +5.81 
Generosity of unemployment benefit 9.6 10.01 +0.41 
Gini coefficient  0.28 
0.31 
(2011) 
+0.03 
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Table 10-6 Statistics of the main variable by institution 
 
Gini 
coefficient 
ALMPs 
( As % of 
GDP) 
Expenditure on 
UI (As % of 
GDP) 
Other social 
expenditure 
(As % of GDP) 
Generosity of 
UI 
Basic Security-Targeted 0.33 0.59 1.23 17.69 8.13 
Citizenship 0.25 0.97 1.32 23.86 11.82 
Hybrid 0.29 0.80 2.01 19.96 10.22 
Residual 0.27 0.93 1.86 26.33 11.60 
Local MIP 0.35 0.24 0.51 17.11 6.95 
 
These statistics show that income inequality was higher in the Basic security-Targeted 
model and Local MIP model and lower in Citizenship model and Residual model. In fact, 
this is one of the hypotheses proposed earlier in this chapter so a T-test was carried out 
to check whether this difference is statistically significant. If this difference is statistically 
significant, then it sheds light on the idea that institutional design is significantly related 
to differences in income inequality. For the T-test, countries in Basic security-Targeted 
and Local MIP model were classified as one group (Group 1) and countries in Citizenship 
model and Residual were classified as another group (Group 2). As shown in the table, the 
Group 1 showed a higher level of income inequality than the Group 2 and the T-test 
showed whether this difference is statistically significant or not. 
Table 10-7 Result of T-test 
 
Table 10-7 shows the results of the T-test. The t-test showed that the 95% confidence 
interval of Group 1 did not overlap that of Group 2, and that 95% of the confidence 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      249
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)                                      t =  24.3065
                                                                              
    diff              .0735486    .0030259                 .067589    .0795081
                                                                              
combined       251    .2927809    .0027239    .0431546    .2874162    .2981456
                                                                              
       2       149    .2628926      .00197     .024047    .2589996    .2667856
       1       102    .3364412    .0022566    .0227907    .3319647    .3409177
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
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interval of the difference between Groups 1 and 2 was between .675 and .079. This result 
shows that the Gini coefficient of Group 1 is likely to be higher than that of Group 2 at 95% 
probability. This result may provide supporting evidence that income inequality is 
significantly different according to the institutional design of unemployment benefit and 
MIPs. This also can be momentum to proceed further analysis.  
Table 10-8 Correlation between key factors 
 
Share of 
working age 
population 
Spending on 
ALMPs 
Unemployment 
rate 
Spending 
on UB 
Spending 
on 
others 
Union 
density 
GDP 
per 
cap 
Share of 
working age 
population 
1.000      
 
Spending on 
ALMPs 
-.2648*** 
 
1.000     
 
Unemployment 
rate 
-.1470*** .1698*** 1.000    
 
Spending on 
UB 
-.1174*** .6092*** .5459*** 1.000   
 
Spending on 
others 
-.0688 .5440*** -.1045** .2269*** 1.000  
 
Union density -.2767*** .5307*** -.0739* .3630*** .3007*** 1.000  
GDP per cap .1714*** -.1302*** -.4908*** -.267*** .1733*** -.0529 1.000 
Table 10-8 shows a correlation between the independent variables to avoid multi-
collinearity. There is a substantial degree of correlation regarding spending on ALMPs. It 
can be seen that spending on ALMPs is correlated with spending on unemployment 
benefit, unemployment rate and other welfare programmes. In particular, the correlation 
coefficient is 0.6 between spending on ALMPs and spending on unemployment benefit.  It 
is still helpful to carry out a regression analysis as this correlation is not a perfect linear 
correlation, so there is no perfect multicollinearity (Stock & Watson, 2012). So all the 
analyses were repeated without spending on unemployment benefit being included in 
order to check whether there were any substantial changes in the significance and 
direction of the other variables.  
In brief, it seems to be true that the focus on welfare policy for addressing unemployment 
is moving from a protective policy to an active policy as the data show that 
unemployment expenditure decreased as total social expenditure increased, but the 
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differences were not very big. Spending on ALMP still forms only a small proportion but it 
has increased consistently. However, although the expenditure on unemployment benefit 
slightly decreased, the quality of social policy measured by generosity score did not 
change much. As explained above, Denmark showed a clear increase in ALMP and a 
decrease in unemployment benefit, and the UK and the Netherlands showed decreases in 
both, but the decrease in unemployment benefit was larger. Therefore, we cannot find 
concrete evidence of the retrenchment of the traditional welfare state, at least from the 
descriptive statistics. Spending decreased slightly, but generosity still looked stable over 
the last few decades. 
One thing to be noted is that the standard deviation of unemployment spending and total 
social expenditure decreased between 1985 and 2009 whereas that of ALMP slightly 
increased. This implies that the trend in expenditure on the old social policy including 
unemployment spending showed convergence. The standard deviation of social 
investment also decreased so it can be assumed that social investment had increased and 
that the gap between countries reduced. This indicates that most developed countries are 
now taking a similar path in terms of their unemployment benefit systems and ALMPs.  
In addition, the descriptive statistics show that there is a significant difference in income 
inequality and spending on ALMPs according to institutional design. Basic security-
Targeted model and Local MIP model had relatively high levels of income inequality and 
low levels of ALMPs and unemployment benefit. Citizenship model and Residual model 
had low levels of income inequality and high levels of ALMPs as well as traditional social 
spending.  The results of the T-test showed that countries in Basic security-Targeted 
model and Local MIP model had significantly higher levels of income inequality than 
countries in Citizenship model and Residual model.  
10.5. Income inequality and the effect of ALMPs  
This section presents the results of the main analysis of the relationship between ALMPs 
and income inequality. As stated in Chapter 1, the primary research question of this thesis 
is first to look to the empirical relationship between spending on ALMPs and income 
inequality, and second to look at the effect of the institutional design of unemployment 
benefit/MIPs, and third to look at how the interaction between the two affects income 
inequality. To find the answers, section 10.5.1 presented the effects of spending on 
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ALMPs without considering the institutional design of unemployment benefit/MIPs, and 
section 10.5.2 showed regressions in institutional design and with the interaction 
between ALMPs and the institutions of unemployment benefit/MIPs. 
10.5.1. The effect of ALMPs: without context variables   
The empirical analysis employed the following process. First, the fixed-effect model 
controlling the between-countries effect is examined. This model is expected to find the 
within-country effect of the independent variables by removing the between-countries 
variance. Then the results of the random-effect model assuming that country-level 
variance is uncorrelated with independent variables are compared with the result of the 
fixed-effect model. Finally, the results of the multi-level analysis are shown to see the 
within-country and between-countries effects. The results from each model are shown in 
Table 10-8.  
Models 1 and 2 show the results of the fixed-effect, random-effect and multi-level models 
respectively. There are some differences between the random-effect model and the 
fixed-effect model. The effects of ALMPs are same in terms of significance and direction, 
but the effects of the unemployment rate and union density are different as they are 
significant in the random-effect model but not in the fixed-effect model. Again, the 
random-effect model is based on unrealistic assumptions so it may generate spurious 
results.  
The results show that an increase in ALMP is significantly related to a decrease in income 
inequality. The effect of ALMPs is significant in both the random-effect model and the 
fixed-effect model. The random intercept model shows that it has a significant effect 
within a country, but not quite significant between countries. Many previous studies have 
argued that an active social policy does not show impressive results in terms of income 
distribution but this result implies that ALMPs do have a significant effect on decreasing 
income inequality. In any given country, we can observe that an increase in ALMPs is 
related to a decrease in income inequality. 
The effect of other variables is not much different from expectation. The interesting thing 
is the effect of unemployment benefit and other social expenditure. Other things being 
equal, these models show no significant effect of spending on unemployment benefit 
within-country. The multi-level model shows that these variables are not significant 
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within-country, but very significant for reducing income inequality between countries. In 
other words, the results show that countries with a higher level of unemployment 
spending are likely to have a lower level of income inequality. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 6, the between-countries effect is likely to suffer from omitted variable bias so it 
is unlikely to be reliable. So it looks as if spending on unemployment benefit is not 
significantly related to changes in income inequality in this analysis.  Of course, this does 
not necessarily mean that social spending on unemployment benefit does not have an 
effect on income inequality. In fact, it should be noted that the redistributive effect of 
ALMPs is stronger than unemployment benefit after controlling the unemployment rate. 
This is an unexpected result as previous studies have argued that unemployment benefit 
is more redistributive as it is directly related to the redistribution of income whereas 
ALMPs are a more indirect way than traditional social policy.  
Controlling for all the other independent factors in this model, the coefficient of GDP 
shows that income inequality among the working-age population slightly but significantly 
increases as GDP per capita increases. Income inequality also increases when 
unemployment rate increases. The results also show that union density is not significantly 
related to income inequality. Strong union density does not show a significant effect on 
income inequality but it has a significant effect between countries. 
Based on these results, it can be assumed that an increase in ALMPs is significantly 
related to a decrease in income inequality when other things are equal. Other models 
subjected to a sensitivity test showed a similar result for the main interest variable. They 
all showed that an increase of spending on ALMPs is related to a reduction in income 
inequality but there is only a small difference in the controlled variables. For instance, the 
GLS model and the linear regression model with Huber-White robust standard error 
showed that union density has a significant effect on income inequality. In other words, 
income inequality is reduced when union density is strong. Vliet and Wang (2015) pointed 
out that the global financial crisis in 2008 could affect the results, so this current study 
also attempts to implement a two-way fixed-effect model to control the time-fixed effect 
as well as an entity (country) fixed effect. The results still showed that an increase in 
ALMP is significantly related to a decrease in income inequality. 
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Table 10-9 Regression without institutional variable 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 
Fixed effect 
model 
Random effect 
model 
Within-country 
effect 
Between country 
effect 
Share of working age 
population between 
16-64 
-.392625 
(-1.97*) 
-.3742559 
(-3.86***) 
-.4064203 
(-4.35***) 
-.3944985 
(-1.43) 
ALMP -.0155058 
(-2.59**) 
-.0126919 
(-2.71***) 
-.016143 
(-3.44***) 
-.016948 
(-1.26) 
Unemployment benefit -.0035503 
(-.80) 
-.0048443 
(-1.99**) 
-.0030928 
(-.1.27) 
-.0149957 
(-2.37**) 
Other social 
expenditure 
-.000315 
(-.35) 
-.001159 
(-2.17**) 
-.0002067 
(-.35) 
-.0043038 
(-4.74***) 
Real GDP per capita 1.13e-06 
(2.71**) 
8.81e-07 
(5.69***) 
1.09e-06 
(6.73***) 
-.1.67e-06 
(-3.18***) 
Unemployment rate .0017663 
(1.75*) 
.0023961 
(4.24***) 
.0016511 
(2.96***) 
.0025734 
(1.76*) 
Union density -.0003707 
(-.82) 
-.0009476 
(-5.50***) 
-.0004035 
(-1.59) 
-.0005994 
(-3.22***) 
Constant .5442766 
(.3.88***) 
.5747053 
(8.54***) 
.7239949 
(3.92***) 
Observations 281 281 281 
Clusters 21 21 21 
R square 
Within=.3883 
Between=.4157 
Overall=.5608 
Within=.3697 
Between=.6357 
Overall=.6934 
Log likelihood=808.51318 
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Figure 10-5 Scatter plot 
 
Figure 10-5 shows a scatter plot of ALMPs and income inequality. In this scatter plot, the 
X axis represents the spending on ALMPs, shown as the difference from the mean value 
of each country, and the Y axis represents the Gini coefficient among the working-age 
population. As explained above, the difference from the mean value is used to estimate 
the within-country effect.  The scatterplot and the fitted line show that there is a negative 
effect between the two variables although the slope is very modest. According to this 
scatterplot, income inequality is negatively related to an increase in spending on ALMPS 
in a given country. This is in line with the results of the regression analysis which showed 
that an increase in spending on ALMPs is related to a decrease in income inequality in 
general. However, this general effect is the average value of the coefficient of each 
country so it does not provide detailed information on how the relation differs between 
countries. As shown in the case of a private pension, the within-country effect can differ 
from country to country for a variety of reasons. In this case, we can expect that this 
relationship will be different according to the institutional design of the unemployment 
benefit. Figure 10-6 shows a scatterplot and fitted line between two variables according 
to the institutional designs of unemployment benefit and MIPs.  
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Figure 10-6 Fitted line by institutional design 
 
We can see that the slope showing spending on ALMPs is quite different according to the 
institutional design of unemployment benefit and MIPs. Generally, it looks to have a 
negative effect on the Gini coefficient as shown in Figure 10-5, but in fact the effect of 
ALMPs varies. An increase in ALMPs is related to a decrease in income inequality for some 
types but this relationship is the opposite in other types. This is an unbalanced panel so 
the length of the line is different by institutions, but there are some facts which should be 
noted.  
An increase in spending on ALMPs is related to a decrease in income inequality in 
Citizenship model, Residual model and Local MIP model, but this relation is the opposite 
in Basic security-Targeted model and Hybrid model. In fact, the relation between the two 
variables is not very clear in Basic security-Targeted model and Local MIP model. 
Observations of countries in these models do not show a distinct direction so no clear 
relationship between the two variables is shown. In addition, observations in these 
models are clustered at a high level of income inequality whereas observations are 
clustered at a lower level of income inequality in Citizenship model and Residual model. 
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Observations in Hybrid model are spread across a range from low level to high level of 
income inequality.  
This figure cannot be concrete evidence for a relationship between institutional design 
and income inequality, but it nevertheless shows why we need to consider the 
institutional design of a public pension as those differences between different institutions 
could be due to the difference in the institution and its interplay with ALMPs. These 
context variables on the institutional design of unemployment benefit and MIPs cannot 
be tested in the fixed-effect model as that model treats context variables as fixed effects. 
Table 10-10 shows the results of the random-effect and multi-level models using context 
variables and interaction variables. 
10.5.2. The effect of spending on ALMPs in the context of institutional design of 
unemployment benefit 
The results of Model 3 show the institutional design of an unemployment benefit which is 
classified based on universal and means-testing criteria. Countries are divided into five 
types and the Hybrid model is reference group in this analysis. ALMPs still show the 
significant effect of reducing income inequality and other social expenditure does not 
have a within-country effect, but it is quite significant in reducing income inequality in the 
between-countries effect. In contrast, unemployment rate shows a significant effect on 
increasing income inequality in a given country, but between countries the effect is not 
significant. The direction of each variable is in line with our expectation. 
Income inequality is significantly affected by the institutional design of unemployment 
benefit and MIP. As shown in the descriptive statistics, the Citizenship model and the 
Residual model have significantly lower levels of income inequality than the other types, 
other things being equal. The other models have a relatively higher level of income 
inequality and the multi-level model shows that the Local MIP model has the highest level 
of income inequality. In other words, income inequality is significantly lower in the 
Citizenship model and the Residual model than in the other types, and Local MIP model 
has a significantly higher level of income inequality, other things being equal.  
Without institutional variables, an increase in ALMPs is still significantly related to a 
decrease in income inequality. One thing different is that an increase in expenditure on 
unemployment benefit does not have a significant effect on income inequality in the 
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fixed-effect or multi-level models as discussed in section 10.5.1, but it is significantly 
related to an increase in income inequality at least between countries effect, when 
institution variables are considered. 
Table 10-10 Regression with institutional variables 
Variable 
Model 3 
Random effect 
model 
Within-country 
effect 
Between country 
effect 
Share of working age 
population between 16-
64 
-.3882384 
(-4.16***) 
-.4030737 
(-4.32***) 
-.4293943 
(-1.76**) 
ALMP -.0128471 
(-2.86***) 
-.0159959 
(-4.23***) 
-.0095169 
(-.84) 
Unemployment benefit -.00406551 
(-1.72*) 
-.0029446 
(-1.21) 
-.0104078 
(-1.82*) 
Other social 
expenditure 
-.0004089 
(-.77) 
-.0000966 
(-.16) 
-.0030981 
(-2.90***) 
Real GDP per capita 9.30e-07 
(6.18***) 
1.62e-07 
(6.71***) 
-1.30e-06 
(-2.92***) 
Unemployment rate .0018272 
(3.51***) 
.001623 
(2.91**) 
.0009842 
(.81) 
Union density -.0007392 
(-4.20***) 
-.0004109 
(-1.62) 
-.0007549 
(-5.05***) 
Basic security- 
Targeted 
.0055585 
(.43) 
.0004453 
(-.05) 
Citizenship model -.0415333 
(-3.38***) 
-.0180982 
(-2.06**) 
Residual model -.037692 
(-2.90***) 
-.0170929 
(-1.7571*) 
Local MIP .015487 
(1.10) 
.0159137 
(1.81*) 
Constant .5772948 
(8.74***) 
.7245081 
(4.31***) 
Observations 281 281 
Clusters 21 21 
R-square 
Within=.3819 
Between=.8457 
Overall=.8240 
Log likelihood=813.98874 
 
Table 10-11 presents the results of the regression analysis considering the interaction 
between the institutional design of unemployment benefit and ALMPs. This model carries 
some interesting findings. The results show that an increase in ALMPs is associated with a 
decrease in income inequality in the Citizenship, Residual, Hybrid and Local MIP models. 
In other words, the effect of ALMPs on income inequality is not significantly different 
among those four models. The interesting thing is the case of Basic security-Targeted 
model. In this model, an increase in spending on ALMPs is related to an increase in 
234 
 
income inequality, unlike the other models. This is a bit unexpected as we anticipated 
that the distributive effect of ALMPs would be larger in the Basic security-Targeted model 
as it is relatively less generous to the unemployed. As stated in section 2, this chapter is 
an exploration of how ALMPs interact with the institutional design of unemployment 
benefit/MIPs. Therefore, this chapter proposed slightly vague hypotheses which 
suggested that the effect of ALMPs is larger when there is a less generous unemployment 
benefit. It was therefore expected that the effect of ALMPs on decreasing income 
inequality would be larger in the Basic security-Targeted model and Local MIP model, but 
the result is the opposite of that expectation.  
One thing to note is that an increase in unemployment benefit is not significantly related 
to a decrease in income inequality. The multi-level analysis showed that it is significantly 
related to a decrease in income inequality in between countries, but between countries 
the effect is likely to suffer from omitted variables bias so it is unlikely to be reliable. 
However, it is still worth noting the association at the country level as this is also useful 
for understanding the whole of ‘what is going on’ (Bell, Fairbrother & Jones, 2016). The 
between-countries effect shows that countries with a higher level of unemployment 
spending have significantly lower levels of income inequality.  
Table 10-11 Regression with interaction variables 
Variable 
Model 4 
Random effect 
model 
Within-country 
effect 
Between country 
effect 
Share of working age 
population between 16-
64 
-.3299899 
(-3.41***) 
-.3324921 
(-3.37***) 
-.4289695 
(-1.76*) 
ALMP -.0225846 
(-2.72***) 
-.0189042 
(-2.22**) 
-.0093991 
(-.83) 
Unemployment benefit -.0038603 
(-1.60) 
-.0022561 
(-.90) 
-.0103755 
(-1.82*) 
Other social 
expenditure 
-.0002935 
(-.55) 
-.0002092 
(-.35) 
-.0030672 
(-2.88***) 
Real GDP per capita 9.42e-07 
(6.25***) 
1.07e-06 
(6.61***) 
-1.27e-06 
(-2.88***) 
Unemployment rate .0016778 
(2.98***) 
.0014205 
(1.93**) 
.0010739 
(.89) 
Union density -.0008247 
(-4.63***) 
-.0006441 
(-2.33**) 
-.0007585 
(-4.48***) 
Basic security-
Targeted 
-.0168896 
(-1.11) 
.0004428 
(.05) 
Citizenship -.0517226 
(-3.53***) 
-.0174395 
(-1.99**) 
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Residual -.0431183 
(-2.54**) 
-.0168542 
(-1.69*) 
Local MIP .0099122 
(.62) 
.0162223 
(1.85*) 
ALMP*Basic .0367783 
(2.56***) 
.0312648 
(2.04**) 
ALMP*Citizenship .0125062 
(1.35) 
.0039287 
(.41) 
ALMP*Residual .006295 
(.51) 
-.0003558 
(-.03) 
ALMP*Local MIP -.0005848 
(-.02) 
.0006166 
(.02) 
Constant .548172 
(7.69***) 
.7215469 
(4.31***) 
Observations 281 281 
Clusters 21 21 
R square 
Within=.3943 
Between=.8634 
Overall=.8372 
Log likelihood=816.40588 
The conditional plot shows this relationship more clearly. As discussed in Chapter 7, the 
conditional plot presents the marginal effect of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable. In this case, it shows how much the Gini coefficient is changed when 
the spending of ALMPS increases by one unit of measure. The slope of the Local MIP type 
is steeper than those of the other three types, whereas the slope of the Basic Security 
type shows an increase in income inequality as ALMPs increase. The other three types 
show almost identical slopes. 
236 
 
Figure 10-7 Conditional plot 
 
Some sensitivity tests were conducted for this analysis. As discussed in the previous 
section, this analysis employed social spending as a measurement of welfare effort to 
capture as many observations as possible so all of these models were repeated with the 
welfare generosity score. Two-way fixed-model analysis was employed to control the 
time-fixed effect, such as the financial crisis in 2008. Jackknife analysis was then applied 
to check for bias. The results of all these analyses are available in the Appendix C.2 .  
The jackknife analysis made no difference because the multi-level model is not affected 
by unbalanced data, as discussed in the previous chapter. However, the results were 
slightly different when the generosity index was used (Appendix C.1). The directions of 
the coefficients remained the same, but the relationship between ALMPS and income 
inequality in the Basic security-Targeted model became insignificant.  
10.6. Discussion and conclusion 
The starting point of this chapter was to examine the distributive outcome of ALMPs, 
which are an emerging strategy for dealing with the new risks facing the welfare state. 
This study therefore set out to find the effect of ALMPs on income inequality and how it 
changes in different institutional contexts. Some empirical studies have previously 
addressed this topic and most of them have argued that an active social policy does not 
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have a significant effect on income distribution but it does have significant effect on 
increasing the employment rate. However, there have not been many studies which have 
relied on a rigorous quantitative method based on a large data set so this current study 
attempted to examine the distributive effect of ALMPs using a time-series data set. In fact, 
the cross-country variation in income distribution and active social policy was quite 
diverse so the effect of an active social policy can also be diverse. Some previous studies 
argued that the effect of an active social policy simply cannot be generalised as its 
distributive effect depends on the specific policy and socio-demographic structure of each 
country (Vaalavuo 2013; Vliet & Wang 2015). In addition, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter, current traditional social policies are expected to play an important role in 
moderating the distributive effect of ALMPs. Therefore, this analysis attempted to control 
socio-economic factors and the differences in the institutional designs of unemployment 
benefit and MIP. 
This study classified the institutional design of unemployment benefit systems and MIPs 
based on the earnings-relatedness, qualifying period, duration and policy structure of 
MIPs. Five models were eventually identified and it was expected that the distributive 
effect of ALMPs would be different according to the institutional design of unemployment 
benefit and MIP. The findings were twofold. 
First, the results showed that ALMPs have significant effect on decreasing income 
inequality. This implies that ALMPs can be a useful policy instrument to include the poor 
in the labour market so that they can get paid in order to reduce the gap between the 
rich and the poor. In this regard, it was expected that ALMPs would have positive 
consequences on income distribution in terms of inequality. One of the main criticisms of 
ALMPs is that they are only concerned with re-entry to the labour market for the 
unemployed so the quality of the job is often neglected. Thus, ALMPs sometimes force 
the poor to get a poorly paid job so they cannot get out of poverty even when they are 
working. However, the findings of this study have shown that ALMP has a significant 
effect on reducing the income gap between the rich and the poor, ALMPs can also be 
related to a significant redistributive outcome. As shown above, Cantillon (2011) argued 
that an active social policy does not work well on poverty reduction as an active social 
policy is less redistributive than conventional social policy, and conventional social policy 
becomes less generous.  
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The descriptive statistics showed that the generosity of unemployment benefit looked 
stable between 1985 and 2010 but that the trend was different by countries as some 
countries showed a clear decrease in the generosity of their unemployment benefit. From 
the perspective of finance, expenditure on unemployment benefit was slightly decreased 
and most countries maintained a similar level. However, the unemployment rates during 
this period increased, so spending on unemployment benefit divided by unemployment 
rate decreased in most countries. Overall, the descriptive statistics showed that the 
traditional unemployment benefit tended to decrease during this period.  
The findings also raise the issue of the redistributive characteristics of an active social 
policy. Along with Cantillion, previous researchers employed social investment 
expenditure including ALMPs and other education expenditure to examine the 
distributive outcome of an active social policy and showed that an active social policy 
does not have a significant effect on income distribution. However, the active social policy 
and social investment that were used in those studies were a mixture of various concepts, 
so there might be an inevitable failure to find any significant effect of social investment or 
active social policy. So this current study separated ALMPs from other active social 
policies and found that ALMPs had a significant effect on reducing income inequality.  
Another main finding of this study is the effect of ALMPs in the context of the institutional 
design of unemployment benefit. Some researchers have argued that the effect of ALMPs 
could decline when unemployment benefit is very generous. The findings of this current 
study have shown that the policy structure of unemployment benefits and MIPs can make 
a difference in income inequality, and the marginal effects of ALMPs can be different 
depending on the policy structure of unemployment benefit and MIP.  
The most notable finding regarding interaction was that an increase in ALMPs is related to 
an increase in income inequality in the Basic Security-Targeted model. The other four 
models showed that an increase in ALMPs is significantly related to a decrease in income 
inequality. In other words, the distributive effect of ALMPs is different only in the Basic 
Security-Targeted model. The distinctive structural difference of the Basic Security-
Targeted model is that it has a means-tested or flat-rate unemployment benefit, not an 
earnings-related unemployment benefit. Australia and New Zealand have means-tested 
unemployment benefits and they do not have social assistance such as MIPs, and the UK 
239 
 
and Ireland have a flat-rate unemployment benefit combined with various means-tested 
welfare schemes.  
In this case, it can be inferred that a means-tested system makes a difference in the effect 
of ALMPs. As discussed in the literature review, there is a huge debate on the advantages 
and disadvantages of the means-tested system. One of the main disadvantages is that it 
removes the incentive for the poor to make an effort to get out of poverty. In this case, 
most countries impose some conditions for the unemployed to get a benefit from 
unemployment benefit, such as job searching or vocational training. These conditions are 
expected to act as incentives to make an effort to get a job. However, some unemployed 
people who receive the unemployment benefit are likely to stay in benefit rather than 
escape from unemployment if they do not expect to be paid as much as they want in a 
new job. In this case, their income level remains low although the government provides 
more opportunities for training and education. In contrast, the unemployed who expect 
to get a much higher income than the unemployment benefit can join ALMP programmes 
actively and get jobs that pay a higher wage. This can create a bigger gap between the 
bottom and the high-income classes. 
Further research is clearly required into why the effect of ALMPs has a difference 
direction only in the Basic Security-targeted model. However, what we have found here is 
that the institutional design of unemployment benefit and MIPs not only has a significant 
effect on income inequality but also a significant effect on moderating the effect of 
ALMPs on income inequality. In particular, an increase in ALMPs was associated with a 
decrease in income inequality in most of the types that we classified, but this was 
associated with an increase in income inequality only in the Basic Security-targeted model 
that does not have an earnings-related unemployment benefit system. These findings 
offer some explanations based on the discussion of the disadvantages of the means-
tested system but this has been just a preliminary exploration, so further research is 
required on this issue.  
Another issue to keep in mind is that we do not have sufficient data to evaluate the 
outcome of ALMPs. As discussed in the previous section, there are many on-going 
discussions of the availability and usage of quantitative data in research into ALMPs. This 
current study has attempted to explore the effect of ALMPs by using data available so far, 
so these results are not final result for the distributive outcome of ALMPs.  In addition, 
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ALMPs are expected to take effect with a time lag. However, this analysis did not explicitly 
consider a time lag because of data issues. Therefore, it is also very important to establish 
a data set with appropriate quality and further research considering the time lag of 
ALMPs is required. In addition, as discussed in section 10.3, there are still many issues 
regarding data on ALMPs. The data used in this study considered only national-level ALMP 
programmes, so data on local government and the private sector were not considered in 
this study. Previous researchers have pointed out that the role of local government and 
the private sector in delivering ALMPs is increasing (Finn, 2012; Sol & Westervel, 2005) so 
this should be considered as a topic for further study.  
In conclusion, the findings of this study have shown that ALMPs have a significant effect 
on reducing income inequality and this effect can be different according to the policy 
structure of unemployment benefit and MIPs. ALMPs still have a significant effect on 
reducing income inequality when the unemployment benefit is relatively generous. This 
result also implies that there is no trade-off relationship between ALMPs and traditional 
unemployment benefit. This means that these results are in line with the positive effect 
of flexicurity, and show that a generous unemployment benefit combined with ALMPs 
can have a positive effect on income inequality, as well as on employment rates. There 
was only one type which showed that an increase in ALMPs has a negative effect on 
income distribution and the most distinctive aspect of that type is that it has a means-
tested or a flat-rate unemployment benefit, rather than an earnings-related 
unemployment benefit at the national level. The disadvantage of the means-tested 
system can be one reason for a negative effect on income inequality, but further research 
is required to determine what factors cause this difference. In addition, the conventional 
welfare state presents a significant effect of reducing income inequality, and the policy 
structure of the unemployment benefit and MIP matters not only in income distribution 
but also in the effect of ALMPs.   
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Chapter 11. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The primary goal of this thesis was to examine the empirical relationship between new 
welfare policy instruments and income inequality. It has explored the distributive 
outcome of private pensions and ALMPs considering the institutional design of a 
protective welfare policy, such as public pension and unemployment benefit. It has shown 
that the effect of private pensions or ALMPs on income inequality can be different 
according to the institutional design of public pensions or unemployment benefits. At the 
same time, this study has also attempted to examine the effect of the institutional design 
of pension and unemployment benefit. This was based on the debate about the ‘paradox 
of distribution’ which argues that the universal system has a better shape of income 
distribution than the targeted system. 
This final chapter brings together each part of this thesis and draws a conclusion and 
implication from the empirical findings from the analysis chapter. This chapter also offers 
a discussion of the limitations of this thesis in terms of methodology and policy 
implications and suggests topics for further research. Section 1 presents a brief summary 
of the thesis, including the background rationale for the research framework and the 
methodology. Section 2 reviews all the findings from the analysis chapters and 
synthesises the results. It also provides an empirical answer to the research question set 
out in Chapter 1. Section 3 discusses the policy implications which come from main 
findings, and how this thesis contributes to the existing literature theoretically and 
empirically. Section 4 reviews the limitations of the thesis in the chosen research 
framework, and suggests directions for further research. 
11.1. Summary of the thesis 
Income inequality had been considered as inevitable in a market economy for a long time. 
Some researchers have argued that income inequality could be a serious problem at the 
early stage of economic development, but it would be relieved as the economic structure 
develops (Kuznets, 1955). However, it has been reported that income inequality has 
increased over the last few decades in the developed world as well as the developing 
world (OECD, 2008; 2015). A high level of income inequality has a significant association 
with many social issues. Studies have shown that countries with high levels of inequality 
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are likely to have higher suicide rates and crime rates. In addition, poor households are 
likely to have poor health status when they live in countries with high income inequality. 
Some studies have shown that a high level of income inequality has a negative effect on 
individuals’ subjective well-being and social solidarity, so countries with high income 
inequality have a lower level of social trust, which is a salient factor in social capital. These 
researchers have argued that a high level of income inequality is not desirable for either 
individuals or for society as a whole.  
The welfare state restrains poverty and inequality by providing assistance and protection 
to vulnerable groups in the society. One of the main functions of a welfare state is to 
redistribute resources and spread social risk so that vulnerable groups can afford to 
maintain a decent quality of life. Despite the similarities in terms of the objective of the 
welfare state, details of the trajectory of welfare state development are quite different by 
countries so each country has a different institutional design of its welfare state.  
Empirical studies have shown that the difference in institutional design makes a 
significant difference in consequences in terms of poverty and inequality (Palme 2006; 
Scruggs & Allan 2006). In particular, there are long debates on the effects of the universal 
system and the targeted (or means-tested) system (Korpi & Palme, 1998). The targeted 
system is designed to provide protection to people who are in need of it, such as 
individuals at the lower end of the income class, whereas the universal system is aimed at 
providing benefit to all people in the society. The targeted system looks more effective in 
poverty and inequality reduction, but empirical studies have shown that the universal 
system lowers poverty and inequality.  
On the other hand, the environment surrounding the welfare state has been changing 
quickly since the early 1980s. Changes in the economic structure, including the 2008 
financial crisis, an increase in life expectancy and low fertility rates, changes in household 
formation and an increase in female labour market participation rate, all provide a 
rationale for re-thinking the traditional welfare state. An aging population produces an 
increase in public spending on pension programmes and is often considered as a threat to 
the fiscal structure of the welfare state. At the same time, developments in technology 
and changes in economic structure affect the labour market structure resulting in long-
term unemployment due to the lack of advanced knowledge and skills. Low-skilled 
workers now face a growing risk of unemployment. These changes are closely related to 
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the emergence of new social risks which the traditional welfare state finds it difficult to 
cover. It requires reform or the introduction of new policy instruments in the welfare 
state.  
Therefore, this thesis posed three questions regarding the effect of the welfare state on 
income inequality. The first is from the debate on the effect of the institutional design of 
the welfare state. As stated above, there is a debate regarding the effects of the universal 
system and the targeted system on income distribution, so this thesis attempted to 
analyse the effect of the institutional design of the welfare state on income inequality and 
to see which system is more closely related to a reduction in income inequality. There 
have been many empirical studies on this topic, but this thesis approached the issue with 
a different method using a time-series data set. 
The second question is the effect of the new policy instruments which emerge in the 
process of reforming the welfare state. There are various types of new policy instrument 
but this thesis has focused on private pensions (excluding mandatory private pension, as 
they are not different from public pension practically) and ALMPs as population aging and 
the long-term unemployment of low-skilled workers are considered important changes in 
the welfare state. So, this study analysed the effect of private pensions on income 
inequality among the elderly and the effect of ALMPs on income inequality among the 
working-age population.  
The third question is the interaction between the new policy instruments and the 
institutional design of the traditional welfare state. In other words, the third question is 
about the interaction between private pensions and the institutional design of the public 
pension system, and between ALMPs and unemployment benefit / minimum income 
programmes. Some studies have shown that the policy outcome of private pensions is 
dependent on the characteristics of the public pension system, but there are few studies 
of ALMPs and unemployment benefit. Thus, we assumed that the distributive outcome of 
the new policy instruments can be affected by the institutional design of the traditional 
welfare state.  
Consequently. the first chapter of this thesis proposed three main research questions.  
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Q1. How does the institutional design of the welfare state affect income inequality? 
Which system is more useful for reducing income inequality between universalism and 
the targeted system? 
Q2. How are new policy instruments related to changes in income inequality?  
Q3. Do relations between the new policy instruments and income inequality differ by the 
institutional design of the traditional welfare state? 
Regarding the chosen methodology, quantitative research on comparative social policy 
has a ‘small-N’ problem as a sample in the research is unlikely to be sufficiently large. 
Time-series data are frequently used to overcome the small-N issue. Time-series data 
means using repeated observations of each country over time, so it makes 100 
observations if twenty countries are observed for five years. However, time-series data 
require a careful approach as assumptions of Ordinary Least Square regression are often 
violated. An important issue is how to control unobserved heterogeneity between 
countries. There are country-specific characteristics which vary by country but are not 
changed over time. The regression model can suffer from omitted variable bias if these 
country-specific characteristics are not controlled. The fixed-effect model is often used to 
control country-specific characteristics as it treats these characteristics as fixed effects, so 
these effects are taken out and we can see the pure relationship between the dependent 
variable and the independent variables. In other words, only the within-country effect can 
remain in the fixed-effect model. The cross-sectional effect, which focuses on between-
countries differences, is likely to suffer from omitted variable bias so it is likely to be 
spurious.  
In fact, the fixed-effect model could be used to answer Q.2 but it cannot be used for Q.1 
or Q.3.  Q.1 and Q.3 were designed to examine the effect of the welfare institution on 
income inequality, and the institution is not likely to change over time or it moves very 
slowly. The fixed-effect model cannot estimate an institution that does not change or 
changes slowly (Bartel, 2008; Bell& Jones, 2015). The fixed-effect model treats the 
institution as a fixed effect, so it cannot be estimated as the effect of the institution is 
already taken out. Other models, such as the random-effect model, can be used but it too 
is likely to produce a spurious result because of its unrealistic assumption that covariance 
between independent variables and unobserved error equals Zero (Cov(Xit, Ui)=0). In most 
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cases, independent variables are associated with unobserved error terms (Bartel, 2008; 
Bell & Jones, 2015; 2016) 
Therefore, this study employed the random intercept model, which is a multi-level model. 
The advantagege of the random intercept model is that it separates the within-country 
effect and the between-countries effect. The random intercept model allows estimation 
of the effect of institutions, and we can still see the within-country effect at the same 
time. In addition, it is possible to test the effect of interaction between time-variant 
variables and the institution. This thesis overcame the limitations of the fixed-effect 
model and estimated the effect of the time-invariant institution by employing the multi-
level model. 
Q.1 has been tested by several previous researchers but this thesis used a slightly 
different methodology so it was not just a repetition of previous studies. As stated above, 
debates on the effect of institution design on income distribution are deeply related to 
the effect of the universal and targeted systems. However, institutions in each country 
have complicated structures so it is not easy to use a simple classification. Previous 
studies have employed various typologies, although the foundation of their classifications 
was concentrated on the universal system and the targeted system. Therefore, this study 
also attempted to employ a different classification based on the findings of previous 
studies.  
Q.2 and Q.3 were designed to find more practical answers to fill gaps in the literature. As 
stated above, some studies have examined the distributive outcome of welfare reform or 
new policy instruments, but they were based on either county-specific cases or relatively 
small numbers of observations and there seems to have been no agreement on the 
distributive outcome of new policy instruments. In addition, although some studies have 
discussed the relation between the two in a theoretical perspective, most empirical 
studies have not considered the interaction between new policy instruments and the 
institutional design of the traditional welfare state. However, new policy instruments do 
not work in a vacuum, as there are already existing social programmes. Therefore, Q.2 
and Q.3 look at the empirical relationship between income inequality and new policy 
instruments in the context of the institutional design of the welfare state by employing 
time-series data from about twenty OECD countries between the years 1980-2010.    
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Chapters 8, 9, and 10 presented an empirical investigation of how new policy instruments 
are related to income inequality. Chapters 8 and 9 particularly focused on how changes in 
private pension spending are related to income inequality among the elderly. Chapter 8 
described the research settings, particularly focusing on the classification of institutional 
designs of a public pension system. First, this chapter followed the traditional 
classification of Beveridge-type and Bismarck-type systems. The Beveridge-type is based 
on a flat-rate, universal system whereas the Bismarck type is based on the earnings-
related occupational system. Second, this chapter attempted to take a different approach 
based on eligibility and earnings-relatedness. Earnings-relatedness was computed by 
using the gap in replacement rate between the rich and the poor. Countries fell into high 
earnings-relatedness if this gap is low and  into low earnings-relatedness if this gap is high. 
Low earnings-relatedness means that the public pension system is more close to a flat-
rate system. Eligibility was computed by the coverage rate of each country. If a country 
has a higher coverage rate than the average across the countries, this country is 
considered to be closer to universal coverage. Consequently, this chapter produced three 
types of institutional design of public pension. Chapter 8 also provided descriptive 
statistics and an analysis. Chapter 9 provided a supplementary analysis to Chapter 8. The 
classification in Chapter 8 was based on eligibility and earnings-relatedness, but there are 
more things to be considered so Chapter 9 looked at the distributive effect of first- and 
second-tier pension programmes when private pensions increase, which provided 
supplementary evidence for the analysis in Chapter 8. Chapter 10 mainly focused on the 
effect of ALMPs on income inequality among the working-age population and proposed a 
classification of unemployment benefit and MIPs. These are more complicated than a 
pension system, and the classification was made based on the existence of earnings-
related unemployment benefit and the characteristics of MIPs. This chapter produced five 
types, and the empirical analysis showed how changes in ALMPs are related to changes in 
income inequality and how this relation can be different by institutional design of 
unemployment benefit / MIPs. Due to limited data availability, Chapter 10 focused on the 
years 1985 to 2010. 
11.2. Synthesis of the findings 
It is not easy to produce practical policy implications from one empirical study, but this 
thesis has nevertheless produced a number of notable findings. This study has shown that 
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new policy instruments, private pensions and ALMPs are on the increase, but this is not 
necessarily related to a decrease of the traditional (or protective) welfare institute. In 
addition, those new policy instruments are clearly associated with changes in income 
inequality, but the directions are different from the theoretical expectation in some cases. 
The institutional design of the traditional welfare state is also significantly related to 
changes in income inequality. As expected, institutions based on the universal system 
show a lower level of income inequality, and the targeted system shows a relatively high 
level of income inequality. Moreover, the effect of new policy instruments is significantly 
affected by the institutional design of the traditional welfare state. An increase in private 
pensions or ALMPs is related to a decrease in income inequality when the public pension 
and the unemployment benefit are based on the universal system. In contrast, an 
increase in private pensions or ALMPs is related to an increase in income inequality if the 
public pension and unemployment benefit are based on the targeted system. Now it is 
necessary to return to the research questions to bring the results together and draw 
some practical lessons and conclusions.  
Q.1 is about how the institutional design of the traditional welfare state is related to 
changes in income inequality. As shown In Chapters 8 and 10, this thesis attempted to 
classify the institutional design of public pensions and unemployment benefit/MIPs. 
Regarding the public pension system, it has been shown that the institutional design of a 
public pension system has a significant effect on income inequality. The strong earnings-
relatedness/high coverage type showed a relatively lower level of income inequality than 
the other types. The institutional design of unemployment benefit/MIP showed a 
significant effect on income inequality. The Citizenship model and the Residual model  
countries had significantly lower levels of income inequality whereas the Local MIP model  
had a significantly higher level of income inequality. As stated in Chapter 9, the 
Citizenship model and the Residual model had earnings-related unemployment benefits 
and supplementary MIPs and Local MIP model did not have unemployment benefit or 
MIPs at the national level, so it is not altogether surprising. In fact, the distributive 
outcome of the Basic security-Targeted model  is more interesting, as it has a flat-rate 
unemployment benefit and means-tested MIPs. it is more close to the targeted system 
compared to the Citizenship model and the Residual model, and it has a higher level of 
income inequality than those two models. Namely, the Citizenship model and the 
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Residual model showed the lowest level of income inequality and Local MIP model had 
the highest, whereas the other two models were in between them.  
In brief, the effect of the institutional design of a welfare state is clear in the public 
pension system, and unemployment benefit. In addition, the direction of the effect is also 
in line with the so-called ‘paradox of redistribution’ which argues that the universal 
system is more useful than the targeted system in terms of distributive consequences. It 
has been argued in many previous studies and this study has confirmed the paradox of 
redistribution by testing it using multi-level analysis based on a large time-series data set.  
Q.2 is about the direct distributive outcome of new policy measurements. Chapters 7 and 
8 showed the effect of private pensions on income inequality and showed that an 
increase in private pensions is associated with a decrease in income inequality, unlike the 
expectation. In fact, this result is in line with the findings of a recent empirical study by 
Vliet and Wang (2015) who used data from about fifteen countries over fifteen years, and 
this current study has shown that the results remain the same when the data stretch out 
to twenty countries over thirty years. For the distributive outcome of ALMPs, an increase 
in ALMPs is associated with a decrease in income inequality. Some researchers have 
argued that social investment, including ALMPs, does not have a positive effect on 
income distribution (Cantillon 2011), but this study has shown that ALMPs alone have a 
positive effect on decreasing income inequality.  
Q.3 is about how the distributive outcome of new policy measurement can be different 
from existing welfare programmes. There have been many studies which have examined 
the distributive outcome of the institutional design of the welfare state and that of new 
policy instruments, but they have not considered the empirical relationship between the 
two. In a broad sense, a generous welfare institution deteriorates the effect of new policy 
instruments on income inequality; it is either positive or negative. However, it is very 
difficult to define ‘generous’ so this study used a complicated classification.  
Regarding the effect of private pensions, it has already been shown that an increase in 
private pensions is related to a decrease in income inequality, but it was expected that 
this relation could be changed by the institutional design of the welfare state. An increase 
in private pensions is still related to a decrease of income inequality in the strong 
earnings-related/high coverage rate type and the weak earnings-related type, but it is 
related to an increase in income inequality in the strong earnings-relatedness/low 
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coverage rate type only. In other words, income inequality increases when private 
pensions increase if the public pension system of a country is based on a strong earnings-
related and low coverage rate system. Previous studies have argued that the strong 
earnings-relatedness of a public pension makes private pensions less attractive so the 
effect of private pensions on income distribution could be insignificant. However, this 
study has shown that the effect of private pensions is still significant when the public 
pension has strong earnings-relatedness. Moreover, a notable finding has been that an 
increase in private pensions is related to an increase in income inequality under a system 
that has strong earnings-relatedness but low coverage. As shown in Chapter 8, countries 
that have a weak earnings-related system are likely to have a high level of coverage rate. 
Consequently, it can be inferred that an increase in private pensions has a negative effect 
on income distribution if the coverage rate is low. The targeted system provides benefit 
to the poor only, so the middle class and the rich have a strong incentive to take out 
private insurance and this makes income gap bigger. In this sense, the poor and the 
middle class can be included in the public pension when the coverage rate is high and 
private pensions still have a positive effect on income distribution as long as the poor are 
included in the public pension. Therefore, this study proposes that it is important to cover 
the poor with the public pension. 
This study carried out an additional analysis to examine the distributive effect of 
replacement rate at each level of public pension. Most of the developed countries have a 
two-tier pension system. A second-tier programme usually reflects the income security 
dimension so it is contribution-based and more selective, whereas a first-tier programme 
reflects the redistributive dimension. The difference in coverage matters in income 
inequality as shown in Chapter 7 and it has been shown that the important thing is 
whether the poor can be covered by the pension system or not.  The poor are unlikely to 
have a private pension so the income gap would increase if the quality of the public 
pension is low. In this regard, it was expected that the benefit level of each tier 
programme might have a different effect on income inequality especially when they are 
combined with a private pension. Strengthening the first-tier pension programme can be 
a good strategy to achieve lower income inequality when the role of private pensions 
increases.  
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This study used coverage rate as one of the main tools of classification but in fact, most 
countries have a two-tier public pension system which is contribution-based (standard 
pension) or non-contributory (minimum pension). It has been shown that an increase in 
the replacement rate of both programmes has a significant effect on reducing income 
inequality but that an increase in replacement rate in the standard pension has a larger 
effect than in the minimum pension on the decrease of income inequality. However, this 
relationship is reversed when the interaction between replacement rate and private 
pension is considered. Namely, an increase in the replacement rate of the first-tier 
programme is related to a decrease in income inequality but an increase in the 
replacement rate of the second-tier programme is related to an increase in income 
inequality considering the interaction with an increase in private pension.   
This implies that the rich could get benefit from a generous public pension and add more 
benefit from a private pension on the top of public pension when the replacement rate of 
the standard pension increases, as the income level during working life is to be 
maintained even after retirement. The expansion of private pensions under this 
circumstance leads to more benefit for the rich so income inequality increases as a result. 
However, an increase in the replacement rate in the minimum pension is related to a 
decrease in income inequality and this relationship gets stronger when the proportion of 
private pensions increases. This implies that an increase in the replacement rate of the 
minimum pension is still related to an increase in income inequality even when the 
proportion of private pensions increases. It can be inferred that increasing the generosity 
of the first-tier programme can be a good strategy for relieving income inequality when 
private pensions increase.  
Regarding the interaction between ALMPs and unemployment benefit / MIPs, the effect 
of ALMPs is significantly different by the institutional design of the unemployment benefit 
and MIPs. It has been shown that an increase in ALMPs is associated with a decrease in 
income inequality in most types of country, but the relationship is reversed in the Basic-
security-Targeted model. Under this institutional setting, an increase in ALMPs is related 
to an increase in income inequality. The notable difference between the Basic security-
Targeted model and the other model is that it is based on a flat-rate unemployment 
benefit or mainly means-tested MIPs. Some previous studies have argued that the effect 
of ALMPs deteriorates when the unemployed are supported by generous unemployment 
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benefit or MIPs, but the results of this current study have shown that ALMPs have the 
positive effect of reducing income inequality generally and this is not significantly 
changed under the relatively generous institution of unemployment benefit.  
In fact, Chapter 10 showed that the effect of ALMPs is negative on income distribution 
when the country has a means-tested system. In this case, further research is required on 
the reason why the Basic security-Targeted model has a different direction from the other 
models as this study only attempted exploratory research. However, some preliminary 
hypotheses have been proposed on this. Most countries impose some conditions to get 
benefit from unemployment benefit or MIPs, such as job searching or vocational training, 
which are expected to play a role as incentives to encourage the unemployed to make an 
effort to find a job. However, some of the unemployed cannot access the unemployment 
benefit or MIPs under a means-tested system. Consequently the unemployed do not have 
an incentive to join the ALMP programmes and this is particularly true of the unemployed 
at the margin. They have no incentive to join an ALMP programme actively so the effect 
of ALMPs to help the unemployed to get into labour market can be reduced compared 
with other types and this can mean that an increase in ALMPs is related to an increase in 
income inequality. 
In brief, the interaction between new policy instruments and the institutional design of 
the welfare state showed interesting results, although that classification that was made in 
this study did not make a clear distinction between the different settings of welfare 
institutions. For the public pension system, an increase in private pensions is related to a 
decrease in income inequality except in the strong earnings-relatedness/low coverage 
type, and an increase in replacement rate is also related to a decrease in income 
inequality but its effect is larger in the minimum pension than in the standard pension. 
These results imply that including the poor in a public pension system can be important 
for decreasing income inequality.  For ALMPs, an increase in ALMPs is related to a 
decrease in income inequality except in the Basic security-Targeted model. In a broad 
sense, the effect of ALMPs is negative in terms of income distribution when the 
unemployment benefit /MIPs system is more close to the targeted system.  
It is not easy to draw practical and direct policy implications or lessons from these 
findings, as this study only explored the relationship between new policy instruments, 
welfare institutions and their distributive outcomes. Although there were many 
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limitations to this study, the research is worthwhile as it has provided broad policy 
guidelines on how to use and structure policy tools to reduce income inequality. Before 
considering the lessons and implication, it is necessary to consider the limitations of this 
research study.  
11.3. Limitations of the research 
Although this study attempted to classify and analyse available empirical data as much as 
possible, there were still some limitations. The limitations have been stated in each 
chapter, but it is still helpful to repeat them here as they directly affect what can be 
argued based on the findings. The limitations of the research can be divided into two 
parts. The first is related to limitations on data and methodology, and the second  is 
related to the issue of the classification of the institutional design of the welfare state. 
The limitations of the data and the methodology were largely discussed in Chapter 7, so 
this section focuses on issues over the classification of the institutional design of the 
welfare state.   
This study attempted to classify public pension systems and unemployment benefit 
systems based on selected criteria. However, most typology studies have faced similar 
issues. For pension programmes, most pension programmes have a very complicated 
structure so it is difficult to understand them properly. This study focused on coverage 
rate and earnings-relatedness but the replacement rate and the relationship between 
first- and second-tier pensions are also important. Replacement rate was tested 
separately but it still could not be seen from one specific angle.  For ALMPs, the structures 
of unemployment benefit/MIPs are different by countries so heterogeneity between 
countries which are classified as the same type is still significant. For example, in Basic 
security-Targeted model, Australia and New Zealand have means-tested unemployment 
benefit but the UK and Ireland have flat-rate unemployment benefit combined with 
various means-tested welfare schemes. Although these countries are more close to a 
targeted system, the details are still different. Countries in Hybrid model also had 
substantial differences in regard to the duration of unemployment benefit. Countries in 
Hybrid model do not show any clear distinction and have different mixed types of 
mechanism.  
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Another issue about classification is that this study assumed that institutions had not 
changed during the study period. As stated in Chapter 8, pension programmes tend to 
change very slowly so it seems to be fine to assume that the classification would remain 
the same over the period, but small changes were still made and it was same for 
unemployment benefits and MIPs. In particular, the classification of unemployment 
benefit and MIPs employed data from 1996 to 2010, so it did not exactly correspond to 
the period of analysis which was from 1985 to 2010. It was the same for the pension 
system, as earnings-relatedness was computed by using data from 2001 to 2013 which 
was different from the period of the main analysis. This also applies to data availability, 
and this study attempted to work with the data which were available. Also, it should be 
remembered that time-series data could be useful in comparative research but 
researchers should be careful to estimate the effect of the institution, as an institution is 
likely to change if the time span of the study is long.  
Despite its limitations, this study has still produced a number of interesting findings as 
shown in the previous section. Therefore, we can draw some meaningful lessons from the 
findings, although the limitations of the research should be kept in mind.  
11.4. Lessons and implication 
The findings of this study raise a number of implications for comparative research into 
income inequality and welfare reform. In fact, the lessons of the findings are mentioned 
in each chapter but it is still useful to repeat them here. The main lessons and 
implications can be divided into two parts. First, the implications of the methodology will 
be discussed and then the impact of the research on existing theories and on the 
literature on comparative welfare state research and income inequality will be presented.  
11.4.1. Lessons from methodology and data 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, comparative welfare state research which uses quantitative 
analysis often suffers from the small-N issue, and using time-series data is one way to 
overcome this problem. However, there are many issues to be considered when using 
time-series data, such as omitted variables bias or auto-correlation. Previous studies used 
simple OLS (Korpi & Palme 2006) or correcting auto-correlation but not omitted variables 
bias (Vliet & Wang, 2015). However, omitted variable bias might produce a spurious 
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result (Bartel, 2008; Shalve, 2007) and the fixed-effect model is frequently used as it can 
remove omitted variable bias by controlling country heterogeneity, but it cannot estimate 
time-invariant variables, such as institutions (Bartel, 2008; Bell & Jones, 2015). The 
researcher suggests using an analytical tool to control omitted variable bias and estimate 
the time-invariant variable at the same time by separating the within-country effect and 
the between-countries effect. The results of the random-effect and multi-level models 
when the institution variable is applied largely correspond to each other but there is still a 
notable difference. Therefore, it is suggested that it might not be a good way to put too 
much emphasis on results from the random-effect model or other models that do not 
control country heterogeneity, particularly when the effect of a time-invariant variable is 
considered. In fact, the multi-level model is suggested as an alternative to the fixed-effect 
model or the random-effect model (Bartel, 2008; Bell & Jones, 2015) as long as we can 
get a sufficient amount of data. The findings also confirm the usefulness of the multi-level 
model for using time-series data. However, it is still necessary to be careful when using 
multi-level analysis as it does not control auto-correlation, so future researchers should 
consider the feature of data that they want to use.  
The findings also suggest the importance of the appropriate data set in comparative 
welfare research. Availability of data is a salient issue and has been frequently mentioned 
in previous studies. Due to the development of technology and statistical skill, we have 
much excellent  quality data for comparative welfare research now, but it still does not 
seem to be sufficient for more rigorous research. In particular, data on income inequality 
need to be improved. The Gini coefficients among the elderly have many missing values in 
many countries. In addition, as described in Chapter 6, the Gini coefficient is good 
indicator for describing the general situation of inequality in a society, but it does not 
show details of the inequality. The main disadvantage of an aggregated index such as Gini 
coefficients is that it cannot show how income distribution changes (Deininger & Squire, 
1996). Redistribution from the top to the middle class can be considered to be the same 
as redistribution from the middle to the bottom class. Income shares by quintile could be 
a better alternative but these data are available only partially so they do not seem to be 
appropriate for a time-series data set. Atkinson (1991) suggested that large amounts of 
data are required to avoid spurious results.  
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11.4.2. Implication for theory and knowledge 
Apart from the lessons from the methodology and the data, the findings of this study also 
raise several important implications for studies on the relationship between welfare 
reform and income inequality. Further research is still necessary, as this study cannot 
propose precise policy advice or practical implications, but the findings nevertheless 
provide some meaningful guidelines and lessons on how welfare reform affects income 
inequality.  
First, the results show that new policy instruments are positively related to income 
inequality, which means that an increase in new policy instruments is related to a 
decrease in income inequality. For private pensions, some previous studies predicted that 
income inequality would be increased if the proportion of private spending increases. 
They argued that the better off are likely to be able to afford to buy private pensions and 
this exacerbates income inequality. In addition, other studies have argued that private 
pensions do not have a significant effect on income distribution if the public pension is 
generous enough for the rich. However, some studies have shown that an increase in 
private pensions is not necessarily related to an increase in income inequality. These 
arguments and the results of previous studies are still controversial and inconsistent, but 
the result of this current study support the argument that the effect of private pensions is 
not necessarily negative on income distribution. It is same for ALMPs. As shown in 
Chapter 10, not many empirical studies have looked at the distributive outcome of ALMPs 
and some studies have attempted to examine the distributive outcome of social 
investment, which includes ALMPs. Most of these studies have shown that social 
investment does not have a significant effect on income distribution, and others have 
argued that social investment will not produce better income distribution. Social 
investment covers various areas so its impact might be unclear as some of them take a 
long time to take effect. Therefore, this study separated ALMPs from other forms of social 
investment and looked at the relation between ALMPs and income inequality, and 
showed that an increase in ALMPs is related to a decrease in income inequality. In other 
words, it can be inferred that social investment might not reduce poverty and inequality, 
but this is not because of ALMPs. ALMPs in themselves can be regarded as having a 
positive effect on income distribution.  
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However, a more important finding of this study is that the effect of new policy 
instruments can be different by welfare institution, which affects new policy instruments. 
In particular, it has been shown that there is no trade-off relationship between new policy 
instruments and traditional welfare programmes in terms of distributive outcome. For 
private pensions, the effect of private pensions is much affected by the institutional 
design of the public pension programme. What matters is that an increase in private 
pensions is related to a decrease in income inequality when the public pension has a high 
coverage rate.  As stated in Chapter 8, there is a debate on how earnings-relatedness 
affects private pensions and these results show that strong earnings-relatedness is not 
necessarily related to the insignificance of private pensions. This shows that coverage is a 
more important factor affecting the impact of private pensions. High coverage is related 
to a positive effect on private pensions on income inequality. Therefore, if the 
government wants to increase the proportion of private pensions because of budget 
pressure, then it has to make an effort to extend its coverage and include the low-income 
class in the public system. Additional analysis of the distributive effect of the minimum 
pension replacement rate also shows that the expansion of a minimum pension which is 
based on a non-contributory system is important to avoid increasing income inequality. 
An increase in the replacement rate of the minimum pension is associated with a 
decrease in income inequality, whereas an increase in the replacement rate of a standard 
pension is associated with an increase in income inequality when the private pension is 
on the increase. In other words, a standard pension that is likely to have strong earnings-
relatedness and limited eligibility is not related to a decrease in income inequality even 
when the generosity of the standard pension increases.  
Therefore, the most important implication of this study for pension programmes is that 
the design of a public pension system to include more people, particularly the lower 
income class, is very important to avoid serious income inequality when the proportion of 
private pensions increases. The role of the minimum pension system is more important in 
this sense.  
Regarding the effect of ALMPs, the effect of ALMPs on income inequality is also much 
affected by the institutional design of the unemployment benefit system and MIPs. As 
stated above, generally an increase in ALMPs is related to a decrease in income inequality, 
but the effect is reversed when it is combined with a flat-rate or targeted unemployment 
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benefit. Under the Basic security-Targeted model, an increase in ALMPs is related to an 
increase in income inequality. Unlike pension systems, not many studies have looked at 
the details of the theoretical discussion on how ALMPs are related to unemployment 
benefit or MIPs. As frequently mentioned throughout this thesis, many studies have 
disagreed over the disadvantages of a targeted system compared with a universal system. 
This study also provides an explanation for this based on the disadvantages of the 
targeted system. As mentioned in Chapter 10, some unemployed who receive the 
unemployment benefit are likely to stay in benefit rather than escape unemployment if 
they do not expect to get paid as much as they want in the new job. In this case, their 
income level remains low even though the government provides more opportunities for 
training and education. Therefore, an increase in ALMPs is not related to decreasing 
income inequality in a means-tested system. In addition, some previous studies have 
shown that a generous unemployment benefit can reduce the effect of ALMPs on 
employment rates and other studies have argued that flexicurity indicates that ALMPs 
and generous unemployment benefit make a synergy impact. The results of this study 
suggest that the flexicurity model can have desirable results in terms of income 
distribution, as well as employment rate.  
It is worth noting that the effect of ALMPs is related to an increase in income inequality 
only in the Basic security-Targeted model and further studies are required to look at this 
relation in more detail and offer more elaborate explanations.  
In a broad sense, this study has shown that new policy instruments do not work in a 
vacuum. Private pensions and ALMPs do not act at a distance from existing institutions; 
they are closely associated with each other. Therefore, the interplay between the two 
should be carefully considered when new policy instruments are introduced. The findings 
of this study have also shown the advantages of universalism over the targeted system. 
However, the institutional design of a welfare system does not clearly show any 
significant effect on income inequality, but the effect of new policy instruments shows a 
positive effect on income inequality under the universal system.  
New policy instruments have various goals apart from income distribution. Reduction of 
the government’s fiscal burden or establishing a more sustainable and productive welfare 
system are also regarded as two of the main reasons to introduce new policy instruments. 
In addition, changes in the view of the welfare state are a reason for welfare reform. A 
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protective welfare state played an important role after the Second World War, but recent 
changes in economic structures and developments in technology have raised a question 
about whether the traditional welfare state might not be appropriate for improving the 
welfare of citizens in a society. Namely, a protective welfare state might not contribute to 
providing proper protection, widening economic opportunities or reducing social risks in 
the long term under the current socio-economic changes in the modern world. Luckily, 
this study has shown that new policy instruments also have a positive effect on income 
inequality if they are combined with an appropriate traditional welfare institution.  
The findings of this study also put an emphasis on the role of the traditional welfare state 
in income distribution. The welfare generosity of the public pension system is significantly 
related to a decrease in income inequality. This means that a decrease in the generosity 
of the public pension system is related to an increase in income inequality. For pension 
generosity and income inequality among the elderly, the relationship is quite clear that an 
increase in pension generosity is related to a decrease in income inequality. For 
unemployment benefit and income inequality among the working-age population, the 
relationship is not significant but the institutional design of unemployment benefit and 
MIP is still significantly related to changes in income inequality. In particular, Local MIP 
model showed the highest level of income inequality and countries in this type do not 
have any unemployment benefit or MIPs at the national level. Therefore, the traditional 
welfare institution still matters in income inequality.   
Consequently, it can be argued that it is important to maintain the quality of the 
traditional welfare state, although new policy instruments do have a positive impact on 
income distribution. It is not a useful strategy therefore to decrease the traditional 
welfare state which increases spending on new policy instruments in terms of income 
inequality. In this case, reforming the traditional welfare state to make a better 
combination with new policy instruments is required to stop the increase of income 
inequality, rather than a retrenchment of the traditional welfare state. As discussed 
above, it is not relevant to draw practical policy advice from one empirical study, but this 
can nevertheless be a general guideline for future research and policy practice.  
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11.5. Conclusion and suggestions for further study 
At the start of this thesis, the question was asked why income inequality has increased 
over the last few decades and how can we stop the increase of income inequality. There 
are various reasons for the increase of income inequality, and welfare policy is one of 
salient tools for the government to reduce income inequality by the redistribution of 
income. Welfare policy has been designed and implemented in various ways by different 
countries, as each country has its own socio-economic structure and political interest 
groups surrounding each welfare institution. Each country has its own process of 
development in its welfare state so now we can see various types of welfare state across 
the world. The traditional welfare state had played an important role in  increasing 
income inequality.  
However, the traditional welfare state now faces new socio-economic issues which 
require a new system to protect the poor and reduce new social risks that are brought in 
by changes in socio-economic structure throughout the world. There have not been many 
studies which have examined the distributive outcome of new policy instruments, so this 
study looked at the relationship between new policy instruments and income inequality. 
There are various types of new policy instruments, but this study has concentrated on 
private old-age pensions and ALMPs. 
These new policy instruments do not work separately. The traditional welfare state 
institution already exists and previous studies have shown that it is closely related to the 
effect of new policy instruments. Therefore, this study looked at the effect of new policy 
instruments on income inequality and how they interplay with the existing institutional 
design of the traditional welfare state. Before looking at this interplay, this study also 
examined the effect of the new policy instruments and the effect of the institutional 
design of the traditional welfare state respectively.  
The main empirical contribution of this study is to show that the distributive outcome of 
new policy instruments can be different by the institutional design of the welfare state 
which surrounds new policy instruments. Generally, an increase in private pensions is 
related to a decrease in income inequality, but the relationship is reversed when the 
public pension system has strong earning-relatedness and a low coverage rate. For ALMPs, 
the general increase in ALMPs is related to a decrease in income inequality but it has the 
opposite direction when the unemployment benefit system is based on a targeted or flat-
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rate system. Both cases show that the distributive outcome of new policy instruments is 
closely related to the institutional design of the traditional welfare state.  
These results raise several important implications. They show that the institutional design 
of the traditional welfare state plays an important role in determining the effect of new 
policy instruments on income inequality. In particular, new policy instruments are related 
to an increasing in income inequality under a welfare institution based on a targeted 
system whereas it is related to a decrease in income inequality under other welfare 
institutions. This shows the disadvantage of the targeted system in terms of income 
inequality when it is combined with new policy instruments. Although new policy 
instruments are actively being introduced, the traditional welfare state still matters in 
income distribution. The government needs to reform the traditional welfare state but 
the retrenchment of a welfare state does not have to be treated as a synonym for reform. 
Changing the traditional welfare state seems to be necessary to amplify the synergy with 
new policy instruments. The reduction in income inequality, of course, is not the only goal 
of welfare reform, but the findings of this study suggest that the reform of the welfare 
state, rather than its retrenchment, is required to have the better shape of income 
distribution.  
Despite the relevant findings of this study, there are still many issues to be researched on 
the relationship between income inequality and the welfare state.  
This study has focused on the distributive effect of private pensions and ALMPs but there 
are diverse dimensions which lead to the current reform of the welfare state.  One of the 
salient changes in the current world is changes in family structure. As stated in Chapter 5, 
the traditional welfare state institution is based on the male breadwinner model so 
changes in the family structure in terms of gender roles require substantial changes in the 
welfare state. Previous studies have argued that those changes are closely related to 
changes in income inequality (Korpi, 2000; Esping-Andersen, 2009). Instability of marital 
status, an increase in assortative marriage and the female labour participation rate are 
also important factors which lead to changes in income distribution. The conventional 
idea of gender roles in the household is the male breadwinner model and the job of 
females is to take care of children and household chores. However, as the economy grows 
and the education level of women increases, the dual-earner model is more prevalent 
now in most developed countries, especially western and northern European countries. 
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The increase in the education level of women leads to higher incomes for women and 
makes women’s bargaining power greater within the household. Women have become 
more independent than in their grandmothers’ generation and various types of marriage 
are socially accepted today. This is related to the increase in the number of female 
household heads and this is salient in the change of income inequality since the gender 
gap in earnings is still significant in most countries although the gap is now decreasing 
(Esping-Andersen, 2009). Martin (2006) showed that 41% of the change in income 
inequality are related to changes in family structure during the 1976-2004 period. Lerman 
(1996) examined the relation between changing US family structure and income 
inequality and also found an increase in the number of households with an unmarried 
mother, which suggests that high income inequality is closely related to the increase in 
income inequality in the US.  
However, Esping-Andersen (2007) insisted the impact of the changes in family structure 
on income inequality is significant only in America, not in European countries which are 
well equipped with a suitable social welfare system because social protection acts as a 
cushion for the female breadwinner and the children in their household in European 
countries. He found that the incidence of the lone mother is not associated with dynamic 
income inequality in European countries. In contrast, Kollmeyer (2012) found that the 
number of children with a single mother is related to an increase in income inequality, 
which means that the incidence of the lone mother is related to an increase in income 
inequality in Europe as well as in America. In a later study, Esping-Andersen (2009) argued 
that the effect of family structure could be different among European countries according 
to the welfare institution which the country has. Namely, he argued that changes in 
household structure and in the sociological characteristics affect income distribution, but 
that the size and pattern of change vary according to the welfare institution 
So changes in family structure and gender roles are considered to be an important 
dimension in income distribution, as well as for the welfare state institution. An 
increasing number of studies have recognised the importance of those changes on 
income inequality, but there is not sufficient empirical research on this topic. It is 
necessary to look at not only the aging population and changes in the labour market 
structure, but also changes in family and household structure in order to deal with the 
increase in income inequality and the effect of the welfare state. Changes in family 
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structure or individual behaviour on marriage are observed and measured at the 
individual or household level, whereas policy instruments are observed and measured at 
the national level. The multi-level model which combines micro-level variables with 
macro-level variables allows us to test the impact of new policy instruments on income 
distribution controlling micro-level changes. Further research on this topic is required to 
see the big picture of how the welfare state and income inequality interplay with each 
other.   
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Appendix 
Appendix A. Statistical appendix to chapter 8: additional regression models 
1. Regression without capital openness: Bismarck Model and Beveridge model 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Fixed effect 
model 
Random effect 
model 
Random effect 
model 
Within- 
effect 
Between 
effect 
Within- 
effect 
Between 
effect 
Share of elderly population over 65 
years old 
-.1896081 
(-.76) 
-.1623039 
(-1.36) 
-.1601393 
(-1.34) 
-.1793572 
(-1.38) 
-.3391442 
(-.66) 
-.1887185 
(-1.44) 
-.3310343 
(-.64) 
Labour Market participation rate of 
elderly 
.0037949 
(2.52**) 
.0035851 
(4.80***) 
.0035881 
(4.79***) 
.0034656 
(4.27***) 
-.0037957 
(3.05***) 
-.0034431 
(4.24***) 
.0038946 
(3.08***) 
Real GDP per capita -3.09e-07 
(.58) 
-2.35e-07 
(-0.76) 
-2.31e-07 
(-.74) 
-2.82e-07 
(-.89) 
-1.42e-06 
(-.93) 
-2.88e-07 
(-.91) 
-1.45e-06 
(-.96) 
Relative size private pension -.0246553 
(-1.46) 
-.0284182 
(-2.78***) 
-.0285461 
(-2.78***) 
-.0239502 
(-2.03**) 
-.89126 
(-2.24**) 
-.0231836 
(-1.94*) 
-.0894948 
(-2.26**) 
Welfare generosity -.0068378 
(-5.54***) 
-.0065435 
(-9.96***) 
-.0065659 
(-9.71***) 
-.0067262 
(-9.13***) 
-.0060649 
(-4.78***) 
-.0065378 
(-7.63***) 
-.0061012 
(-4.82***) 
Bismarck model  
.0278859 
(1.68*) 
-.0290246 
(1.65*) 
.0005589 
(.02) 
.0001361 
(.01) 
Private pension *Bismarck   
-.0171156 
(-.19) 
 
.0526535 
(.43) 
Constant .5130362 
(8.59***) 
.4941229 
(18.26***) 
.494363 
(18.18***) 
.5637661 
(7.53***) 
.5640432 
(7.56***) 
Observations 175 175 175 175 175 
Clusters 19 19 19 19 19 
R square 
within  = 0.4824 
between= 0.5213 
overall = 0.4646 
within  = 0.4816 
between = 0.5867 
overall = 0.5639 
within  = 0.4812 
between = 0.5934 
overall = 0.5673 
Log likelihood= 487.517 Log likelihood= 487.61011 
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2. Regression without capital openness: Earning-relatedness and universal eligibility models 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Random effect
4
 
model 
Random effect 
model 
Within- 
effect 
Between 
effect 
Within- 
effect 
Between 
effect 
Share of elderly population over 65 
years old 
-.1304313 
(-1.13) 
-.0760638 
(-.64) 
-.1825578 
(-1.41) 
-.5889093 
(-1.29) 
-.1287166 
(-1.00) 
-.6738288 
(-1.50) 
Labour Market participation rate of 
elderly 
.0035205 
(4.72***) 
.0031226 
(4.04***) 
.0032773 
(4.10***) 
.0037382 
(3.01**) 
.0028403 
(3.56***) 
.0033898 
(2.77***) 
Real GDP per capita -2.18e-07 
(-.70) 
-.2.96e-07 
(-.94) 
-2.50e-07 
(-.79) 
-1.58e-06 
(-1.17) 
-3.68e-07 
(-1.16) 
-1.77e-06 
(-1.33) 
Relative size private pension -.0316302 
(-3.19***) 
.0273228 
(.93) 
-.024185 
(-2.05**) 
-.0691812 
(-2.17**) 
.061358 
(1.86*) 
-.0679618 
(-2.16**) 
Welfare generosity -.0062558 
(-9.44***) 
-.0063332 
(-9.59***) 
-.0067415 
(-9.13***) 
-.0047899 
(-3.19***) 
-.0070125 
(-9.62***) 
-.0044606 
(-3.01***) 
Type 1 -.0286189 
(-1.69*) 
-.0173368 
(-.97) 
-.0263415 
(-1.76*) 
-.0260309 
(-1.77*) 
Type 2 -.0139594 
(-.67) 
-.003333 
(-.15) 
-.0242651 
(-1.22) 
-.0260309 
(-1.34) 
Private pension *Type 1  
-.0644926 
(-2.09**) 
 
-.0914742 
(-2.74***) 
Private pension *Type 2  
-.0701114 
(-1.71*) 
 
-.1032783 
(-2.27**) 
Constant .5128841 
(17.88***) 
.503391 
(17.40***) 
.5765763 
(8.31***) 
.585774 
(8.57***) 
Observations 175 175 175 175 
Clusters 19 19 19 19 
R square 
within  = 0.4794 
between = 0.6418 
overall = 0.6062 
within  = 0.5001 
between = 0.6434 
overall = 0.6062 
Log likelihood= 
488.94098 
Log likelihood  =  
492.87433 
     
 
                                                          
4 Fixed effect model does not estimate institution variables, so the result would be same with previous table. 
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3. Regression with social spending instead of generosity score: Bismarck Model and Beveridge model 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Fixed effect 
model 
Random effect 
model 
Random effect 
model 
Within- 
effect 
Between 
effect 
Within- 
effect 
Between 
effect 
Share of elderly population over 65 
years old 
-.1398363 
(-.33) 
-.0857246 
(-.52) 
-.1078991 
(-.66) 
-.1425028 
(-.87) 
-.6555811 
(-1.26) 
-.2175091 
(-1.40) 
-1.322678 
(-2.11**) 
Labour Market participation rate of 
elderly 
.0056353 
(2.93***) 
.0047965 
(5.04***) 
.0047472 
(4.84***) 
.0033763 
(3.43***) 
.0057114 
(3.53***) 
.0029982 
(3.02***) 
.0061631 
(4.03***) 
Real GDP per capita -8.79e-08 
(-.11) 
-2.24e-07 
(-.53) 
-2.05e-07 
(-.48) 
1.24e-07 
(.30) 
-2.85e-06 
(-2.08**) 
5.91e-08 
(.15) 
-4.66e-06 
(-2.84***) 
Capital openness -.0002239 
(-.02) 
-.0006876 
(-.17) 
-.0013133 
(-.33) 
-.0027621 
(-.73) 
.0374388 
(2.79***) 
-.0039978 
(-1.10) 
.052131 
(3.27***) 
Relative size private pension -.0233502 
(-.97) 
-.0223585 
(-1.68*) 
-.022988 
(-1.75*) 
-.0192041 
(-1.33) 
-.032989 
(-.65) 
-.0148497 
(-1.09) 
-.0885589 
(-1.46) 
Pension expenditure -.0018626 
(-.42) 
.0014218 
(.62) 
.0015874 
(.67) 
-.0015464 
(-.62) 
.0075183 
(1.77*) 
-.0009507 
(-.40) 
.0125899 
(2.51**) 
Other social expenditure -.0022943 
(-1.60) 
-.0036157 
(-4.46***) 
-.0036465 
(-4.38***) 
-.0023924 
(-2.85***) 
-.0121187 
(-6.40***) 
-.0027424 
(-3.45***) 
-.015604 
(-6.58***) 
Bismarck model  
-.0041015 
(-.23) 
 -.0136441 
 (-.64) 
.0064201 
(.29) 
-.0396684 
(-1.37) 
Private pension *Bismarck   
 .1484541 
(1.27) 
 
.427524 
(3.28***) 
Constant .3177223 
(6.41***) 
.3219385 
(14.54***) 
.3260089 
(14.23***) 
.4819598 
(8.16***) 
.6403011 
(7.71***) 
Observations 161 161 161 161 161 
Clusters 18 18 18 18 18 
R square 
within  = 0.2906 
between= 0.2296 
overall = 0.2916 
within  = 0.2720 
between = 0.4018 
overall = 0.4465 
within  = 0.3097 
between = 0.2557 
overall = 0.3401 
Log likelihood  =  
429.24809 
Log likelihood  =  
436.16171 
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4. Regression with social spending instead of generosity score: Earning-relatedness and universal eligibility models 
Variable 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Random effect 
model 
Random effect 
model 
Within- 
effect 
Between 
effect 
Within- 
effect 
Between 
effect 
Share of elderly population over 65 
years old 
-.1412277 
(-.92) 
-.0439446 
(-.28) 
-.1450964 
(-.88) 
-.4631781 
(-.91) 
-.0686712 
(-.42) 
-.3617563 
(-.77) 
Labour Market participation rate of 
elderly 
.0044021 
(4.84***) 
.0038696 
(4.06***) 
.0028522 
(2.58**) 
.0055525 
(3.41***) 
.0021664 
(2.05**) 
.0052072 
(3.24***) 
Real GDP per capita -1.12e-07 
(-.27) 
-2.18e-07 
(-.52) 
1.84e-07 
(.44) 
-2.34e-06 
(-1.63) 
1.93e-08 
(.05) 
-2.20e-06 
(-1.66*) 
Capital openness -.0012816 
(-.32) 
-.0014199 
(-.37) 
-.0033226 
(-.87) 
.0167756 
(.76) 
-.003224 
(-.87) 
.0094527 
(.47) 
Relative size private pension -.0178945 
(-1.48) 
.0615966 
(1.80*) 
-.0191327 
(-1.32) 
-.0034677 
(-.07) 
.0893067 
(2.09**) 
.0034472 
(.08) 
Pension expenditure .0002842 
(.13) 
.0004428 
(.20) 
-.0013792 
(-.55) 
.0055116 
(1.17) 
-.002443 
(-.10) 
.0034584 
(.78) 
Other social expenditure -.0032994 
(-4.11***) 
-.0036888 
(-4.54***) 
-.0024298 
(-2.88***) 
-.0105674 
(-3.86***) 
-.0033272 
(-3.75***) 
-.0100282 
(-4.00***) 
Type 1 -.0409518 
(-2.66***) 
-.0245629 
(-1.39) 
-.0224111 
(-1.17) 
-.0284884 
(-1.56) 
Type 2 -.0434483 
(-2.48**) 
-.0243099 
(-1.20) 
-.0110253 
(-.65) 
-.0122147 
(-.79) 
Private pension *Type 1  
-.0876071 
(-2.44**) 
 
-.1137106 
(-2.65***) 
Private pension * Type 2  
-.1125282 
(-2.39**) 
 
-.1539886 
(-2.65***) 
Constant .3591014 
(14.44) 
.343801 
(13.44***) 
.4773579 
(8.40***) 
.4813248 
(9.21***) 
Observations 161 161 161 161 
Clusters 18 18 18 18 
R square 
within  = 0.2749 
between = 0.5695 
overall = 0.5773 
within  = 0.3034   
between = 0.6167 
overall = 0.5977 
Log likelihood  =  
429.82371 
Log likelihood  =  
434.07776 
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5. Jackknife regression: Bismarck Model and Beveridge model 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Fixed effect 
model 
Random effect 
model 
Random effect 
model 
Within- 
effect 
Between 
effect 
Within- 
effect 
Between 
effect 
Share of elderly population over 65 
years old 
-.158188 
(-.72) 
-.1325582 
(-.66) 
-.1347554 
(-.67) 
-.1693264 
(.66) 
-.5658771 
(-2.44**) 
-.1793603 
(-.73) 
-.5538637 
(-2.34**) 
Labour Market participation rate of 
elderly 
.0026777 
(2.49**) 
.0027811 
(3.49***) 
.0027693 
(3.43***) 
.0027623 
(2.39**) 
.0032711 
(2.37**) 
.0026944 
(2.38**) 
.0034184 
(2.40**) 
Real GDP per capita 1.47e-07 
(.23) 
1.44e-07 
(.26) 
1.46e-07 
(.26) 
8.22e-08 
(.14) 
-2.23e-06 
(-3.02***) 
8.31e-08 
(.14) 
-2.28e-06 
(-3.00***) 
Capital openness -.0086689 
(-.89) 
-.0077442 
(-.83) 
-.0078381 
(-.83) 
-.007773 
(-.78) 
.0107719 
(.96) 
-.0080672 
(-.81) 
.0105135 
(.93) 
Relative size private pension -.032235 
(-2.78***) 
-.0347025 
(-3.24***) 
-.0345723 
(-3.21***) 
-.0293443 
(-2.30**) 
-.1042318 
(-1.62) 
-.0282364 
(-2.22**) 
-.1047633 
(-1.60) 
Welfare generosity -.007224 
(-6.00***) 
-.0067398 
(-7.27***) 
-.0067582 
(-7.04***) 
-.0070052 
(-5.65***) 
-.0061813 
(-11.43**) 
-.0066973 
(-4.55***) 
-.0062409 
(-11.88**) 
Bismarck model  
.0262307 
(1.60) 
.0260447 
(1.47) 
.0068102 
(.24) 
.0061482 
(.21) 
Private pension *Bismarck   
.005563 
(.09) 
 
.895051 
(.66) 
Constant .5370401 
(7.29***) 
.5098544 
(8.81***) 
.5109507 
(8.70***) 
.6089598 
(13.83***) 
.6101448 
(14.02) 
Observations 175 175 175 175 175 
Clusters 19 19 19 19 19 
R square 
within  = 0.5048 
between= 0.5106 
overall = 0.4726 
within  = 0.5037 
between = 0.5716 
overall = 0.5616 
within  = 0.5040 
between = 0.5688 
overall = 0.5601 
Log likelihood  =  
491.09378 
Log likelihood  =  
491.37085 
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6. Jackknife regression: Earning-relatedness and universal eligibility models 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Random effect 
model 
Random effect 
model 
Within- 
effect 
Between 
effect 
Within- 
effect 
Between 
effect 
Share of elderly population over 65 
years old 
-.1060287 
(-.59) 
.0432111 
(-.23) 
-.1631673 
(-.65) 
-.6875681 
(-4.75***) 
-.1094533 
(-.44) 
-.7709137 
(-5.41***) 
Labour Market participation rate of 
elderly 
.0026907 
(3.31***) 
.002561 
(3.00***) 
.0024761 
(1.95*) 
.0031779 
(2.29**) 
.0019803 
(1.56) 
.0028092 
(2.10**) 
Real GDP per capita 1.79e-07 
(.32) 
1.07e-07 
(.19) 
1.23e-07 
(.20) 
-1.82e-06 
(-2.82***) 
2.03e-08 
(.03) 
-1.92e-06 
(-2.95***) 
Capital openness -.0081212 
(-.87) 
.0083031 
(-.89) 
-.0082394 
(.83) 
-.0026393 
(-.08) 
-.0084759 
(-.85) 
-.0044525 
(-.12) 
Relative size private pension -.0376727 
(-3.86***) 
.0206759 
(.88) 
-.0296605 
(-2.32**) 
-.0717033 
(-.71) 
.0565198 
(1.90*) 
-.0676247 
(-.62) 
Welfare generosity -.00064923 
(-7.11***) 
-.0065014 
(-7.57***) 
-.0070691 
(-5.69***) 
-.0045736 
(-3.11) 
.0073611 
(-6.06***) 
-.0041907 
(-2.63***) 
Type 1 -.0296588 
(-3.57***) 
-.0182341 
(-1.73*) 
-.02807 
(-.88) 
-.287383 
(-.84) 
Type 2 -.0140818 
(-2.78***) 
-.0046428 
(-.73) 
-.0284676 
(-1.99**) 
-.0308711 
(-2.06**) 
Private pension* Type 1  
-.0648589 
(-2.72***) 
 
-.0921479 
(-3.11***) 
Private pension * Type 2  
-.0667523 
(-2.54**) 
 
-.1069681 
(-2.67***) 
Constant .5308436 
(8.27***) 
.5184296 
(8.15***) 
.6038232 
(14.58***) 
.6118587 
(15.02***) 
Observations 175 175 175 175 
Clusters 19 19 19 19 
R square 
within  = 0.5018 
between = 0.6332 
overall = 0.6117 
within  = 0.5229 
between = 0.6383 
overall = 0.6143 
Log likelihood  =  
492.35134 
Log likelihood  =    
496.603 
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Appendix B. Statistical appendix to chapter 9: additional regression models 
1. Two-way fixed effect model 
Variable 
    
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   
Share of elderly population over 65 years 
old 
-.0989634 
(-.38) 
-.044052 
(-.22) 
.0006936 
(.00) 
-.0323106 
(-.24) 
 
Labour Market participation rate of elderly .0034844 
(1.70) 
.003105 
(1.88*) 
.0029389 
(1.67) 
.00153 
(.90) 
 
Real GDP per capita -1.95e-06 
(-2.46**) 
-1.77e-06 
(-2.97**) 
-1.50e-06 
(-2.17**) 
-1.22e-06 
(-1.87*) 
 
Openness of Capital Market .0006007 
(.11) 
-.0005898 
(-.09) 
.0042829 
(.94) 
.0014105 
(.27) 
 
Relative size private pension -.0322996 
(-2.82**) 
-.0226517 
(-1.86*) 
-.0192667 
(-1.93*) 
.081676 
(1.23) 
 
Size of Welfare state -.006649 
(-4.50***) 
-.0050582 
(-3.86***) 
-.004607 
(-3.65***) 
-.005015 
(-4.86***) 
 
Benefit level (1
st
 tier program) -.0229146 
(-.93) 
 
-.0226378 
(-1.24) 
-.0088809 
(-.88) 
 
Benefit level (2
nd
 tier program)  
-.0794626 
(-3.15***) 
-.0665784 
(-2.76**) 
-.0345247 
(-1.15) 
 
Private pension* 1
st
 tier program    
-.2742109 
(-4.05***) 
 
Private pension * 2
nd
 tier program     
.041214 
(.47) 
 
Constant .4804258 
(8.40***) 
.4750839 
(8.75***) 
.4489299 
(10.00***) 
.4347739 
(10.44***) 
 
Observations 171 166 165 165  
Clusters 19 18 18 18  
R Square 
within  = 0.5880 
between = 0.6323 
overall = 0.6109 
within  = 0.6117 
between = 0.5886 
overall = 0.5889 
within  = 0.6215 
between = 0.6523 
overall = 0.6238 
within  = 0.6665 
between = 0.6639 
overall = 0.6511 
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2. Jackknife regression 
Variable 
Model 4 Model 5 
Fixed effect model Random effect model Within-country effect Between country effect 
Share of elderly population over 65 
years old 
.0206634 
(.10) 
.0169276 
(.11) 
.1308225 
(.70) 
-.4038968 
(-3.19***) 
Labour Market participation rate of 
elderly 
.0017428 
(1.64) 
.0019342 
(2.34**) 
.0028891 
(3.57***) 
.0016561 
(1.16) 
Real GDP per capita 9.34e-08 
(.16) 
3.29-08 
(.06) 
-2.63e-07 
(-.48) 
2.07e-07 
(.31) 
Openness of Capital Market .0039769 
(.42) 
.0044729 
(.57) 
.0059564 
(.76) 
.0100115 
(1.20) 
Relative size private pension .0642694 
(.86) 
.0528113 
(.80) 
-.0603807 
(-2.08**) 
-.080389 
(-4.28***) 
Size of Welfare state -.0043325 
(-2.18**) 
-.0046876 
(-4.09***) 
-.004437 
(-2.68***) 
-.0057716 
(-13.11***) 
Benefit level (1
st
 tier program) -.0279597 
(-1.84*) 
-.0287302 
(-1.92*) 
-.0510962 
(-2.97***) 
-.1033959 
(-7.66***) 
Benefit level (2
nd
 tier program) -.0584852 
(-1.69*) 
-.0570655 
(-1.95*) 
-.0577427 
(-2.22**) 
-.0397565 
(-2.85***) 
Private pension* 1
st
 tier program -.280731 
(-2.26**) 
-.2774798 
(2.46**) 
-.8758806 
(-2.15**) 
Private pension * 2
nd
 tier program  .0719153 
(.75) 
.0835464 
(1.03) 
1.06844 
(3.89***) 
Constant .3966313 
(4.78***) 
.4098032 
(6.74***) 
.5156772 
(15.48***) 
Observations 165 165 165 
Clusters 18 18 18 
R Square 
within  = 0.5636 
between = 0.6801 
overall = 0.6221 
within  = 0.5627 
between = 0.6907 
overall = 0.6364 
Log likelihood  =  497.08497 
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Appendix C. Statistical appendix to chapter 10: additional regression models 
1. Regression with generosity score instead of social expenditure (Luxemburg is dropped) 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Fixed effect model Random effect model 
Random effect model 
Within- effect 
Between 
effect 
Within- effect 
Between 
effect 
Share of working age population between 16-
64 
-.197792 
(-1.32) 
-.2496798 
(-2.62***) 
-.2283227 
(-2.36**) 
-.1976659 
(-2.37**) 
-.4175174 
(-1.37) 
-.1579036 
(-1.63) 
-.432048 
(-1.39) 
ALMP -.0074611 
(-1.04) 
-.0077638 
(-1.98**) 
-.0225071 
(-3.18***) 
-.0072251 
(-1.86*) 
-.0196492 
(-2.19**) 
-.0199043 
(-2.83***) 
-.0199451 
(-2.17***) 
Generosity score (UB) -.0046131 
(-2.63**) 
-.0039225 
(-3.53***) 
-.00362 
(-3.27***) 
-.0046502 
(-3.73***) 
.0030331 
(1.46) 
-.0048529 
(-3.65***) 
.0060065 
(1.42) 
Generosity score (others) -.0029222 
(-2.03*) 
-.002277 
(-3.17***) 
-.0022525 
(-3.16***) 
-.0028039 
(-3.29***) 
-.002128 
(-1.99**) 
-.0033653 
(-3.66***) 
-.0021609 
(-1.97**) 
Real GDP per capita 1.85e-06 
(3.83***) 
1.52e-06 
(8.80***) 
1.56e-06+ 
(8.79***) 
1.84e-06 
(9.86***) 
-2.81e-06 
(-3.98***) 
1.95e-06 
(10.08***) 
-2.89e-06 
(-3.99***) 
Unemployment rate .001034 
(2.11**) 
.0011842 
(3.39***) 
.0010878 
(3.06***) 
.0010834 
(3.16***) 
.0002815 
(.27) 
.0009876 
(2.86***) 
.0002585 
(.24) 
Union density -.0000254 
(.958) 
-.0005396 
(-3.30***) 
-.006497 
(-4.08***) 
-.0000708 
(-.33) 
-.0008549 
(-4.87***) 
-.0000641 
(-.27) 
-.0008603 
(-4.79***) 
Basic security  
-.0059561 
(-.46) 
-.0275525 
(-2.00**) 
.0104691 
(.88) 
.0096122 
(.79) 
Residual citizenship  
-.0271873 
(-2.16**) 
-.0447277 
(-3.39***) 
-.0128869 
(-1.25) 
-.0126144 
(-1.19) 
Last safety net  
-.0276865 
(-2.16**) 
-.0694661 
(-2.68***) 
-.029089 
(-3.31***) 
-.029583 
(-3.23***) 
Local MIP  
.00628 
(.45) 
-.0053904 
(-.37) 
.0306051 
(2.62***) 
.0301094 
(2.51**) 
ALMP*Basic   
.0328509 
(2.50**) 
 
.0165458 
(1.20) 
ALMP*Residual   
-.0206832 
(2.41**) 
 
.0214512 
(2.45**) 
ALMP*Last safety   
.0134239 
(1.20) 
 
.0103975 
(.93) 
ALMP*Local MIP   
.0129983 
(.55) 
 
.019297 
(.84) 
Constant .4795628 
(5.13***) 
.5368342 
(8.64***) 
.5345054 
(8.41***) 
.7066757 
(3.17***) 
.7200149 
(3.16***) 
Observations 281 281 281 281 281 
Clusters 20 20 20 20 20 
R square 
within  = 0.5099 
between= 0.4837 
overall = 0.5972 
within  = 0.4972 
between = 0.7636 
overall = 0.7690 
within  = 0.5037 
between = 0.8044 
overall = 0.8007 
Log likelihood =  839.53564 Log likelihood =  842.64523 
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2. Jackknife regression 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Fixed effect model Random effect model 
Random effect model 
Within- effect 
Between 
effect 
Within- effect 
Between 
effect 
Share of working age population between 16-
64 
-.392625 
(-3.21***) 
-.3882384 
(-3.23***) 
-.3299899 
(-2.68***) 
-.4030737 
(-3.35***) 
-.4293943 
(-3.60***) 
-.3324921 
(-2.67***) 
-.4289695 
(-3.58***) 
ALMP -.0155058 
(-2.72***) 
-.0128471 
(-2.57***) 
-.0225846 
(-3.00***) 
-.0159959 
(2.83***) 
-.0095169 
(-1.79*) 
-.0189042 
(-2.39**) 
-.0093991 
(-1.73*) 
Unemployment benefit spending -.00355503 
(-1.26) 
-.0040655 
(-1.68*) 
-.0038603 
(-1.52) 
-.0029446 
(-1.04) 
-.0104078 
(-4.24***) 
-.0022561 
(-.75) 
-.0103755 
(-4.08***) 
Other social spending -.000315 
(-.42) 
-.0004089 
(-.73) 
-.0002935 
(-.51) 
-.0000966 
(-.13) 
-.0030981 
(-5.04***) 
-.0002092 
(-.27) 
-.030672 
(-5.05***) 
Real GDP per capita 1.13e-06 
(4.35***) 
9.30e-07 
(4.73***) 
9.42e-07 
(4.72***) 
1.08e-06 
(4.18***) 
-1.30e-06 
(-4.29***) 
1.07e-06 
(4.03***) 
-1.27e-06 
(-4.17***) 
Unemployment rate .0017663 
(2.37**) 
.0019272 
(2.74***) 
.0016778 
(2.29**) 
.001623 
(2.18**) 
.0009842 
(1.18) 
.0014205 
(1.81*) 
.0010739 
(1.26) 
Union density -.0003707 
(-.75) 
-.0007392 
(-3.83***) 
-.0008247 
(-4.46***) 
-.0004109 
(-.86) 
-.0007549 
(-7.76***) 
-.0006441 
(-1.31) 
-.0007585 
(-7.75***) 
Basic security  
.0055585 
(1.18) 
-.0168896 
(-1.88*) 
.0004453 
(.08) 
.0004428 
(.08) 
Residual citizenship  
-.0415333 
(-6.71***) 
-.0517226 
(-4.71***) 
-.0180892 
(-4.20***) 
-.0174395 
(-3.95***) 
Last safety net  
-.037692 
(-9.06***) 
-.0431183 
(-4.23***) 
-.0170929 
(-3.34***) 
-.0168542 
(-3.23***) 
Local MIP  
.015487 
(2.59**) 
.0099122 
(.78) 
.0159137 
(3.04***) 
.0162223 
(3.04****) 
ALMP*Basic   
.0367783 
(2.55**) 
 
.0312648 
(2.00**) 
ALMP*Residual   
.0125062 
(1.28) 
 
.0039287 
(.35) 
ALMP*Last safety   
.006295 
(.64) 
 
-.0003558 
(-.04) 
ALMP*Local MIP   
-.0005848 
(-.02) 
 
.0006166 
(.02) 
Constant .5442766 
(6.33***) 
.5772948 
(6.70***) 
.548172 
(6.12***) 
.7245081 
(8.27***) 
.7215469 
(8.23***) 
Observations 281 281 281 281 281 
Clusters 21 21 21 21 21 
R square 
within  = 0.3883 
between = 0.4157 
overall = 0.5608 
within  = 0.3819 
between = 0.8457 
overall = 0.8240 
within  = 0.3943 
between = 0.8634 
overall = 0.8372 
Log likelihood =  813.98874 Log likelihood =  816.40588 
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3. ANOVA 
1) Institutional design of UI/MIP and income inequality                                       3) Institutional design of UI/MIP and expenditure on UI 
 
Number of Observation= 526 R-Squared=.2256 
Root MSE=. 902 Adj R-Square=.2197 
Source  
Partial Sum of 
square 
F Prob>F 
Institutional 
design 
 123.558  37.94 0.0000(***) 
Residual  424.139    
Total  547.697    
 
 
2) Institutional design of UI/MIP and ALMPs                                                              4) Institutional design of UI/MIP and generosity of UI 
 
Number of Observation= 539 R-Squared=.5518 
Root MSE=1.681 Adj R-Square=.21975485 
Source  Partial Sum of square F Prob>F 
Institutional 
design 
 1859.547  164.38 0.0000(***) 
Residual  1510.215    
Total  3369.763    
 
  
 
Number of Observation= 322 R-Squared=.5611 
Root MSE=. 03907 Adj R-Square=.5556 
Source  
Partial Sum of 
square 
F Prob>F 
Institutional 
design 
 .35243  101.32 0.0000(***) 
Residual  .2756    
Total  .6280    
  
Number of Observation= 554 R-Squared=.2264 
Root MSE=. 431 Adj R-Square=.2208 
Source  
Partial Sum of 
square 
F Prob>F 
Institutional 
design 
 29.920  40.17 0.0000(***) 
Residual  102.234    
Total  132.155    
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Appendix D. Structural features of unemployment benefit and MIP 
Type Country 
Main UB is 
earning-
related? 
Qualifying 
period 
Duration MIP supplementary to UB? Any requirement exist? MIP exist? 
Type 
1 
Australia 0 0 999 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
New Zealand 0 0 999 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
United Kingdom 0 12 26 0 1 1 
Ireland 0 260 52 0 1 1 
Type 
2 
Finland 0* 34 100 1 1 1 
Sweden 0* 52 60 1 1 1 
Norway 1 4 104 1 1 1 
Luxembourg 1 26 52 1 1 1 
Switzerland 1 52 80 1 1 0 
Netherlands 1 1040 90 1 1 1 
Type 
3 
Denmark 1 52 104 0 1 1 
Portugal 1 52 121 0 1 1 
Spain 1 52 104 0 0 1 
Canada 1 45 42 0 1 1 
Type 
4 
Belgium 1 78 999 0 1 1 
France 1 104 104 0 1 1 
Germany 1 104 52 0 1 1 
Austria 1 312 39 0 1 1 
Type 
5 
United States 1 20 99 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Greece 1 42 52 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Italy 1 104 35 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1: Yes 0: NO 
Qualifying period and duration is measured in the number of weeks. 
*Optional earnings-related UB exists 
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Abbreviations 
 
ALMPs    Active Labour Market Policies 
ANOVA   Analysis of Variance 
GLS        Generalised Least Square 
GDP       Gross Domestic Product 
GNI        Gross Net Income 
ICRG      International Country Risk Guide 
IMF        International Monetary Fund 
MIP         Minimum Income Program 
MLM      Multilevel modelling 
MPR      Minimum Pension Replacement rate 
OECD     Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OLS        Ordinary Least Square  
REM      Random Effect Model 
SPR       Standard Pension Replacement rate 
TSCS     Time Series Cross Sectional 
UI          Unemployment Insurance 
VAT      Value Added Tax 
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